Date: 12-14-2015

Case Style: USA v. STEWART

Case Number: 84-73 (RWR

Judge: Richard W. Roberts

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Plaintiff's Attorney: Frederick A. Battista

Defendant's Attorney: Thomas E. Haney

Description: On June 22, 1984, Judge Joyce Hens Green sentenced Stewart
to one year of imprisonment for carrying a pistol without a
license, in violation of 22 D.C. Code § 3204, two to six years of
imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and a special parole term of
three years to follow his imprisonment, with those sentences to
run concurrently to each other and consecutively to any other
sentence. See Govt.’s Oppn. to Def.’s Pet. for a Writ of
Mandamus (“Govt.’s Oppn.”), ECF No. 5, Ex. A, J. & Commitment
Order at 1.
At that time, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)1 required that the
sentencing judge impose a mandatory term of three years of
special parole. See United States v. Brundage, 903 F.2d 837,
839 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing the history of sentencing
provisions under 21 U.S.C. § 841). “Special parole was ‘a
period of supervision served upon completion of a prison term’
and administered by the United States Parole Commission.”
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 399 (1991)
1 At the time of Stewart’s 1984 sentencing, 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) stated that “[a] special parole term provided for in this section or section 845 or 845a of this title shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other parole provided for by law.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(c), repealed by Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 224(a)(6), 48 Stat. 1837, 2030 (1984).
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(quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388 (1980)).
The special parole term was “designed to take effect upon the
expiration of the period of parole supervision following
mandatory release, or at the full term date following parole, or
upon release from confinement following sentence expiration.”
United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (quoting Roberts v. United States, 491 F.2d 1236, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1974)).
Stewart was paroled in this case on June 18, 1990, and his
parole was scheduled to last until June 16, 1994. See Govt.’s
Oppn., Ex. B, Certificate of Parole at 1. During this period of
parole, Stewart was convicted in Virginia of robbery, possession
of a firearm by an individual convicted of a felony, and use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony. See id., Ex. C, Order
for the Circuit Ct. for Fauquier County, Commonwealth of Va. at
1-2. For these offenses, Stewart was sentenced on August 3,
1993 to an aggregate maximum term of 27 years of imprisonment,
followed by a five-year term of supervision. See id. at 3.
After Stewart completed the sentence for his Virginia offenses,
the Commission revoked Stewart’s parole in this case on
March 13, 2007. See id., Ex. D, 3/13/07 Notice of Action at 1
2.
On May 14, 2009, Stewart was released from prison and began
serving a mandatory release supervision period in this case.
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See id., Ex. E, Bureau of Prison Sentence Monitoring Computation
Data at 13. Stewart’s mandatory release supervision period
ended on March 21, 2010, id. at 17, and his three-year term of
special parole imposed in this case began without any credit for
time previously spent on parole. See id. That term of special
parole was scheduled to expire on March 22, 2013. See id., Ex.
G, Warrant and Warrant Application at 4.
In September 2012, Stewart was convicted in D.C. Superior
Court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See id.,
Ex. G-1, J. in Crim. Case; Ex. G at 1, 4; Ex. E at 3. He was
sentenced on September 10, 2012 to a term of 28 months of
imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release of five
years. See id., Ex. E at 3-4; Ex. G-1. Following Stewart’s
sentencing in D.C. Superior Court on September 10, 2012, the
Commission issued a special parole violation warrant on
September 11, 2012 to be lodged as a detainer against Stewart
and to be executed upon the completion of his D.C. Superior
Court sentence. See id., Ex. G at 1, 5. Stewart filed the
instant petition on July 29, 2014, just before the Commission
executed the special parole violation warrant on September 19,
2014, when Stewart completed his D.C. Superior Court prison
term. See id., Ex. G at 2, Ex. E at 5. The Commission then
notified Stewart that it had found probable cause to believe
that he had violated the conditions of his special parole in
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this case due to his D.C. Superior Court conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See id., Ex. I,
Letter from Bureau of Prisons, dated October 7, 2014, at 1. The
Commission held a hearing on November 5, 2014, revoked his
special parole in this case, and sentenced him to 32 months in
prison. See 11/5/14 Notice of Action at 1. Stewart served time
in prison from November 5, 2014 until May 8, 2015.2 On May 9,
2015, he began serving the term of supervised release that was
imposed by the Superior Court in 2012. That term is scheduled
to end May 7, 2018.3
Stewart asserts that the Parole Commission issued a parole
violation warrant after he had completed his parole term when
the Commission had no further authority over him. He complains
that the warrant, lodged as a detainer in North Carolina where
he was incarcerated on other charges at the time he filed his
motion, is therefore an illegal detainer. He frames his request
for relief as both a request for a writ of habeas corpus to free
him from the restraints of the illegal detainer, and a request
for a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to grant him the
2 Stewart served less than the entire 32 months because he was given credit for time served for his D.C. Superior Court sentence. See 11/5/14 Notice of Action at 1.
3 Stewart was not given credit for any time previously spent on special parole. See 11/5/14 Notice of Action at 1.
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parole hearing he has been seeking in which he can challenge the
parole violation warrant.4
DISCUSSION
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of
its subject matter jurisdiction in any litigation. A habeas
petition is certainly the kind of matter that a district court
has the power to entertain. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). But the
two bases upon which Stewart asserts that subject matter
jurisdiction lies in this Court over his habeas claim sound more
in issues of venue and personal jurisdiction: 1) any future
detention resulting from a parole violation finding in this case
would occur in this district, and 2) the warrant was issued in
this district by the Commission which is located here.
An inmate may seek habeas to challenge a detainer lodged
against him by an authority that would be his future custodian
should the detainer be honored. See Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488-89, 500-01 (1973). Even if
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition is
4 Because Stewart is proceeding pro se, his petition will be liberally construed in order to accurately capture the nature of the legal relief that he seeks. See e.g., Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“‘[A] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
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present only when the court has personal jurisdiction over the
custodian of the petitioner, see Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414,
415 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495), the
Commission is a proper custodian here since the Commission is
the authority that issued the detainer that brought Stewart into
immediate custody after he finished serving his recent prison
term. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 498-99. This Court could have
personal jurisdiction over the Commission since the Commission
is located in this district, and the United States does not
contest -- thus waives -- this Court's personal jurisdiction
over the Commission concerning the habeas claim. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(1); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
The government ultimately does not challenge this Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over the habeas claim. This Court
is also satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction over
the habeas claim in this case. But what is ultimately
dispositive of the petition here is that Stewart’s claim that
the detainer is illegal has no merit and affords him no basis
for achieving the relief he seeks, whatever the terms he uses
for framing the relief sought.
II. UNTIMELY DETAINER
Stewart contends that he had already completed his sentence
in this case at the time the Commission lodged a detainer
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against him. Pet. at 1. The government opposes Stewart’s
claim, arguing that the warrant was issued before Stewart’s term
of special parole in this case expired. Govt.’s Oppn. at 6-8.
At the time the special parole violation warrant was issued
in September 2012, Stewart’s sentence in this case had not yet
ended. Stewart’s mandatory release supervision period ended on
March 21, 2010. See Ex. E at 17. Stewart’s three-year special
parole term began on March 22, 2010, and was scheduled to end on
March 22, 2013. See Ex. F. Thus, Stewart’s sentence in this
case had not yet ended when the Commission issued the special
parole violation warrant on September 10, 2012.
The fact that the special parole violation warrant was
executed after the scheduled end of Stewart’s term of special
parole in 2013 does not render the warrant invalid. The Parole
Commission had the legal authority to revoke a term of special
parole provided that the special parole violation warrant was
issued before the end of Stewart’s federal sentence. See 28
C.F.R. § 2.98(e) (“The issuance of a warrant under this section
operates to bar the expiration of the parolee’s sentence. Such
warrant maintains the Commission’s jurisdiction to retake the
parolee either before or after the normal expiration date of the
sentence and to reach a final decision as to the revocation of
parole”); see also Bethea v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 751 F. Supp. 2d
83, 87 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[I]ssuance of the warrant tolls the
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running of the sentence[.]” (citation omitted)); Owens v.
Gaines, 219 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100-01 (D.D.C. 2002) (same).
Therefore, the warrant issued by the Commission on September 11,
2012 was valid.
III. UNTIMELY HEARING
Stewart also contends that he was denied his right to a
timely revocation hearing. Pet. at 3. In opposition, the
government argues that the Commission’s special parole violation
warrant was lodged as a detainer and because the warrant had not
yet been executed when he filed this petition, Stewart did not
yet have a due process right to a revocation hearing. Govt.’s
Oppn. at 9.
A parolee is entitled to a revocation hearing only after a
violation warrant is executed, and not at the point when a
warrant is issued. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976)
(“[The petitioner] has been deprived of no constitutionally
protected rights simply by issuance of a parole violator
warrant. The Commission therefore has no constitutional duty to
provide petitioner an adversary parole hearing until he is taken
into custody as a parole violator by execution of the
warrant.”); Munn Bey v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 824 F. Supp. 2d 144,
146 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Hence, the right to a revocation hearing
within a reasonable time is only triggered after the parole
violator warrant is executed, not when it is lodged, and when
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the defendant is taken into custody under that warrant, not any
other criminal warrant.” (citation omitted)). As the Supreme
Court stated in Moody,
[The] execution of the warrant and custody under that warrant [is] the operative event triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole revocation. This is a functional designation, for the loss of liberty as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is taken into custody under the warrant.
Moody, 429 U.S. at 87 (citations omitted). Detention following
the warrant’s execution is what implicates the defendant’s
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. The
right to a revocation hearing is triggered only after the
warrant is executed.
Similarly, there is no requirement that the Commission
execute a parole warrant before a defendant completes an
intervening sentence. The Commission may lodge a detainer
against a defendant and wait until after the defendant completes
the intervening sentence to execute the warrant. See, e.g.,
28 C.F.R. § 2.47(a) (“When a parolee is serving a new sentence
in a federal, state or local institution, a parole violation
warrant may be placed against him as a detainer.”); see also
Ramsey v. Reilly, 613 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (“If a
parolee is convicted of another crime while on parole and then
sentenced to prison, due process does not require that a parole
violator warrant be executed or that a parole revocation hearing
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be conducted until after the expiration of the new sentence.”
(citation omitted); Brooks v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 510 F. Supp.
2d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The Commission] has no obligation
to execute the warrant until petitioner completes his
intervening sentence.” (citations omitted)); Lyons v. CCA/Corr.
Treatment Facility, Civil Action No. 06-2008 (GK), 2007 WL
2007501, at *2 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (“It is not a violation of
a parolee’s due process rights to lodge a parole violator
warrant as a detainer and execute the warrant only after the new
sentence is completed.” (citations omitted)). Therefore,
Stewart did not have a due process right to a revocation hearing
before the warrant’s execution.5 In any event, the Commission
did hold an institutional revocation hearing in this matter on
November 5, 2014, a date shortly after the warrant was executed.
See 28 C.F.R. § 2.49(f) (“Institutional revocation hearings
shall be scheduled to be held within ninety days of the date of
the execution of the violator warrant upon which the parolee was
retaken.”).

Outcome: There is no basis for finding that the Commission’s special
parole violation warrant was issued unlawfully. Stewart neither
established any right to a revocation hearing before the warrant
was executed nor showed any unreasonable delay by the Commission
when it conducted the hearing after the warrant was executed.
Thus, Stewart’s petition is without merit, and his petition will
be denied. An appropriate final order accompanies this
memorandum opinion.

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Defendant's Experts:

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