Date: 01-04-2016

Case Style: State Of Connecticut v. Osbourne

Case Number: AC36182

Judge: Thomas G. West

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Plaintiff's Attorney: Rocco A. Chiarenza, Gail P. Hardy, Anthony Bochicchio

Defendant's Attorney: Jon L. Schoenhorn, Alex Gaudio

Description: The defendant, Antoine Osbourne, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,ofassaultinthefirstdegreeinviolationofGeneral Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence (1) photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s clothing, and (2) a hearsay statement of the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. OnOctober5,2011,atapproximately1a.m.,HuonHoward, the owner of the International Cafe ´ in Hartford, Glen Spyke, and employee, and six to eight others, including Richard Coombs, were standing in the rear parking lot of the cafe ´ as the cafe ´ was preparing to close.Howard,Spyke,andCoombsobservedthedefendant and two other men enter the rear lot through the back gate. The victim, Durie ‘‘Duey’’ Hemans, was standingaloneintherearpatioarea.HowardandSpyke witnessed the defendant approach the victim and engagehiminaverbalargument,whichtheyattempted to deescalate.1 Subsequent to the argument, the defendant shot the victimintheleg.Initiallythereafter,thevictimwasstill, but upon realizing he had been shot, he attempted to move inside the cafe ´. As the victim tried walking into the cafe ´, the defendant shot him two additional times. The victim then proceeded to enter the cafe ´ and make his way into the women’s restroom. The victim eventually was assisted by others into a vehicle and driven to the hospital. While at the hospital, the victim gave a statement to the police regarding the shooting. On the basis of their investigation, the police arrested and charged the defendant. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault in the first degree. Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed postverdict motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, reiterating certain objections made during the trial, which the court denied. The court rendered judgmentinaccordancewiththeverdictandsentenced thedefendanttofifteenyearsofincarceration,followed by five years of special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant first claims that the court improperly admittedphotographsofbloodfoundatthecrimescene and of the victim’s blood soaked clothing, arguing that the photographs were immaterial and prejudicial. Specifically, the defendant contends that (A) the photographswerenotrelevantbecausehewasnotcontesting that the victim was shot or where the victim went after the shooting, and (B) the limited probative value of the photographswas outweighedbytheir prejudicialeffect
becausethephotographsimproperlyinflamedtheemotions of the jury. The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant’s claim. During the state’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor offered into evidence a photograph that depicted blood trails leading to the back door of the cafe ´. The defendant objected to the admission of the photograph, and the court excused the jury. Outside of the presence of the jury, Valentine Olabisi,anofficerwiththeHartfordPoliceDepartment, identified four additional photographs depicting, respectively, a pool of blood near the front door of the cafe ´,abloodtrailleadingtowardthebathroom,another blood trail inside the cafe ´, and a pool of blood in the bathroom. Thedefendantarguedthattheonlypurposeforadmitting these photographs would be to inflame the jury, appeal to its emotions, and create a sense of sympathy for the victim, thus prejudicing the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant contended that such prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value of the photographs and that the fact that the victim was shot was not a contested matter. He argued that if the court was inclined to admit some of the photographs, admitting all of them was redundant. The state argued that the photographs were corroborative of the testimony of its later witnesses regarding where the victim was shot andwhoshothim,andalsosupportedaninferencethat the shooter intended toshoot the victim. Moreover, the state indicated that all of the jurors had been advised, during jury selection, that this was a case involving a shooting and that it would be logical for the jurors to expect that they would see photographs containing blood. The court examined the photographs at issue and found that none of the photographs was inflammatory orneedlesslygruesome,andthatthephotographswere relevant to the extent and painfulness of the alleged victim’s injuries. The court then concluded that the photographs had a logical tendency to aid the jury in determining the material facts in issue and that the photographsweremoreprobativethanprejudicial.Followingtheadmissionofthephotographsintoevidence, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction in which it stated, in part, ‘‘[y]ou must not allow emotion or sympathy to play a role in your decision and you must not allow the photographs to affect you in that way.’’ Laterinthetrial,duringthetestimonyofJeremyBall, a detective with the Hartford Police Department, the defendant objected to the state’s attempted admission of photographs of the victim’s blood soaked clothing and of clothing that depicted the location of the bullet holes. The court conducted another hearing outside of the jury’s presence. During the hearing, Ball identified the photographs as depicting the victim’s underpants,
an apparent bullet hole in the victim’s underpants, and the front and rear of the victim’s jeans. The defendant asserted that the photographs were upsetting and gory, depicted copious amounts of blood, and were both inflammatoryandimmaterialtoanydisputedissue.The state argued that it was required to prove the element of a physical injury and that the photographs were probative of both the victim’s actual injuries and of the defendant’s intent to inflict physical injury. Ultimately, the court did not ‘‘find anything remotely inflammatory’’ about any of the photographs. Subsequent to the admission of the photographs, the jury was again instructed in accordance with the previous limiting instruction. During the final charge to the jury, the court reiterated that sympathy was not to play a role in its deliberations. The court instructed the jury to pay close attention to its instructions, which included, in part, that the jury ‘‘must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices or sympathy.’’ The court subsequently reiterated twice that the jury should not allow sympathy or sentiment to affect its verdict. A The defendant argues that the court improperly admitted the photographs at issue because, at trial, he was not contesting the fact that the victim was shot or where he went after the shooting, only the identity of the shooter, therefore, the photographs were not relevant to any disputed issue in the case. We begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable standard of review and legal principles. ‘‘Our standard of review for evidentiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the courthasabuseditsdiscretionoraninjusticeappearsto have been done. . . . The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bunting v. Bunting, 60 Conn. App. 665, 670, 760 A.2d 989 (2000). ‘‘[S]ound discretion has long meant a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances andthe law,anddirected bythereason andconscience of the judge to a just result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Statev.Williams,195Conn.1,8,485A.2d570 (1985). Additionally, ‘‘[e]very reasonable presumption shouldbemadeinfavorofthecorrectnessofthecourt’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse ofdiscretion.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)State v. Rolon, 257 Conn. 156, 173, 777 A.2d 604 (2001). We note that ‘‘[e]vidence is relevant if it has any tendencytomaketheexistenceofanyfactthatismate
rialtothedeterminationoftheproceedingmoreprobable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . . Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive.All thatis requiredis thattheevidence tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, [as] long as it is not prejudicial . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 496–97, 964 A.2d 73 (2009). Here, the photographs were relevant because they supported the fact that the victim suffered a physical injury within the statutorily defined meaning of that term, and that the defendant had the requisite intent to inflict physical injury. Furthermore,ourSupremeCourthasrejectedsimilar arguments that the relevance of a piece of evidence is diminished because a defendant does not explicitly dispute a particular element of a crime. See State v. Johnson, 190 Conn. 541, 550, 461 A.2d 981 (1983). In Johnson,thecourt‘‘reject[ed]thedefendant’sassertion thattheelementsofintentandmotivewerenotatissue . . . because the defendant’s claim at trial was that he was not the individual who committed the crime.’’ Id., 550. The court in Johnson noted that ‘‘[t]he defendant did not offer an alibi defense [and therefore] [b]y his plea of not guilty the defendant put in issue every element of the crime charged.’’ Id. The court in Johnson further stated that ‘‘[t]he burden was on the state to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [and] the state was entitled to introduce such legally competent evidence.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id. Accordingly, although the defendant in the present case did not dispute that the victim had been shot, his plea of not guilty put in issue every element of the crime charged, and the state had the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[a] person is guilty of assault in the first degree when . . . (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.’’Accordingly,oneoftheelementsthatthestate wasrequiredtoproveunder§ 53a-59(a)(5)wasthatthe defendant caused physical injury to the victim. General Statutes§ 53a-3(3)defines‘‘physicalinjury’’as‘‘impairment of physical condition or pain.’’ Here, the court actedwithinitsdiscretionindeterminingthatthephotographs depicting the victim’s blood loss at the scene of the crime and the victim’s blood soaked clothing were relevant to establish the ‘‘painfulness of the victim’s injuries,’’ an issue that went to the element of whether
thestatehadprovena‘‘physicalinjury’’forthepurpose of§ 53a-59(a)(5)asthattermhasbeendefinedby§ 53a3 (3). Furthermore, the photographs were relevant as towhetherthedefendantpossessedtherequisiteintent of the crime charged. State v. James, 54 Conn. App. 26, 31, 734 A.2d 1012 (‘‘[a] person’s intent may be inferred from his conduct, as well as the surrounding circumstances’’), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 903, 738 A.2d 1092 (1999). The defendant also argues that because he did not object to the introduction of hospital records detailing thegunshotwoundsofthevictim,thephotographswere cumulative evidence of physical injury, and, therefore, unnecessary and should not have been admitted. This argument fails because ‘‘[t]here is no requirement in this state that a potentially inflammatory photograph be essential to the state’s case in order for it to be admissible;rather,thetest fordeterminingtheadmissibility of the challenged evidence is relevancy and not necessity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 227 Conn. 101, 111, 629 A.2d 402 (1993). Althoughthestatewasabletoofferthevictim’shospital records,itwasnotprecludedfromintroducingthephotographsintoevidence.Seeid.,111–12.(‘‘[t]heprosecution, with its burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is not to be denied the right to prove every essential element of the crime by the most convincing evidence it is able to produce’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Therefore, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the photographs to be relevant. B Additionally, the defendant argues in support of his claim that the photographs were improperly admitted thatthey weremore prejudicialthan probative.Specifically, the defendant contends that the photographs improperly inflamed the emotions of the jury. Section4-3oftheConnecticutCodeofEvidenceprovides: ‘‘Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’’‘‘Apotentiallyinflammatoryphotographmay be admitted if the court, in its discretion, determines that the probative value of the photograph outweighs the prejudicial effect it might have on the jury.’’ State v. Williams, supra, 227 Conn. 111. We note that ‘‘[t]he principles governing the admission of potentially inflammatory photographic evidence are clear. . . . [W]eadheretothegeneral rulethatphotographswhich haveareasonabletendencytoproveordisproveamaterial fact in issue or shed some light upon some material inquiry are not rendered inadmissible simply because they may be characterized as gruesome. . . . When,
however, an initial determination is made by the trial court that such photographs may have the tendency to prejudice or inflame the jury, the admissibility of such evidence is dependent upon the trial court’s determination as to whether their value as evidence outweighs their possible prejudicial effect. . . . Since the trial court exercises its broad discretion in such circumstances, its determination will not be disturbed on appealunlessaclearabuseofthatdiscretionisshown.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev.Walker,206 Conn. 300, 314–15, 537 A.2d 1021 (1988). Here, the court determined that the photographs depictingthepoolsandtrailsofthevictim’sbloodwere notmoreprejudicialthan probativebecausetheycould ‘‘depict the extent and painfulness of the alleged victim’s injuries’’ and demonstrated the ‘‘character, location and course of injury to prove not only that the victim was shot but the manner in which it had occurred.’’ With respect to the photographs showing thevictim’sbloodsoakedclothing,thecourtfoundthat there was nothing inflammatory about the images. Asnotedpreviously,thephotographswereprobative not only of the element of physical injury, but also of intent. ‘‘A person’s intent may be inferred from his conduct, as well as the surrounding circumstances’’; State v. James, supra, 54 Conn. App. 31; and, in the presentcase,thecrimechargedrequiredintenttocause physical injury to another person be proven. See GeneralStatutes§ 53a-59(a)(5).Thephotographsdepicting the pools of blood and the victim’s blood soaked clothing were probative of the defendant’s intent to cause physical injury. Furthermore, the photographs at issue in this case depicted pools and trails of blood and the victim’sbloodsoakedclothing;noneofthephotographs at issue depicted the victim himself. In this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determiningthattheprobativevalueofthephotographs outweighed any prejudicial effect.2 Additionally, the court gave limiting instructions to the jury prior to the introduction of both groups of photographs by the state, and again during its final charge, thus, further minimizing any potential of undue prejudice. The court cautioned the jury not to allow its decision to be influenced by any emotion or sympathy evokedfromviewingthephotographs.Therefore,inthis case, although the photographs admitted into evidence depicted blood found at the scene and the victim’s bloodyclothing,thetrialcourt’sdeterminationthatthey were more probative than prejudicial does not constituteanabuseofdiscretion.SeeStatev.Epps,105Conn. App.84,96,936A.2d701(2007),cert.denied,286Conn. 903, 943 A.2d 1102 (2008) In sum, on the basis of our review of the record, the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court decided to admit the subject photographs so arbitrarily
as to vitiate logic, or decided to admit the photographs based on improper or irrelevant factors; see State v. Jacobson, 283 Conn. 618, 627, 930 A.2d 628 (2007); and, thus, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in admitting the subject photographs. II Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly admitted part of Spyke’s prior written statement that he gave to the police. Specifically, he argues that the courtimproperlyadmitted‘‘thekeyportiondealingwith whether the defendant and Hemans were involved in an argument before the shooting’’ because it was not inconsistentwithSpyke’stestimonyattrial.3 Thedefendant further argues that ‘‘whether or not Spyke heard what he perceived to be an argument is wholly disconnected from any observations about a gun,’’ and that ‘‘thehearsayregardingtheargumentdidnotevenfollow sequentially in the document so as to suggest the need for context or ‘completeness.’ ’’ This argument, however, reveals that the defendant misconstrues the court’s ruling in admitting portions of the written statement. The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant’s claim. During the trial, on direct examination by the state, Spyke testified as to what he observed and heard outside of the cafe ´ on October 5, 2011. Spyke testified that he saw the victim outside the cafe ´ and heard ‘‘a little shouting’’ or ‘‘[a] little argument’’ between the victim and the defendant, but that he did not hear what was said. The state questioned Spyke regarding what he observed relating to theshooting,andSpyketestifiedthataftertheargument he heard a ‘‘pop’’ sound. Spyke further testified that he saw the defendant with his hand up, but that he did not see him with a gun. When the state questioned him aboutwhetherherecalledtellingthepolicethathesaw a gun in the defendant’s hand, Spyke maintained that he did not see a gun, but merely assumed that the defendant had a gun based upon the positioning of his hand. Spyke also denied that he told the police that the gunwas adarkcolor.The stateclaimedthat Spykewas testifying inconsistently with his sworn police statement, and attempted to offer the entire written statement as a prior inconsistent statement under Whelan forsubstantivepurposes.SeeStatev.Whelan,200Conn. 743, 752–54, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986). Spyke testified, however: ‘‘I’m saying the same thing I’m telling, that’s what’s in the statement.’’ Defense counsel objected to the admissibility of the statement in its entirety, claiming that only the portions of the statement that Spyke wasbeingquestionedaboutwereadmissible.Thecourt held a hearing outsidethe jury’s presence during which thestatearguedthatitwasashort,twopagestatement, it did not mention any prior bad acts or prejudicial
material, and the entire statement placed the events into context. The court then stated that only certain portions of the statement should be admitted. The state then provided a redacted copy of Spyke’s statement for admission under Whelan. The redacted written statement provided in relevant part: ‘‘[The defendant] said something like ‘[w]hat’s going on’ to Dewy.4Dewysaidsomethinglike‘Iwillcheckyoulater.’ Orsomethinglikethat.[Thedefendant]andDewywere shouting at each other at that point so I am not sure what else they were saying. . . . [The defendant] had his right hand down by his right leg and then all of a sudden he tilted his hand up and I saw that [the defendant] was holding a gun in his right hand. The gun was dark colored. I then saw [the defendant] pick up his right hand with the gun and pointed it toward Dewy. [The defendant] then shot Dewy. I heard about three shots.’’5 The court noted that the first paragraph offered by thestatecontainedthestatement:‘‘[Thedefendant]said something like ‘[w]hat’s going on’ to Dewy. Dewy said something like ‘I will check you later,’ ’’ and that this statement should be admitted. The defendant objected on the grounds that this portion of the statement was consistent with Spyke’s testimony. The state argued that it was inconsistent because Spyke had testified that he could not hear what the defendant and the victim had been saying to one another. The court ruled that this portion was inconsistent with Spyke’s testimonyandnotedthatthedefendantcouldcross-examine Spyke on the scope of the inconsistency. Accordingly, the statement was admitted as substantive evidence pursuant to Whelan. The court also admitted the next two sentences immediatelyfollowing,whichread,‘‘[o]rsomethinglike that. [The defendant] and Dewy were shouting at each other at that point so I am not sure what else they were saying.’’ The court admitted these sentences in order to place the first portion of the statement into context pursuant to State v. Arthur S., 109 Conn. App. 135, 141, 950A.2d615(holdingconsistentportionsofstatements thattrialcourtadmittedwere necessarytoplaceinconsistentstatementsintocontext),cert.denied,289Conn. 925, 958 A.2d 153 (2008). Inthestate’sclosingargument,theprosecutorargued that the proof of an argument between the defendant and the victim was probative of the element of intent, and that, although motive did not need to be proven, the jury could find that evidence of such an argument providedamotive.Defensecounsel,inherclosingargument, reminded the jury that there was no consistent testimony regarding any alleged argument between the defendant and the victim. In the state’s rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the redacted copy of Spyke’s statement to police was proof that an argument
occurred between the defendant and the victim. ‘‘As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard by which we review the trial court’s determinations concerning the exclusion of evidence.’’ State v. Billie, 250Conn.172,180,738A.2d586(1999).‘‘[T]headmissibility of evidence, including the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to Whelan, is a matter within the . . . discretion of the trial court. . . . [T]he trial court’s decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done. . . . On review by this court, therefore, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634, 643, 945 A.2d 449 (2008). ‘‘It is well settled that, [a]n out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and is generally inadmissible unless an exception to the general rule applies. . . . In State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. 743, however, [our Supreme Court] adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated,whenthedeclaranttestifiesattrialandissubject to cross-examination. This rule has also been codified in § 8-5(1) of theConnecticut Code ofEvidence, which incorporates all of the developments and clarifications oftheWhelanrulethathaveoccurredsinceWhelanwas decided.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, supra, 286 Conn. 641–42. Our review of the court’s admission of evidence ‘‘is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reachedtheconclusionthatitdid.’’Statev.Billie,supra, 250 Conn. 180. ‘‘This standard does not vary for the court’s determination of whether two statements are inconsistent. . . . Whether there are inconsistencies between the two statements is properly a matter for the trial court. . . . In determining whether an inconsistency exists, the testimony of a witness as a whole, or the whole impression or effect of what has been said, must be examined.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prutting, 40 Conn. App. 151, 157, 669 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 922, 974 A.2d 1328 (1996). The defendant appears to argue that the first portion of Spyke’s written statement to the police, which the court admitted into evidence as a Whelan statement, was not inconsistent with his testimony at trial. The courtadmittedtheportionofSpyke’swrittenstatement providing,‘‘[thedefendant]saidsomethinglike‘[w]hat’s going on’ to Dewy. Dewy said something like ‘I will check you later,’ ’’ as a Whelan statement. The court based this decision on the fact that when Spyke was questioned at trial about whether he heard what the
defendant and Dewy were arguing about, he testified, ‘‘[n]o,Icouldn’tgetthewords.’’Therefore,itwaswithin thecourt’sdiscretiontodeterminethatthefirstportion of Spyke’s written statement was inconsistent with his testimony at trial. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the first portion of the written statement as a Whelan statement. Thedefendantalsoappearstobecontendingthatthe courtadmittedbothportionsofthestatementregarding theargumentinordertoprovidecontextfortheportion describing the defendant raising a gun. The basis for the court’s decision to admit the second portion of the statement regarding the argument, however, was toprovidecontextforthefirstportionofthestatement, whichthecourtadmittedunderWhelanasapriorinconsistent statement, as discussed previously. In order to place that inconsistency in context, the court admitted the second portion of Spyke’s prior written statement regarding the argument, namely that, ‘‘[the defendant] and Dewy were shouting at each other at that point so I am not sure what else they were saying.’’ Although thecourtdidadmittheportionofthewrittenstatement regardingthegunasapriorinconsistentstatementpursuant to Whelan, that was unrelated to the admission of the portions regarding the argument. ‘‘In general, the court should seek to avoid admitting evidence that is likely to confuse or mislead the jury. . . . The principle of affording the fact finder the proper context inwhich to consider statementsis codified in Connecticut Code of Evidence § 1-5 (a), which provides that ‘[w]hen a statement is introduced by a party, the court may, and upon request shall, require the proponent at that time to introduce any other part of the statement, whether or not otherwise admissible, that the court determines, considering the context of the first part of the statement, ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.’ This type of determination is largely dependent on the unique circumstancesineachcaseand,aswithevidentiaryissues in general, is best left to the sound discretion of the trialcourt.’’(Citationomitted.)Statev.ArthurS.,supra, 109 Conn. App. 140. Here, after admitting the first portion of the statement regarding the argument as a prior inconsistent statement, the court determined that the second portion was necessary to provide context for the first. In this case, the court thoughtfully and carefully reviewed, line by line, the entire statement that the statesoughttointroduceasanexhibit.Thecourtheard argument from both sides as to whether each line in question should be admitted. The court then admitted aredactedversionofthestatement,includingbothconsistent and inconsistent portions of the statement. It explained its reasoning in admitting the consistent portion in terms of establishing context for one of the
inconsistent portions. See id., 141 (holding that trial court exercised sound discretion when it took similar precautions). Given the court’s careful consideration of the statements at issue, the defendant has failed to establish that the court decided to admit the consistent portion of the statement regarding the argument so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or decided to admit the consistent portion based on improper or irrelevant factors.

Outcome: We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in admitting the statement. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the first portion of the written statement as a prior inconsistent statement under Whelan and the second portion as a consistent statement to provide context to the first. Accordingly, the defendant’s claims fail. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: