Case Number: 17-2126

Judge: Before: KEITH, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

Court: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Plaintiff's Attorney: Philip L. Ellison

Defendant's Attorney: Brett Meyer

Description: Saginaw, Michigan civil rights lawyer represented the Plaintiff who claimed that her fourth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant.

Between 2014 and 2017, Tabitha Hoskins chalked Taylor’s tires on fifteen separate
occasions and issued her citations in kind. Each citation included the date and time the chalk
was placed on her vehicle’s tires. The cost of a citation starts at $15 and increases from there.
On April 5, 2017, Taylor filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City, alleging
defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches by placing chalk
marks on her tires without her consent or a valid search warrant. Taylor also sued Hoskins in her
individual capacity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), asserting that chalking was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
or alternatively, if it was a search, it was reasonable under the community caretaker exception.1
Hoskins also asserted a qualified immunity defense.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City
engaged in a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment by placing chalk marks on Taylor’s
tires to gather evidence of a parking violation. The district court, however, agreed with the
defendants that the search was reasonable because: (1) there is a lesser expectation of privacy in
automobiles; and (2) the search was subject to the community caretaker exception to the warrant
requirement.2 Taylor timely appeals.

* * *

Outcome: Taking the allegations in Taylor’s complaint as true, we hold that chalking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, specifically under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. This does not mean, however, that chalking violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we hold, based on the pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the “community caretaking” exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this. When the record in this case moves beyond the pleadings stage, the City is, of course, free to argue anew that one or both of those exceptions do apply, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement might apply.
For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the City’s
motion to dismiss and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: