Date: 03-28-2016

Case Style: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DANIEL B.*

Case Number: AC 36418

Judge: Alexandra D. DiPentima

Court: Connecticut Appellate Court

Plaintiff's Attorney: Ronald G. Weller, David I. Cohen, Maureen Ornousky

Defendant's Attorney: A. Paul Spinella, Philip Russell

Description: The defendant, Daniel B., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court unduly restricted his access to certain information regarding a confidential informant who testified at trial, (3) the court improperly limited the cross-examination of a witness by the defendant, and (4) the court provided improper instructions in its jury charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant married the victim in 2005. By late 2009, the marriage had begun to deteriorate. Approximately one year later, the defendant filed for divorce. Duringtherelevantperiod,thedefendantandthevictim lived in the same residence in Stamford. On June 9, 2011, the defendant called John Evans, a childhood friend, to arrange a meeting. At approximately3p.m.,thedefendantandEvansmetinaDunkin Donuts. At the outset of the meeting, the defendant asked Evans if he ‘‘knew anybody that could murder his wife as a hit man.’’ The defendant told Evans that he was getting a divorce and explained that his wife was ‘‘getting the house, the kids . . . and . . . trying to get some money . . . .’’ Although Evans tried to dissuadehim,thedefendantstatedthathadbeen‘‘thinking about it for two years, and he [had] made up his mind . . . [that] he needs [his wife murdered] . . . before his next court date.’’ The meeting concluded with Evans agreeing to ‘‘talk to a couple of people in New York and . . . see if [he] could arrange [a meeting with a hit man].’’On the same day, Evans called John Evensen, a retired Stamford police officer.1 Evans told Evensen that the defendant had requested that he find a hit man; Evensen urged Evans to ‘‘do the right thing’’ because it was ‘‘somebody’s life.’’ Evensen then told Evans that he would call someone to ‘‘see what he could do.’’ Later that evening, Evensen telephoned James Matheny, then commander of the bureau of criminal investigations of the Stamford Police Department, to convey the information provided by Evans. Matheny thenspokewithEvansdirectly.Afterthisconversation, Mathenydevelopedaplaninwhichthedefendantwould meet with an undercover police officer feigning to be ahitman.Aspartoftheplan,Evanscalledthedefendant to inform him that he had found a hit man from New York who wanted to speak with him that night. The defendant agreed to meet with the purported hit man, who was in fact Officer Michael Paleski, Jr., of the Branford Police Department.
ThemeetingbetweenthedefendantandPaleskitook place at a rest stop off Interstate 95 near Darien. The plan consisted of Paleski following Evans to the rest stop in a vehicle equipped with a hidden video camera. PaleskiandEvansarrivedfirstandwaitedforthedefendant, who arrived shortly after midnight on June 10, 2011. Evans introduced the defendant to Paleski and then returned to his car. The defendant entered Paleski’s vehicle where the hidden video camera recorded the murder for hire plot. After the meeting ended and Paleski had departed, the defendant was arrested. The defendant was charged with attempt to commit murder and violating a criminal protective order.2 Following an eight day jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the attempt to commit murder charge and not guilty of the violation of a protective order charge. The court sentenced him to twenty years of incarceration, suspended after fifteen years, followed by five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to prove that his conduct constitutedasubstantialstepinacourseofconductintended toculminateinamurder.Thus,heclaimsthatanessential element of § 53a-49 was not established.3 We do not agree. The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. The entire meeting between the defendant and Paleski lasted slightly more than sixteen minutes. During the meeting, three major points were discussed in the murder for hire plot. First, the defendant agreed to pay $10,000 for Paleski to murder his wife. The defendant also agreed to deliver $3000 as a down payment and $800 for a firearm the following morning because obtainingthemoneythatnightwouldcreatesuspicion.4 Second, when asked for information about the victim, the defendant readily provided his wife’s name, home address, place of employment and work schedule,5 as well as a photograph, explaining to Paleski that his wife’s hair color was different from what was depicted in the photograph.6 The final point discussed at the meeting focused on the method by which Paleski was to murder the defendant’s wife. The defendant had voiced his concern that heneededtobecautiousinthisillicitendeavorbecause he was ‘‘obviously the first person [that] . . . [was] going to be looked at [after his wife was murdered].’’ Paleski, then, explicitly asked the defendant how he wantedthemurderaccomplished.Thedefendantnoted that his wife’s place of employment was in a ‘‘rough section’’ of the city and that she drove a ‘‘nice car.’’
This information prompted Paleski to suggest that he could ‘‘make it look like a [carjacking] or something,’’ to which the defendant acknowledged, ‘‘[s]omething like that . . . take the car . . . [it] is going to get [found] and it kind of like explains it.’’ Paleski then soughtclarificationastotheresultdesiredbythedefendant, ‘‘[Y]ou want her completely out of the picture, right? Morte.’’ The defendant replied, ‘‘[T]hat’s where it’s getting to . . . .’’ The defendant then suggested a Thursday as a possible day for the murder because he would be with his children at his aunts’ house. Paleski concurred that he could ‘‘take the bitch off’’ when the defendant was with his aunts, and the defendant replied, ‘‘exactly.’’ The meeting concluded with the defendant and Paleski agreeing to meet the following day at 10 a.m. at the same location. The defendant iterated that, to be cautious, he was not going to use his phone. Rather, he would purchase a prepaid mobile phone to contact Paleski.Afterconfirmingthetimeandplaceofthemeeting where the defendant would bring the money, the defendant thanked Paleski, exited the vehicle, and promptly was taken into custody as soon as Paleski left the rest stop. The defendant’s claim on appeal is that his conduct was not a ‘‘substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission’’ of murder. General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2). He argues that in Connecticut, a ‘‘substantial step’’ requires an overt act that ‘‘must be more than mere preparation,’’ and such act ‘‘must be in close proximity to the actual crime and ‘comeprettynear’tocompletingthecrimebutforsome interference.’’ Thus, in contemplating what act constitutes a substantial step, ‘‘the focus is on what is left to be done not what has already been done.’’ Applying thisreasoning,thedefendantcontendsthatthemeeting with Paleski was ‘‘merely preparatory and did not constitute a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission of murder.’’ At best, the defendant argues, the meeting was a ‘‘mere solicitation, which, by itself, is never an attempt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We are not persuaded. We begin by recognizing that ‘‘[a] defendant who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an arduous burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leandry, 161 Conn. App. 379, 383, 127 A.3d 1115, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015). As to the standard of review for this claim, this court applies a two part test. ‘‘We first review the evidence presented at the trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . . [Second, we] thendeterminewhetherthe jurycouldhavereasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferencesreasonablydrawntherefrom,thatthecumulative effectoftheevidenceestablishedguiltbeyondareason
able doubt. . . . In this process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, inwhole orin part,of evidencethat iscircumstantial rather than direct. . . . The issue is whether the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justifytheverdictofguiltybeyondareasonabledoubt.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hanks, 39 Conn. App. 333, 338–39, 665 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 926, 666 A.2d 1187 (1995). The law relevant to an insufficiency of the evidence claim teaches that ‘‘the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidenceprovesthedefendantguiltyofalltheelements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 808, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007). We, however, are mindful that ‘‘[w]e do not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record. . . . Rather, we must defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor andattitude.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)State v.Damato,105Conn.App.335,344,937A.2d1232,cert. denied, 286 Conn. 920, 949 A.2d 481 (2008). Turning to the statutes applicable here, § 53a-54a (a) defines murder, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘A person is guilty of murder when, withintent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .’’ Section 53a-49 (a) defines criminalattempt,inrelevantpart,asfollows:‘‘Aperson is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he . . . (2) intentionally does . . . anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act . . . constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’ Furthermore, ‘‘[c]onduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step . . . unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-49 (b). It is noteworthy that ‘‘[w]hat constitutes a substantial step in any given case is a question of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osbourne, 138 Conn. App. 518, 528, 53 A.3d 284, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 937, 56 A.3d 716 (2012). Thus, in this case, to prove the defendant guilty of violating §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, the state had toprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthatthedefendant,
withtheintenttocausethedeathofhiswife,committed an act that was a substantial step aimed at achieving her death. A To dispose of the defendant’s argument and resolve his sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must review Connecticut’s criminal attempt statute. As implicitly acknowledged by the parties, our Supreme Court and this court have conflicting authority on what conduct constitutesasubstantialstep:specificallyastowhether the focus is on ‘‘what the actor has already done and notonwhatremainstobedone.’’(Emphasisinoriginal.) State v.Lapia,202Conn.509,515,522A.2d272(1987).7 In resolving this apparent contradiction in our case law, we begin with a review of § 5.018 of the Model Penal Code because § 53a-49 was modeled after it. See State v. Moreno-Hernandez, 317 Conn. 292, 303, 118 A.3d 26 (2015); see also id., 304 n.5 (comparing General Statutes § 53a-49 and Model Penal Code § 5.01). Because § 53a-49 stems, in part, from the Model Penal Code, the code’s comments are pertinent. See State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 372, 757 A.2d 36, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 764 (2000). The comments state that the Model Penal Code formulation of criminal attempt ‘‘shifts the emphasis from what remains to be done . . . to what the actor has already done.’’ 1 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1985) § 5.01, comment 6 (a), p. 329 (Model Penal Code and Commentaries). The significance, then, is that this ‘‘approach will broaden the scope of attempt liability.’’ Id.; see also 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2003) § 11.4 (e), p. 226 (‘‘[the Model Penal Code approach] will broaden the scope of attempt liability in a way which is consistent with the purpose of restraining dangerous persons, as: (1) the emphasis is upon what the actor has already done rather than what remains to be done; (2) liability will be imposed only if some firmness of criminal purpose is shown’’ [footnote omitted]). Althoughconflictingdecisionsexistinbothappellate courts,wenonethelessfindsupportinrecentConnecticut case law to frame our criminal attempt formulation in conformance with the Model Penal Code, i.e., the focus is on what the defendant has already done and not what remains to be done.9 In State v. Carter, 317 Conn.845,848,858,120A.3d1229(2015),thedefendant was convicted of attempt to commit assault in the first degree for aiming a firearm at a police officer’s midsection, followed by ‘‘position[ing] himself in a shooting stance and put[ting] his finger on the trigger guard.’’ The defendant challenged the conviction by claiming that it was not established that he had the requisite intent to commit this crime. Id., 848. One of the defendant’s arguments was that ‘‘there was insufficient evidence of intent because he never attempted to rack the
gun, and thus the gun would not have fired even if he had pulled the trigger.’’ Id., 860. In disposing of this argument, our Supreme Court made the following observation: ‘‘[W]hether the gun was racked or not seems to be beyond the point. The defendant’s claim that he did not rack the gun, even if true, would only support the proposition that he did not take the next step to complete the crime which, of course, is irrelevant to the inquiry whether he took a prior substantial step to commit the offense. Because the defendant was charged with attempt to commit assault, it was only necessary for him to take a substantial step under the circumstances as he believe[d] them to be . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 861. Our Supreme Court’s analysis thus focused on what the defendant already had done and not what remained to be done. Similarly, this court in State v. Osbourne, supra, 138 Conn. App. 528, explained that the standard for the substantial step element of criminal attempt ‘‘focuse[d] on what the actor has already done and not what remains to be done. . . . The substantial step must be at least the start of a line of conduct which will lead naturally to the commission of a crime. . . . What constitutesasubstantialstepinanygivencaseisaquestion offact.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Wefurther clarified that ‘‘[t]he ultimate measure of the sufficiency of the defendant’s conduct to constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of assault in the first degree is not, to reiterate, how close in time or place or final execution his proven conduct came to the consummation of that crime, but whether such conduct, if at least the start ofalineofconductleadingnaturallytothecommission of thecrime, strongly corroborated hisalleged criminal purpose.’’ Id., 530. Our reasoning in Osbourne, reinforced by the majority of appellate cases, our reading ofCarter,andtheModelPenalCode,supportourdetermination that to dispose of the defendant’s sufficiency oftheevidenceclaimbeforeus,wemustfocuson‘‘what the actor has already done and not what remains to be done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 528. B We now turn to the meritsof the claim. The evidence beforethejuryincludedEvans’testimonyandthevideo in which the defendant and Paleski plotted a murder for hire scheme. Through Evans, the state presented evidence that, if credited by the jury, established that the defendant sought his help to attain the services of a hit man. Furthermore, Evans testified that he tried to dissuade the defendant, but the defendant stated that he had been contemplating this course of action for ‘‘two years, and he [had] made up his mind . . . [that] he needs [his wife murdered] . . . before his next court date.’’
The state also presented the video recording of the meeting between the defendant and Paleski. The video allowedthejurytoobservetheconduct,demeanor,and attitude of the defendant as he agreed to hire Paleski to kill his wife. In a little more than one-quarter of an hour,thedefendantagreedtoaprice(toincludeadown payment and money for the murder weapon), provided Paleski with key information, namely, his wife’s name, home and work address, her work schedule, a description of her vehicle, and suggested a day, location, and manner for the murder to ensure that the defendant wouldhaveanalibi.Finally,thejuryalsosawthedefendant twice confirm to Paleski that he wanted his wife murdered. The defendant argues that because he did not pay Paleski his conduct was merely preparatory. Indeed, Paleski did state that he ‘‘can’t do shit without that money.’’ The defendant’s argument, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, the substantial step standard focuses of what he has already done, i.e., agreeing to hire a hit man and providing critical information about thevictim,andnotwhatremainstobedone,i.e.,paying the purported hit man. See State v. Osbourne, supra, 138 Conn. App. 528. Moreover, the mere fact that the defendant did not make a payment is not dispositive. See State v. Servello, supra, 59 Conn. App. 373 (‘‘Our Supreme Court has stated that the essential element of ahiringrelationshipisanagreementtocompensatethe [agent] for his services. . . . In interpreting the relevant section pertaining to hiring an agent to carry out a murder, we are concerned principally with adopting a construction . . . that effectuates the legislative intention, not with the technical niceties of contract law.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 5.01, comment (6) (a), p. 329 (‘‘[t]hat further major steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial’’). ‘‘To constitute a substantialstep,however,consummationof[payingthe hitman]isnotrequired.Anyotherinterpretationwould impose a requirement of a more stringent standard of proof for attempt than is provided by § 53a-49.’’ State v. Servello, supra, 375. Second, what constitutes a substantial step in any givencaseisaquestionoffact;Statev.Osbourne,supra, 138 Conn. App. 528; a point never addressed by the defendant. Mindful that we are not jurors and our role is limited to determining whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant took a substantialstepthatwasstronglycorroborativeofhiscriminal purpose, we must defer to the jury’s assessment of Evans’ credibility and evaluation of the video. We determine that it was reasonable for the jury to have concluded that the defendant took a substantial step
in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the murder of his wife.10 Thedefendant’ssecondargumentthathisconduct,at best, amounts to solicitation warrants little discussion. The state presented sufficient evidence concerning the defendant’sconductthatthejuryreasonablycouldhave concluded that it constituted a substantial step. See State v. Griggs, 288 Conn. 116, 131 n.18, 951 A.2d 531 (2008) (‘‘[a] conviction for attempted murder does not require a showing of actual injury, but only intentional conductthatconstitutesasubstantialsteptowardcausing the death of another’’). Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we determine that sufficient evidenceexistedforthejurytohavereasonablyconcluded that the cumulative effect of Evans’ testimony and the video established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with the intent to cause the death of his wife, committed a substantial step aimed at achieving hiswife’sdeathwhenhesoughttohireahitman,agreed to a price, provided critical information about the victim, and suggested the method by which to commit the murdertoensurehisalibi.Accordingly,thedefendant’s first claim must fail. II The defendant next claims that the court, White, J., abused its discretion by unduly restricting access to certain records regarding Evans’ role as a confidential informant.Specifically,thedefendantcontendsthatthe court should have made the confidential records available to him. We disagree. The following procedural history is relevant to this claim. In a letter sent to the state, the defendant sought ‘‘all pertinent information pertaining to [Evans],’’ namely, records that detailed Evans’ assistance in any investigation, a complete list of financial payments or benefits in connection with the defendant’s case and any other case in which the informant was involved, andallinformationlisting‘‘illicitactivities’’and‘‘allegationsofwrongdoing’’connectedtoEvans.Althoughthe state objected, the court ordered the state to ‘‘confer with the Stamford Police Department and hand over, under seal, any records it has in connection with . . . Evans.’’ The court directed that those records were to include, but not be limited to, ‘‘any financial payments made by [the] Stamford Police Department to . . . Evans in connection with his work as a [confidential informant] for the Stamford Police Department’’ and thesupervisor’slog.Uponreceiptofthesealedrecords, the court conducted an in camera review and, at a hearing,disclosedtothedefendantthat‘‘Evansworked as a [confidential informant] for the Stamford Police Department on eight occasions between . . . August of 2006 and June of 2011.’’ The court, however, noted
that these records failedto indicate whether Evans had been paid. Therefore, the court ordered the state a secondtimetodeterminewhetherEvanshadbeenpaid anything, observing that ‘‘the defense is entitled to that information.’’ The state complied with the court’s second order. The Stamford Police Department sent a letter that was reviewed in chambers and not shown to defense counsel. At the subsequent hearing, the court explained that the letter indicated that there were ‘‘no written records regarding payments made to . . . Evans over the period of time for which he worked as a [confidential informant]. . . . [T]he letter [also] indicate[d] that there were payments made to . . . Evans for gas and food. None of the payments exceeded thirty dollars. The payments [were] not broken down as to each time . . . Evans worked as an informant.’’ Importantly, the court stated that the letter indicated that Evans ‘‘didn’t receive any payment in connection with [the defendant’s] case.’’ When the court ruled that the records were to be sealed, defense counsel objected. He wanted to question the police officers who furnished the information contained in the sealed letter. The court denied this request and noted to defense counsel that, ‘‘for most part, [the court] granted [defense counsel’s disclosure] motion,’’ which had not sought a disclosure of who were the police officers involved in the undercover operation.Thecourt,whileaddressingdefensecounsel, summarized its ruling as follows: ‘‘You know who the person you claim is a [confidential informant], you know the person’s identity. You know how often [Evans] worked with the Stamford Police Department. . . . You know something about the payments that were made . . . .’’ The defendant claims on appeal that because Evans’ credibility wasessential tothe case, therecords ‘‘might [have] contain[ed] exculpatory information especially relevanttoEvans’credibility.’’Therefore,thedefendant argues, he needed full access to the confidential records. We have reviewed the sealed records, and we do not agree with the defendant. The standard of review and principles of law that guide our analysis are well established. We review a court’s decision to not release confidential records under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 256, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005); see also State v. Delgado, 64 Conn. App. 312, 319, 780 A.2d 180 (2001), aff’d, 261 Conn. 708, 805 A.2d 705 (2002). ‘‘This court has the responsibility to conduct its own in camera review of the sealed records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to release those records to the defendant. . . . The linchpin of the determination of the defendant’s access to the records is whether they sufficiently disclose material especially probative of the ability to comprehend, know and correctly relate the truth . . . so as to justify breach of their confidentiality . . . . Whether and to what extent access to the records should be grantedtoprotectthedefendant’srightofconfrontation mustbedeterminedonacasebycasebasis.’’(Citations omitted;internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev.Delgado, supra, 64 Conn. App. 319; see also State v. Webb, 75Conn.App.447,458,817A.2d122(assertingthatthis court has responsibility to conduct its own in camera inspection of sealed records), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 919, 822 A.2d 244 (2003). ‘‘At this stage in the proceedings, when the court has reviewed the records in camera, access to the records must be left to the discretion of the trial court which is better able to assess the probative value of such evidence as it relates to the particular case before it . . . and to weigh that value against the interest in confidentiality of the records.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado, supra, 320. We have conducted our own in camera inspection of the sealed records. On the basis of that review, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. The court properly disclosed the relevant information to the defendant, namely, that Evans had worked as a confidential informant on eight occasions, and that, althoughthesealedrecordsdidnotlistthespecificpast instances, Evans was previously compensated a petty amountandnotcompensatedforhisparticipationinthe defendant’scase.Moreover,thesealedrecordsfailedto contain any exculpatory evidence. Our review of the records reflects that the court properly exercised its discretion in denyingthe defendant access tothe confidential records. See State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 436, 957 A.2d 852 (2008) (‘‘[a] criminal defendant does not have the right to conduct a general fishing expeditionintoprivilegedorsensitiverecords’’[internalquotation marks omitted]). Thus, the defendant’s claim must fail. III The defendant also argues that the court improperly limited his cross-examination of Evans regarding his relationship with certain police officers.11 The defendant contends that this ruling violated his federal and stateconstitutionalrightstoconfrontationandhisright topresentadefense,or,inthealternative,wasanabuse of discretion resulting in harmful error. Because the defendant had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Evans to challenge his credibility and potential bias, we reject the defendant’s argument. The following facts and procedural history are relevant here. After the court, White, J., ordered certain
records regarding Evans’ status as a confidential informant sealed; see part II of this opinion; the state filed a motion in limine on the eve of trial requesting certain limitations on the defendant’s cross-examination of Evans. Specifically, the state sought, inter alia, that the defendant ‘‘be limited to inquire about [Evans’] contact with the Stamford police in this case alone.’’ Ontheseconddayoftrial,thecourt,Hudock, J.,held a hearing on the state’s motion. The state requested thatthecourthavedefensecounsel‘‘delineatethequestions he plan[ned] to ask . . . Evans regarding his prior contact with the Stamford Police Department and rule whether or not those require him to be less specific in order for the court not to run into a conflict with the public policy interests in this case . . . .’’ Defense counsel stated that he sought to inquire into Evans’ expectationofmonetarycompensationorotherconsiderationinconnectionwiththiscase.Thecourtexplicitly stated that it did not ‘‘have a problem with [defense counsel] asking about expectations . . . [or] payments.’’ Defensecounselalsoarguedthatthedefendant’sconfrontation rights afforded him wider latitude in crossexamining Evans. Citing a 1977 case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit12 and its progeny, the defendant argued that because Evans was aconfidentialinformant,hehad‘‘anopendooroncredibility and on expectation of payment’’ during the crossexamination.Specifically,thedefendantsoughttoquestion Evans about a specific police officer by name and ‘‘one particular unit . . . within the Stamford Police Department.’’ The court denied this request. After the arguments concluded, the court observed that it needed to balance the defendant’s right to confrontEvansagainstpublic policyconcerns,namely,the police department’s need for information from confidentialinformantsaswellEvans’safety.Ultimately,the court ruled that the defendant could inquire as to the following: (1) ‘‘the fact that . . . Evans was engaged in criminal investigations’’; (2) ‘‘how many investigations there were, over what period of time’’; (3) ‘‘moneys received from the Stamford Police Department’’; (4) ‘‘expectation [of financial reward] in this particular case’’; and (5) ‘‘[any] other consideration, [if there was] . . . a good faith basis.’’ At trial, the defendant extensively cross-examined Evans.HeestablishedthatEvanshadworkedasaconfidential informant for the Stamford Police Department. When pressed by the defendant, Evans could not recall when he first worked as an informant for the Stamford police department, or on how many occasions he providedthepolicewithinformation.Regardingcompensation,Evanstestifiedthathehadbeencompensatedonly with ‘‘gas money,’’ and was adamant that he had ‘‘never [taken] any money from [the police] besides [gas
money].’’Evansdidconcedethatamemberofthepolice department had ‘‘ripped up’’ a speeding ticket. Also, Evans testified that a police officer had written him a letterofrecommendationinsupportofhisbailenforcement agent license application.13 Finally, when asked— on two separate occasions—whether he had been paid or expected to be paid in either money or some other form of compensation, Evans unequivocally answered in the negative. Thestandardofreviewtodeterminewhetheradefendant’s right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted is well settled. ‘‘The general rule is that restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . but this discretion comes intoplay only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment. . . . We must, therefore, conduct a two-step analysis, determining first whether the cross-examination permitted to defense counsel comported with sixth amendment standards . . . and second, whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the scope of that cross-examination. . . . The constitutional standard is met when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which[the]jurors,asthesoletriersoffactandcredibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reeves, 57 Conn. App. 337, 346, 748 A.2d 357 (2000). ‘‘To establish an abuse of discretion, [the defendant] must show that the restrictions imposed upon [the] cross-examination were clearly prejudicial. . . . Once itisestablishedthatthetrialcourt’srulingonthescope of cross-examination is not constitutionally defective, this court will apply [e]very reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 346–47. Our analysis is also guided by the following principles. ‘‘The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying. . . . Cross-examination to elicit factstending to show motive,interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted.’’(Citationsomitted;internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 343–44. We are mindful that, ‘‘[g]enerally speaking, the [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985). Thus, ‘‘[i]n determining whether a defendant’s right
of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reeves, supra, 57 Conn. App. 345–46. The defendant’s reliance on State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 618 A.2d 32 (1992), is misplaced. Our SupremeCourtin Santiago heldthatthetrialcourthad violatedthedefendant’sconstitutionalrighttoconfrontation by improperly limiting his cross-examination of one of the state’s witnesses. Id., 326. The witness in that case was a former Hartford police officer who testified to knowing two of the detectives who respondedtotheshootingincidentinwhichthemurder at issue had occurred. Id., 330. When the defendant soughttoquestionthewitness‘‘astowhatrelationship, ifany,hepresentlyhadwiththeHartfordpolicedepartment,’’ the state objected and the court sustained the objection. Id. The court in Santiago concluded that the trial court ‘‘improperly prohibited inquiry into a legitimate area of cross-examination . . . [because] [i]t is always relevant to the issue of bias that a witness may have a relationship to the prosecuting authorities in a criminal case.’’ Id., 332. Our Supreme Court further explained that because the witnesses’ testimony was criticaltothefindingofguilt,thetrialcourt’s‘‘improper limitation on the defendant’s cross-examination . . . require[d] reversal . . . .’’ Id., 334. The facts of this case, however, are distinguishable and do not require a similar result. UnlikethedefendantinSantiago,thedefendanthere was allowed to inquire into Evans’ past connections with the Stamford Police Department. Although Evans wasuncertainastowhenhefirstworkedasaconfidential informant and as to how many instances he did so, the defendant was allowed to cross-examine Evans on his previous work as a confidential informant for the Stamford Police Department. More importantly, the defendant elicited testimony that the Stamford Police Department, in the past, had bestowed Evans with favorable treatmentby ‘‘ripp[ing] up’’ aspeeding ticket, as well as providing him a letter of recommendation for his bail enforcement agent license application. As the sole trier of fact, the jury was free to believe Evans’ claim that he received only ‘‘gas money’’ as compensation for his efforts as a confidential informant and that he had not been paid or expected compensation in connection with this case. We conclude that the defendant’s cross-examination of Evans satisfied the constitutional requirements. The recorddemonstratesthatthedefendantwasgivensufficientopportunitytocross-examineEvansregardinghis motive and bias for testifying. The record is clear that
the defendant elicited a sufficient amount of informationtoaidthejuryinassessingEvans’credibility.Thus, the jury was presentedwith sufficient facts from which it could determine the reliability of Evans’ testimony. Furthermore, the court did not unduly restrict the defendant’s cross-examination of Evans. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the inquiry asit did.Thecourtwas facedwithbalancing theprobative value of the evidence that could have been elicited from Evans against the state’s public policy concerns, namely, the police department’s need for information fromconfidentialinformantsaswellasensuringEvans’ safety. The court’s ruling provided sufficient latitude forthedefendanttocross-examineEvansonthe‘‘issues [that were] actually litigated at trial’’; State v. Reeves, supra,57Conn.App.346;byaffordinghimtheopportunity to inquire into Evans’ relationship with the Stamford Police Department as evidenced by Evans’ testifying to two occasions of favorable treatment.14 Therefore, this argument must fail. IV The defendant’s final claimis that the court provided improperinstructionstothejury.Specifically,heargues that the court failed to properly instruct the jury on the crime of attempt to commit murder and on the defense of entrapment. We address each in turn. We first set forth the relevant law governing the defendant’s improper jury instruction claim. The standard of review for claims of instructional impropriety is well established. ‘‘When reviewing the challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurateuponlegalprinciplesastheopinionsofacourt of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to thejuryinsuchawaythatinjusticeisnotdonetoeither party under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . wewillnotviewtheinstructionsasimproper.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griggs, supra, 288 Conn. 124. ‘‘We will reverse a conviction only if, in the context of the whole, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict. . . . A jury instruction is constitutionally adequate if it provides the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements ofthecrimecharged,andaffordsthemproperguidance fortheirdeterminationofwhetherthoseelementswere present. . . . An instruction that fails to satisfy these requirementswouldviolatethedefendant’srighttodue process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend
ment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . The primary purpose of the charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which they might find to be established. . . . The purpose of a charge is to call the attention of the members of the jury, unfamiliar with legal distinctions, to whatever is necessary and proper to guide them to a right decision in a particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 125–26. A The defendant claims that the court’s charge to the jury ‘‘lacked sufficient guidance . . . on what constitutes a ‘substantial step’ . . . .’’ Specifically, he argues that he was found guilty because the court did not ‘‘explicitly define and give examples’’ of what constitutesa‘‘substantialstep’’bylistingthoseexamplesprovided in § 53a-49 (b).15 Thefollowingfactsprovidethecontextforthisclaim. After both parties submitted their requests to charge, thecourtprovidedthepartieswiththeproposedcharge for the attempt count at the charging conference. Defense counsel took a ‘‘strenuous exception,’’ arguing that the proposed charge—by leaving out the specific examples provided in the statute—would confuse the jury because it could not ‘‘appreciate the level of proximity to the death of the victim and the severity of the conduct toward achieving that goal.’’ As a result, the defendant argued, it would be a ‘‘miscarriage of justice not to read’’ the examples. On appeal, the defendant relies on State v. Washington, 15 Conn. App. 704, 546 A.2d 911 (1988), for the proposition that he was ‘‘entitled to fact specific requests to charge, as well as a definition, or at least guidance from the trial court as to what does and what doesnotconstituteasubstantialstepundertheattempt statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The state counters that the jury instruction was accurate and almost verbatim to the criminal jury instruction provided by the Judicial Branch; thus, the jury charge did not mislead the jury. Moreover, the state argues, it was within the court’s discretion not to provide the examples listed in the statute. We agree with the state. Thedefendant’scontentionthatStatev.Washington, supra, 15 Conn. App. 704, entitles him to his requested jury charge is faulty. The defendant in Washington argued on appeal that the court erred in reading § 53a49 (b) in its entirety to the jury because only three of the seven listed examples were relevant to his case. Id., 708–709. Thus, the defendant contended, the jury was ‘‘misled and confused’’ when it had to consider irrelevant statutory examples because the instructions ‘‘invited[thejury]toconsidertheoriesofliabilityunsupportedbytheevidence.’’Id.,709.ThecourtinWashington did not agree, noting that it had ‘‘no doubt that the
court’s instructions . . . aided the jury in understanding the difficult concept of what constitutes a substantial step.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 710. Washington holdsthat itis permissible,but notmandatory, for a court to read the ‘‘irrelevant statutory examples [provided in § 53a-49 (b)] . . . as illustrations’’ because those examples are not intended to be ‘‘various statutory bases of liability . . . .’’ Id. In the fourteenappellatedecisionscitingWashingtonasofthe date of this opinion, not one suggests that it mandates courtstoreadthestatutoryexamplesprovidedin§ 53a49 (b). We decline the defendant’s invitation to expand our holding in Washington. We conclude that the charge was proper. The court’s instructions mirrored the language of the statute.16 See GeneralStatutes§ 53a-49(a);seealsoStatev.LoSacco, 11 Conn. App. 24, 29–30, 525 A.2d 977 (finding no error in jury charge when judge read statute verbatim), cert. denied, 204 Conn. 812, 528 A.2d 1158 (1987). Also, the charge was taken nearly verbatim from the criminal juryinstructionprovidedbytheJudicialBranch.17 ‘‘This court has noted that [w]hile not dispositive of the adequacy of the [jury] instruction, an instruction’s uniformity with the model instructions is a relevant and persuasive factor in our analysis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leandry, supra, 161 Conn. App. 396–97. Moreover, the commentary to the jury instruction advises the court that it ‘‘may, if it so chooses, and if supported by the evidence, provide an example of what is a ‘substantial step.’ ’’ Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2008) § 3.2-2, commentary(Rev.toDecember1,2007[modifiedNovember 17, 2015]), available at http://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/ Part3/3.2-2.htm (last visited March 23, 2016). The defendant’s argument that the jury’s deliberations were ‘‘clouded by speculation’’ because the court didnotprovidethestatutoryexamplesisitselfspeculative. ‘‘Jurors are expected to bring their common sense and common experience to the deliberation process.’’ State v. Padua,273Conn.138, 159,869A.2d 192(2005). Inapplyingitsownreasoning,thejuryreasonablycould have concluded that the defendant’s conduct, namely, ‘‘seekingashooter,meetingwithhimtoplanthemurder of his [wife], and establishing a time later . . . to make the first of three payments pursuant to the defendant’s plan,’’ constituted more than mere preparation. The charge was proper and the jury was not misled. Therefore, this claim must fail. B The defendant next claims that the court provided aninadequatejuryinstructiononthedefenseofentrapment in contravention of General Statutes § 53a-15.18 The following facts are necessary to resolve this claim. Late on the sixth day of trial, after the court
provided both parties with a preliminary charge and discussed it in chambers, the court held a charging conference. At that time, the court acknowledged that the defendant was using entrapment as a defense. Specifically,thecourtnotedthatthedefendantwasarguing that because Evans was a bail enforcement agent and a previous confidential informant, he should be considered a ‘‘government agent for purposes of this prosecution.’’ The following day, after the court read the entrapment chargeto thejury,19 thedefendant objected on the ground that the court, in substituting ‘‘government agent or police officer’’ in its charge, would confusethejury.Thedefendantarguedthat‘‘publicservant or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant’’ should have been read throughout the charge. The state countered that the charge, as given, followed the model jury instruction and provided proper guidance to the jury. The court ruled that the charge, as given, was proper. On appeal, the defendant makes a similar claim. Specifically, he argues that the jury charge was defective becauseitexcludedEvansfromthecategoryofpersons who may have ‘‘induced’’ the defendant to commit the crime. As characterized by the defendant, this charge was ‘‘constitutionally infirm [because] . . . [the] court’sjuryinstructionunconstitutionallynarrowedthe breadth of the statute to exclude Evans.’’ Thus, the defendant argues, the jury was misled. We disagree. In resolving this final issue, we are guided by the following principles. ‘‘A defendant’s right to present a defense is of constitutional dimension. Thus, [w]here the legislature has created a legally recognized defense . . . [due process requires] a proper jury instruction on the elements of the defense . . . so that the jury may ascertain whether the state has met its burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . When the evidence presented at trial, construed in the light most favorable to the defendant, supports such a defense, a charge on the defense is obligatory.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Riley, 159 Conn. App. 462,477–78, 123 A.3d 123, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 949, 125 A.3d 528 (2015). Our review of the jury charge, read as a whole, leads ustoconcludethatitwasproper.First,thecourtbegan its instruction by reading a nearly verbatim version of the statute on the defense of entrapment. Second, the charge followed the model jury instruction,20 which we have stated is ‘‘a relevant and persuasive factor in our analysis.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leandry, supra, 161 Conn. App. 397. Third and finally, the defendant provides no case law, nor did we find any Connecticutcase, supporting his argumentthat the term‘‘governmentagentorpoliceofficer’’inthecontext of an entrapment charge misleads a jury. There are, however, Connecticut cases that use the term ‘‘govern
ment agent’’ to explain our entrapment law. See State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 79, 640 A.2d 553 (1994) (‘‘[w]here the [g]overnment has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue . . . the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt thatthedefendantwasdisposedtocommitthecriminal act prior to first being approached by [g]overnment agents’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 5, 89 A.2d 219 (1952) (‘‘if the evil intentand the criminaldesign originate inthe mind of the government agent and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged . . . no conviction may be had’’); State v. Nero, 122 Conn. App. 763, 784–85, 1 A.3d 184 (2010) (‘‘[i]n their zeal to enforce the law . . . [g]overnment agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the [g]overnment may prosecute’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Outcome: Thus, in this case, the jury instruction on the elements of the defense of entrapment was proper and did not mislead the jury. Accordingly, the defendant’s final argument must fail. The judgment is affirmed.

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