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Date: 10-02-2017

Case Style:

LaWanda King v. Ford Motor Company

Case Number: 16-3391

Judge: DeGuilio

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on appeal from the Northern District of Illinois (Cook County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: John Moran

Defendant's Attorney: Zach T. Bowles, Mark Howard Boyle, Karen Kies DeGrand, Emily Louise Hussey, Jawayria Zarreen Kalimullah, Kathleen M. Nemechek, Meagan Pearl Vanderweele, Kurt David Williams

Description: LaWanda King worked for many
years as an assembler in Ford Motor Company’s vehicle assembly
plants. After transferring to its Chicago plant in 2010,
though, she claims that she was sexually harassed by a super‐
* Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 No. 16‐3391
visor, after which she began getting reassigned to less desirable
tasks, missing out on overtime, and receiving unwarranted
discipline. Ultimately, she was fired in 2013 after missing
several weeks of work for medical reasons that Ford
claims she didn’t properly document. In this suit, King asserts
claims for sexual harassment and FMLA interference, and
also asserts that Ford retaliated against her for her complaints
of sexual harassment and her taking of FMLA leave. Due to a
series of procedural missteps and substantive shortcomings,
all of her claims fell at summary judgment. King appeals, and
we affirm.
I. Background
LaWanda King began working for Ford Motor Company
in its vehicle assembly plants in 1992, initially at an Ohio
plant. King was a union employee and worked in the Chassis
Department as a headlight aimer. The events underlying this
suit began after King transferred to Ford’s Chicago plant in
2010. King states that, in December 2011, her supervisor made
inappropriate, sexually charged comments over a period of
several days. King complained to a labor relations representative
and also made calls to Ford’s national harassment hotline
to report the harassment. King asserts that after she began
complaining of harassment, she began getting reassigned to
different, less‐desirable tasks, and was denied overtime opportunities.
On March 20, 2012, King filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), alleging among other claims that she had been
sexually harassed and retaliated against. The EEOC issued a
right‐to‐sue letter on that charge on August 31, 2012. However,
King had moved without advising the EEOC of her
change of address, so she did not receive the letter.
No. 16‐3391 3
King claims that her employment remained turbulent over
the ensuing months. She was disciplined on a number of occasions
and claims that she was not paid for certain hours that
she worked, though she offers few specific examples of any of
these incidents. She was also disciplined in January 2013 for
having eight absences over the previous eighteen months, for
which Ford’s attendance policy called for a two‐week suspension.
King returned from that suspension in February, but
was then diagnosed with a medical condition that required
her to take time off work. On March 7, 2013, she called Ford’s
third‐party benefits administrator and requested a medical
leave. That call triggered a conditional medical leave, but
King was required to submit documentation justifying her
need for leave. King’s doctor submitted a form describing
King’s need for leave, but Ford’s medical department deemed
the form insufficient, as it lacked certain details.
Because King’s conditional leave expired and her doctor’s
note was found insufficient, King’s continued absence from
work triggered Ford’s 5‐Day Quit Process. Under that process,
which is set forth in the collective bargaining agreement,
a notice is issued to the employee advising that the employee
has five working days to either return to work or justify their
continued absence. The notice is automatically initiated by
Ford’s medical records system. Employees who fail to comply
with the notice will be fired and lose their seniority.
A 5‐Day Quit notice was issued to King on March 21, 2013,
and was mailed the following day. The notice advised King
that her continued absence had not been approved, and that
she had five working days to report for work or give a satisfactory
reason for her continued absence. On April 1—five
4 No. 16‐3391
working days after the notice was mailed—King called several
employees in Ford’s labor relations department, including
Aaron Wynn, a labor relations representative. She did not
reach any of those individuals, so she left voicemails, but does
not indicate what she said. There is no evidence that Wynn
received any of those messages before the following day. King
also spoke to two other employees. One unidentified employee
stated that King’s doctor needed to submit documentation
or King would be fired, and a clerk in the medical department
stated that King’s paperwork was acceptable
through March 28 (which had already passed), but that her
doctor needed to submit paperwork to extend her leave beyond
On April 2, having not received any documentation justifying
King’s continued absence, Wynn processed King’s termination,
stating that her leave had expired and that she
failed to respond to the 5‐Day Quit notice. At that time, Ford’s
records showed that King had worked 970 hours in the preceding
12 months, which would not be enough to be covered
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Around
this same time, King filed two more charges of discrimination
with the EEOC. On March 27, King filed a charge alleging that
Ford retaliated against her for her previous charge and her
other complaints of harassment by reassigning her, denying
her overtime, failing to pay her for hours that she worked, and
unfairly disciplining her. Ford did not receive notice of that
charge until after it terminated King’s employment. King filed
another charge the following month, alleging that her termination
was in retaliation for her first charge.
The EEOC issued right‐to‐sue letters on those charges in
August 2013, after which King filed her complaint in this case
No. 16‐3391 5
on November 6, 2013. Her complaint asserted claims for sexual
harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e‐2, ‐3; for interference with her rights under the
FMLA and retaliation for her taking of FMLA leave, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615; and for a violation of the Illinois Whistleblower’s Act.
After the close of discovery, Ford moved for summary judgment
on all counts. In her response, King relied heavily on a
declaration from Grant Morton, a union chairman at the
plant. Ford argued that the declaration should be stricken because
King never disclosed Morton as a witness. In ruling on
the motion, the district court agreed and struck Morton’s declaration.
On the substance of the claims, the court held that
King’s sexual harassment claim was time‐barred, that her
FMLA interference claim failed because she had not worked
enough hours to be eligible for FMLA leave at the time of her
firing, and that she had not provided evidence sufficient to
support an inference of retaliation. Accordingly, the court
granted summary judgment as to the federal claims and relinquished
supplemental jurisdiction over the state‐law claim.
King filed a motion for reconsideration, but the district court
denied that motion, so King appealed.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir.
2017). We construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences
in a light most favorable to the non‐moving party. Id. Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
6 No. 16‐3391
A. Morton Declaration
Before proceeding to the substance of the claims, King objects
to the district court’s decision to strike Morton’s declaration.
Morton stated in his declaration, for example, that Ford
representatives had expressed to him their displeasure that
women were filing sexual harassment complaints with the
EEOC and told him that his “people better stop complaining.”
Morton also stated that when he discussed with a human resources
representative why King had been marked “absent
without leave” on a number of occasions, she responded that
“it would be helpful if Ms. King dropped her EEOC charge”
and that the AWOLs would be cleared if King did so. Ford
argued that the district court should not consider this declaration
because King failed to disclose Morton as a witness in
her Rule 26(a) disclosures, which prevented Ford from being
able to depose him or investigate his statements during discovery.
The district court agreed, so it struck the declaration.
Rule 26(a) requires a party to disclose the name of “each
individual likely to have discoverable information—along
with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses….” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). If a party fails to do so, it “is not allowed
to use that … witness to supply evidence on a motion …, unless
the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857
(7th Cir. 2003) (stating that the sanction of exclusion “is automatic
and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show
that its violation of Rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless”).
The determination of whether a Rule 26(a) violation is
justified or harmless is entrusted to the broad discretion of the
district court. David, 324 F.3d at 857. “We review all discovery
No. 16‐3391 7
sanctions for abuse of discretion and will uphold a district
court’s decision so long as it could be considered reasonable.”
Dynegy Marketing & Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 514
(7th Cir. 2011).
King spends many pages on appeal arguing why the district
court’s decision was unreasonable, but in the district
court, her argument on this point spanned only three sentences:
she argued that Morton’s name had come up in discovery,
so Ford knew about him and could have deposed him.
She did not cite to the record for those alleged disclosures,
though, so the district court was entitled to disregard that assertion,
and we will not consider on appeal materials that
were not properly cited to the district court.1 Sommerfield v.
City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017); Burton v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2017);
Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med., 800 F.3d 843, 849 (7th
Cir. 2015). And as the district court noted, there is obvious
prejudice in failing to disclose such a witness during discovery,
as that prevented Ford from deposing Morton and conducting
any appropriate follow‐up discovery, so the violation
was not harmless. King also argues that the district court
should have taken other steps to cure the prejudice without
striking the declaration. However, she did not propose any
alternatives to the district court, and while the court may have
been within its discretion to pursue other options, it did not
abuse its discretion in choosing to strike the declaration. Hassebrock
v. Bernhoft, 815 F.3d 334, 341 (7th Cir. 2016); Novak v.
1 The district court also noted that its own review of the record did not
reveal anything that would have adequately disclosed Morton as a witness
on the topics covered in his declaration. We find no error in that conclusion
8 No. 16‐3391
Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 777 F.3d 966, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2015);
Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir.
In a motion for reconsideration, King noted that Morton
had filed an EEOC charge of his own, which she believes
should have alerted Ford to some of Morton’s assertions of
misconduct. That charge was not filed until after the close of
discovery in this case, though, and it still did not show that
Morton would be a witness for King, so that charge would not
have alleviated any of the prejudice. The motion for reconsideration
also attached a letter King’s counsel wrote on the day
discovery closed that referenced the Rule 26(a) disclosures.
However, that letter could have been submitted along with
King’s response to the motion for summary judgment, so it
was not properly presented for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 494 (7th
Cir. 2008). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion for reconsideration on this issue. Accordingly,
we analyze the motion for summary judgment
without considering Morton’s declaration.
B. Sexual Harassment
King first asserts a Title VII claim based on sexual harassment
by her supervisor in December 2011. King filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC based on that harassment in
March 2012, and the EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter on August
31, 2012. King did not file suit until November 6, 2013,
though, well over 90 days later, so the district court granted
summary judgment on this claim based on the statute of limitations.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐5(f)(1) (requiring plaintiffs to
file suit within 90 days of being notified of their right to sue).
No. 16‐3391 9
In the district court, King argued that she never received
the right‐to‐sue letter, so the 90‐day limitations period never
began to run. The district court rejected that argument, as
King admitted that she failed to keep the EEOC apprised of
her current mailing address, so her non‐receipt of the rightto‐
sue letter was her own fault. See Reschny v. Elk Grove Plating
Co., 414 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that when receipt
of the right‐to‐sue letter “is delayed by fault of the plaintiff,
the constructive receipt doctrine applies and the 90‐day
clock starts running once delivery is attempted at the last address
King does not contest that holding on appeal, but argues
only that her claim is nonetheless timely because she reincorporated
the allegations from her first, time‐barred charge into
her second and third charges, as to which her suit is timely.
However, “[i]f the claimant fails to file suit within the ninetyday
window, the lapsed claims are not revived by including
them in a second EEOC charge and restarting the process.”
Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, 465 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir.
2006); accord Rivera‐Diaz v. Humana Ins. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 748
F.3d 387, 391 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the proponent of a discrimination
claim fails to sue within the specified ninety‐day period,
his claim expires and is not resuscitated by the filing of
a second administrative charge.”); Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.
& Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). This argument
is also factually incorrect, as the later charges refer to the first
charge as protected activity in support of retaliation claims,
10 No. 16‐3391
but do not allege any sexual harassment. Accordingly, the district
court correctly granted summary judgment as to this
C. FMLA Interference
King next asserts a claim for FMLA interference. Though
she suggests in passing that she was improperly denied
FMLA leave on previous occasions, the only argument King
develops on appeal is that Ford interfered with her right to
FMLA leave by firing her in April 2013 for her medical absence
that began the previous month. The district court
granted summary judgment on that claim because King failed
to provide sufficient evidence that she had worked enough
hours to be eligible for the FMLA’s protections at that time.
The FMLA entitles certain eligible employees to up to 12
weeks of leave in a year. To be eligible for FMLA leave, an
employee must have worked at least 1,250 hours in the preceding
12‐month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A); Pirant v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The right of
family leave is conferred only on employees who have worked
at least 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months.”). Plaintiffs
bear the burden of proving their eligibility for the FMLA’s
protections, Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of
Will Cty., 559 F.3d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2009), meaning King must
provide evidence that she had worked at least 1,250 hours in
the 12 months prior to her leave.
2 Any protected activity during this period could still support a retaliation
claim if it triggered later acts of retaliation that are not time‐barred,
but as discussed below, King has not shown a causal connection between
her activities during this period and the later adverse actions as to which
her suit is timely.
No. 16‐3391 11
In moving for summary judgment, Ford submitted its time
records showing that King had worked only 1,157 hours in
the 12 months before she began her absence in March 2013,
and only 970 hours in the 12 months before her firing on April
2, 2013. In response, King submitted an affidavit in which she
stated that, on unspecified occasions, she had been marked
absent without leave on days she was actually at work or absent
with leave. She then stated: “Disregarding improper
AWOLS, I worked a sufficient number of hours to qualify for
FMLA. Prior to requesting FMLA leave in March 2013, I met
the minimum number of hours worked to be eligible for
FMLA leave, if [Ford] removed improper disciplines and
AWOLS from my employment record.”
That conclusory assertion falls far short of creating a triable
issue of fact on this question. “Summary judgment is not
a time to be coy: ‘conclusory statements not grounded in specific
facts’ are not enough” to stave off summary judgment.
Sommerfield, 863 F.3d at 649 (quoting Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of
the City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2016)). King’s
affidavit did not identify any particular error in Ford’s time
records or even attempt to estimate how many hours she had
actually worked over the year in question; she offered only
the bare legal conclusion that she should be deemed to have
worked enough hours to be eligible for FMLA leave.
The district court did not, as King contends, make a credibility
finding in holding that this statement did not create a
triable issue of fact. Rather, it correctly observed that King’s
affidavit did not contain any facts—as opposed to conclusions—
that would show she actually worked at least 1,250
hours in the preceding year. See Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367
F.3d 714, 726 (7th Cir. 2004); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,
12 No. 16‐3391
134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 56 demands something
more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a
particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific
concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the
matter asserted.”). King also argues that her burden is lightened
because Ford’s records are unreliable, but the bare assertion
in her affidavit would not meet any burden, no matter
how light.3 See Melton v. Tippecanoe Cty., 838 F.3d 814, 819 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“At the very least, an employee relying on his own
recollection to prove a violation of FLSA must have a reasonably
reliable story; FLSA plaintiffs are still bound to the requirements
of Rule 56.”).
Finally, King tried to remedy this shortcoming through a
motion for reconsideration, with which she submitted an unsworn
chart purporting to identify her hours over the year in
question. That was too late, though, as a motion for reconsideration
is not an opportunity to present materials that could
have been presented the first time around. Obriecht, 517 F.3d
at 494. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to consider those materials, and it correctly granted
summary judgment on this claim.
D. FMLA and Title VII Retaliation
Finally, King asserts claims for retaliation, claiming that
Ford retaliated against her for her taking of FMLA leave and
her complaints of sexual harassment. To make out a claim of
retaliation under either the FMLA or Title VII, a plaintiff must
3 King also relies on appeal on a wage complaint she filed in which
she claimed to have unpaid hours, but she did not cite to that document
in the district court, and that document does not show that any uncredited
hours took place in the pertinent period.
No. 16‐3391 13
show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection
exists between the two. Carter v. Chi. State Univ., 778 F.3d
651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015); Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994,
998 (7th Cir. 2013). There is no dispute that the first two elements
are met in at least some respect, so these claims boil
down to whether there is a causal connection between the
There is, however, a question as to the scope of the protected
activity and adverse actions that King has properly presented.
King’s filings speak in sweeping terms as to both elements,
stating, for example, that King had the anti‐harassment
hotline “on speed dial,” and that after her protected activity,
she “went unpaid, was wrongly disciplined, punished
for petty offenses, and wrongly deemed AWOL numerous
times.” Assertions at such a high level of generality do not
suffice at this stage, though—a party “must present specific
facts showing a genuine issue to survive summary judgment.”
Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir.
2008); see also Bordelon, 811 F.3d at 991 (holding that a plaintiff’s
conclusory assertions were insufficient to avoid summary
judgment where he “only offered sweeping generalizations
about the way the protected class was treated”); Lucas,
367 F.3d at 726. King offers few specific examples of any of
those incidents, and often makes no attempt to connect them
to her claim. For example, while King argues that she was consistently
denied overtime and reassigned to less desirable positions,
she never identifies who was responsible for those actions
or whether that person would have been aware of her
protected activity.
14 No. 16‐3391
Distilled to the facts that were properly identified and supported,
the only protected activity as to King’s FMLA claim is
a leave she took in March 2012.4 As to her Title VII claim,
King’s protected activity consists of her March 2012 EEOC
charge and her internal complaints of harassment, the last of
which was a call to the anti‐harassment hotline in April 2012.
Meanwhile, the adverse action on which King focuses most
heavily is her firing in April 2013. Beyond that, the only action
she identifies with sufficient specificity for these purposes is
her January 2013 suspension for excessive absences. Accordingly,
the question is whether the evidence could support a
causal connection between those instances of protected activity
and those adverse actions. In deciding that question, we
consider the evidence as a whole and ask whether a reasonable
jury could draw an inference of retaliation. Ortiz v. Werner
Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764–66 (7th Cir. 2016).
First, King identifies four other employees who she believes
were treated better than she was. However, she does
not say how, nor does she attempt to show that they are similarly
situated to her or even that they are outside her protected
class. Thus, any different treatment of those employees
offers no support for a finding that Ford’s treatment of King
was retaliatory. See Arizanovska v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 682
F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The ‘similarly‐situated’ inquiry
is a ‘flexible, common‐sense one,’ but it at least requires that
4 To the extent there were others, they would have been earlier than
this one, and thus would have been even farther removed from the adverse
actions. Also, King does not challenge the district court’s holding
that the leave immediately preceding her firing in April 2013 would not
constitute protected activity if, as we have held, she was not eligible for
FMLA leave at that time.
No. 16‐3391 15
the plaintiff name a comparator outside her protected class.”
(quoting Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007))).
King also argues that the timing of the adverse actions was
suspicious. There was a gap of almost a year between the last
protected activity in April 2012 and King’s firing, though, and
of about nine months between the last protected activity and
her discipline in January 2013. Gaps that large tend to undermine
rather than support any inference of causation. Carter,
778 F.3d at 658 (“[W]e do not find a span of seven months to
be suspicious.”) (also collecting cases where five‐, six‐, and
nine‐month gaps were found too great to be suspicious).
King’s argument in this regard relies on characterizing previous
events such as her reassignments and denials of overtime
as part of a pattern of retaliation that culminated in her firing.
As just discussed, however, King has not adequately developed
that argument by identifying specific instances or showing
that whoever was responsible for them was aware of her
protected activity or was involved in the later actions. Thus,
those generalizations offer no support for a claim of retaliation.
King’s primary argument on causation is that Ford’s reason
for firing her was pretextual, as she argues that she adequately
responded to the 5‐Day Quit notice and should not
have been fired for that reason.5 At the outset, though, our
concern is not whether Ford’s decision to fire King was correct,
but whether it was retaliatory. Even assuming that the 5‐
Day Quit notice was not the real reason for King’s firing, King
would still need to offer some reason to infer that retaliation
was the reason. However, she offers no suspicious timing, no
5 King does not develop any argument that the January 2013 discipline
was pretextual.
16 No. 16‐3391
comparator evidence, and (without the Morton declaration)
no comments by decisionmakers in reference to any of King’s
or anyone else’s protected activities that could suggest a retaliatory
animus. Thus, even if King could show that the 5‐
Day Quit process was a pretext, there is no evidence from
which a jury could find that it was a pretext for retaliation for
King’s taking of FMLA leave or complaints of sexual harassment
a year earlier. That missing link is fatal to King’s claims.
Teruggi v. CIT Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir.
2013) (stating that even “if [the plaintiff’s] evidence showed
pretext, that alone would not be sufficient to survive summary
judgment” without some evidence pointing to a prohibited
animus as the cause for the decision); Van Antwerp v. City
of Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295, 298–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that,
even assuming the plaintiff provided evidence of pretext, his
claim would still fail without “some minimal showing that
the ‘real reason’” for the decision was discrimination).
Regardless, we agree with the district court that the evidence
does not support a finding of pretext, either, which concerns
whether the stated reason was not merely erroneous or
unfair, but a lie. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852 (7th Cir.
2012). After King had been absent from work for nearly three
weeks, at which point her conditional leave had expired and
the medical department had found her doctor’s note lacking,
Ford issued a 5‐Day Quit notice that required King to either
report for work or give the Human Resources Department a
satisfactory reason for her continued absence. King did not
report back to work, and though she called and spoke to or
left voicemails for various employees, she does not identify
what she said or whether she provided a “satisfactory reason”
for her continued absence, as required. She did not show that
No. 16‐3391 17
any of those messages reached Wynn before he processed her
termination, either.
King further argues that she was fired a day early, as she
should have had until the end of the day on April 2, 2013 to
respond to the notice. However, the notice expressly stated
that King had to respond within five working days of the date
on the notice—March 21, 2013—and there is no genuine dispute
that April 1, 2013 was at least five working days later.6
King also stated that a clerk in the medical department told
her that her paperwork was acceptable (though only through
March 28), but there is no evidence that the medical department
ever conveyed such a belief to Wynn, who knew that a
5‐Day Quit notice had been issued and had no indication that
King complied with it. Thus, even assuming that Ford got its
wires crossed and erred in firing King, that does not show that
the reason was pretextual. For those reasons, the district court
correctly granted summary judgment on King’s retaliation
III. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking
the Morton declaration or in rejecting the materials and arguments
raised for the first time on a motion for reconsideration.
On the evidence properly before it, the district court correctly
held that King’s sexual harassment claim was untimely and
6 Ford began counting from March 22, when the notice was mailed,
and because March 29 was a holiday, five working days after March 22
was April 1, giving King through the end of that day to comply with the
18 No. 16‐3391
that she failed to provide evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment on her remaining claims.

Outcome: Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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