Date: 08-22-2015

Case Style: In re Santiago G.

Case Number: SC19449

Judge: John M. Rogers

Court: Connecticut Judicial Branch

Plaintiff's Attorney: Michael Besso, George Jepsen and Gregory T. D’Auria

Defendant's Attorney: Elizabeth Knight Adams, Matthew Eagan

Description: The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Santiago was born in Guatemala to the respondent on April 18, 2009. He was cared for since his birth, however, by Maria G., an Argentinian citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States who resided in Stamford, and, for some of that time, by Henry L., Maria G.’s husband.1 OnOctober16,2012,thecommissionerfiledamotion for an order of temporary custody of Santiago on the basis of neglect. An accompanying summary of facts substantiating the commissioner’s allegations of neglect, which was supported by the affidavits of two socialworkersfortheDepartmentofChildrenandFamilies (department), Martha Saavedra and Ingrid Aarons, statedthefollowing:OnSeptember17,2012,thedepartmenthadreceivedareportfromthefederalDepartment ofHomelandSecurity(HomelandSecurity)2 statingthat Maria G. and HenryL. possibly had purchased Santiago in Guatemala and smuggled him into the United States on June 14, 2009.3 On October 10, 2012, Saavedra and aHomelandSecurityinvestigatorhadconductedajoint visittoMariaG.’shometoquestionherabouttheallegationsinthereport.MariaG.toldthetwothatherformer housekeeper’smotherhadintroducedhertoanindividual, later identified as the respondent, in Guatemala. According to Maria G., the respondent was a teenager at the time and an orphan. Maria G. also stated that the
respondent was pregnant and interested in giving away herbaby.MariaG.indicatedfurtherthattherespondent did not have proper identification, and that she could not remember the respondent’s name. According to Saavedra’ssupplementalaffidavit,MariaG.furthertold her and the Homeland Security investigator that Maria G. and Henry L. had paid an unnamed physician, at an unknown clinic in Guatemala, to deliver the baby; that theyhadamidwifefalselystatethatthebabywasMaria G.’s in order to obtain a birth certificate naming Maria G.andHenryL.asthebaby’sparents;andthattheyhad paid another party $6000 for a falsified United States passportforthebabytopermithisentryintotheUnited States. Upon receiving the foregoing information, the department had invoked a ninety-six hour hold over Santiago, and he was placed in a licensed foster home. Thedepartmentrepresentedtothecourtthatthewhereabouts of Henry L. were unknown, despite the department’s efforts to contact him, and that Santiago had ‘‘no known legal guardian or legal custodian.’’ Aarons’ supplemental affidavit provided additional reasons insupport ofthe motionfor anorder oftemporarycustody.Inthataffidavit,Aaronsattestedthat,after theninety-sixhourholdhadexpired,Santiagohadbeen returned to Maria G. because two other trial courts, Mottolesse, J., and White, J., had denied the commissioner’s two previous requests for orders of temporary custody, one judge reasoning that Santiago’s ‘‘ ‘illegal status’ ’’didnotconstituteevidenceofimmediatephysical danger. Aarons further attested to the following: ‘‘Althoughitremainsunclearhow[MariaG.]obtained physical custody of this child, Homeland Security has an active investigation into the allegations of child trafficking. Santiago’s safety and [well-being] is now completely reliant on [Maria G.] and her statement that she will keep the child safe and not take the child out of this jurisdiction. . . . ‘‘[The department] has no independent information astotheidentityofthebiologicalparentsofthechildor the circumstances which surrounded [Maria G.] having obtained physical custody except by [Maria G.’s] own uncorroborated statement. . . . ‘‘Upon information and belief, [Maria G.] is in the United States with a [g]reen [c]ard. Her actions in connection with smuggling the child into the United States may result in her being deported to Argentina and/or subject to other criminal sanctions. . . . ‘‘Because of the pending Homeland Security investigation,the [department’s]currentinvolvement, andthe denial of the two [previous] [m]otions for [o]rder of [t]emporary [c]ustody, the risk to the child has increased. In particular, the risk of [Maria G.’s] flight with the child, despite her assurances otherwise. The child’s safety should not be based on the assurances
of an individual who admittedly brought the child into this country under fraudulent circumstances. . . . ‘‘Thechild’smedicalcareanddaycaredecisionshave all been made by [Maria G.] without her having any legalrighttomakethesedecisions.Thisagainplacesthe childindanger[without]anylegalguardianavailableto make these decisions. Because of [Maria G.’s] lack of status in this action the [c]ourt’s jurisdiction to make orders against her for the protection of the child is tenuous at best. . . . ‘‘The [department] is seeking access to this child to ensure his safety and [well-being]. Still, only a [fulltime] legal guardian and/or custodian, with [twentyfour] hour control and access can ensure that the child is not removed from the jurisdiction or that medical or other emergencies can be appropriately addressed. . . . ‘‘Henry [L.] . . . is alleged to have acted in concert with[Maria G.]in [the]acquisition andtransportof this child into the United States. Although the [department] has been given a telephone number for [Henry L.] by [Maria G.], [Henry L.] has not returned [the department’s] calls. Although [Maria G.] has agreed to remain in contact with [the department], there is no guarantee that she will follow through with her word. . . . ‘‘[Maria G.] has not disclosed to the [department] pertinent information [such as] the biological mother’s or father’s names, the midwife’s name, the doctor or the clinic where the delivery occurred. [Maria G.] also has failed to disclose the identity of the person who provided the passport for the child. Nor has she provided the [department] with the passport or a copy thereof,asshestateditwasdestroyed.However,[Maria G.] has reported that she paid someone for the delivery of the child and for the fraudulent passport. . . . ‘‘By her statements and her actions, [Maria G.] is not being completely candid and cooperative with the [department] inthis investigation. The safetyand [wellbeing] of this child should not be entrusted to a person who has disclosed involvement in potential criminal conduct. . . . ‘‘To leave the child with [Maria G.] would keep the child in a zone of immediate physical danger. . . . ‘‘[The attorney for the minor child] is in agreement with the [o]rder of [t]emporary [c]ustody.’’ On October 16, 2012, on the basis of the foregoing allegations, the trial court, Heller, J., granted the commissioner’s motion for an order of temporary custody. TheorderwassustainedfollowingahearingonOctober 25, 2012, with the agreement of the attorney for Santiago, because neither of Santiago’s biological parents had been identified by that time.4 On November 15, 2012, the trial court, Heller, J., adjudicated Santiago
neglected, on the basis of abandonment by his biological parents, who still remained unknown, and ordered him committed to the commissioner’s custody. After removing Santiago to a temporary foster home in November, 2012, the department placed him in a legal riskpreadoptivefosterhomeinDecember,2012,where he remains today. At the time of this placement, the department’s permanency plan for Santiago was termination of his biological parents’ rights and adoption by the foster parents. On December 6, 2012, counsel for the department informed the trial court that Maria G. had provided him with the respondent’s identity and that the department was in the process of verifying that the respondent was in fact Santiago’s biological mother.5 Counsel also informed the court that Maria G. was facing federal prosecution for immigration fraud and possible deportation and/or incarceration. On February 28, 2013, the respondent filed an appearance through counsel6 and beganparticipatinginthecase.Shedidnotappealfrom the October 16, 2012 order of temporary custody or the November 12, 2012 adjudication of neglect, at that time oranytimethereafter.DNAtestingresultssubsequently confirmedthattherespondentwasSantiago’sbiological mother and, on June 6, 2013, the trial court entered an order adjudicating her to be the same.7 Initially, following Santiago’s removal and foster home placement, Maria G. was permitted to visit him weekly.AfterJanuary20,2013,however,thevisitswere discontinuedunilaterallybythedepartment.8 Following the establishment of the respondent’s maternity, the department sought to reinstate visitation, and it changed its permanency plan to termination of the respondent’s parental rights and placement of Santiago with Maria G. The commissioner also reversed her earlier opposition to Maria G. intervening in the case. See footnote 4 of this opinion. On June 5, 2013, however, the attorney for Santiago filed emergency motions requesting that Santiago receive a psychological evaluation, to appoint him a guardian ad litem and to delay reunification visits with Maria G. The attorney represented that Santiago had ‘‘expressed a strong desire not to visit with Maria G. and not to be returned to her care,’’ and further quoted from a May, 2013 department status report reflecting a physician’s recommendation that Santiago’s foster placement remain in place until the ‘‘legal situation’’ was clarified, because he had established a secure and stable connection with his foster family and would be affected adversely by further disruptions. The trial court, Heller, J., granted all of these motions and, aside from an August, 2013 interactional evaluation, there was no further contact between Maria G. and Santiago for the remainder of the proceedings. The trial court appointed Rodolfo J. Rosado, a psy
chologist, to conduct psychological and interactional evaluations of Santiago and Maria G., which were completed on or about August 6, 2013. Rosado reported a strong bond betweenMaria G. and Santiago.He recommended that visitation recommence, and that Santiago ultimatelybe returnedto MariaG. OnOctober16, 2013, the department filed a motion for visitation. The attorney for Santiago continued to oppose visitation. OnOctober22,2013,the respondentfiledhermotion to revoke Santiago’s commitment, requesting that he beremovedfromthecommissioner’scustodyandtransferred to Maria G.’s custody and guardianship. Therein, the respondent cited the trial court’s finding that she was Santiago’s biological parent, and her consistently helddesirethatMariaG.beSantiago’sadoptivemother. She further cited Rosado’s report of a remaining bond between the two, his recommendation that they be reunited, and the fact that there were no substantiated reports of Maria G. physically abusing or neglecting Santiago while he was in her care. On December 20, 2013, the commissioner filed the motion to open, requesting that the November 15, 2012 judgment that had adjudicated Santiago neglected be setaside.Accordingtothecommissioner,thatjudgment was ‘‘based on the mutual mistake of the parties that the identity of [Santiago’s] biological parents was unknownatthetimeofthecommitmentandthat[Santiago] had been a victim of human trafficking.’’ Also in December,2013,thetrialcourtorderedDavidMantell,a licensedclinicalpsychologist,toperformpsychological and interactional evaluations of Santiago and his foster family.Mantellrecommended,contrarytoRosado’srecommendation,thatSantiagoremainwiththefosterfamily because, in short, yet another disruption in his life would be too traumatic. II TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS A The Trial A trial on the motion to open the judgment filed by the commissioner and the motion to revoke Santiago’s commitmentfiledbytherespondentwasheldonmultipledaysbetweenJanuary16andApril22,2014.Several witnessestestified,includingSaavedraandMariaBrereton, a regional administrator for the department, Maria G., Rosado, Mantell and Brian Kaschel, the guardian ad litem appointed for Santiago. During the course of the trial, the trial court learned that Maria G. had pleaded guiltytoafederalfelonyinconnectionwithherbringing Santiago into the country illegally with forged documents, and that she soon would be deported to Argentina as part of her sentence.9 Saavedra and Brereton testified about the initial
removal of Santiago from Maria G.’s home, following the department’s receipt of the report from Homeland Security, and the contemporaneous filing of a neglect petition. Both women testified that Maria G. initially claimed that she was Santiago’s biological mother, but after further questioning, changed her story to the one recountedinthepreviouslydescribedaffidavits.Saavedra testified that Maria G.’s story could not be verified, nor could the allegations of human trafficking be disproven, because the department had no information regarding the identity of Santiago’s biological parents. Breretonexplainedsimilarlythattherespondent’sidentity was not confirmed until June, 2013, and that the initial removal was sought because the department had informationthatSantiago‘‘hadenteredthecountryillegally, did not have a guardian [and] was a possible victim of human trafficking . . . .’’ According to Brereton,the‘‘primaryissue’’wasneglectduetothelackofa guardian,buttherealsowasconcernabout‘‘thehuman trafficking question.’’ There were no indications of physical abuse. Brereton explained that eventually, once the respondent’s maternity and intentions were confirmed,departmentofficialsbelievedthatamistake had been made and began attempts to return Santiago to Maria G. Maria G. relayed the story of how she and Henry L. acquired custody of Santiago upon his birth in Guatemala, which was consistent with that recounted in the previously described affidavits. She testified, inter alia, that prior to Santiago’s birth, she and Henry L. had consulted two attorneys in Guatemala, who told them thattheycouldnotadoptthebabybecausealladoptions inthecountry‘‘wereclosed’’atthetimeandbecausethe respondent, who then was a fourteen year old orphan, lackedpersonaldocumentation.MariaG.explainedthat she and Henry L. then paid for the baby to be delivered in a clinic, because if he had been born in a hospital, hewouldhavebeenturnedovertoanorphanage.Maria G.insisted thattheydidnot payanythingto therespondent and encouraged her, or her older sister, to keep the baby, but that the respondent was desperate, destitute and adamant that they take him. She recounted howthey subsequentlyobtainedafalse documentfrom amidwifeindicatingthatshehadgivenbirthtoSantiago and used it to obtain a birth certificate and a Guatemalan passport for Santiago, but then discovered that thosedocumentswouldnotenablethemtoreturntothe United States with Santiago unless she could provide evidence of his prenatal history. Thereafter, Maria G. indicated, Henry L. returned to the United States, and she was introduced to a man in Guatemala who sold her a forged American passport for Santiago. Ultimately, Maria G. also returned to the United States, using that fraudulent passport to bring Santiago with her. Maria G. and Henry L. then consulted two more attorneys, who advised them that Santiago’s illegal sta
tuscouldnotberemediedandthattheycouldnotlegally adopt him, at least in part because of the existence of the falsified birth certificate. The three thereafter resided in Connecticut without legal trouble until the commencement of the events underlying this appeal. Rosado and Mantell testified consistently with the opinions they had expressed in their earlier written reports. In short, both agreed that Santiago had experienced much trauma due to the disruptions in his life that already had occurred, namely, the unexplained departure of Henry L.; see footnote 1 of this opinion; his removal from Maria G.’s home, and his initial placement in a different foster home prior to his placement with his current foster family. They also agreed that Santiago likely would have psychological issues in the futureduetotheseoccurrences.Theexpertsdisagreed, however, as to what course of action would lead to the least future trauma, with Rosado recommending that Santiago be returned, aftera transition period, to Maria G., and Mantell opining that Santiago would be better off remaining with his current foster family. Kaschel testified as to his opinion that, although Maria G. was asuitableandworthyguardian,itwouldnotbeinSantiago’s best interests to be placed with her. Kaschel also was concerned with, among other things, the implications of Maria G.’s impending deportation to Argentina. OnApril22,2014,thetrialcourt,Mottolese,J.,denied the commissioner’s motion to open the judgment and the respondent’s motion to revoke Santiago’s commitment, and disapproved the department’s permanency plan of placing Santiago with Maria G. Regarding the motiontorevoke,thecourtfirstfoundthatthegrounds for Santiago’s commitment no longer existed. It thereafterconcludedthatrevocationofthecommitmentwas not in Santiago’s best interests, essentially agreeing with Mantell that the trauma that would result from disruptinghisplacementyetagain andreturninghimto MariaG.wouldbegreaterthanthatwhichhepotentially might suffer in the future were the status quo left in place,givenwhatalreadyhadoccurred.Thecourtfound thatanyattachmentSantiagostillhadtoMariaG.would diminish and that he was thriving with his foster family and would continue to do so. In sum, the trial court concluded, it would be in Santiago’s best interest to remain with his foster family, and contrary to his best interest to be returned to Maria G.10 B Posttrial Motions On April 28, 2014, the commissioner filed a motion forreconsiderationofthetrialcourt’sdecision,arguing that delay in the trial and the failure to afford Maria G. visitation with Santiago in the interim had impacted adversely her chances at gaining custody. The commissioner argued further that the court improperly had
failed to grant her December 20, 2013 motion to open basedonthemutualmistakeoftheparties,specifically, theparties’beliefthattheidentitiesofSantiago’sbiological parents were unknown and could not be ascertained, and that Santiago had been a victim of human trafficking. She noted that, subsequent to the order of temporary custody and the neglect adjudication, the department was able to verify the respondent’s identity and confirm her desire that Maria G. have custody of Santiago. According to the commissioner, the respondent’s wishes as to who should have custody of her son should have ‘‘weighed heavily’’ in the earlier proceedings, but were not due to the mutual mistake. The commissionerimploredthecourtto‘‘actnowtocorrect [the order of temporary custody and neglect adjudication] because those judgments were based on mistaken facts.’’ Judge Mottolese granted the commissioner’s motion for reconsideration, but denied the relief requested therein. He questioned whether there had been any mutual mistake and concluded, in any event, that the best interests of Santiago were paramount. Judge Mottoleseexplainedthatinitially,hehaddisagreedstrongly with Santiago’s removal from Maria G.’s home, particularly because two other trial judges had denied the commissioner’srequestsforanorderoftemporarycustody, but that ‘‘the facts [that] came out in the trial certainly prevailed over [his] initial emotional reaction to the case.’’ The respondent’s appeal to the Appellate Court followed. III APPELLATE COURT PROCEEDINGS In the Appellate Court, the respondent claimed, inter alia,thatthetrialcourtimproperlyhadconsideredSantiago’s best interests, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (m),11 because the original cause for his commitment to the commissioner had never existed.12 In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn. App. 845–46. The Appellate Court, relying on its recent opinion in In re Avirex R., 151 Conn. App. 820, 96 A.3d 662 (2014), concluded that the trial court improperly had decided the respondent’s motion to revoke Santiago’s commitment byapplying § 46b-129(m) insteadof § 46b-129(j), because the respondent had sought to transfer guardianship of Santiago to a party who was not his parent or former legal guardian, making the latter subsection the applicable one. In re Santiago G., supra, 846–50. TheAppellateCourtdetermined,however,thatthetrial courtproperlyhadconsideredSantiago’sbestinterests, because that was what application of § 46b-129 (j) would have required. Id., 851. In short, the Appellate Court held, the trial court had committed harmless error. Id. We thereafter granted the respondent’s petition for
certification to appeal,13 limited to the following questions: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the [respondent’s] motion to revoke commitment [when] both the respondent . . . and the [department] agree[d] that the initial basis for the state’s removal of the child from his home was found never to have existed?’’ and (2) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the [commissioner’s] motion to [open] due to a mistake, in favor of a best interest determination regarding the child’s current placement?’’ In re SantiagoG.,315Conn.926,926–27,109A.3d921(2015). IV THE PRESENT APPEAL A The Parties’ Claims The respondent claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to revoke Santiago’s commitment because, regardless of whether the issue is analyzed under subsection (j) or (m) of § 46b-129, the court lacked the authority to deny the motion on the basis of Santiago’s best interests when the only factual basis for his removal from Maria G.’s home and commitment to the commissioner’s custody later was determined to bemistaken.Accordingtotherespondent,bothofthose subsections necessarily contemplate that a proper causeforremovalexistedinthefirstinstance,andhere, it has been definitively disproven that Santiago was a victim of human trafficking. The respondent contends that Santiago improperly was removed from Maria G.’s custody solely due to concerns about his immigration status, and she emphasizes that there never was any evidenceofanyvictimization,abuseorphysicalneglect. The commissioner agrees with the respondent that the factual basis for Santiago’s removal was mistaken, because ultimately it was determined that Maria G. had notengagedinhumantrafficking,andshecontendsthat the trial court improperly failed to afford appropriate significance to this fact by denying the respondent’s motion to revoke on the basis of Santiago’s best interests. According to the commissioner, the unusual facts and procedural posture of this case made a typical applicationofthestatutorystandardimproper,andthat instead, some other procedure should have been employed to rectify the mistakes that were made and to return Santiago to Maria G.’s custody. The attorney for Santiago opposes the reversal of the Appellate Court’s judgment, and contends that that court properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of the respondent’s motion to revoke the commitment. According to Santiago’s attorney, the respondent’s claim amounts to an improper collateral attack on the order of temporary custody and the neglect adjudica
tion, decisions from which she did not appeal. He emphasizes that Maria G. is not Santiago’s biological orlegalparent,andthereforelacksanyconstitutionally protected right to parent him that the trial court should have considered but did not. We disagree with the factual premise of the respondent’s legal argument that § 46b-129 (m) is inapplicable where the initial cause for commitment never existed, because it is clear from the record before us that the bases set forth by the commissioner in support of her motion for an order of temporary custody and the neglect petition did, in fact, exist. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly proceeded pursuant to§ 46b-129(m)andengagedinabestinterestsanalysis prior to denying the respondent’s motion to revoke.14 B Analysis Webeginwiththestandardofreview.Therespondent challenges the meaning and/or applicability of § 46b129 (m) given the facts of this case, which essentially are not disputed. The meaning of a statute, and the question of whether it applies to a given factual scenario, are matters of statutory interpretation, over which our review is plenary. Efstathiadis v. Holder, 317 Conn. 482, 486, A.3d (2015). We turn to the relevant governing legal principles. The commissioner may seek and obtain the commitment of a child or youth to her custody by filing ‘‘a verified petition plainly stating [inter alia] such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court as neglected, uncared for or abused within the meaning of section 46b-120 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-129 (a). If it appears from the specific allegations of the petition and accompanying affidavits ‘‘that there isreasonablecausetobelievethat(1)thechildoryouth is . . . in immediate physical danger from the child’s or youth’s surroundings, and (2) as a result of said conditions, the child’s or youth’s safety is endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s safety, the court shall either (A) [order the child’s] parents or other [guardian]toappear[foradeterminationregardingtemporary custody], pending disposition of the petition, or (B)issueanorderexpartevestingthechild’soryouth’s temporary care and custody in [a relative] or in some other person or suitable agency.’’ General Statutes § 46b-129 (b). ‘‘Upon finding and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared for, neglected or abused the court may (A) commit such child or youth to the [commissioner], and such commitment shall remain in effect until further order of the court, except that such commitment may be revoked or parental rights terminated at any time by the court . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) (2) (A)
Section 46b-129 (m) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he commissioner, a parent or the child’s attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth. . . .’’ Our rules of practice provide further that ‘‘[w]hether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication [here, of neglect], and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking revocation of commitment hasthe burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists. If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.’’ Practice Book § 35a-14A; see also In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737, 758–59, 1 A.3d 5 (2010). Pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (2), a trial court, ‘‘prior to awarding custody of [a] child to the department pursuant to an order of commitment . . . must both find and adjudicate the child on one of three [statutorily defined] grounds: uncared for, neglected or [abused].’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Alison G., 276 Conn. 146, 159, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005). Adjudication on any of these groundsrequiresfactualsupport,and‘‘[t]hetrialcourt’s determination thereafter as to whether to maintain or revokethecommitmentislargelypremisedonthatprior adjudication.’’ Id., 160. Accordingly, ‘‘[t]he court, in determining whether cause for commitment no longer exists . . . look[s] to the original cause for commitment to see whetherthe conduct or circumstances that resulted in commitment continue to exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Inthepresentmatter,thetrialcourt, Heller,J.,found thattherewasreasonablecausetobelievethatSantiago was in immediate physical danger and issued an order of temporary custody in reliance on the affidavits of Saavedra and Aarons. Thoseaffidavits emphasized that the child lacked a legal guardian in the United States, given that the identities of his biological parents were unknown,andalsothatMariaG.wasbeinginvestigated by federal authorities for possible child trafficking and wasfacingdeportationandcriminalsanctionsforsmugglingSantiagointothecountry.Moreover,theaffidavits explained, due to the recent intervention of state and federal authorities into her life, Maria G. was aware of these facts, which gave her a strong incentive to flee with Santiago. Subsequently, Judge Heller, presumably relying on the same affidavits, adjudicated Santiago neglected on the basis of abandonment by the respondent. See General Statutes § 46b-120 (6) (A) (defining neglected child as one who, inter alia, ‘‘has been abandoned’’).15 We disagree with the commissioner and the respondent that the cited factual bases for the court’s
rulings were mistaken or that they never existed. At the outset, we must emphasize that the issue before the trial court was whether Santiago had been abandoned by his biological mother, the respondent in this case, and not by Maria G. In Connecticut, the number of ways to create a legal parent-child relationship is limitedand exclusive:by conceptionor throughlegal adoption,orpursuanttoourstatutesgoverningartificial insemination or valid gestational agreements. Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 690–94, 698, 12 A.3d 783 (2011). An examination of Maria G.’s account of how sheandHenryL.hadacquiredSantiagoinGuatemala,as reflectedinthesocialworkers’affidavitsandultimately verified to be true, clearly demonstrates that, at the time of Santiago’s removal, none of these paths to legal parenthood, for Maria G., had been satisfied. Additionally, although Maria G. was in possession of a birth certificate naming her as Santiago’s mother, she ultimately conceded that that birth certificate was fraudulent. As we previously have explained, ‘‘[a] birth certificate is a vital record that must accurately reflect legal relationships between parents and children—it does not create those relationships.’’ Id., 698. In sum, it was absolutely correct that Santiago had no legal guardian in the United States, and neither the parties nor the court was mistaken in this regard. Theotherfactsattestedtobydepartmentrepresentatives were equally true. At the time of the order of temporarycustodyandneglectadjudication,theidentitiesofSantiago’sbiologicalparentswereunknown,and the respondent was not identified to the court until approximately three weeks after the neglect adjudicationwasrendered,didnotappearinthecaseforanother three months and was not confirmed to be Santiago’s biological mother for another six months. In addition, Maria G. was being investigated for child trafficking, as indicated by Homeland Security’s report to the department.Finally,shedidfacedeportationandcriminal sanctions for smuggling Santiago into the country, asamplydemonstratedbythefactthatshelaterpleaded guilty to a federal felony and is awaiting deportation to Argentina. The grounds on which the trial court relied for the adjudication of neglect also existed and were not, as the respondent and the commissioner now insist, mistaken or untrue. For purposes of termination proceedings, ‘‘abandonment’’ has been defined as a parent’s ‘‘fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . .’’ General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (A). ‘‘Maintain [asusedinthestatute]impliesacontinuing,reasonable degree’’ of interest, concern, or responsibility and not merely a ‘‘sporadic showing’’ thereof. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Paul M., 148 Conn. App. 654, 664, 85 A.3d 1263, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 938, 88 A.3d
550 (2014). Although the respondent ultimately appeared in the proceedings in February, 2013, and actively advocated for what she perceived to be the most desirable outcome for Santiago, her relinquishment of the child just after his birth to Maria G. and Henry L. in April, 2009, even if motivated by good intentions, undoubtedly constituted abandonment. Importantly,thereisnoindicationintherecordthatthe respondent and Maria G., who had met shortly before Santiago’s birth and parted ways approximately two weeks after he was born, had maintained any type of contact or correspondence prior to the events underlying this appeal. Rather, when questioned by investigators, Maria G. was unsure of the respondent’s name, and was not able to provide it to the court until almost two months after Santiago’s removal from her home. Additionally,therespondenthasneversoughttoregain custody of Santiago, but contends only that he should be returned to Maria G. Ultimately, a complete investigation, which included locating and contacting the respondent and having her submittoDNAtesting,revealedthatMariaG.’saccount of how Santiago came to be in her care and custody was true. That circumstance, however, does not render false the essential facts that supported the trial court’s custodialorders,asrecitedherein.Althoughtherespondentandthecommissionernowattempttocharacterize the sole basis of the removal as the department’s absolute belief that Santiago had been a product of child trafficking, rather than smuggled into the country following an illegal adoption, that characterization is not borne out by the record. In fact, the commissioner, in seekinganorderoftemporarycustodyandadjudication of neglect, relied heavily on allegations related to the lack ofa legalguardian inthis country whocould make essential decisions on behalf of Santiago. It is entirely understandable that, with the benefit of hindsight and full, accurate and verified information at their disposal, department officials came to regret the manner in which they chose to exercise the discretion with which they are vested in the execution of their agency duties. This is especially so given the unfortunate and unpredictable manner in which the proceedings played out, in particular the delay in the trial and the contemporaneous denial of visitation between Maria G. and Santiago,which initially resulted from the unilateraldecisionofthedepartmentbutthereafterwas continuedatthebehestoftheattorneyforSantiagoand allowedbythecourt.Nevertheless,thatthedepartment eventually came to view its initial decisions to pursue removal and custody as unnecessary, and perhaps ill considered, does not render those decisions without a factual basis. As a final matter, we must reject the suggestion of the parties that the highly unusual facts of this case
warranted a disregard of the typical procedures attendant to a motion to revoke commitment, in favor of some alternative approach more suited to the circumstances. The problem here is not so much that the statutory framework is inadequate, but that it was not designedtoaccommodateindividualswhohavechosen tooperateoutsideofthestricturesofthelaw,regardless of their reasons. It was because the respondent and MariaG.knowinglyagreedtoeffectuateanillegalinternational adoption that Maria G. was vulnerable to the cruel act of a vindictive individual; see footnote 2 of thisopinion;andallofthesubsequentoccurrencesthat that act set in motion. Because Maria G. lacked the status of a legal parent, she also lacked the constitutionalandstatutoryrightsattendanttothatstatus.Additionally, the illegalities involved in Maria G. obtaining Santiago and transporting him, using a fraudulent passport, to the United States resulted in significant delay in the discernment of the truth, during which the interests of Santiago in stability and permanency16 began to diverge, as it turns out inexorably, from the interests of the respondent and Maria G. We say this not to chastise or lay blame, but rather, to explain that the law is ill equipped to save those who have chosen to disregard it.17 The respondent’s second claim, that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s decision denying the commissioner’s motion to open the judgment,alsorestsonthepremisethattheearlieradjudicationofneglectwasbasedonafactualmistake.Because we disagree with that premise, the second claim necessarily fails.

Outcome: The judgment is affirmed.

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