Date: 10-19-2015

Case Style: Tavani v. Riley

Case Number: AC37034

Judge: Lubbie Harper, Jr

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Plaintiff's Attorney: J. Colin Heffernan, John C. Hefferna

Defendant's Attorney: Heather M. Wood

Description: The plaintiff, Michael Tavani, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action for adeclaratory judgment. On appeal,the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action, sua sponte, on the ground that his case was not justiciable.1 We agree, and reverse the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. On December 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a one count complaint against the defendant, Maureen Riley, seeking declaratory relief ‘‘that [he] has fully complied with his child support obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to the care and support of either of [his] children, who are now adults, or [the defendant].’’ The trial court stated the following facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint: ‘‘On March24, 1994, the EssexCounty, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court granted the plaintiff and the defendant a divorce. Both parties and their children resided in Massachusetts at the time of the divorce. Between 1994 and 2000, the plaintiff relocated to Connecticut and the defendant relocated to Virginia. On April 28, 2000, the defendant petitioned the Virginia Department of Social Services to pursue the plaintiff for his alleged failure to pay child support from 1994 through 2000. The Massachusetts support order was registered in Connecticut on July 11, 2000. The Virginia Department of Social Services contacted the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services in Putnam, which contacted the plaintiff and directed him to appear in court on September 14, 2000, and provide proof of his gross income from March, 1994, to September, 2000. The Connecticut Support Enforcement Services determinedthattherewasnoarrearageandfacilitatedfuture child support payments from 2000 to 2009. ‘‘The plaintiff further alleges that on August 10, 2009, the Connecticut Superior Court terminated the plaintiff’s child support obligation at the plaintiff’s request because his children were emancipated. The court did not find any arrearage owed at the time the support order was terminated.2 On January 3, 2012, the defendant, who was now living in New Hampshire, filed a complaintforcontemptintheEssexCounty,Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. The Massachusetts court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2012, for lack of jurisdiction because neither party resided in [Massachusetts]. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that he ‘has fully complied with his child support obligation and that there are no arrearages relating to thecare andsupportofeither of[his]children, whoare now adults, or [the defendant]. The purpose in seeking declaratoryjudgmentistoprevent[thedefendant]from engaging in any further forum shopping that would require [the plaintiff] to once again prove to a court’s
satisfaction that he has fully met his obligations.’ The plaintiff wishes to enforce a judgment from this court under thefull faith andcredit clause ofthe constitution in any state and at any time the defendant brings a claim against him. ‘‘On February 6, 2013, the defendant was defaulted for failure to plead. On March 6, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment after default, which was denied onMarch22,2013.OnAugust27,2013,thecourtgranted the plaintiff’s August 15, 2013 motion to transfer and the matter was transferred to the family docket. The plaintiff then filed a motion for judgment on October 17, 2013.’’ (Footnote added.) On November 6, 2013, the court heard oral argument and referred the matter to theFamilySupportMagistrateDivision,andonJanuary 30, 2014, the Family Support Magistrate Division referred the case back to the family division of the trial court.3 ‘‘ThematterwasheardonJuly10,2014,atwhich timethecourtdeniedthemotionforjudgmentand[sua sponte] dismissed the case for a lack of substantial question in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations. The plaintiff filed a motion for articulation on July 11, 2014.’’ On August 7, 2014, the court issued its memorandum of decision, concluding that there was no justiciable controversy or substantial issue to allow it to declare judgment. The court explained that ‘‘[t]here is no pending action concerning a complaint of contempt against the plaintiff. The last action against the plaintiff, filed onJanuary3,2012,wasdismissedbytheMassachusetts Probate and Family Court for lack of jurisdiction. The Massachusetts child support order, which was registered in Connecticut, has been terminated and there is no pending contempt case in Connecticut. The action for declaratory judgment itself is not an uncertainty that requires settlement; it is an action by which the court may determine a question that is already in dispute and distinctly separate from the issue of whether the court should declare judgment for the moving party.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘when there is no justiciablecontroversyorsubstantialissueforthecourt to rule in a declaratory judgment action, a default for failure to plead does not require the court to declare judgment.’’ Because the court had no information as to what the defendant may or may not claim in a future action, it stated that ‘‘the defendant’s previous act of bringingaclaimofcontemptdoesnotallowtheplaintiff to ascertain with reasonable certainty that the defendant willbring thesame actionin anotherjurisdiction.’’ In otherwords, thecourt determinedthat theplaintiff’s complaint was not justiciable. For those reasons, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and dismissed his case. This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action on the ground that the case
was not justiciable. He argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court erroneously interpreted the plaintiff’s complaint as seeking an advisory opinion as to whether or not the defendant could pursue an action against the plaintiff in another forum.’’ He further argues that this was not his request; his request was for the court to find a specific fact, which presently exists, that there was a previous finding of zero arrearages of child support owed to the defendant.4 As a preliminary note, we treat the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment as a request for an accounting to clarify whether he owes the defendant any child support arrearage. See Drahan v. Board of Education, 42 Conn. App. 480, 489, 680 A.2d 316 (‘‘[W]e emphasize that the construction of a pleading is a question ultimately for the court. . . . When a case requires this court to determine the nature of a pleading filed by a party, we are not required to accept the label affixed to that pleading by the party. In this vein, we analyze the pleadings at issue in the present case.’’ [Internal quotationmarksomitted.]),cert.denied,239Conn.921, 682A.2d1000(1996).Uponreviewoftherecordandthe plaintiff’s complaint for declaratoryrelief, we conclude that the plaintiff sought an accounting by the court, thatasofAugust10,2009,whenhischildsupportobligationwasterminatedduetohischildren’semancipation, he owed no arrearage in his child support obligations. The plaintiff seeks to prove, by review of the records of the Connecticut Support Enforcement Services, a division of the court operations of the judicial branch, that no arrearage exists and to have the court issue a specific finding to that effect. Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[e]ven beyond the four month time frame set forth in Practice Book § 17-4 . . . courts have continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior . . . judgment . . . pursuant to [their] inherent powers . . . . When an ambiguity in the language of a prior judgment has arisen as a result of postjudgment events . . . a trial court may, atanytime,exerciseitscontinuingjurisdictiontoeffectuate its prior [judgment] . . . by interpreting [the] ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 604, 974 A.2d 641 (2009). Next, we set forth the applicable standard of review for issues regarding justiciability. ‘‘A court will not resolve a claimed controversy on the merits unless it is satisfied that the controversy is justiciable. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determinationofthecontroversywillresultinpractical
relief to the complainant. . . . As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. . . . Finally, because an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate reviewisplenary.’’(Citationomitted;internalquotation marks omitted.) Shenkman-Tyler v. Central Mutual Ins.Co.,126Conn.App.733,738–39,12A.3d613(2011). Here, we hold that the plaintiff’s complaint was justiciable. Although the court found that there was not an actual controversy, we determine that the plaintiff was entitled to obtain an accounting or clear ruling that he does not owe any arrearage for child support to the defendant. Although the defendant has taken no action in this matter, the interest of the plaintiff in seeking an accounting is adverse to that of the defendant, who recentlyhadattemptedtopursuecollectionofaclaimed child support arrearage against the plaintiff in Massachusetts. This Massachusetts filing by the defendant wasdespitehersuccessfulpetitiontohaveConnecticut Support Enforcement Services enforce and collect the child support payment from 2000 to 2009, when all the children had attained the age of majority.5 Additionally, thematteriscapableofbeingadjudicatedbythecourt,6 and if the court can augment its August 10, 2009 order by permitting the plaintiff to establish he owes no arrearage, the plaintiff can achieve practical relief by having the ability to prove to another forum that he has met his obligation. Therefore, the plaintiff’s case meets the requirements of justiciability.

Outcome: The judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for ahearingontheaccountingactiontoascertainwhether the plaintiff owes any arrearage for child support to the defendant. In this opinion the other judges concurred

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