Date: 09-01-2015

Case Style: Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Haida Investments Ltd

Case Number: SC19439

Judge: Justice Dennis G. Eveleigh

Court: Connecticut Judicial Branch

Plaintiff's Attorney: Jillian L. McNeil, James T. Shearin

Defendant's Attorney: Michael C. Gilleran, Christopher L. Ayers, Robert D. Laurie, Shrina B. Faldu

Description: This action arises out of a dispute over the control and ownership of 500 shares of stock (shares) in the named plaintiff, Trikona Advisers Limited(Trikona),aninvestmentadvisorycorporationspecializing in Indian real estate, which is incorporated in theCaymanIslands.TheplaintiffsAsiaPacificVentures Limited (Asia Pacific) and Vera Financial Corporation (Vera Financial) brought an interpleader action, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-484, to determine ownership of the shares.1 The named defendant, Haida Investments Limited (Haida), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering an interlocutory judgment of interpleader.2 On appeal, Asia Pacific claims that Haida lacks standing to appeal because Haida was notaggrievedbythetrialcourt’sinterlocutoryjudgment of interpleader.3 Haida contends that there are no competing claims to the shares warranting the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader.4 We conclude that Haida has established aggrievement and that the trialcourtproperlyrenderedaninterlocutoryjudgment of interpleader because Asia Pacific and Vera Financial alleged facts sufficient to establish that Haida has a claimtothesharesandthattherearefaciallycompeting claims to the shares. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Therecordrevealsthefollowingfactsandprocedural history, which provide the necessary background for the resolution of this appeal. The present interpleader action stems from a dispute between two families over theownershipandcontrolofTrikona.5 In2006,Aashish Kalra6 andRakshittChughformedTrikona.AsiaPacific allegedly owns 50 percent of Trikona stock, representing Kalra’s interest. Haida and ARC Capital, LLC (ARC Capital), collectively own the remaining 50 percent of Trikonastock, representingChugh’sinterest. Kalraand Chugh initially were comanaging directors of Trikona, sharing equal operational control over the corporation, and they both served on Trikona’s board of directors since itsinception.7 OnFebruary 24,2012, Trikonafiled a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Chugh, acting in his capacity as the agent of Haida, had breached his fiduciary duties owed to Trikona (underlying complaint).Intheunderlyingcomplaint,Trikonasoughtthe imposition of a constructive trust on the stock held by Haida and ARC Capital.8 Between2010and2012,VeraFinancialmadeaseries of unsecured loans to Asia Pacific. In April, 2013, Vera Financial and Asia Pacific entered into an agreement, which consolidated the unsecured loans into one securedloanandgrantedVeraFinancialasecurityinterest, not to exceed $500,000, in all of the assets of Asia Pacific, including Asia Pacific’s shares in Trikona. The agreement also included a special power of attorney, by which Asia Pacific granted Vera Financial the right
to acquire, sell, transfer, assign, and dispose of all or any part of the shares. Asia Pacific subsequently defaulted on its obligation under the agreement. Vera Financial alleges that, in July, 2013, Asia Pacific ‘‘executed a stock power transferring and/or assigning all of its ownership rights in the shares to Vera Financial.’’ In February, 2012, Haida and ARC Capital, as shareholders of Trikona, filed a petition to wind-up and dissolveTrikonaintheGrandCourtoftheCaymanIslands and named Asia Pacific as the principal respondent in the action. Haida and ARC Capital also sought the immediate appointment of provisional liquidators, otherwise known in the United States as trustees. The GrandCourtoftheCaymanIslandsgrantedthisrequest in January, 2013, and awarded Haida and ARC Capital approximately $760,000 in attorney’s fees against Asia Pacific. Haida and ARC Capital moved to attach the shares and the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands subsequently granted an ex parte provisional charging order against the shares in the amount of the judgment that had been previously awarded. In its appellate brief beforethiscourt,Haidarepresentsthat,oncethecharging order was made absolute, Haida and ARC Capital issued a summons for the sale of the shares by public auction. On October 4, 2013, Asia Pacific filed a motion in the SuperiorCourtseekingpermission totendertheshares to that court or, in the alternative, the appointment of atemporaryreceivertoholdtheshares.Byacomplaint dated October 23, 2013 (interpleader complaint), Asia Pacific and Vera Financial commenced the present interpleader action, seeking, among other relief, a final judicial determination as to the proper owner of the shares.9 Haida and ARC Capital did not file an answer totheinterpleadercomplaintdenyingthefactualallegations contained therein.10 Followingoralargumentonthemotion,thetrialcourt rendered an interlocutory judgment of interpleader, ordering that the shares be deposited with the clerk of the court on the same day that the order was entered. In its brief, Haida represents that, following the trial court’s judgment of interpleader, Haida and ARC Capital asked for an adjournment of the proceeding before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, which was granted, and that, therefore, the public auction never took place. Haida subsequently moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader.Followingoralargument,thetrialcourtdenied that motion. Haida subsequently appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (1) and 61-10 (b), thiscourtorderedthetrialcourttoarticulatethefactual basis for its judgment of interpleader. Specifically, this
court ordered clarification as to ‘‘whether [the trial court] found [that there were claims by] two or more [persons] to the [shares].’’ The trial court issued an articulationinwhichitstatedthatithad‘‘concludedthat all of the parties who participated in the interpleader hearing had, and apparently still have, claims to the [shares] which were and are strong enough to justify the standards of an interlocutory judgment of interpleader.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The trial court further clarified that it cannot ‘‘make the necessary determinations as to any of the . . . parties, who are at this point in the case at least potentially entitled to some interest in the [shares], until the case is tried on the merits.’’ Before we address the claims on appeal, we begin by setting forth the general legal principles governing interpleader actions pursuant to § 52-484. ‘‘Although interpleader originally derived from common law and equity, in [1893], the legislature adopted ‘a broad statutory bill in the nature of interpleader that did not incorporate the traditional equitable restriction[s] [on interpleader]. Except for the addition of a provision for costs and fees and for a few trivial language modifications,thisstatuteremainsasConnecticut’sinterpleader rule.’ ’’ Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, 297 Conn. 489, 495–96, 1 A.3d 1026 (2010), quoting 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 225 (b). Section 52-484 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties whoclaim tobe entitledto or interestedin such money or other property. Such court shall hear and determine all questions which may arise in the case . . . .’’ ‘‘‘[I]nterpleaderisabroad joinderdevicetofacilitate consolidation of related claims so as to avoid multiple litigation as well as protection against multiple liability . . . .’ ’’ Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 496, quoting 2 E. Stephenson, supra, § 225 (a). ‘‘The classic interpleader action existing in equity, prior to the enactment of the statute, was brought by a disinterested stakeholder to establish the undivided ownership of money or property claimed by two or more entities or individuals. . . . After the passage of the forerunner to § 52-484 in 1893, the rule that an interpleaderactionbemaintainedonlybyastakeholder with no interest in the disposition of the fund was relaxed.’’ (Citations omitted.) Millman v. Paige, 55 Conn. App. 238, 242, 738 A.2d 737 (1999). ‘‘Section 52484 does not preclude an action . . . in which all claimants, including an interested possessor, as defendants, seek all or a portion of the amount being held by one
of the defendants. The equitable purpose of the statute is to give all those interested or entitled to all or a portion of a fund held by another an opportunity to resolve all questions in a single action.’’ Id., 243; see also Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 497n.9(notingthat‘‘stakeholdersmaycommenceinterpleader actions even if they have an interest in the disputed fund’’). ‘‘Actions pursuant § 52-484 involve two distinct parts . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497; see also Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 216 n.24, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). In the first part, the court must determinewhethertheinterpleaderplaintiffhasalleged facts sufficient to establish that ‘‘there are adverse claims to the fund or property’’ at issue. Practice Book § 23-43. If the courtconsiders interpleader to be proper under the circumstances, then the court may render an interlocutory judgment of interpleader. See Yankee Millwork Sash & Door Co. v. Bienkowski, 43 Conn. App. 471, 473, 683 A.2d 743 (1996) (‘‘[t]he interlocutory judgment of interpleader determines the propriety of the interpleader procedure’’). Only once an interlocutory judgment of interpleader has been rendered may the court hold a trial on the merits, compelling the partiestolitigatetheirrespectiveclaimstothedisputed property. Practice Book § 23-44.11 I As a preliminary matter, we first address the issue of whether Haida has standing to bring the present appeal. Asia Pacific contends that Haida lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Specifically, Asia Pacific asserts that, because Haida disclaims all rights to the shares, Haida wasnotaggrievedbythetrialcourt’sinterlocutoryjudgment of interpleader and, therefore, Haida does not have sufficient interest in the matter to pursue this appeal. Haida contends that it has standing to bring this appeal because it was named as a defendant to the interpleader action. We agree with Haida. ‘‘A threshold inquiry of this court upon every appeal presentedtoitisthequestionofappellatejurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Sultar, 253 Conn.429,434,754A.2d782(2000).‘‘Therighttoappeal is purely statutory, and only an aggrieved party may appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, 312 Conn. 600, 610, 95 A.3d 500 (2014); see also Practice Book § 61-1. General Statutes § 52-263, which governs the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, providesinrelevantpartthat‘‘ifeitherpartyisaggrieved by the decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial . . . he may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge . . . .’’12 ‘‘A determination regarding . . . subject matter jurisdic
tion is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Niro v. Niro, 314 Conn. 62, 67, 100 A.3d 801 (2014). ‘‘It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; eithertypewillestablishstanding,andeachhasitsown unique features.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, supra, 312 Conn. 620. ‘‘Classical aggrievementrequiresatwopartshowing.First,aparty mustdemonstrateaspecific,personalandlegalinterest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed toageneralinterestthatallmembersofthecommunity share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected thatspecificpersonalorlegalinterest.’’(Internalquotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists bylegislativefiat,notbyjudicialanalysisoftheparticularfactsofthecase.Inotherwords,incasesofstatutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 92, 971 A.2d 1 (2009). ‘‘Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 461, 839 A.2d 589 (2004). In the present case, Haida does not claim statutory aggrievement; therefore, we consider whether Haida has been classically aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Asia Pacific claims that, by contending on appeal that it does not presently have any claim to the shares, Haida has failed to satisfy the test for classical aggrievement because it has no specific personal and legal interest that has been adversely affected. For purposes of resolvingthe issue of whether Haida has been aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader, it is not necessary that this court determine the exact nature of Haida’s interest in the subject matter. Haida need only have a ‘‘personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, supra, 312 Conn. 620. Asia Pacific and Vera Financial allege that Haida and ARC Capital are seeking to use the final charging order from the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to gain full control and ownership over the shares, thereby obtaining full control and ownership of Trikona and gaining the authority to withdraw the underlying complaint. Although, in its appellate brief, Haida disclaims ‘‘any possessory interest’’ in the shares andassertsthat‘‘nolienexists,’’Haidadoesnotdispute
that the shares are subject to a charging order in the amountofajudgmentpreviouslyawardedtoHaidaand ARC Capital in a proceeding held before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands or that the shares may be sold at a public auction in the Cayman Islands in satisfaction of the judgment rendered by that court against Asia Pacific.13 These undisputed facts demonstrate that Haida has an interest in the disposition of thesharesatthesecondstageoftheinterpleaderaction because of its interest in having the shares sold at a public auction to satisfy its judgment against Asia Pacific.Weconclude,therefore,thatasasecuredcreditor of Asia Pacific by means of the charging order granted by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, Haida has a sufficient personal and legal interest in the subject matter of this action to be aggrieved. See Perry v. Perry, supra, 620. Moreover, it is sufficient that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial’sallegationsestablishthatthereisa‘‘possibility’’ that some legally recognizable interest of Haida’s ‘‘ ‘has been adversely affected’ ’’ by the interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267 Conn. 461. Because the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader has effectively deprived any party of the use of the shares and the ability to exercise any rightsoverthesharesuntilthereisajudicialdetermination as to each party’s rights to the shares, the present case satisfies the standard for classical aggrievement. We conclude, therefore, that Haida has standing to bringthisappealbecausethe allegationsinAsiaPacific and Vera Financial’s interpleader complaint, if true, demonstrate that there is a possibility that Haida’s alleged security interest in the shares will be adversely affected. II Havingconcludedthatwehaveappellatejurisdiction, wenext considerthe meritsof Haida’sclaimon appeal. On appeal, Haida claims that the only entity with an interest in the shares legally recognized under the law of the Cayman Islands is Asia Pacific and that, as a result, the statutory requirement that the property at issue in an interpleader action be ‘‘claimed by two or more persons’’ has not been satisfied. General Statutes § 52-484. Asia Pacific and Vera Financial respond that there are competing claims to the shares. Specifically, Asia Pacific claims that Asia Pacific, Haida, and ARC Capital have uncontested claims to the shares and that Vera Financial has a ‘‘contested claim’’ to the shares. Vera Financial asserts that it has a claim to the shares because Asia Pacific validly transferred ownership of thesharestoVeraFinancialasthewinding-upproceeding held in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands was not formally recognized under chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. Vera Financial further claims that Haida and ARC Capi
tal have an ex parte lien over the shares. We conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have alleged facts sufficienttoestablishtheexistenceofcompetingclaims to the shares. Neither this court nor the Appellate Court has established the standard of review for a claim challenging the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader pursuant to § 52-484.14 Therefore, in determining the appropriate standard of review, we turn to a procedurally similar action—a motion to intervene as a matter of right. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 456–57, 904 A.2d 137 (2006). ‘‘Forpurposesofjudgingthesatisfactionof[the]conditions[forintervention]welooktothepleadings,thatis, tothemotionforleavetointerveneandtotheproposed complaint or defense in intervention, and . . . we accept the allegations in those pleadings as true. The question on a petition to intervene is whether a wellpleaded defense or claim is asserted. Its merits are not to be determined. . . . Thus, neither testimony nor other evidence is required to justify intervention, and [a] proposed intervenor must allege sufficient facts, through the submitted motion and pleadings, if any, in order to make a showing of his or her right to intervene. The inquiry is whether the claims contained in the motion, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that will be affected by the judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added;internalquotationmarksomitted.)Id.,457.Similarly, the question presented at the first stage of an interpleader action is whether there are ‘‘conflicting claimstopropertyinthehandsofastakeholder’’soasto make interpleader appropriate. Commercial Discount Co. v. Plainfield, 120 Conn. 274, 278–79, 180 A. 311 (1935), citing Grand Lodge v. Burns, 84 Conn. 356, 363, 80 A.157 (1911). ‘‘Acomplaint in aninterpleader action should allege only such facts as show that there are adverse claims to the fund or property and need not, in fact, should not, allege the basis upon which any claimant relies to justify his claim; the latter allegationsaretobemadeinthestatementofclaimfollowing the interlocutory judgment of interpleader.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yankee Millwork Sash & Door Co. v. Bienkowski, supra, 43 Conn. App. 473, citing Practice Book (1978–97) § 538 (now § 23-43). This court has held that ‘‘the less restrictive de novo standard of review is more consistent with the nature of the relevant inquiry taken to evaluate [whether a movant seeking to intervene as a matter of right has demonstrated a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation], which is confined to a review of the relevant pleadings, with all allegations therein taken as true’’ than the abuse of discretion standard of review. Kerriganv.CommissionerofPublicHealth,supra,279 Conn. 455. In light of the similarities to granting a
motion to intervene as a matter of right, we conclude thattheappropriatestandardofreviewforaninterlocutory judgment of interpleader is de novo.15 Section 52-484 is ‘‘remedial . . . and to be favorably construed. It requires the court to which any complaint founded upon it may be brought, to ‘hear and dispose of all questions which may arise in such case,’ and by the provision for making not only all who claim to be ‘entitled to,’ but all who claim to be ‘interested in,’ the property in question, parties defendant, shows that its purpose is to secure a determination of every right, title or interest that can by possibility be set up.’’16 (Emphasis added.) Union Trust Co. v. Stamford Trust Co., 72 Conn. 86, 93, 43 A. 555 (1899); see also United States v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 748 F.3d 86, 95 (2dCir.2014)(‘‘[a]ninterpleadersuit,byitsverynature, identifies various possible claimants to the funds at issue, but leaves it to the court to decide which, if any, have a valid claim’’ [emphasis in original]); 44B Am. Jur. 2d 609, Interpleader § 3 (2007) (‘‘Interpleader statutes are to be liberally construed. Every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of a putative stakeholder’s right to interplead.’’ [Footnote omitted.]). ‘‘It is the express purpose of interpleader actions to avoid duplicativelitigation byresolvingall possiblequestions of liability between all possible parties in one proceeding. As such, interpleader actions are especially designedtoadvancetheinterestsofwisejudicialadministration and should be furthered whenever possible.’’ Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Conn. 1978); see also John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Advance Realty Co., 9 Conn. Supp. 367, 368 (1941) (‘‘[t]he instances will be extremely rare where an interlocutory judgment will be denied when the plaintiff alleges the possession of funds to which two or more claim to be entitled’’). In the present case, although Vera Financial alleges thatitisthe‘‘legaland/orequitableowner’’oftheshares, AsiaPacificassertsthatitcontinuestoowntheshares.17 Furthermore,AsiaPacificandVeraFinancialallegethat the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands awarded Haida and ARC Capital a judgment against Asia Pacific at the winding-up proceeding and subsequently granted an ex parte provisional charging order against the shares in the amount of the judgment. Asia Pacific alleges that the Grand Court ofthe Cayman Islands disregarded the fact that Asia Pacific had existing creditors, including a secured creditor, namely, Vera Financial, when it madethechargingorderabsolute.HaidaandARCCapitaldidnotdenyAsiaPacificandVeraFinancial’sallegations regarding the alleged charging order at oral argument before the trial court. Having reviewed the facts set forth in the interpleader complaint, we conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial’s allegations arelegallysufficienttosupportthetrialcourt’sinterlocutory judgment of interpleader.
Haida dedicates most of its appellate briefs to contesting the merits of each party’s purported claim to the Trikona shares, and its briefs are devoid of any claim that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have failed to satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Practice Book § 23-43.18 The crux of Haida’s claim on appeal is that, pursuant to Cayman Islands law, Asia Pacific is the only possible legal owner of the shares and that, therefore, there are no competing claims to the shares that would warrant the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader, as required under § 52-484. First, Haida alleges that Cayman Islands law precludes any transfer of shares in a company after the commencement of a winding-up proceeding. Thus, Haida claims that Vera Financial can have no claim to the shares under Cayman Islands law because the alleged stock power between Asia Pacific and Vera Financial occurred after the winding-up proceeding held in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands had commenced. Second,HaidasimilarlyclaimsthatCaymanIslandslaw precludes Haida’s acquisition of the shares without an order from the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. Haida argues that, as a result of the charging order against the shares issued by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, Haida and ARC Capital issued a summons for the sale of the shares at a public auction. Haida claims that because any individual or entity, including Asia Pacific and Vera Financial, would have anopportunitytobidonthesharesatthepublicauction and no such auction has yet taken place, Haida does not have a ‘‘possessory interest’’ in the Trikona shares. TotheextentthatHaidaassertsthatthiscourtshould consider the merits of the claims alleged in the interpleader complaint to determine their viability under Cayman Islands law, we decline to entertain such an assertion.19 It was not the role of the trial court, nor is it the function of this court on appeal, to consider the merits of the purportedly competing claims at this preliminary stage of the present interpleader action. See Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497. Applying the interpleader standard set forth previously in this opinion, and considering the liberal construction of § 52-484, we accept the allegations in the interpleader complaint as true and conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have alleged facts sufficient to establish that Asia Pacific, Vera Financial, Haida, and ARC Capital all have facially competing claims to the shares. See 44B Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 3, p. 609 (‘‘[i]nterpleader statutes are to be liberally construed’’). As the Appellate Court has previously explained,AsiaPacificandVeraFinancialhavenoduty to ‘‘allege the basis upon which any claimant relies to justify his claim’’ before the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader, as the parties will have an opportunity to present such allegations at the second procedural stage of this action in which the merits of
their claims are adjudicated. Yankee Millwork Sash & Door Co. v. Bienkowski, supra, 43 Conn. App. 473. We further rely upon the trial court’s articulation in which it stated that interpleader was proper under the circumstances because all parties to the interpleader action are ‘‘at least potentially entitled to some interest in the stock . . . .’’20 Moreover, insofar as Haida claims that the charging order granted by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands against the shares does not qualify as a sufficient interest in the Trikona shares for purposes of maintaining an interpleader action, we disagree. As this court explained in Union Trust Co., § 52484 is broad enough to encompass any ‘‘interest that canbypossibilitybesetup.’’(Emphasisadded.)Union Trust Co. v. Stamford Trust Co., supra, 72 Conn. 93. In consideration of the fact that these parties have been involved in multiple proceedings in several jurisdictions; see footnote 5 of this opinion; and that the underlying dispute between the parties is likely to continue until the ownership of the shares and, thus, the ultimate control of Trikona, are determined, it is in the interest of wise judicial administration to resolve all questions concerning the shares in a single proceeding with all interested parties present. See Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, supra, 454 F. Supp. 1365 (noting that ‘‘interpleader actions are especially designed to advance the interests of wise judicial administration’’).

Outcome: We conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have sufficiently stated a cause of action for interpleader, satisfying the pleading requirements as set forth in Practice Book § 23-43. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader. The judgment is affirmed.

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