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Date: 03-27-2016

Case Style: State of Missouri, ex rel. Jodi Davis-Demars, v. The Honorable Chris Kunza

Case Number: ED103789

Judge: Roy L. Richter

Court: MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS EASTERN DISTRICT

Plaintiff's Attorney: Leah Womack Askey

Defendant's Attorney: Thomas E. Crocco

Description: Davis-Demars was sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, some consecutive to each other, some concurrently with other sentences and ordered that she be placed in the
Department of Corrections' ("Department") long-term treatment program pursuant to Section
217.362. Pursuant to the trial court's judgment, Davis-Demars was placed in a twelve-month
long-term treatment program in October of 2014. Prior to her completion of the program, the
Department issued a court report investigation advising the trial court that Davis-Demars would
be released on probation on October 30, 2015. On October 16, 2015, Respondent issued the
following order:
The above named Defendant/Offender will have completed a program pursuant to 217.362 RSMo. The Court now orders supervision of the offender by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole effective FEBRUARY 1, 2016, for a term of five (5) years with the attached Special Conditions. (emphasis in the original)
Davis-Demars then filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus from this Court
compelling Respondent to vacate her order of October 16, 2015 and further Order of December
1, 2015 and issue a new order that complies with the provisions of Section 217.362. On
December 21, 2015 we entered a Preliminary Order in Mandamus.
II. DISCUSSION
Much of the following is taken directly from Judge Norton’s opinion in State ex rel. Salm
v. Mennemeyer, 423 SW 3d 319 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) without further attribution:
Pursuant to article V, Section 4 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction
to issue original remedial writs. "Mandamus is a discretionary writ that is appropriate where a
court has exceeded its jurisdiction or authority and where there is no remedy through appeal.
"State ex rel. Poucher v. Vincent, 258 S.W. 3d 62, 64 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotation
omitted).
Davis-Demars argues that, pursuant to Section 217.362.3, Respondent was required, upon
Davis-Demars’ successful completion of the long-term treatment program, to either: (1) allow
her to be released on probation; or (2) issue an order executing her sentences. She contends that
Respondent exceeded her authority by delaying her release from custody from October 30, 2015
following her successful completion of the long-term treatment program to February 1, 2016.
We agree.
Pursuant to Section 217.362.2, "the court may sentence a person to the [long-term
treatment] program which shall consist of institutional drug or alcohol treatment for a period of
at least twelve and no more than twenty-four months, as well as a term of incarceration." Upon
successful completion of the program, an offender will be released on probation unless the court
determines that probation is not appropriate. Section 217.362.3. "If the court determines that
probation is not appropriate the court may order the execution of the offender's sentence. "Id.
Accordingly, upon an offender's successful completion of the long-term treatment program, the
trial court must: (1) allow the offender to be released on probation; or (2) determine that
probation is not appropriate and order the execution of the offender's sentence.
Here, Respondent issued an order purporting to begin probation on February 1, 2016.
Nothing in Section 217.362 gave Respondent the authority to delay Davis-Demars’ release from
custody beyond that which was already established by the Department. Upon Davis-Demars’
successful completion of the long-term treatment program, Section 217.362.3 required
Respondent to either allow her to be released on probation or determine that probation was not
appropriate and execute the sentences. Accordingly, Respondent exceeded her authority when
she ordered Davis-Demars to remain in custody until February 1, 2016.
We therefore make the Preliminary Order in Mandamus permanent and order Respondent
to vacate her orders of October 16, 2015 and December 1, 2015 and issue a new order that is
fully compliant with the limited authority granted to her by Section 217.362. Respondent has
determined that probation is appropriate, Respondent, under Section 217.362, is not required to
conduct a hearing.

Outcome: The Preliminary Order in Mandamus is made permanent. Respondent is hereby directed to vacate her orders of October 16, 2015 and December 1, 2015 and issue a new order that is fully compliant with the limited authority granted to her by Section 217.362. In issuing an order that is compliant with Section 217.362, Respondent is required to issue an order releasing Davis Demars on probation immediately.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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