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Date: 02-10-2021
Case Style:
Taymor Travon McIntyre v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 02-19-00289-CR
Judge: Dana Womack
Court: Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph W. Spence
Andrea Jacobs
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Fort Worth, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Taymor Travon McIntyre with a Murder charge.
A. Attempted Robbery and McIntyre’s Detainment
McIntyre and several of his acquaintances devised a plot to rob a known drug
house in July 2016. On the way to the robbery, the group rode in two separate cars.
Two male members of the group brought handguns while another male brought a
pair of brass knuckles. Once they arrived at the house, two of the girls—one of
whom was dating the homeowner’s son—went inside the house with the intention of
relaying information to the remainder of the group via text messaging. Shortly after
that, and because the homeowner’s son had seen a third female participant waiting in
3
a vehicle outside, one of the two girls who had entered the home came back out and
got the girl in the car. When the girls reentered the house, they purposely left the
door unlocked. One of the girls also went and unlocked the garage door.
Later, several of the male participants, including McIntyre, entered the house
with two of them brandishing the guns and yelling for everyone to get on the ground.
McIntyre, who did not have a weapon, went into the living room and flipped over the
couch where he was expecting to find drugs and money. Around the same time, one
of the guys struck the homeowner’s son in the face and then shot him. The son
survived the shooting. At the same time, the other guy with a gun shot and killed
another man in the house. Eventually all of the assailants fled the house in the two
cars, but before they left, members of the group took a few watches and cell phones
belonging to people in the house.
As police began to investigate the murder, they learned of McIntyre’s role and
obtained a warrant for his arrest. By early August, police had apprehended everyone
in the group except McIntyre and another accomplice. On September 21, police
received a tip regarding McIntyre and the accomplice’s whereabouts, and the two
were apprehended.
Because McIntyre was sixteen years old at the time and the accomplice was also
a juvenile, police took them to the Mansfield Public Safety Building and arranged to
have City of Mansfield Municipal Court Presiding Judge Erin Bakker read them their
Miranda rights in accordance with Texas Family Code Section 51.095. See Tex. Fam.
4
Code Ann. § 51.095. Once in the building, officers placed McIntyre in one of four
interview rooms, and they placed his accomplice in another room. Sergeants Tom
Hewitt and James Vanduzi of the Mansfield Police Department joined McIntyre.
B. McIntyre’s Initial Contact with Hewitt and Vanduzi
After allowing McIntyre to go to the bathroom, Hewitt asked McIntyre for
information on how to contact his parent or guardian.1 Hewitt then retrieved a bottle
of water and gave it to McIntyre, and after having learned that McIntyre had not eaten
that day, Hewitt got a package of cheese crackers and gave it to McIntyre. During this
time, Hewitt explained to McIntyre that before the officers could speak with him, he
would need to be advised of his rights by a magistrate:
SERGEANT HEWITT: Because of your age, sir, I can’t speak with you
without the judge talking to you first. Right?
MR. McINTYRE: I know, but what is the judge going to, like, talk to me
about?
SERGEANT HEWITT: Well, the judge is going to go over why you’re here
and what your rights are.
1McIntyre initially said that he did not have parents and that he wished to speak
with his road manager. McIntyre ultimately gave Hewitt a number purporting to be
that of McIntyre’s sister whom McIntyre indicated was his legal guardian. Later, as
the officers interrogated McIntyre, they explained that they had contacted the person
McIntyre said was his sister but learned that she was not. McIntyre explained that she
was not his “biological” sister. The record is not clear regarding if McIntyre’s parent
or legal guardian was ever contacted.
5
C. McIntyre’s Initial Contact with Judge Bakker
A short time after this exchange, Hewitt left, and Judge Bakker entered the
room.
2
Judge Bakker introduced herself and explained that she did not work for the
police department and that, because McIntyre was a juvenile, a magistrate needed to
advise him of his Miranda rights:
So what the law says is, if police officers want to talk to someone under
age, a magistrate or judge actually has to give them those warnings.
Okay? So that’s what I’m here to do today. Okay? So a couple of
things. First, we’re going to go over it, make sure you understand it.
Okay? I’m going to go over the warnings one at a time.
McIntyre then asked to go to the bathroom, and he was allowed to go again.
Upon his return, Judge Bakker continued to explain her role to McIntyre:
As you’ll see in your rights we go over, it’s your choice to talk to them or
not. Once everything’s over, I come back in and my job at that point is
to make sure that you were treated appropriately, that nothing that
wasn’t supposed to happen happened, and that you understood
everything that went on and that you don’t have any questions and that
everything that went on is voluntary.
Judge Bakker emphasized to McIntyre that she was there to make sure that he
understood “what’s going on and that you’re treated the way you’re entitled to be
treated.” She further explained that she had a written form that contained his rights
and his charges, and that after he fully understood each right, she was going to have
him initial each right to indicate that he understood them. Judge Bakker informed
2Vanduzi had already left the room and did not return until after Judge Bakker
advised McIntyre of his rights.
6
McIntyre that he had been accused of or was a witness to the offense of capital
murder. Using a “New Statutory Warning of Juvenile” form, Judge Bakker then
proceeded to explain each of the Section 51.095 warnings
3
to McIntyre.
As to the first right, the following exchange occurred:
JUDGE BAKKER: First one, you may remain silent and not make any
statement at all. Do you understand what that means?
MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
JUDGE BAKKER: What does that mean?
MR. McINTYRE: Basically, like, I don’t have -- I don’t have to say anything to
anyone.
JUDGE BAKKER: Correct. Okay. Do you have any questions on that one,
what it means?
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
3The rights as they are written on the form are:
• You may remain silent and not make any statement at all.
• Any statement you make may be used as evidence against you.
• You have the right to have an attorney present with you to advise you
either before or during any questioning or interviews with peace officers
or attorneys representing the State.
• If you are financially unable to employ an attorney, you have the right to
have an attorney appointed for you to advise you before or during any
questioning and/or interviews with peace officers or attorneys
representing the State.
• You have the right to stop an interview or questioning at any time.
7
JUDGE BAKKER: You --
MR. McINTYRE: Can you explain it fully, like if --
JUDGE BAKKER: Do you have questions of me of what it means?
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. McINTYRE: Like, I don’t have any questions. I just want it to be
explained. You may remain silent and not make any statement at all, but I
thought, like, I was called in here to make a statement. Like, they told me that,
like, I needed to -- that they were going to try to talk to me. But, like, if I don’t
talk, what’s the point of me, like, coming here?
JUDGE BAKKER: Well, I don’t know, and I’m not involved in that part of
what’s going on. All I can tell you is, like I said, since you’re 16 and police
officers want to talk to you -- in most -- in certain situations when police
officers want to talk to people they may have to read them these rights.
MR. McINTYRE: All right.
JUDGE BAKKER: But since you’re 16, I do it.
MR. McINTYRE: All right. It’s cool.
JUDGE BAKKER: As far as what happens after that, as far as what -- the
choices you make, that -- that doesn’t involve me.
MR. McINTYRE: All right.
JUDGE BAKKER: We just do this, and then I come back and make sure
everything was okay and that you are okay. Make sense?
MR. McINTYRE: Yeah.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. Do you have any questions on the first one?
MR. McINTYRE: Huh-uh.
8
Judge Bakker then asked McIntyre if he would write his initials on the form
next to the right that she had just explained. But McIntyre stated that he did not want
to initial anything and their exchange continued, with Judge Bakker explaining
McIntyre’s next right to him:
MR. McINTYRE: Can I have a phone call? I don’t know what any of this
means. I need to call my lawyer.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. Let me -- let me go over these all with you, okay,
and then I’ll step out. Okay? I understand if you don’t want to initial.
MR. McINTYRE: But I don’t know, like --, like, action and consequence to all
of these, like --
JUDGE BAKKER: Understood. Understood. Well, let me just go over and
make sure you understand what they mean. Okay? The second one is any
statement you make may be used as evidence against you.
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
JUDGE BAKKER: Do you know what that means?
MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. You have the --
MR. McINTYRE: It can be evidence for you or against you.
JUDGE BAKKER: Correct.
MR. McINTYRE: All right.
After telling a hypothetical about how evidence might be used against
McIntyre, Judge Bakker went on to explain the remainder of McIntyre’s rights:
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. You have the right to have an attorney present with
you to advise you either before or during any questioning or interviews with
9
peace officers or attorneys representing the State of Texas. Do you understand
what that means?
MR. McINTYRE: (Nods head.)
JUDGE BAKKER: What’s another word for “attorney”?
MR. McINTYRE: Lawyer.
JUDGE BAKKER: There you go. If you are financially -- what does
“financial” mean?
MR. McINTYRE: Like you can’t afford it.
JUDGE BAKKER: Money, correct.
MR. McINTYRE: Yeah.
JUDGE BAKKER: If you are financially unable to employ an attorney, you
have the right to have an attorney appointed for you to advise you before,
during -- I’m sorry, before or during any questioning and/or interviews with
peace officers -- that’s another word for cops.
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
JUDGE BAKKER: You understand that? Okay. -- or attorneys representing
the State of Texas. Do you understand that whole thing?
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. And you have the right to stop an interview or
questioning at any time. What I say on that is this: If you decide, I’m going to
answer questions, that doesn’t mean you have to answer every single question
asked of you. Okay? That means you can say, Yeah, I’ll answer those three
questions, then say, No, I’m done. Or you can say, Yeah, I’ll answer Question
1 and 5, but I don’t want to touch 2, 3, and 4. That just because you say, I’ll
talk, doesn’t mean --
MR. McINTYRE: And what --
JUDGE BAKKER: -- you have to keep talking.
10
MR. McINTYRE: And what happens, like --
JUDGE BAKKER: What?
MR. McINTYRE: -- about the questions that I don’t answer.
JUDGE BAKKER: You just don’t answer them.
MR. McINTYRE: Uh-huh.
JUDGE BAKKER: That’s your right. Okay? Do you feel like you understand
these?
MR. McINTYRE: Yeah, but I still feel like I need, like, an adult present.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. I understand that.
MR. McINTYRE: One that, like -- a comfortable adult that I’m comfortable
with.
JUDGE BAKKER: I understand. I get that. I just need to make sure what --
just right here this part --
MR. McINTYRE: Oh, this is all -- I understood every single one of these --
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay.
MR. McINTYRE: -- rules.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. Would you --
MR. McINTYRE: So I just sign it?
JUDGE BAKKER: Would you -- would you put your initial on each line for
me, please?
MR. McINTYRE: (Complies.)
11
After Judge Bakker and McIntyre both signed the bottom of the form, she
informed him that officers would now come in to talk with him and that she would be
back when they were finished speaking to him. Then Judge Bakker asked McIntyre
whether he had any more questions of her. McIntyre said, “Yes -- I mean no.” Judge
Bakker then left the room.
D. Hewitt and Vanduzi Interrogate McIntyre
After Judge Bakker left, Hewitt and Vanduzi entered the room. Hewitt asked
McIntyre whether he needed more water, and he said, “I’m good.” Hewitt explained
to McIntyre that they knew of his involvement in a crime and that the officers were
there to get McIntyre’s side of the story. As this conversation between Hewitt and
McIntyre continued, Hewitt never mentioned the exact charges he was discussing
with McIntyre. At one point, the following transpired:
MR. McINTYRE: Are you accusing me of capital murder?
SERGEANT HEWITT: Am I acc- -- no. That -- you need to listen --
MR. McINTYRE: Because that’s what it says on the paper. I’m just putting --
SERGEANT HEWITT: Exactly.
MR. McINTYRE: -- two and two together like --
Hewitt continued to explain to McIntyre that the officers wanted his story of
what had happened, that the investigation had already revealed McIntyre’s
involvement in the robbery, and that others involved had been “pointing the finger”
at McIntyre. Hewitt also discussed his inability to contact a relative with a number
12
McIntyre had given him earlier. At one moment, McIntyre asked Hewitt if he could
make a phone call, to which Hewitt responded:
You can talk to me. You can either talk to me or not. Here -- but I’m
telling you, [McIntyre], you don’t have to talk to me, Bud, but if you
don’t clear up your side of it, all we got is what everybody else said you
did, and all we got is the evidence showing that you were there, and
that’s enough.
As the interrogation continued, McIntyre’s version of his involvement changed.
At first, McIntyre insisted that he was only in the car outside and that he never went
into the house with the other assailants. Hewitt accused McIntyre of not telling the
truth and asked, “Why don’t you tell me?” McIntyre responded, “Because I’ve been
in this situation. I was proven innocent.” At one point in the interview, McIntyre
asserted his right not to answer questions about others involved in the attempted
robbery: “Actually, I just -- I think I’m going to choose not to answer that question,
if that’s okay with you.” Hewitt responded, “That’s fine with me.” McIntyre then
agreed that he had gone inside the house during the attempted robbery.
Later, McIntyre again asserted his right to not answer certain questions when
he told Hewitt that he was going to “pass on that question.” When Hewitt indicated
that McIntyre could not pass on the questions, McIntyre responded, “Yes I do. Read
13
the paper, Bro. Is that the paper? Read it. I’ll read it for you.”
4
And then later,
McIntyre asserted, “Don’t ask me any questions if they aren’t about me, Bro.”
E. Judge Bakker Returns to Speak with McIntyre
Eventually, Hewitt and Vanduzi left the interview room, and Judge Bakker
returned. After acknowledging that McIntyre had not made a written statement, she
crossed out that section of the form and had McIntyre initial each corner of the page.
Judge Bakker then asked some follow-up questions about McIntyre himself, including
whether he could read and write in English, whether he was a U.S. citizen, what grade
he should be in, and what was his favorite subject.
At one point, Judge Bakker asked McIntyre whether he was under the influence
of any drugs or alcohol, to which McIntyre said that he had smoked “weed this
morning.” The following exchange occurred:
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. But -- okay. Take a look at me for one second.
MR. McINTYRE: (Complies.)
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. You don’t look to be high to me right now. Are
you?
MR. McINTYRE: Am I high right now?
JUDGE BAKKER: Yeah.
MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
4
It is not clear from the video whether Hewitt had the form that Judge Bakker
and McIntyre had signed, but Hewitt did have what appeared to be a file with him
containing a number of documents.
14
JUDGE BAKKER: You’re high?
MR. McINTYRE: Yes.
JUDGE BAKKER: On what?
MR. McINTYRE: Weed.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. When did you smoke it?
MR. McINTYRE: Like, an hour ago.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. Well, you’ve been here for two and a half hours, so
did you smoke it in here?
MR. McINTYRE: Huh-uh.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay.
MR. McINTYRE: I smoked it in the car before I came.
JUDGE BAKKER: In your car?
MR. McINTYRE: It wasn’t mine.
JUDGE BAKKER: Okay. But not in a police car?
MR. McINTYRE: Oh, no, not a police car.
Judge Bakker then asked whether the officers had forced him to do anything
while they interrogated him and whether they had deprived him of anything.
McIntyre answered no to both questions. He acknowledged that the officers had
allowed him to go to the bathroom when he needed and that neither of them had
offered him a bribe. He also stated that he still understood the warnings Judge
Bakker had given him prior to the interrogation, and he affirmed that everything done
15
in the interrogation was done “voluntarily, of [his] own free will.” Judge Bakker and
McIntyre then signed the bottom of the form, Judge Bakker confirmed he had no
more questions for her, and she left the interview room.
After Judge Bakker left the room, Hewitt came back in the room and asked
whether McIntyre needed anything or needed to go to the bathroom. McIntyre said,
“No.” Shortly after, as Hewitt explained that McIntyre and his accomplice were
“fixing to head out,” he again asked if McIntyre needed anything. McIntyre requested
to again go to the bathroom, and Hewitt allowed him to do so.
F. McIntyre Absconds and His Case is Transferred to Criminal District Court
After the interview, officers placed McIntyre in the custody of Tarrant County
Juvenile Services who had received a referral indicating that McIntyre had engaged in
delinquent conduct by committing the offenses of capital murder and aggravated
robbery. The State later instituted a juvenile delinquency proceeding. On January 5,
2017, McIntyre was released from the juvenile detention facility to the custody of his
sister. As a condition of his release, McIntyre was required to wear an electronic
monitoring device. On March 27, 2017, juvenile services received notice that
McIntyre had cut off the monitoring device. On June 30, 2017, the United States
Marshals Service in Union County, New Jersey apprehended McIntyre, and he was
returned to the custody of Tarrant County Juvenile Services.
On July 5, 2017, Tarrant County Juvenile Services received another referral
indicating that McIntyre had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the
16
offense of aggravated robbery in an unrelated incident. Eventually, McIntyre was
transferred to the custody of the Tarrant County Sheriff and placed in jail.
Based on the State’s transfer petition, on August 30, 2017, the juvenile court
waived its exclusive jurisdiction over McIntyre and transferred him to Tarrant County
Criminal District Court Number Two. On August 31, the Criminal District Court
accepted the transfer. Ultimately, the State charged McIntyre with one count of
capital murder and three counts of aggravated robbery in connection with the home
invasion.
G. The Suppression Hearing
Prior to trial, McIntyre moved to have his recorded statement to the officers
suppressed. The trial court held a hearing.
1. Judge Bakker’s Testimony
Judge Bakker testified that she was the magistrate that gave McIntyre the
Section 51.095 warnings. After explaining her routine practices in administering the
warnings, Judge Bakker described specifically what she recalled about having given
McIntyre the warnings.
According to Judge Bakker, after sitting down with McIntyre in the interview
room, she took note that McIntyre spoke English, did not seem upset, and lacked any
observable mental incapacities. She also said that McIntyre used a vocabulary
consistent with a sixteen year old, he was respectful and polite, and he “seemed to
communicate with [her] effectively.” Judge Bakker further stated that she saw
17
nothing to indicate that McIntyre was intoxicated in any manner and that she had no
concerns about proceeding with reviewing the warnings with McIntyre at that time.
As she began to cover the warnings with McIntyre, Judge Bakker first read the
paragraph of the warning form which indicated that McIntyre had been either accused
of or was a witness to the offense of capital murder. Judge Bakker said that she then
explained to McIntyre that she was going to go over the statutory warnings one at a
time to make sure he understood them and to answer any questions he might have
about them.
By Judge Bakker’s account, McIntyre asked and was allowed to go to the
bathroom before she read the warnings. After he returned, Judge Bakker said she
pulled her chair near McIntyre’s so that they could review the written warnings
together, and from there, Judge Bakker began to read the warnings one at a time.
Judge Bakker said that at the end of reading the warnings to McIntyre, he
acknowledged understanding the rights that she had read to him, and he initialed each
of the warnings on the form. According to Judge Bakker, she had no concerns about
whether McIntyre understood the warnings, and if she had, she would not have
allowed an interview to go forward. After McIntyre acknowledged that he
understood the rights, Judge Bakker then informed McIntyre that when he had
finished speaking with the officers, she would return and speak with him to ensure
that he had not been mistreated.
18
Judge Bakker acknowledged that, as she began to read him his rights, McIntyre
asked about a lawyer, but Judge Bakker interpreted McIntyre’s question to be an
inquiry into whether she was a police officer or whether he needed an attorney to
explain his rights to him. According to Judge Bakker, once she explained that her
purpose was to make sure he understood his rights, McIntyre said, “[O]h, okay, yeah,
yeah, I’m with you.” Judge Bakker stated that once McIntyre understood that she was
not there to ask about an alleged offense, McIntyre agreed to “go forward going
through all [the form’s] information.” Judge Bakker said that McIntyre never
mentioned a lawyer to her again.
After officers were finished interviewing McIntyre, Judge Bakker returned to
the room and went over the remainder of the form with him, as she had told him she
would. Upon her return, Judge Bakker noticed that McIntyre had not given a written
statement on the form, so she crossed through the pages applicable to written
statements, and he initialed each page she had marked out. She also reviewed and
filled out the post-interview portion of the form with McIntyre. As she did, she
began asking McIntyre questions from the form. For example, Judge Bakker asked
McIntyre what grade he was in and what his hobbies were. She wrote his answers on
the form. Judge Bakker also asked McIntyre whether he was intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs, and McIntyre said that he had smoked marijuana in the car prior
to the police having detained him. But Judge Bakker said that McIntyre did not
appear to be intoxicated to her.
19
Additionally, Judge Bakker asked McIntyre whether he had made his verbal
statements to the officers freely and voluntarily, whether the officers had mistreated
or threatened him, and whether the officers had deprived McIntyre of food or drink.
Judge Bakker said that, through her questions and observations, she believed that
McIntyre understood his rights before and after speaking with the officers, and that in
her opinion, all of McIntyre’s actions “were knowing and voluntary.” Judge Bakker
testified that both her interactions with McIntyre as well as McIntyre’s interview with
the officers were captured and recorded on video. But Judge Bakker admitted that
even though she had the authority under the Family Code to request to watch the
portion of the video where the officers interviewed McIntyre, she chose not to do so
and thus did not know what happened during the time McIntyre was actually
interviewed by police.
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Judge Bakker whether she
had ever asked McIntyre if he agreed to waive the rights she had read to him, and
Judge Bakker responded, “No.” Defense counsel then asked whether Judge Bakker
agreed that there was no “express[] waiver” by McIntyre. Judge Bakker said,
Again, I’m not trying to be cagy, but that’s not what I’m there to judge.
I mean, I explained his rights to him. The word “express waiver” is your
term. It’s also a term of art and a term of law. I believe he understood
his rights and I believe that what he did was knowing and voluntary.
20
2. Detective Patrick Knotts’s Testimony
Detective Patrick Knotts of the Mansfield Police Department testified at the
suppression hearing as well. According to Knotts, he served as the lead detective in
the investigation of McIntyre’s involvement in the attempted robbery and resulting
murder. Knotts said that officers arrested McIntyre in Arlington on September 21
and transported him to an interview room at the Public Safety Building in Mansfield,
which, according to Knotts, is a designated juvenile processing facility by local
agreement with Tarrant County. Knotts testified that the Public Safety Building has
four interview rooms that are equipped with video and audio recording equipment
and that these rooms were used for multiple purposes including interviewing
arrestees—both adults and juveniles—as well as victims: “It could be any number [of]
reasons [the rooms] can be used.” By Knott’s account, he placed McIntyre in room
number four, and he placed McIntyre’s accomplice in a room across the hall. Knotts
said that Hewitt and Vanduzi interviewed McIntyre while he interviewed the other
suspect.
Knotts averred that, because of Mansfield Police Department policy and the
law, he never allows juveniles who are in custody to “comingle” with adults who are
in custody. According to Knotts, they are housed and detained in separate rooms at
the facility. Knotts explained the reasoning behind this policy:
[I]t’s important any time that you have a juvenile in custody that they
have to remain separate from any adult prisoner, any adult suspect as
well. So even if you have a juvenile and adult say they’re involved in the
21
same criminal episode, you would still separate them when you’re doing
any investigation or interviews or something like that once they come
into your custody.
At the hearing, the defense introduced the video recording of the officers’
interview with McIntyre as well as his interactions with Judge Bakker. The defense
also introduced a transcript of the entire video. The trial court noted on the record
that it had watched the video and read the transcript. Ultimately, the trial court
denied McIntyre’s suppression motion. In its order denying the motion, the trial
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law.
H. The Verdict and Sentencing
Later, a jury trial was held. At the beginning of trial, McIntyre pleaded not
guilty to capital murder and aggravated robbery causing bodily injury by shooting with
a firearm. McIntyre pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery by
threatening with a firearm. At trial, McIntyre’s recorded statement was played for the
jury. The jury found McIntyre guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder and
guilty of aggravated robbery causing bodily injury by shooting with a firearm. After
the punishment phase of trial, the jury assessed punishment at fifty-five years’
incarceration for the murder conviction, thirty years’ incarceration for one of the
aggravated robbery convictions, and thirteen years’ incarceration for each of the
remaining two convictions. The trial court rendered judgments accordingly, ordering
McIntyre’s sentences to run concurrently, and this appeal followed.
22
III. DISCUSSION
All three of McIntyre’s issues contend that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. Thus, we will first set out the proper standard of review and then
address his issues in turn.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress the statement of a
juvenile under the same abuse of discretion standard as a motion to suppress the
statement of an adult in a criminal proceeding. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763,
768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); In re J.A.B., 281 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2008, no pet.). We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reviewing the
trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State,
800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of
the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State,
214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we defer almost totally to
the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court
determined those facts on a basis other than evaluating credibility and demeanor, and
(2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating credibility and
demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09
23
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions
de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a suppression
motion, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Wiede,
214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When
the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings.
Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo
unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of
the legal ruling. Id. at 818.
B. Express Waiver of Rights
In his first issue, McIntyre argues that “[t]he trial court erred in denying
[McIntyre’s] motion to suppress his recorded oral statement and admitting the same at
trial over his objection because the requirements of Texas Family Code Section
51.095 were not strictly complied with in that neither the police, nor the magistrate,
ever requested or obtained an express waiver of [McIntyre’s] rights prior to custodial
interrogation.” The State argues that the trial court properly denied McIntyre’s
motion to suppress his statement because Section 51.095 does not require an express
24
waiver and that both law enforcement and Judge Bakker strictly followed Section
51.095. We agree with the State.
1. Relevant Statutes and Cases
The language in Section 51.095 of the Family Code is substantially the same as
that contained in Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the exception
that the Family Code requires that a magistrate administer the warnings to a juvenile.
Section 51.095(a)(5)(A) of the Family Code provides that the statement of a child
made while in custody is admissible if:
(5) the statement is made orally [while the child is in custody of an officer] and
the statement is recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device
that records images, and:
(A) before making the statement, the child is given the warning
described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the warning is a part of
the recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waives each right stated in the warning.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.095(a)(5)(A).
5
5The warnings required to be given by Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) are as follows:
(i) the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any
statement that the child makes may be used in evidence against the child;
(ii) the child has the right to have an attorney present to advise the child either
prior to any questioning or during the questioning;
(iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorney, the child has the right to have
an attorney appointed to counsel with the child before or during any interviews
with peace officers or attorneys representing the state; and
(iv) the child has the right to terminate the interview at any time.
25
Article 38.22, section 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that no oral statement of an adult accused of an offense shall be admissible unless
“prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the warning in
Subsection (a) of Section 2 above and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning.”
6
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 38.22, § 2(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that Article 38.22
does not require an express waiver of rights. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
Recognizing the consistency in language between these statutes, a number of
Texas appellate courts have held that there is no requirement that a juvenile explicitly
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.095(a)(1)(A).
6Article 38.22, Section 2(a)’s warnings are:
(1) [A suspect] has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all
and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during
any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer
appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.
Tex. Code. Crim Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 § 2(a).
26
or expressly waive his rights pursuant to Section 51.095 of the Family Code, just as an
adult is not required to expressly waive his rights pursuant to Article 38.22 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. See Coby v. State, No. 01-18-00991-CR, 2020 WL
3867280, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“The Family Code does not require that the defendant
explicitly waive his rights.”) (citing Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)); In re C.M., No. 10-10-00421-CV, 2012 WL
579540, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 22, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]here is no
requirement that a juvenile explicitly waive his rights pursuant to section 51.095 of the
Family Code or article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”); Crenshaw v. State,
No. 01-09-00791-CR, 2011 WL 286126, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Jan. 27, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that there
is no requirement that a juvenile explicitly waive his Section 51.095 rights); In re J.L.,
No. 10-06-00246-CV, 2007 WL 3298920, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 7, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“Section 51.095(a)(5)(A) does not require that every right be
individually waived either in writing or verbally, but only that the juvenile knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waive[s] each right.”). Rather, an implicit waiver can be
inferred from the actions and words of the person being interrogated. See Joseph v.
State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1979)).
7
7Given the nature of McIntyre’s first and third issues, we will address the
27
2. Analysis
In this case, it is undisputed that McIntyre never expressly waived the rights
that Judge Bakker had informed him about. And even though McIntyre “concedes
that the [requirement of an express waiver] is not the current state of the law,” he
nonetheless contends that “strict compliance” with Section 51.095 is required. He
goes on to define “strict compliance” as necessitating an express waiver even though
no such language is present in Section 51.095.
To support his argument, McIntyre cites cases where courts have expressed
that strict compliance with Section 51.095 is required. But these cases do not support
the position that the rights in that section be expressly waived. In re Matter D.J.C.,
312 S.W.3d 704, 720–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); In re J.B.J.,
86 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.). Indeed, in D.J.C., the
magistrate failed to warn the juvenile that his video-recorded statement could be used
in evidence against him even though Section 51.095 expressly requires that the
magistrate inform a juvenile of that right. 312 S.W.3d at 719. And in J.B.J, the court
held that officers had strictly complied with the parental-notification provisions of the
Family Code—waiver was not at issue. 86 S.W.3d at 815. In short, these cases do not
support McIntyre’s position that strict compliance with Section 51.095 requires an
express waiver of rights by the juvenile.
voluntary nature of McIntyre’s statement in our analysis of his third issue.
28
McIntyre also attempts to distinguish the cases of Marsh, C.M., Crenshaw, and
J.L. (cases relied on by the State at the suppression hearing and cited by the trial court
in its findings of fact and conclusions of law) from his case, arguing that the juvenile
defendants in those cases all made overt acts that constituted an express waiver. For
example, McIntyre points out that in Marsh, Marsh had “expressed a willingness to
make a written or recorded statement.” 140 S.W.3d at 905. For C.M., McIntyre
contends that C.M. made an express waiver of his rights when he stated that “he
understood those rights and answered affirmatively when the magistrate asked him if
he still wanted to talk to the detectives.” 2012 WL 579540, at *8. McIntyre
distinguishes Crenshaw from an implied-waiver case by drawing attention to the fact
that after being warned of his Section 51.095 rights, Crenshaw simply began telling his
side of the story without any instigation from the police. 2011 WL 286126, at *11.
And McIntyre differentiates J.L. because J.L. responded to the magistrate’s comment
that he did not have to make a statement by circling “I DO” on the form informing
him of his rights. 2007 WL 3298920, at *1. While it is true that there are factual
differences in these cases that distinguish them from McIntyre’s case, each of these
cases stand for the proposition that an express waiver is not required under Section
51.095. See id.; Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 905; C.M., 2012 WL 579540, at *8; Crenshaw,
2011 WL 286126, at *11. Notably, McIntyre points to no provision of Section 51.095
that Judge Bakker failed to strictly follow. We conclude that these cases undercut
McIntyre’s position that an express waiver is required.
29
Even though McIntyre admits that case law in Texas is contrary to his position,
McIntyre ultimately asks this court to set a bright-line rule that a juvenile must
expressly waive his Section 51.095 rights. But McIntyre again simply makes the
argument that the edicts of the Family Code should be strictly complied with—he
does not point to any authority suggesting why we should hold contrary to established
law that no express waiver is required. See Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 911; see also C.M.,
2012 WL 579540 at *7 (“[T]here is no requirement that a juvenile explicitly waive his
rights pursuant to section 51.095 of the Family Code or article 38.22 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”).
We conclude, as other courts have, that there is no requirement of an express
waiver of the rights articulated in Section 51.095(a)(5)(A). Thus, the trial court did not
err by denying McIntyre’s motion to suppress his statement based on the lack of an
express waiver. See Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 911 (construing Section 51.095 consistently
with Article 38.22 and holding that neither statute requires an express waiver). We
overrule McIntyre’s first issue.
C. Designated Juvenile Processing Office
In his second issue, McIntyre argues that the trial court erred by not
suppressing his statement because his statement was obtained in a room not
exclusively used for interviewing children in violation of Family Code Section
52.025(a). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.025(a). The State counters that McIntyre was
interviewed in a room exclusively designated as a juvenile processing office and that
30
the area was exclusively used for that purpose at the time; thus, the trial court did not
err by concluding that the location of the interview did not violate Section 52.025(a).
The State also argues, in the alternative, that even if the interview room did not meet
the necessary standard of a juvenile processing office, McIntyre has failed to show a
causal connection between the making of his statement and the failure of the
interview room to be used exclusively as a juvenile processing office. Again, we agree
with the State.
The Texas Family Code sets out detailed procedures for the detainment and
arrest of juveniles accused of delinquency, and police officers and courts are bound to
comply with those procedures. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 52.01–52.026; In re D.Z.,
869 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied). Efforts at
compliance with the requirements of the Family Code have been closely scrutinized
by Texas courts in the past. See, e.g., Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001); In re R.R., 931 S.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no
writ); In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 563–65. As a general rule, violations of the Family
Code will render evidence subsequently obtained from the juvenile inadmissible. Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03(e).
Section 52.02 provides that a person taking a child into custody must
immediately bring that child to a designated juvenile processing office or to one of
several listed alternative sites. Id. § 52.02; see Anthony v. State, 954 S.W.2d 132, 136
31
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (“The police station must use an area
designated exclusively for processing juveniles.”). Section 52.025(a) states,
The juvenile board may designate an office or a room, which may be
located in a police facility or sheriff’s offices, as the juvenile processing
office for the temporary detention of a child taken into custody under
Section 52.01. The office may not be a cell or holding facility used for
detentions other than detentions under this section. The juvenile board
by written order may prescribe the conditions of the designation and
limit the activities that may occur in the office during the temporary
detention.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.025(a). The purpose for requiring juveniles to be
interrogated in specially designated areas is to protect them from exposure to adult
offenders and the stigma of criminality. Williams v. State, 995 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
But a designated juvenile processing office does not need to be exclusively used
for juveniles to satisfy Section 52.025 so long as juveniles and adults are not
interviewed in the designated office or room at the same time. Id. In Williams, an
officer suspected that Williams, a juvenile, was involved in a murder. Id. Upon
learning that Williams had been detained in jail under his brother’s name, the officer
went to the jail and asked Williams whether he would be willing to give a statement
concerning what happened on the night of the murder. Id. Williams agreed and was
released to the officer’s custody. Id. The officer took Williams directly to a
magistrate’s office, and the magistrate informed him of his rights and gave him the
warnings required by the Family Code. Id.; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.095(a)(1)(A).
32
When the magistrate finished with this procedure, the officer took Williams to the
Youth Crimes Bureau of the local police department. Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 758. As
a result of ongoing remodeling, no interview rooms were available at the Youth
Crimes Bureau. Id. Thus, the officer took Williams to the homicide office, where
Williams gave his statement. Id. The officer testified that the office was vacant except
for himself and Williams. Id. No adult offenders were present. Id. After the
statement was completed, the officer took Williams back to the magistrate, Williams
signed the statement in the magistrate’s presence, and the magistrate certified that the
statutory requirements had been satisfied and that the statement was made voluntarily.
Id. Williams’s statement was later introduced at his murder trial. Id. at 756.
On appeal, Williams argued that his statement should not have been admitted
at trial because he made his statement in a room that was not used exclusively to
interview juveniles and thus it did not meet the statutory definition of Section 52.025.
Id. at 758. The Williams court reasoned that because no one else was in the homicide
office at the time Williams made his statement, the purposes of protecting juveniles
from exposure to adult offenders and the stigma of criminality had been fulfilled. Id.
According to the Williams court, “To hold that Williams’s statement was inadmissible
under these circumstances would be to place form above substance.” Id. at 758–59.
33
The court held that Williams’s statement was properly admitted at trial even though
the homicide office was not exclusively used to interview juveniles.
8
Id.
The facts of this case are substantially similar to the facts in Williams, and we
conclude that the same resolution is proper. Like in Williams, officers brought
McIntyre to an interview room that Knotts testified was used for many purposes
including interviewing both juveniles and adults. And similar to Williams, there were
no adult offenders present when McIntyre gave his statement to the officers. Indeed,
Knotts testified that it was both the law and Mansfield Police Department policy to
keep juveniles and adults separate. Moreover, like in Williams, McIntyre was informed
of his rights by Judge Bakker before he spoke with the officers. After McIntyre made
his verbal statement to the officers, Judge Bakker returned to the interview room and
8The State has identified two cases—In re D.J.C. and Anthony—that could be
interpreted to indicate that Section 52.025 requires that the juvenile processing office
be reserved exclusively for that purpose, but we agree with the State’s position that
these cases are distinguishable from McIntyre’s. See In re D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d 704, 718
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“The evidence shows that the
interview room used by Officer Garcia was ‘used routinely to interview all criminal
subjects.’”); Anthony, 954 S.W.2d at 136 (“The police station must use an area
designated exclusively for processing juveniles.”). In both of those cases, there was
evidence that the juveniles were not taken to a juvenile processing facility, and there
was no evidence that the facilities were used exclusively as juvenile processing offices
at the time the interviews transpired. D.J.C., 312 S.W.3d at 718; Anthony, 954 S.W.2d at
136. Here, McIntyre was taken to a designated juvenile processing facility, and Knotts
testified that it was exclusively used for that purpose at the time McIntyre was
interrogated. Furthermore, the San Antonio Court of Appeals later distinguished
Anthony from its decision in Williams specifically “[b]ecause no one else was in the
homicide office at the time Williams made his statement.” Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 758–
59 (emphasis added).
34
certified that the statutory requirements had been satisfied and that McIntyre’s
statement was voluntary. Because, like in Williams, McIntyre was not exposed to adult
offenders and the stigma of criminality, we hold that, under these circumstances, it
would be placing form over substance to conclude that McIntyre’s statement was
inadmissible simply because at other times the room in which he was interrogated was
used for other purposes, including interviewing adult offenders.9
Furthermore, this case demonstrates how impractical it would be to interpret
Section 52.025 as requiring that juvenile processing offices be reserved exclusively for
that purpose at all times. As the State points out, the juvenile holding log for the
Mansfield Police Department, which McIntyre introduced at the suppression hearing,
demonstrates that only sixteen juveniles were interviewed at that building over the
course of three years and three months. Those interviews in total lasted
approximately six hours. Thus, to elevate form over substance and require juvenile
9We decline McIntyre’s invitation to “remand this matter to the trial court” to
make additional conclusions of law indicating that the lack of exclusivity of the room
had no impact on his statement because even if the trial court had given a wrong
reason for its ruling, we would uphold the ruling if it is both supported by the record
and correct under any applicable legal theory. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). Our conclusion that designated juvenile processing offices do not need to be
exclusively used for juveniles to satisfy Section 52.025 so long as juveniles and adults
are not interviewed in the designated office or room at the same time is an applicable
legal theory in this case, and it is supported by the record. We do note that the trial
court specifically found that the interrogation was conducted “in an interview room
designated for juvenile interviews in addition to adult, child, witness, and victim
interviews.”
35
processing offices to be reserved exclusively for that purpose at all times would mean
that the Mansfield Police Department would be required to keep multiple interview
rooms vacant year-round when they would only be used an average of two hours per
year. We hold that the trial court did not err by not suppressing McIntyre’s statement
because of where he gave the statement.10
We overrule McIntyre’s second issue.
10There is another, independent reason why—one urged by the State—the trial
court did not err by refusing to suppress McIntyre’s statement—McIntyre has not
shown a causal connection between any alleged Family Code violation and the making
of his statement. See Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In
order for a juvenile’s written statement to be suppressed because of a violation of
Section 52.025, there must be some “exclusionary mechanism.” Id. Unlike Section
51.095, Section 52.025 is not an independent exclusionary statute. Section 51.17 of
the Family Code provides that “Chapter 38, Code of Criminal Procedure, appl[ies] in
a judicial proceeding under this title.” Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 51.17(c). Thus, if
evidence is to be excluded because of a Section 52.025 violation, it must be excluded
through the operation of Article 38.23(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See
Gonzales, 67 S.W.3d at 912 (holding that Article 38.23(a) governs admissibility of
evidence gained through a violation of a non-exclusionary Family Code provision).
Article 38.23(a) provides that “[n]o evidence obtained by an officer or other
person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of
Texas . . . shall be admitted in evidence.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held that evidence is not
“obtained . . . in violation” of a provision of law if there is no causal connection
between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence. Gonzales, S.W.3d at
912; Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Chavez v. State,
9 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In light of Article 38.23(a), before a
juvenile’s statement can be excluded, there must be a causal connection between the
Family Code violation and the making of the statement. Gonzales, S.W.3d at 912;
Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The burden of proof is on
the party asserting the exclusion of evidence. Pham, 175 S.W.3d at 773.
In this case, McIntyre has not even argued that there is a causal connection
between the alleged violation that his interrogation was not conducted in a proper
juvenile processing office and the fact that he gave his statement to the officers. And
36
D. The Voluntariness of McIntyre’s Statement
In his third issue, McIntyre argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing
his statement because, when considering the totality of the circumstances, it was
involuntarily made. Specifically, McIntyre argues that a number of facts demonstrate
that his statement was not given voluntarily. McIntyre concedes that he was neither
threatened nor promised anything in exchange for his statement. The State contends
that, when viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
McIntyre’s statement was voluntarily made.
“The statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears
that it was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion[.] ‘The
determination of whether a confession is voluntary is based on an examination of the
totality of circumstances surrounding its acquisition.’” Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995)). Further, on appeal, the appellate court does not engage in its own factual
review but decides whether the trial judge’s fact findings are supported by the record.
Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Trial courts are given
almost complete deference in determining historical facts. St. George v. State,
this court has read the transcript of and watched the video of McIntyre’s statement as
he made it to the police. Nothing in the record before us, or McIntyre’s arguments in
his brief to this court, suggests that McIntyre, or his decision to make his statement to
police, was affected by the use of the interview room. Because McIntyre has not
shown this causal connection, he has failed to show how the trial court erred by not
suppressing his statement. See Gonzales, S.W.3d at 912.
37
237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by the record, an appellate court is not at liberty to disturb them; thus, we
address only the question of whether the trial court improperly applied the law to the
facts. Id.
It is notable that during the interrogation, McIntyre demonstrated an awareness
of his rights. Specifically, at multiple times during the interrogation McIntyre chose
not to answer certain questions. For example, at one moment in the interrogation he
asserted, “Actually, I just -- I think I’m going to choose not to answer that question, if
that’s okay with you.” Later, he told Hewitt that he was going to “pass on that
question.” Furthermore, he responded to a line of questioning by stating, “Don’t ask
me any questions if they aren’t about me, Bro.” McIntyre even explained to Hewitt
that he understood his right not to answer certain questions, that he knew that the
right was expressed on the form he signed, and that he was willing to read the form to
Hewitt. This is significant because Judge Bakker had explained to McIntyre that as
part of his right to remain silent and not make any statement at all, he could choose to
answer some questions and at the same time assert his right not to answer others.
Here, regarding Judge Bakker’s testimony from the suppression hearing, the
trial court found that
• Judge Bakker is the presiding judge for the Mansfield Municipal Court.
• Judge Bakker conducted the magistrate warnings of McIntyre.
38
• Judge Bakker read and thoroughly explained the statutorily required
magistrate warnings to McIntyre.
• Judge Bakker carefully explained the warnings to McIntyre and invited and
allowed him to ask questions throughout the process to determine if he
understood the warnings and what was happening.
• Judge Bakker wanted to make sure that McIntyre understood she was
someone he could trust so that he could communicate any mistreatment or
issues to her as a neutral magistrate who is not present on behalf of the
police.
• McIntyre did not appear to have any cognitive issues, and appeared to use a
vocabulary that, if not elevated, was at baseline with what she thought a
sixteen-year-old vocabulary would be.
• McIntyre did not appear to be upset emotionally, was respectful, polite, and
communicated effectively.
• McIntyre did not display or articulate any issues such as thirst or hunger
and was allowed to use the bathroom.
• McIntyre indicated that he understood his rights and included his initials
and signature on the form.
• Judge Bakker had no concerns regarding McIntyre’s understanding of the
warnings.
• Judge Bakker did not have any concerns regarding the police interviewing
McIntyre following her warnings.
• Judge Bakker would not have allowed the police interview to go forward if
she had concerns.
• McIntyre did not request an attorney, was not coerced or threatened, and
did not request that either the warnings or interview be stopped.
• Judge Bakker also met with McIntyre immediately following the police
interview.
39
• Judge Bakker went through the remaining questions on the form in a
thorough manner.
• McIntyre initialed the four comers of the portion of the form where Judge
Bakker had marked through indicating that he had not provided a written
statement.
• Judge Bakker worked to make sure McIntyre understood that she was there
to talk with him and make sure he was okay.
• Despite McIntyre’s indication that he had ingested marijuana earlier that
day, he did not appear intoxicated.
• Judge Bakker believed that McIntyre understood his rights as explained and
had made a voluntary waiver during the police interview and was
specifically not mistreated, threatened, or hurt in anyway.
• McIntyre appeared more tired following the police interview and was
responsive and respectful but did not appear agitated.
• Judge Bakker would have indicated on the form any concerns she had
regarding McIntyre’s understanding of his rights following the police
interview.
• Judge Bakker determined that McIntyre understood his rights as explained
and his actions during the subsequent interview were voluntary.
• Judge Bakker testified credibly.
Regarding Knotts’s testimony, the trial court found that
• Knotts was the lead investigator from the Mansfield Police Department on
McIntyre’s case.
• The police interview was conducted by Hewitt and Vanduzi following
McIntyre’s arrest in an interview room designated for juvenile interviews in
addition to adult, child, witness, and victim interviews.
40
• McIntyre did not appear to have any medical issues and had not been
harassed, coerced, beaten, or threatened in any way before he went into the
interview room.
• The interview was accurately and competently recorded with audiovisual
equipment.
• Knotts testified credibly.
Each of these facts found by the trial court are consistent with the record and
support the trial court’s finding that McIntyre gave his statement freely and
voluntarily. See Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 910–11 (holding that juvenile defendant’s
statement was made freely and voluntarily where he received the required magistrate
warnings before his statement was recorded, he was informed he could choose not to
speak with the detectives, the magistrate’s opinion was that defendant’s recorded
statement was voluntary, and there was no evidence to the contrary); see also Coffey v.
State, No. 03-01-00342-CR, 2002 WL 437110, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 21,
2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding that the denial of juvenile’s
motion to suppress his confession was not an abuse of discretion in prosecution for
murder despite allegation that confession was involuntary; evidence supported that
statutory safeguards were followed, no evidence supported allegation that confession
may have been coerced, defendant’s statement that he had been “huffing gas” was
contradicted by testimony of officers that they did not smell gasoline in defendant’s
presence, and no evidence supported defendant’s testimony that officer promised him
aid of an influential nature). We conclude that the trial court did not err by
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determining that McIntyre’s statement was voluntarily made; thus, we overrule
McIntyre’s third issue.
Outcome: Having overruled all three of McIntyre’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: