Date: 07-16-2016

Case Style: STATE OF MONTANA v. TONY JORGENSON

Case Number: 2016 MT 170N

Judge: Mike McGrath

Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

Plaintiff's Attorney: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Caitlin Overland, Deputy County Attorney

Defendant's Attorney:

Thane Johnson

Description: Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Tony Edward Jorgenson appeals from the District Court’s Opinion and Order
affirming the Justice Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. We
affirm.
¶3 On February 5, 2011,the State charged Jorgenson with driving under the influence
of alcohol. He appeared, pled not guilty, and the Justice Court set a trial date of July 14,
2011. A t the time set for jury selection an insufficient number of potential jurors
appeared, and the Justice of the Peace declared a mistrial. The new trial was set for July
28, 2011. The State then requested a continuance because of an unavailable witness and
because of concerns that the same jury pool would be used as in the first attempt at trial.
The Justice of the Peace set a new trial date for October 20, 2011.
¶4 In August 2011 the State filed amended charges. Jorgenson appeared, entered a
plea of not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial
under § 46-13-401(2), MCA. That section provides:
After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, with prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant’s motion is not brought to trial within 6 months.
3
The Justice of the Peace denied the motion to dismiss, relying upon State v. Strong,258
Mont. 48, 49, 851 P.2d 415, 416 (1993), concluding that the trial had been set to begin
within six months of the date of the mistrial. In addition, the Justice of the Peace found
that the State did not engage in dilatory conduct bringing the case to trial.
¶5 In November 2011 Jorgenson entered a guilty plea to one of the amended charges,
reserving his right to appeal the speedy trial issue. He filed a timely appeal to the District
Court. The parties completed briefing by September 14, 2012, but it was not until July
2015 that the District Court acted upon Jorgenson’s appeal. At that time the District
Court affirmed the Justice Court’s denial of Jorgenson’s motion to dismiss, and he
appeals.
¶6 In Strong, this Court clearly approved the position of the American Bar
Association’s Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice that the speedy trial
calculation begins to run anew as of the date of a mistrial. State v. Sanders, 163 Mont.
209, 214, 516 P.2d 372, 375 (1973). Here, the pending trial date at the time of
Jorgenson’s motion to dismiss was within six months of the date of the mistrial.
Therefore, there was no violation of § 46-13-401, MCA, or of Jorgenson’s right to a
speedy trial. Contrary to Jorgenson’s argument on appeal, Strong does not make the
resetting of the speedy trial clock upon a mistrial contingent upon charges being refiled
within the original six month window. We agree with the District Court that the State
demonstrated good cause for any delay

Outcome:

We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, this case presents a question controlled by settled law. ¶Affirmed.

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