Description: Detroit, Michigan criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant claimed a violation of the speedy trial act.

Following our circuit’s binding precedent, we previously held in this case that
preindictment plea negotiations are “period[s] of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant” that are automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) of the
Speedy Trial Act. United States v. White, 679 F. App’x 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
543 U.S. 1099 (2005); United States v. Bowers, 834 F.2d 607, 609–10 (6th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam)). Defendant challenged this precedent for the first time in his petition for a writ of
certiorari as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Bloate v. United
States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, White v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 641 (2018) (No. 17-270). The government then changed horses in midstream,
conceding—also for the first time before the Supreme Court—that our circuit precedent was
incorrect and inconsistent with Bloate, and that the roughly two-week continuance to engage in
preindictment plea negotiations here did not qualify for automatic exclusion under § 3161(h)(1).
Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641 (2018)
(No. 17-270). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the
case back to us “for further consideration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor
General.” White v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 641, 641 (2018).

On remand, we now hold that Bloate abrogated Dunbar and Bowers. Nevertheless, we
deny defendant relief for two independent reasons. First, he cannot overcome plain-error review
of his Bloate argument. Second, and alternatively, the time for preindictment plea negotiations
was properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) of the Speedy Trial
Act. Therefore, we again affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Our prior opinion sets forth the facts pertinent to this remand:
On April 29, 2013, the government filed a complaint against White charging him
with drug distribution and firearm crimes related to the May 14, 2010, search and
seizure. White was arrested on those charges, and an order of temporary
detention was entered, on May 2, 2013. He made his initial appearance the next
day and was released on bond.

After his arrest, the parties engaged in preindictment plea negotiations. To that
end, they filed a stipulation with the district court on May 17, 2013, agreeing to
adjourn White’s preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23, 2013,
and June 7, 2013, from White’s Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were
not successful, and a grand jury indicted White on June 4, 2013.

White, 679 F. App’x at 429. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, thirty-three
days passed between White’s arrest and indictment.

While he filed a bevy of motions before the district court, pertinent to our inquiry is only
White’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because the government violated his speedy
trial rights. Defendant’s motion simply announced that the government failed to indict him
within thirty days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., but
substantively argued only his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The district court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss, denied it, a jury convicted White of multiple crimes, and the district court sentenced him
to 84 months in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim the district
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act
and the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. See White, 679 F. App’x at 430–33.
Following remand from the Supreme Court, we give a fresh look to this issue.

II.

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act strengthens
this constitutional mandate by establishing time limits for completing the various stages of a
federal criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. Among these limits is an obligation that
the government file an indictment within thirty days of arresting a defendant, excepting the time
spent on certain events that can be automatically excluded from that calculation and for other
events if sufficient reasons are given by the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (h). We
typically review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012). And
“[w]e review the district court’s decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance under an abuseof-discretion standard.” United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2014).

The issue on remand is whether the fourteen days spent on preindictment plea
negotiations are excludable under that Act. White argues that our precedent holding that
preindictment plea negotiations are automatically excludable under § 3161(h)(1) no longer
passes muster after the Supreme Court’s Bloate decision. The government counters that this
court should affirm the district court because (1) White forfeited the argument that Bloate
precludes automatic exclusion of preindictment plea negotiations and cannot show plain error,
and (2) even if preindictment plea negotiations are not automatically excludable under
§ 3161(h)(1), that time was excludable as an ends-of-justice continuance pursuant to
§ 3161(h)(7). We address these arguments in turn.

Outcome: We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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