Date: 04-11-2016

Case Style: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY D., SR.

Case Number: SC 19382

Judge: Dennis G. Eveleigh

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court.

Plaintiff's Attorney: Kathryn W. Bare, Gail P. Hardy, Robin D. Krawczyk

Defendant's Attorney: Alan Jay Black

Description: The sole issue in this certified appeal1 is whether, under the facts of the present case, the trial courtproperly denied the oral motion of the defendant, Anthony D., Sr., to withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting a further inquiry into the underlying basis of his motion. The defendant appeals fromthe judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), rendered following the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea.2 See State v. Anthony D., 151 Conn. App. 109, 110–11, 94 A.3d 669 (2014). On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court had conducted a sufficient inquiry concerning the defendant’s motion to withdraw. We conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to a further inquiry into the basis of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the facts of the present case and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following undisputed facts and procedural history.‘‘The defendant was arrested and charged with several crimes related to his sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s child, with whom he had lived since the child was five years old. On December 5, 2011, the evidentiary portion of the defendant’strialcommenced,and,onthatday,thestate presented six witnesses, including the then fifteen year old victim, who testified extensively about the defendant’s sexual abuse, which began when she was six years old. On December 6, 2011, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession to the police, in which he had admitted to sexuallyabusingthevictim.Followingthecourt’sdenial ofthatmotion,thedefendantenteredaguiltypleaunder the Alford doctrine to one count of sexual assault in the first degree . . . and the state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi for each of the remaining criminal charges. The parties agreed to a sentence of ten years incarceration, with a five year mandatory minimum, followed by ten years of special parole.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 111. ‘‘Before accepting the defendant’s plea, the [trial] court . . . conducted a canvass of the defendant in which it asked the defendant if he understood the plea agreement, if he had discussed his plea with his attorney, if he understood the nature of an Alford plea and agreed that there was a likelihood of being found guilty if he went to trial, if he agreed that he likely would get agreatersentenceifheproceededtocompletehistrial, if he was pleading guilty to avoid the risk of trial, and if he understood that he was giving up his right to have
the state prove the charges against him, to confront witnesses and to testify on his own behalf. The defendantansweredyestoeachofthesequestions.Additionally, the defendant acknowledged that he was not threatened or forced to enter his plea, that no one had made any promises to him other than the plea agreement, and that he was acting of his own free will. ‘‘When the court explained the charge of first degree sexualassaulttothedefendant,hestatedthatheunderstood the charge but that he did not agree. The court again explained the Alford plea and again asked the defendant if he understood and still agreed that there was a likelihood that he would get a longer sentence if convicted after trial. The defendant said yes. The court then explained the sex offender registration and treatment requirements to the defendant, and he acknowledged thathe understoodthem. Thecourt proceeded to ask the defendant if he knew that he would besubjecttorandomsearches,polygraphexaminations and electronic monitoring; the defendant offered an inaudible response, and the court asked him if he had any questions for his attorney. The defendant responded by saying that ‘nothing that I ask is gonna change anything.’ The court then stated that it understood the defendant’s point, but wanted to know if the defendant had any questions that he wanted to ask his attorney about what was occurring or about anything of a legal nature. The defendant said no. The court proceeded to accept the plea and to explain to the defendant that the agreement was binding and that the defendant could not come back and change his mind. ‘‘On December 16, 2011, the defendant returned to the [trial] court for his sentencing hearing . . . . At the start of the hearing, the following colloquy took place: ‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: . . . I’m sorry, before we begin, I understand that we are here for sentencing. I’ve met with [the defendant]. He is expressing to me concernsoverthemannerin whichhewasrepresented andis askingthathebe permittedtowithdraw hisplea. ‘‘ ‘The Court: Okay. ‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: Under those circumstances, it would be my application to the court on his behalf that new counsel be appointed to investigate his claim. ‘‘ ‘The Court: With respect to it, the court does not believe that there is any factual basis for it. This was thecourtthattooktheplea.Thiswasdoneinthemiddle ofevidence.[Ifthedefendant]want[s]toclaimatatime after that this was ineffective [assistance] or somehow coerc[ive] [he] can have a habeas proceeding. But, [defense counsel], as an officer of the court, do you knowofanydefectinthatpleacanvassthatwouldallow the court to, in fact, take back the plea at this time? ‘‘ ‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I think that I need to be precise in my language. The canvass itself I think
was quite thorough. ‘‘ ‘The Court: Right. I mean, we went back and forth. And my recollection was that I repeatedly advised him that this was a permanent agreement and that it could not be changed . . . . ‘‘ ‘[U]nless you can point out some defect, I am not inclinedtohavehimwithdrawhisplea,noramIinclined for purposes of an agreed sentencing to delay the sentencing, given the fact that the complainants are here. And . . . there was even the agreement, I believe, of the waiver of the [presentence investigation report] at the time. And the court wanted some record for probation;otherwise,thesentencewouldhavebeenimposed on the date of the plea. ‘‘ ‘So . . . while there may be reasons postjudgment for a different counsel, at this time, I am not going to grant your motion to withdraw because there is no prejudice. This is an agreed sentence. So, unless the court were going to give more and [defense counsel] had to persuade me to give less to maintain the agreement, there is no reason that [defense counsel] is notstandingnexttoyoutodayforanagreeddisposition. . . . All right. The withdrawal—and I’ll just take it as an oral motion, is denied.’ ‘‘The court then heard a statement from the victim’s mother,andthestatereadaletterwrittenbythevictim, both of which explained how the defendant’s actions had impacted their lives. Near the end of the hearing, before imposing [the agreed upon] sentence, the court asked the defendant if he wanted to say anything, to which the defendant responded, ‘No.’ ’’ Id., 114–17. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his ‘‘timely oral motion to withdraw his plea without any type of inquiry or evidentiary hearing as to the underlying basis of [his] motion.’’ State v. Anthony D., supra, 151 Conn. App. 112.TheAppellateCourtconcludedthat‘‘thedefendant presented nobasis for furtherinquiry by thecourt’’ and that, therefore, on the basis of the facts of the present case, ‘‘the inquiry conducted by the court was sufficient.’’Id., 119.Thiscertified appealfollowed. Seefootnote 1 of this opinion. On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the trial court’s failure to conduct a further inquiry into the factual basis of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea3 violated his constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel and to due process of law as protected by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution4 and his rights under Practice Book §§ 39-26 and 39-27.5 Specifically, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that ‘‘the inquiry conducted by the court following the defendant’s oral motion to withdraw his
plea was sufficient under the circumstances of this case.’’6 Id., 112. The defendant requests that we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction and that we order the trial court to either permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In response, the state contends that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first conductingafurtherinquiryorholdinganevidentiaryhearing on the defendant’s motion. Specifically, the state contends that the defendant failed to state a specific basis for his motion and that the trial court properly disregardeddefense counsel’svaguestatement thatthe defendanthad‘‘concerns’’relatingtohislegalrepresentation. We agree with the state and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. It is well established that ‘‘[t]he burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hall, 303 Conn. 527, 533, 35 A.3d 237 (2012). ‘‘To warrant consideration, the defendant must allege and provide facts which justify permitting him to withdraw his plea under [Practice Book § 39-27]. . . . Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., 110 Conn. App. 543, 549, 955 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 950, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008). ‘‘In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this courtmustmakeeveryreasonablepresumptioninfavor of [the correctness of] its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Statev. Lameirao,135Conn.App.302, 320, 42 A.3d 414, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 915, 46 A.3d 171 (2012). Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by Practice Book §§ 39-26 and 39-27. Practice Book § 3926 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A defendant may withdraw his . . . plea of guilty . . . as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicialauthorityshallallowthedefendanttowithdraw his . . . plea upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book §] 39-27 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Practice Book§ 39-27(4)provides,inturn,thatadefendantmay withdraw his guilty plea after acceptance if ‘‘[t]he plea resultedfromthedenialofeffectiveassistanceofcounsel. . . .’’ ‘‘The standard for withdrawing a guilty plea is stringent because society has a strong interest in the
finalityofguiltypleas,andallowingwithdrawalofpleas not only undermines confidence in the integrity of our judicial procedures, but also increases the volume of judicialwork,anddelaysandimpairstheorderlyadministrationofjustice.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.) United States v. Doe, 537 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2008). WefirstnotethattheplainlanguageofPracticeBook § 39-26 expressly imposes limitations upon a defendant’s ability to withdraw his guilty plea after it has beenaccepted.Althoughadefendantmaywithdrawhis guilty plea ‘‘as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted,’’ after a guilty plea is accepted, the defendant’srighttowithdrawhispleaisrestrictedtoanarrow window of time. Practice Book § 39-26. After acceptance, but before the imposition of sentence, the trial court is required to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea under Practice Book § 39-26 only ‘‘upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book §] 3927.’’Onceadefendanthasbeensentenced,henolonger maintains a right to withdraw his guilty plea. Practice Book§ 39-26.Furthermore,weemphasizethatPractice Book § 39-26 requires the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea only ‘‘upon proof’’ of one of the grounds in Practice Book § 3927. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that the defendant bears the burden to present facts sufficient to persuade the trial court that his guilty plea should be withdrawn at this point in the proceedings. We further observe that there is no language in Practice Book §§ 39-26 and 39-27 imposing an affirmative dutyuponthecourttoconductaninquiryintothebasis of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. ‘‘The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to [our] rules [of practice]. . . . It is a principle of statutory construction that a court must construe a statute as written. . . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them.’’(Citationomitted;internalquotationmarksomitted.) State v. Lameirao, supra, 135 Conn. App. 322–23. A review of related rules of practice reveals that when the judges of the Superior Court intend to impose an affirmative dutyon the trialcourt to conductan inquiry of the defendant, they know how to do so. Specifically, unlike Practice Book §§ 39-26 and 39-27, Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20,7 which govern the acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea, explicitly mandate that the trial court ‘‘[address] the defendant personally . . . .’’ PracticeBook§ 39-20alsousesthefollowingplainlanguage to order the trial court to conduct a specific inquiry: ‘‘The judicial authority shall also inquire as to whether the defendant’s willingness to plead guilty . . . results frompriordiscussionsbetweentheprosecutingauthority and the defendant or his or her counsel.’’ (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it would be improper for this court toengraftlanguagerequiringtrialcourtstoaffirmatively
investigate the basis of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea onto ourrules of practice. The task of creating such a requirement properly lies with the judges of the Superior Court, not this court.8 See State v. Obas,320Conn.426,436,130A.3d252(2016)(noting that ‘‘[i]n the absence of any indication of the legislature’s intent concerning this issue, we cannot engraft language onto the statute for [i]t is not the function of the courts to enhance or supplement a statute containing clearly expressed language’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Baker, 141 Conn. App. 669, 672, 62 A.3d 595 (noting that ‘‘ ‘[l]anguage directing the trial court to ‘‘address the defendant personally’’ could easily have been included in the original text of [Practice Book] § 43-10 [3] had that been the intention of the judges of the Superior Court in adopting the rule’ ’’), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 950, 67 A.3d 292 (2013). Inthepresentcase,despitethefactthat,attheoutset of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that the defendant had expressed to him ‘‘concerns over the manner in which he was represented,’’ at no point during the proceedings did the defendant or his counsel cite facts or present evidence astohoworwhycounsel’srepresentationwasallegedly ineffective. At the time he madean oral motion to withdrawthedefendant’sguiltyplea,itwasincumbentupon defense counsel to provide the trial court with specific reasons to support the motion, but he failed to do so. The defendant offers no authority, and we know of none, that mandates a trial court to conduct an inquiry into the factual basis of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea when the defendant raises general ‘‘concerns’’ about his attorney’s representation and proffers no facts in support of his motion. In fact, our case law requires that a defendant ‘‘show a plausible reason for the withdrawal’’ of a guilty plea; State v. Hall, supra, 303 Conn. 533; and ‘‘allege and provide facts’’ that warrant a trial court’s consideration of his motion. State v. Carmelo T., supra, 110 Conn. App. 549; see also State v. Crenshaw, 210 Conn. 304, 311–12, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989) (affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, reasoning that ‘‘[i]t [was] not enough for the defendant to claim that he was told what to say by his lawyer’’ without providing any facts or evidence in support of motion [internal quotation marks omitted]). ThedefendantfurtherclaimsthattheAppellateCourt improperlyconcluded that‘‘[n]eitherthe defendantnor his attorney were denied the opportunity to present a basisforapleawithdrawal.’’Statev.AnthonyD.,supra, 151 Conn. App. 119. Specifically, the defendant contends that the situation at issue in the present case is similar to the one the Appellate Court faced in State v. Morant, 13 Conn. App. 378, 536 A.2d 605 (1988). The defendant concedes that, unlike in Morant, the trial court in the present case did not direct the defendant
to stop speaking. The defendant, however, asserts that he was denied the opportunity to adequately present the factual basis for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a result of the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that if the defendant wished to ‘‘claim at a time after that this was ineffective [assistance] or somehow coerc[ive]’’ he could do so in a habeasproceeding.9 Wedisagree,andfindMorantinapplicable to the present case. InMorant,‘‘immediatelyafterthedefendantwassentenced but before the close of the sentencing proceeding the defendant informed the court that he had not entered his plea on his own ‘recognition’ ’’ and that ‘‘he had been ‘on a pressure force to plead guilty.’ ’’ State v. Morant, supra, 13 Conn. App. 384. When the defendant attemptedtofurtherexplainhisclaimtothesentencing court, the court interrupted him, stating that he could ‘‘ ‘takethatupwith[his]nextattorneyif[he]want[ed]’ ’’ and that such a claim was ‘‘ ‘not appropriate’ ’’ at the time. Id., 382. When the defendant attempted to speak to the court again, ‘‘[t]he court responded with a thinly veiled threat telling the defendant that if he heard anymore from him the court might be sorry that it sentenced him to only ten years suspended after seven.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 385. The Appellate Court concluded that ‘‘the statements made by the defendant [were]sufficienttorequiretheholdingofanevidentiary hearingbecausethetrialcourteffectivelyprecludedthe defendantfrommakinganymorespecificallegationsof fact.’’ Id. We agree with the Appellate Court that the present case is factually distinct from Morant. See State v. Anthony D., supra, 151 Conn. App. 118. In the present case, immediately following the defendant’s oral motion, made through counsel, to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court specifically stated that it did ‘‘not believe that there [was] any factual basis for’’ the motion. The court then asked defense counsel: ‘‘[A]s an officer of the court, do you know of any defect in that plea canvass that would allow the court to, in fact, take back the plea at this time?’’ We disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that this inquiry by the trial court ‘‘limited [defense counsel] to any allegations regarding the adequacy of the plea canvass.’’ See footnote 7 of the dissenting opinion. These statements by the trial court were an invitation to defense counsel to present a factual basis for the motion and defense counsel was free to answer the trial court’s question as he wished. Rather than present such support, defense counsel merely stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I think that I need to be precise in my language. The canvass itself I think was quite thorough.’’ Although the defendant attempts to equate the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that if the defendant wanted to ‘‘claim at a time after that this
was ineffective [assistance] or somehow coerc[ive]’’ he could do so in a collateral habeas proceeding to the statements made by the court in Morant, we are not persuaded.(Emphasisadded.)InMorant,thedefendant and defense counsel repeatedly attempted to explain the basis of the motion to withdraw, but the trial court interruptedandaffirmativelypreventedthemfromproffering specific facts in support of the motion. State v. Morant, supra, 13 Conn. App. 382. Here, in contrast to the situation in Morant, at no point in the proceedings didthetrialcourtcut shortthedefendant’sexplanation of the basis of his motion or direct him to stop talking. We interpret the trial court’s statement as an attempt to convey to the defendant that there were no facts before it that would justify the withdrawal of his plea at that time, but that he remained entitled to make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following the sentencing hearing.10 Moreover, we do not examine the dialogue between defense counsel and the trial court at the sentencing hearing in isolation, and we find the particular circumstances of the present case relevant to our analysis. The record reveals that the trial court’s canvass of the defendant at the change of plea hearing was thorough andpresentedthedefendantwithnumerousopportunities to voice any concerns he may have had with his attorney’s representation of him, or to inform the court thatthesentencewasinconsistentwiththeexplanation of the plea agreement that his attorney had given him. During the plea canvass, the defendant indicated that he had spoken to his attorney about his decision to plead guilty and that the sentence the court was to imposecorrespondedwithhisunderstandingoftheplea agreement. When asked whether anyone had forced or threatenedhimtopleadguiltyandwhetherhehadbeen induced to plead guilty by any promises not contained in the plea agreement, the defendant responded in the negative. The defendant further indicated that he was pleading guilty under the Alford doctrine because he acknowledged that there was a chance that he would be convicted of additional offenses and would face a greater sentence if he decided to proceed with his trial. The trial court specifically asked both defense counsel and the state’s attorney whether they knew of any reasonwhythepleashouldnotbeaccepted,andtheyboth replied that they did not. Finally, before accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court asked the defendant one last time11 whether he understood the plea agreement,towhichherepliedthathedid,andthetrial court also made a specific finding that the defendant ‘‘had the assistance of competent counsel.’’12 Thus, despite the ongoing dialogue between the defendant and the trial court during the plea canvass, the hearing concluded without the defendant alluding to any perceived flaw in the entry of his guilty plea. Thedefendantneverthelessclaimsthatthetrialcourt
had been given notice that the defendant was dissatisfied with his attorney’s representation of him at the change of plea hearing when the trial court asked whether he had any questions for his attorney and he responded that ‘‘nothing that I ask is gonna change anything.’’ We are not persuaded. We find the defendant’s statement to be ambiguous, at best, especially when taken in the context of the status of his case. Given the fact that the defendant changed his plea well after his trial had begun, during which the victim had testified extensively, and immediately after his motion to suppress his incriminating statement to the police had been denied, the defendant’s statement could reasonably be interpreted as an expression of the defendant’s acknowledgment of the strength of the state’s evidence against him and the risk associated with proceedingwithhistrial.13 Furthermore,therecordreveals that if the defendant were dissatisfied with his attorney’s representation of him, he had a clear opportunity to articulate to the court that he was not being adequately represented by his current attorney and to request the appointment of new counsel at this point in the plea canvass. The defendant, however, did not avail himself of this opportunity, and we cannot expect trial judges to be seers. See Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that ‘‘[i]n determining whether to hold a competency hearing, the applicable standard does not contemplate that a judge be omniscient, but simply that a trial court rule on the objective facts of which it has knowledge’’). Additionally, we note that, procedurally, neither the defendant nor his attorney requested an evidentiary hearing or moved for a continuance. The record also discloses that the trial court continued the sentencing untiltendaysafterthepleahearingforpurposesrelated tothedefendant’sparole.Ifthedefendanthadconcerns relating to his guilty plea, he had adequate time to develop a factual basis to support his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant, however, failed to doso.Furthermore,whengivenanopportunitytospeak before the imposition of sentence, the defendant declinedtosayanything.14 Thus,inlightoftheforegoing circumstances, we conclude that, contrary to the dissent’s claim, the defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunitytosatisfyhisburdenofpresentingafactual basis in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finally,werecognizethattheadministrativeneedfor judicialexpeditionandcertaintyissuchthattrialcourts cannot be expected to inquire into the factual basis of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea when thedefendanthaspresentednospecificfactsinsupport of the motion. To impose such an obligation would do violence to the reasonable administrative needs of a busy trial court, as this would, in all likelihood, provide defendants strong incentive to make vague assertions
of an invalid plea in hopes of delaying their sentencing. Because, as this court has previously stated, ‘‘the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are importantcomponentsof[the]criminaljusticesystem’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Revelo, 256 Conn.494,505,775A.2d260,cert.denied,534U.S.1052, 122 S. Ct. 639, 151 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2001); such a practice would undermine the ‘‘strong interest in the finality of guilty pleas.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Doe, supra, 537 F.3d 211; see also id. (‘‘[t]he standard for withdrawing a guilty plea is stringentbecausesocietyhasa stronginterestinthefinality of guilty pleas, and allowing withdrawal of pleas not only undermines confidencein the integrity ofour judicial procedures, but also increases the volume of judicial work, and delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). As previously noted in this opinion, we emphasize that, at the defendant’s request, the trial courtinthepresentcaseinterruptedthetrialinorderto conductacanvassofthedefendantpursuanttoPractice Book § 39-19 and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea. Seefootnote7ofthisopinion;seealsoStatev.Anthony D.,supra,151Conn.App.114.Atthetimethedefendant changedhisplea,thestatehadpresentedsixwitnesses, includingthethenfifteenyearoldvictim,whohadbeen called to testify at length about the defendant’s sexual abuseofher.SeeStatev.AnthonyD.,supra,111.Therefore, on the basis of the facts of the present case, for the trial court to have granted the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without any factual support for the motion on the record would have greatly ‘‘delay[ed] and impair[ed] the orderly administration of justice.’’ United States v. Doe, supra, 211. We conclude that, without specific concerns or facts before it to justify the withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea at sentencing, the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretionindenyingthedefendant’smotiontowithdrawhisguiltypleawithoutconductingafurtherinquiry into the underlying basis of the defendant’s motion.

Outcome: Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly concluded that ‘‘the defendant presented no basis for further inquiry by the court.’’ State v. Anthony D., supra, 151 Conn. App. 119. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

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