Date: 12-07-2015

Case Style: Kenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta

Case Number: AC37396

Judge: Douglas S. Lavine

Court: State Of Connecticut Superior Court

Plaintiff's Attorney: Colin P. Mahon

Defendant's Attorney: Thomas T. Lonardo

Description: The plaintiff, Kenosia Commons, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered infavorofthedefendants,CynthiaDaCostaandCandra DaCosta, in this summary process action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that by virtue of Cynthia DaCosta’s ownership of shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation she is not subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.1 We glean the following facts and procedural history fromthecourtfileandtrialtranscript.OnJune30,2014, the plaintiff had a complaint served on the defendants. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff, as the lessor, and the defendants, as the lessees, had entered into an oral lease for the use and occupancy of 46 Kenosia Avenue lot 10 (lot 10) in Danbury. The initial monthly rent of $425 was payable on the first day of May, 2014, andonthefirstdayofeachmonththereafter.Thedefendants took possession of lot 10 pursuant to the oral lease and still occupy it, but they have failed to pay the rent due under the lease for May, 2014. The plaintiff caused a notice to quit to be served on the defendants onoraboutMay12,2014.2Thecomplaintfurtheralleged thatthedefendantshavefailedtotenderthetotalarrearage duethe plaintiffwithin thetime stated inthe notice to quit. Moreover, although the time designated for the defendants to quit the premises has passed, the defendants continue in possession. In its prayer for relief, the plaintiff sought a judgment of possession. The defendantsrespondedtothecomplaintbyfilingJudicial Branch Form JD-HM-5, pleading that they ‘‘do not know’’withrespecttoeachparagraphofthecomplaint. Following a series of continuances requested by the defendants,thematterwastriedtothecourtonOctober 6, 2014. The plaintiff presented evidence that it is a mixed-usemobilehome ormanufacturedhousingcommunity in Danbury; it has twenty-nine lots, a house, and several apartments. It is the only manufactured housing community cooperative in the state. Although the plaintiff does not own the mobile manufactured home occupied by the defendants, it owns the land beneath it. The monthly rent per lot is $425. As of May 1, 2014, the defendants were delinquent in paying rent for lot 10 in the amount of $2297.78. The defendants have not paid the plaintiff rent since they were served with the notice to quit. Cynthia DaCosta testified that she moved onto lot 10 inearly2011afterpurchasingahomefromPlazaModular and Mobile Homes. She received and signed a lease for lot 10 in February, 2011. She testified that ‘‘we’re a co-op, so you buy shares to be in the park, I paid $2500 fortwelveshares.’’(Emphasisadded.)Shealsotestified
that she and her family encountered difficult circumstances that prevented her from being able to pay rent forlot10.Attheconclusionofevidence,thecourtheard the parties’ arguments. Counsel for the plaintiff stated that § 21-80 is the summary process statute applicable to mobile homes. Specifically, he argued that the statute provides that ‘‘for a nonpayment of rent by a resident, you must give them thirtydays noticeand mustinclude thearrearage, and if the arrearage is tendered in full prior to the expiration of the thirty days on the notice to quit, then theparkownermustacceptitandreinstatetheperson.’’ Cynthia DaCosta argued that the defendants are not trying ‘‘to shirk anything’’ or get out of paying their bills. The plaintiff has refused to accept her plan to pay the arrearage, demanding, instead, full payment. The court took the matter on the papers, but later ordered the parties to appear for a posttrial hearing on November 3, 2014. When the case was called, the court stated: ‘‘[W]e had a—a trial on the merits of the complaintfiledby[theplaintiff]andtestimonywasreceived. And,inreviewingthefile,thecourtfoundothermatters that had been pending here in Danbury Superior Court involving[theplaintiff].Anditcametothecourt’sattention that this could be set up where a person could be a tenant and an owner at the same time, which was never addressed at the trial, andI need to hear whether Ms. DaCosta is a tenant or a tenant-owner. If she’s a tenant-owner, the court—[I] don’t know if it even has the ability to rule against her, because, in effect, she would be an owner displacing herself. That’s the concern of the court. And I don’t know how it’s set up with her and her tenantship with respect to [the plaintiff].’’ The plaintiff’s counsel presented the court with the plaintiff’scertificateofincorporation,bylaws,andrules and regulations, and directed the court to article 13 of the bylaws. Counsel argued, pursuant to article 13, that the homeowner loses the right to own shares under certain circumstances, including eviction. Cynthia DaCosta argued that she purchased shares of stock in the plaintiff for $2500 when she moved in. The court found that Cynthia DaCosta owns twelve shares of stock in the plaintiff. The court took the matter on the papers. On November 7, 2014, the court issued the following order, which constituted the judgment of the court. ‘‘Thecourt heardthematter onitsmerits and,additionally, scheduled a hearing to entertain argument on a posttrial issue that had come to the court’s attention in connection with a companion matter involving [the plaintiff]. That hearing was held on November 3, 2014. After hearing additional argument, the court rules as follows: The tenant, Cynthia DaCosta, by virtue of her ownership shares in [the plaintiff], is equal part owner andtenantandthereforefallsoutsideofthestrictstatu
toryguidelinesforasummaryprocessaction.Thecourt has reviewed the [plaintiff’s] bylaws in their entirety and finds no language that would reduce tenant/owner [Cynthia] DaCosta’sstatus tothat oftenant only,which would then allow her to be the proper target of a summary process action. The motion for judgment of possession is denied.’’ Thereafter the plaintiff appealed from the court’s judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendants are not subject to a judgment of possession pursuant to § 21-80. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession of lot 10 because there was no language in the plaintiff’s bylaws that would reduce ‘‘tenant/owner[Cynthia]DaCosta’sstatustothatoftenant only . . . .’’3 However, the present summary process action is controlled by the relevant General Statutes, not the plaintiff’s bylaws. ‘‘The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession.’’ Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn. App. 439, 443, 473 A.2d 318 (1984). Summary process is a statutory proceeding that is ‘‘intended to be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.’’ Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corp., 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797 (1973).Wethereforeexaminethestatutesapplicableto summary process actions and to mobile manufactured home parks. ‘‘[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The processofstatutoryinterpretationinvolvesthedetermination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question ofwhetherthelanguagedoessoapply.’’(Internalquotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority, 159 Conn. App. 679, 689, A.3d (2015). ‘‘Whenconstruingastatute,[o]urfundamentalobjectiveistoascertainandgiveeffecttotheapparentintent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, includingthequestionof whetherthelanguageactually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine the meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policyit wasdesignedto implement,andto itsrelationship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . . A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilton Meadows Ltd. Partnership v. Coratolo, 299 Conn. 819, 825, 14 A.3d 982 (2011). Chapter 412 of our General Statutes is entitled ‘‘Mobile Manufactured Homes and Mobile Manufactured Home Parks. Park Owners and Residents.’’ Section 21-80 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) An action for summary process may be maintained by the owner of a mobile manufactured home park against a mobile manufactured home resident . . . . (b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, an owner may . . . maintain a summary process action against aresidentwhoownsamobilemanufacturedhomeonly for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental services charges . . . .’’ Chapter 412 of the General Statutes provides definitions for the terms used therein. General Statutes § 2164 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(5) ‘[r]esident’ means a personwhoowns,orrentsandoccupies,amobilemanufactured home in a mobile manufactured home park . . . (7) ‘[o]wner’ means a licensee or permittee or any person who owns, operates or maintains a mobile manufactured home park . . . (9) ‘[p]erson’ means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, the state or any political subdivision thereof, agency, business trust, estate, trust partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal or commercial entity . . . .’’ The parties agree that the defendants are residents oflot10inthesubjectmobilemanufacturedhomepark andthattheyhavefailedtopayrentpursuanttoanoral lease. Cynthia DaCosta owns the mobile manufactured home situated on lot 10, and she owns twelve shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation. The question is whether such stock ownership makes her an owner of the mobile manufactured home park. We conclude that it does not. The plain language of § 21-64 (7) provides that an owner is a person who owns, operates or maintains a mobile manufactured home park. Section 21-64 (9) defines person as a corporation, among other things. Section21-64(9)doesnotdefineownerasashareholder ofacorporation.‘‘[I]tisthedutyofthecourttointerpret statutes as they are written . . . and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Athena Holdings, LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470, 478, A.3d (2015). For this reason, we conclude that the defendants are subject to summary process for failing to pay rent.
Our conclusion that the defendants are subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to the plain language of §§ 21-64 and 21-80 is further supported by our summary process statutes. General Statutes § 47a23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner . . . desires to obtain possession . . . of any land . . . (1) when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of the following reasons . . . (D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period . . . such owner or lessor . . . shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land . . . before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy.’’ (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff is the owner of the land where lot 10 is situated. The defendants are lessees of the land. General Statutes § 47a-24 provides: ‘‘As used in this chapter, (1) ‘lessee or occupant’ includes a member or shareholder of a cooperative housing corporation who occupiesadwellingunitinsuchcorporation’spremises pursuant to an agreement of occupancy, whether or notitisdesignatedasaleaseorrentalagreement,which agreement provides that, for breach by a member or shareholder of any provision of such agreement, the corporation shall have the legal remedies available to a landlord for breach by a tenant of a provision of a lease or rental agreement; and (2) ‘owner or lessor’ includes any such cooperative housing corporation.’’4 (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to § 47a-24, Cynthia DaCosta, a shareholder in the plaintiff cooperative housing corporation, is subject to summary process as a lessee of the plaintiff. We construe the statutes pertaining to mobile manufactured home parks and summary process ‘‘in accordancewiththeoverridingprinciplethatstatutesshould beconstrued,wherepossible,soastocreatearational, coherent and consistent body of law. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 428, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (we read related statutes to form a consistent, rational whole, rather than to create irrational distinctions); In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 524, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) ([s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature presumed to have created a consistent body of law).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 284 Conn. 237, 249, 932 A.2d 1063 (2007). Moreover, this court previously has stated that summary process proceedings include ‘‘actions for possession by cooperative housing corporations against their members or shareholders, based on the breach ofa lease by the members or shareholders .

Outcome: We therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of lot 10 if the defendants failed to pay rent in accordance with the parties’ oral lease agreement. The trial court, however, failed to make factual findings on the basis of the evidencpreesentedastowhetherthedefendantsfailedtocomply with the terms of the subject lease. The matter, therefore,mustberemandedtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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