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Defendant's Attorney:
Jennifer Lynn Baker
Deterrean Gamble
Matthew Deal
Michael Moore
Description:
Houston, Texas – Child Support Modification represented Appellant with seeking to decreas54e the amount of monthly child support payments. .
Hector married appellee Veronica Garza in 2001, and they have two children
together: a son born in 2004 and a son born in 2009.
In 2012, Hector filed for divorce in Fort Bend County. During the divorce
proceedings, Veronica and the children moved to Monterrey, Mexico. In 2013, the
trial court signed an agreed final divorce decree that appointed both parents as joint
managing conservators and granted Veronica the exclusive right to designate the
primary residence of the children, subject to specific restrictions. The final decree
acknowledged that Veronica and the children were living in Mexico, and it ordered
Veronica to return to Fort Bend County with the children by August 1, 2014.
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The parties agreed that Hector would pay $2,339.74 per month in child
support to Veronica. This amount would decrease to $1,949.79 per month after the
parties’ eldest son reached the age of eighteen. Hector also agreed to make monthly
contractual alimony payments to Veronica for three years following the divorce
decree.
After the parties divorced, Veronica remarried in Mexico. Although the final
divorce decree required her to return to Fort Bend County with the children on
August 1, 2014, it is undisputed that she did not do so. The children continue to live
in Mexico, and they have only visited Hector in Texas a few times since the signing
of the divorce decree.
In April 2015, Hector filed a “Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.”
Hector sought a modification of the conservatorship provisions of the divorce decree
to grant him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence and to
restrict the children’s residence to Fort Bend County. Hector also stated in this filing,
“Petitioner believes that the parties will enter into a written agreement containing
provisions for modification of the order providing for support of the children.”
Hector did not state how he wished for the trial court to modify the support provision,
although he did request that the court enter a temporary order requiring Veronica to
pay child support “while this case is pending.” Hector contemporaneously filed a
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motion for enforcement of his possession and access rights based on Veronica’s
failure to return to Fort Bend County with the children.
Over the next several years, the parties engaged in protracted litigation
concerning Hector’s access to the children and Veronica’s retention of the children
in Mexico. In response to Hector’s motion for enforcement, Veronica filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and requested that the trial court decline jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) in favor of
Mexico, which was a more convenient forum. Veronica filed a proceeding in Mexico
to terminate Hector’s parental rights to the children, and Hector filed a “Motion for
Determination of Wrongful Retention.” Hector also filed an application under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention”), in which he sought a determination that Veronica had wrongfully
retained the children in violation of Hector’s custody rights. The trial court, at the
request of the Mexican court hearing Hector’s Hague Convention application, signed
an order determining that Veronica’s retention of the children in Mexico past August
1, 2014, breached Hector’s custody rights.
Nevertheless, in August 2018, the trial court issued a ruling declining
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. After Hector moved for reconsideration, the trial
court signed an order in April 2019, again declining to exercise jurisdiction over
custody matters under the UCCJEA but retaining jurisdiction over child support
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matters under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”). Hector
appealed the trial court’s order declining to exercise jurisdiction over custody
matters. Ultimately, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s order and
remanded the case to the trial court. See Cortez v. Cortez, 639 S.W.3d 298 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.).
While the trial court was considering whether to retain jurisdiction over
custody matters under the UCCJEA, Hector filed a motion for modification of child
support on December 15, 2017. Hector argued that the amount of child support
agreed to in the divorce decree was approximately 50% of his net resources and thus
constituted “above guideline child support.” He also argued that a material and
substantial change in circumstances had occurred because Veronica had started
working in March 2013 and Hector’s employment had been terminated. He was
working on a contract basis at the time of the motion, but his monthly net resources
had been reduced to approximately $5,900 per month.
Hector further argued that below-guideline support was appropriate because
the children’s needs were significantly less than the child support guidelines;
Hector’s ability to pay child support had been hindered by the high costs of litigating
the custody matters; Hector would be required to pay substantial amounts in airfare
and fees to exercise his visitation rights; and Hector had accumulated a significant
amount of debt. Hector requested that the trial court make any modified support
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obligation “effective from April 2015, which is the date of the first modification
filing in this cause.” In a supporting brief, Hector pointed out that he had served
requests for admissions on Veronica. Because she never answered these requests,
they were deemed admitted. These deemed admissions included admissions that
Veronica’s monthly household expenses were less than 30,000 Mexican pesos,
which was equivalent to $1,578.94, and the portion of household expenses related
to the children’s needs was “less than 35% of the overall household expenses.”
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to modify child support on June
3, 2020. Both Veronica and Hector testified at this hearing. Hector requested that his
child support obligation be reduced to $600 per month. Hector’s documentary
evidence included an evaluation performed at the behest of the Mexican court, which
reflected that the approximate monthly gross income of Veronica and her husband
was 54,000 Mexican pesos and their monthly expenses were approximately 29,000
Mexican pesos. The trial court also admitted Hector’s tax returns from 2018 and
2019. These records reflected that Hector made $90,000 in wages in 2018 and 2019,
and his adjusted gross income in 2019 was approximately $143,000.
The trial court signed an order modifying Hector’s child support obligation.
The court reduced Hector’s monthly support obligation to $1,169.86 for both
children. The court ordered this amount to decrease further to $935.90 per month
upon the first child reaching age eighteen. The court found that the modified support
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amount was below the child support guidelines. Specifically, the court found that
Hector’s monthly net resources were $7,564.46; Veronica’s monthly net resources
were $0; guideline child support of 25% of Hector’s monthly net resources would
be $1,891.11, and the actual amount of child support—$1,169.86—was 15.46% of
Hector’s monthly net resources. The court further found that below-guidelines
support was appropriate because “[t]he needs of the children are significantly less
[than] what is provided by the guidelines” and the cost for the children to travel to
Texas, to be paid by Hector, was over $1,000. The court made the modified support
obligation retroactive to January 1, 2018.
Hector requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court
did not file. This appeal followed.
Retroactive Effect of Child Support Modification
In his first issue, Hector argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
making his modified support obligation retroactive only to January 1, 2018, a date
nearly three years after he first sought modification in April 2015. In his second
issue, Hector argues that the court’s decision to make the modified obligation
retroactive only to January 1, 2018, violated Texas public policy by rewarding
Veronica’s attempts to delay the proceedings and “by discouraging the efforts to
engage in peaceable resolution of disputes through voluntary settlement
procedures.”
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A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
A trial court may modify a child support order if the circumstances of the child
or a person affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the
date of the order’s rendition. TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.401(a)(1); Trammell v.
Trammell, 485 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The
party requesting the modification bears the burden of showing the required change
in circumstances. Trammell, 485 S.W.3d at 576.
Family Code section 156.401(b) provides that the trial court may modify the
amount of a support order “only as to obligations accruing after the earlier of (1) the
date of service of citation; or (2) an appearance in the suit to modify.” TEX. FAM.
CODE § 156.401(b); In re Moore, 511 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016,
orig. proceeding) (“Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by ordering
child support retroactive to the date of service of citation or an appearance in the suit
to modify.”); In re B.R.F., 457 S.W.3d 509, 510 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.)
(“Retroactive support is authorized by statute but it is limited to the date citation was
served upon the obligor or the date of obligor’s appearance, whichever occurs
earlier.”). “The effective date of the modified order is within the broad discretion of
the trial court.” In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005,
pet. denied); In re J.G.Z., 963 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no
pet.). Although the trial court has statutory authority to modify a support order
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retroactively, applying this statute is not mandatory but “is left to the broad
discretion of the trial court.” Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575, 582 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); see also Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d
703, 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (stating that trial court
has broad discretion in deciding whether circumstances of case justify retroactive
modification of support obligation).
We review a trial court’s order on a modification request for an abuse of
discretion. Trammell, 485 S.W.3d at 575. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules or principles. Id.;
Brejon v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no
pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling
and indulge every presumption in favor of the ruling. Trammell, 485 S.W.3d at 575.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion if some probative and substantive evidence
supports the order. Id.
B. Analysis
The trial court signed the agreed final divorce decree in January 2013. The
decree set Hector’s monthly child support obligation at $2,339.74. The decree also
required Veronica and the children to return from Monterrey and reside in Fort Bend
County by August 1, 2014. It is undisputed that Veronica did not comply with this
requirement and that the children have resided in Mexico since 2012.
10
Hector filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in April 2015.
Hector alleged generally that “[t]he circumstances of the children, a conservator, or
other party affected by the order to be modified have materially and substantially
changed since the date of rendition of the order to be modified.” He further stated,
“Petitioner believes that the parties will enter into a written agreement containing
provisions for modification of the order providing for support of the children.”
Hector stated that “[t]he requested modification is in the best interest of the
children,” but he did not specifically state how he wished for the trial court to modify
his support obligation. He also requested that the court temporarily order Veronica
“to pay child support while this case is pending.” The trial court did not enter a
temporary order concerning child support.
Over the next several years, the parties engaged in litigation in both Texas and
Mexico. These efforts primarily concerned whether Veronica wrongfully retained
the children in Mexico. On December 15, 2017, before the trial court declined
jurisdiction over custody matters under the UCCJEA, Hector filed a motion for
modification of child support. This motion was the first filing in which Hector
argued that, due to a change in his employment, his monthly net resources had
decreased to approximately $5,900 per month. In a supporting brief, Hector also
argued that, according to deemed admissions, Veronica’s monthly household
expenses were approximately 29,000 Mexican pesos, or $1,500, and the children’s
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monthly needs were less than 35% of the household expenses. Hector argued that
because the needs of the children were only around $500 to $600 per month, the trial
court should set his child support obligation at that amount, which was well below
the child support guidelines.
After a hearing in June 2020, the trial court agreed to lower Hector’s monthly
child support obligation, but it did not lower the obligation as much as Hector had
requested. Instead, the court set Hector’s monthly child support obligation at
$1,169.86 and provided that this modified amount was retroactive to January 1,
2018.
Trial courts are authorized by statute to make a modified child support
obligation retroactive, but this authority is limited to the date citation was served or
an appearance in the modification suit was made, whichever is earlier. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 156.401(b); In re B.R.F., 457 S.W.3d at 510; In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at
294. Here, Hector filed his original petition to modify on April 21, 2015. The record
does not reflect when Hector served Veronica with this petition, but she appeared on
June 22, 2015, when she filed a pleading requesting that the court decline jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA. The trial court therefore had the “broad range” to apply the
modified child support amount retroactively from June 22, 2015, the date Veronica
appeared in the modification suit, up until June 3, 2020, the date of the hearing on
Hector’s motion to modify. See In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at 294.
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The trial court chose to make the modified support obligation retroactive to
January 1, 2018, a date approximately two weeks after Hector filed his motion for
modification of child support which set out detailed reasons for why he believed his
child support obligation should be decreased. This date was within the range allowed
by Family Code section 156.401(b). See TEX. FAM.CODE § 156.401(b); In re B.R.F.,
457 S.W.3d at 510; In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at 294. We conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by making the modified child support obligation
retroactive to January 1, 2018, as opposed to April 2015, when Hector first sought
modification. See In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at 295 (“The trial court had discretion
to either deny, grant, or permit partial relief sought. The court therefore did not err
in setting the modification date later than the date the petition was served.”).
Hector further argues that the trial court’s decision was against Texas public
policy because Veronica wrongfully retained the children in Mexico and had unclean
hands, she engaged in dilatory tactics and did not negotiate in good faith, and the
trial court caused delay by referring the parties to mediation.1 He argues that making
the modified obligation effective only as of January 1, 2018, rewards Veronica for
delaying the proceedings.
1 Hector and Veronica agreed to mediate their dispute in April 2020. They were
unable to reach an agreement during mediation.
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The Legislature has stated that “[it] is the policy of this state to encourage the
peaceable resolution of disputes, with special consideration given to disputes
involving the parent-child relationship, including the mediation of issues involving
conservatorship, possession, and support of children, and the early settlement of
pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 154.002. We do not agree that, to the extent the trial court referred the
parties to mediation, attempting to resolve the parties’ dispute in this way violated
Texas public policy.
Moreover, although several years passed between the time Hector filed his
first petition to modify and the time the trial court decreased his support obligation,
trial courts are not required to give retroactive effect to modification orders. See
Nordstorm, 965 S.W.2d at 582 (noting that while trial courts have statutory authority
to make modified support obligation retroactive, this is not mandatory but is instead
“left to the broad discretion of the trial court”). Hector’s initial modification petition
filed in April 2015 included no details on how he wanted the trial court to modify
the support obligation or on how his changed circumstances justified a decreased
obligation. It was not until December 2017 that he filed a modification motion
setting out specific arguments and evidence for why he believed his obligation
should be decreased. The trial court, in partially granting Hector’s motion to modify,
decreased his monthly obligation by half and made that change effective as of
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approximately two weeks after Hector filed the December 2017 motion. We
conclude that the trial court’s decision making the modified support obligation
retroactive only to January 1, 2018, did not violate Texas public policy.
We overrule Hector’s first and second issues.
Amount of Child Support Modification
In his third issue, Hector argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
it modified the amount of his support obligation because the modified amount was
nearly two times greater than the proven needs of the children. In his fourth issue,
Hector argues that the modified amount of child support violates Texas public policy
because the amount encourages Veronica to retain the children in Mexico.
A. Governing Law
As stated above, the trial court may modify the amount of a child support
obligation if the circumstances of a child or person affected by a support order have
materially and substantially changed since rendition of the prior order. TEX. FAM.
CODE § 156.401(a)(1); Trammell, 485 S.W.3d at 576. “Paramount to the trial court’s
determination of child support is the best interest of the child.” Trammell, 485
S.W.3d at 576. The trial court should consider the circumstances of the children and
parents at the time of the prior order and at the time the modification is sought. Id.
The trial court should also consider the child support guidelines set out in the Family
Code in determining whether a modification of the support obligation is warranted.
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TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.402(a); see id. §§ 154.121–.133 (setting out child support
guidelines). The court may also consider “other relevant evidence in addition to the
factors listed in the guidelines.” Id. § 156.402(b). The trial court has “wide
discretion” with respect to child support matters. In re K.A.M.S., 583 S.W.3d 335,
340 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
The amount of child support established by the child support guidelines is
presumed to be reasonable, and a support order conforming to the guidelines is
presumed to be in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.122(a).
Generally, the child support guidelines are based on the monthly net resources of the
obligor parent. Id. § 154.125(b). The guidelines provide that, for two children, a
support obligation of 25% of the obligor’s monthly net resources is presumptively
reasonable and in the children’s best interests. Id. “Resources” include all wage and
salary income; interest, dividends, and royalty income; self-employment income; net
rental income; and “all other income actually being received.” Id. § 154.062(b).
A court may, however, determine that application of the guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances, and it may order support in an
amount other than that provided by the guidelines if the evidence rebuts the
presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best interest of the child. Id.
§§ 154.122(b), 154.123(a). In determining whether application of the guidelines
would be unjust or inappropriate, the court shall consider evidence of “all relevant
16
factors.” Id. § 154.123(b). One of the non-exclusive factors set out in the Family
Code is the “needs of the child.” Id. Although the court may also consider the net
resources of the obligee parent when considering modifying a support obligation,
see id. § 154.123(b)(5), the court “may not add any portion of the net resources of a
new spouse to the net resources of an obligor or obligee in order to calculate the
amount of child support to be ordered in a suit for modification.” Id. § 156.404(a).
B. Analysis
The agreed divorce decree set Hector’s monthly child support obligation at
$2,339.74. In his motion to modify child support, Hector argued that this amount
“represented approximately 51%” of his net resources and was above the amount set
by the guidelines for two children. Since the divorce decree, Hector’s employment
situation had changed: he was now working on a contract basis and his monthly net
resources had decreased to approximately $5,900. He also pointed out that Veronica
had wrongfully retained the children in Mexico since August 1, 2014, in violation of
the divorce decree, and he had expended tens of thousands of dollars to maintain
contact with the children and his paternity rights. Hector also pointed to a series of
deemed admissions establishing that Veronica’s monthly household expenses were
approximately 30,000 Mexican pesos—or $1,578.94—and the children’s monthly
needs were less than 35% of Veronica’s monthly expenses. He argued that below
17
guidelines support was appropriate in this case because the needs of the children
were “significantly less” than the guidelines.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to modify, and both
Hector and Veronica testified. The trial court admitted a psychological and social
study completed by a Mexican agency in 2017. As part of this study, Veronica
reported that her approximate gross monthly salary was 11,348 Mexican pesos2
and
her husband’s approximate gross monthly income was 42,870 Mexican pesos.
Veronica also reported that her monthly expenses were approximately 29,000
Mexican pesos. Hector argued that this report and the deemed admissions
established that the children’s actual needs were significantly less than guidelines
support for two children, and therefore applying the guidelines would be unjust.
Hector also presented evidence demonstrating that it cost approximately
$1,300 for the children to fly to Texas for visitation, and he argued that this amount
should be considered when determining his support obligation. The trial court also
admitted Hector’s 2018 and 2019 federal income tax returns. The 2018 tax return
reflected that Hector’s wages were $90,000 and his adjusted gross income was
approximately $76,000. The 2019 tax return reflected that Hector’s wages were
2 At the hearing, Veronica stated that this three-year-old report was no longer
accurate. She testified that she was no longer employed.
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again $90,000, but he had nearly $63,000 in additional income, and his adjusted
gross income was approximately $143,000.
Hector requested that the trial court reduce his support obligation to “allow
for equitable households.” He argued that his current support obligation was nearly
double the amount of the expenses for Veronica’s entire household, “which would
situate the children in a very inequitable households.” He stated, “They would live
a life of privilege in Mexico, and they would have to come and visit to a . . . middle
class family household. So that certainly would create an incentive for the children
not to want to come and visit to—to the other parents’ household.” He requested that
the court deviate from the child support guidelines and reduce his monthly support
obligation to $600. Veronica agreed that if Hector’s income had decreased, then his
child support obligation should decrease as well, but she did not agree that reducing
the obligation to $600 per month was appropriate.
In the order modifying Hector’s support obligation, the trial court found that
application of the guidelines was unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances.
The court ordered Hector to pay $1,169.86 in monthly child support until his older
son reached age eighteen and then $935.90 per month until his younger son reached
age eighteen. The court also found that Hector’s monthly net resources were
$7,564.46; Veronica’s monthly net resources were $0; and guideline child support
of 25% of Hector’s monthly net resources would be $1,891.11. The court further
19
found that the modified child support amount of $1,169.86 was 15.46% of Hector’s
monthly net resources. Finally, the court found that application of the guidelines
would be unjust or inappropriate because “[t]he needs of the children are
significantly less [than] what is provided by the guidelines [and] the cost of travel
for the children to visit Texas is $1,058.48.”
On appeal, Hector does not argue that the trial court erred in calculating his
monthly net resources or in determining that Veronica’s monthly net resources were
$0. Instead, he argues that the evidence does not support setting the modified child
support amount at $1,169.86 because, as shown by the deemed admissions, the
“proven needs” of the children were approximately $600 less than that amount, and
the court should have based Hector’s support obligation on the proven needs of the
children. He argues that doing otherwise in this case incentivizes retaining the
children in Mexico, which is contrary to Texas public policy.
This Court has already addressed whether a trial court errs if it does not set a
support obligation based on the needs of the children. See McGuire v. McGuire, 4
S.W.3d 382, 387–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In ordering
child support, the trial court should consider the guidelines set out in the Family
Code, but it may also consider “other relevant evidence.” Id. at 387; TEX. FAM.CODE
§ 156.402; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.125 (applying child support guidelines
based on monthly net resources of obligor). We noted that the Family Code lists
20
“additional factors” to consider when ordering child support, and one of these factors
is “the age and needs of the child.” McGuire, 4 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting TEX. FAM.
CODE § 154.123(b) (listing factors for court to consider in determining whether
application of child support guidelines is unjust or inappropriate)). This factor “is
only one of a nonexhaustive list of seventeen additional factors that a court ‘may’
consider.” Id. at 388. We concluded that the trial court did not err “in failing to set
child support on the additional factor regarding the needs of the children.” Id.
The amount of child support established by the child support guidelines is
presumed to be reasonable, and an order conforming to the guidelines is presumed
to be in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.122(a). However, the
court may determine that application of the guidelines is unjust or inappropriate
under the circumstances, and in making this determination, the trial court is
instructed to consider evidence of “all relevant factors,” including, among other
factors, the needs of the child. Id. §§ 154.122(b), 154.123(b).
The trial court found that Hector’s monthly net resources were $7,564.46, and
Hector does not challenge this finding on appeal. Because Hector has two children,
the guidelines would set his support obligation at 25% of his monthly net resources.
See id. § 154.125(b). Hector’s child support obligation under the guidelines would
therefore be $1,891.11. The trial court, however, found that application of the
guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances of this case, and
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in making this determination, it specifically considered the needs of the children and
the cost for the children to travel to Texas for visitation with Hector. The trial court
set Hector’s modified support obligation at $1,169.86, which is 15.46% of Hector’s
monthly net resources, and is approximately $700 less than the support obligation
that application of the guidelines would impose upon Hector.
The trial court credited Hector’s evidence that the needs of the children were
less than what is provided by the child support guidelines. The court appropriately
considered this evidence when it determined that application of the guidelines would
be unjust or inappropriate and modified Hector’s support obligation several hundred
dollars below the guidelines. See id. § 154.123. Hector cites no authority supporting
his argument that a child support obligation should be based solely on the needs of
the children to the exclusion of other factors, such as the obligor’s monthly net
resources, and this Court has held to the contrary. See McGuire, 4 S.W.3d at 387–
88.
In modifying Hector’s support obligation and setting a below-guidelines
amount, the trial court properly considered Hector’s monthly net resources, which
had decreased since the divorce decree, the travel expenses for the children to visit
Texas, and the needs of the children. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its wide discretion in modifying the amount of Hector’s support obligation. See In
re K.A.M.S., 583 S.W.3d at 340. We further conclude that the trial court did not
22
violate Texas public policy when it considered factors other than the proven needs
of the children—specifically, Hector’s monthly net resources and the children’s
travel expenses—in modifying Hector’s support obligation. See McGuire, 4 S.W.3d
at 387–88.
We overrule Hector’s third and fourth issues.