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Date: 06-21-2020
Case Style:
State of West Virginia vs. Justin K. Legg
Case Number: 19-0875
Judge: Tim Armstead
Court: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Attorney General
Scott E. Johnson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
Need help finding a lawyer for representation for challenging the four certified questions regarding the conspiracy statute contained in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in West Virginia.
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Description:
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
.
In 2017, the Central West Virginia Drug Task Force (“Task Force”) began
an investigation into drug activity that was eventually referred to as Operation Mountaineer
Highway. Thereafter, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) began working with the
Task Force on this investigation.
The Task Force began its investigation into two individuals, Greg Coleman
and Ryan Johnson, after controlled purchases were made from Mr. Coleman’s residence.
In May of 2018, the DEA applied for and was granted “a wire intercept order” allowing
3
them to listen to and record conversations between Greg Coleman and others. The wiretap
investigation revealed that Greg Coleman sold drugs to more than twenty individuals in
Fayette County, West Virginia.
On May 15, 2019, the petitioner, Justin K. Legg, was indicted by a Fayette
County, West Virginia, Grand Jury for the offense of conspiracy. In addition to the
petitioner, Operation Mountaineer Highway resulted in numerous other individuals being
indicted.2
In the indictments, the State “alleged that the Defendant conspired with a single
named, unindicted co-conspirator to deliver or possess with intent to deliver one kilogram
or more of heroin, and that the Defendant and/or the unindicted co-conspirator did act to
effect the object of the conspiracy. No other co-conspirators are named or identified in the
Indictment.”
Although the petitioner may not have distributed over one kilogram of heroin
himself, the State asserts that he and other similarly situated defendants are responsible for
the heroin that Mr. Coleman distributed as part of the overall conspiracy. Following
discovery and the filing of various motions, the Circuit Court of Fayette County entered its
“Order Certifying Questions To The Supreme Court of Appeals Of West Virginia.”3
The
five questions, and the circuit court’s answers are as follows:
1. For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code Section
60A-4-414(b), is an Indictment specifically alleging a
2 Sixteen of the cases were assigned to the Honorable Thomas H. Ewing.
3 The Honorable Thomas H. Ewing consolidated the related cases that were assigned
to him for the limited purpose of certifying questions to this Court. Petitioner Justin K.
Legg’s case was designated as the lead case for the limited purpose of resolving the
questions presented.
4
conspiracy involving a single defendant and only one other
co-conspirator sufficient, under constitutional principles, to
put the defendant on notice that he/she may be held
responsible under section 4-414(f) for the quantity of drugs
delivered or possessed with intent to deliver solely by the
co-conspirator to other persons, who have also been
charged in separate indictments alleging a single
conspiracy involving the same co-conspirator, when those
other persons are not named in the indictment?
Answer: Yes.
2. For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code Section
60A-4-414(b), does section 4-414(f) incorporate the
common law principle that overt acts have to be in
furtherance of the conspiracy before the jury can attribute
to the defendant “all of the controlled substances
manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver
or manufacture by other participants or members of the
conspiracy”?
Answer: Yes.
3. For purposes of the jury’s determination under West
Virginia Code Section 60A-4-414(f), is evidence of an
unindicted co-conspirator’s drug transactions with others
not named or identified in the Indictment admissible for the
jury’s consideration in determining the amount of
controlled substance attributable to the Defendant for
purposes of West Virginia Code Section 60A-4-414(b)
subject to the knowing and foreseeable principles outlined
in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and its
progeny?
Answer: Yes.
4. For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code Section
60A-4-414(b), can the jury consider the volume of
controlled substances distributed by the named, coconspirator as part of his separate conspiracies with others
not named or identified in the Indictment for purposes of
the jury’s determination under West Virginia Code Section
60A-4-414(f) even when the State does not intend to
introduce evidence to show that the defendant had any
connection or dealings with any of the unindicted coconspirator’s other alleged, separately indicted coconspirators?
Answer: Yes.
5
5. Where the Indictment charges a conspiracy in violation of
West Virginia Code Section 60A-4-414(b) involving the
defendant and only one other named, but unindicted cconspirator, may counsel for the defendant continue to
represent similarly situated, but separately indicted
defendants who were not named in the defendant’s
indictment but who are alleged to have had separate
conspiracies with the same, named unindicted coconspirator as identified in the defendant’s Indictment,
when the State seeks to offer evidence in the defendant’s
trial of drug transactions between the named, unindicted coconspirator and the other separately indicted individuals for
the jury to consider in determining the quantity of
controlled substance attributed to the defendant under West
Virginia Code Section 60A-4-414(f)?
Answer: No.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified
by a circuit court is de novo[,]” Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W. Va.
172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996), meaning that “we give plenary consideration to the legal issues
that must be resolved to answer the question” certified by the circuit court. Michael v.
Appalachian Heating, LLC, 226 W. Va. 394, 398, 701 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Prior to addressing the issues raised in this proceeding, we exercise our
authority to reformulate the questions certified by the circuit court in order to fully address
the legal issues presented.
When a certified question is not framed so that this
Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the
question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate
questions certified to it under both the Uniform Certification of
6
Questions of Law Act found in W.Va. Code, 51-1A-1, et seq.
and W.Va. Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating to certified
questions from a circuit court of this State to this Court.
Syl. Pt. 3, Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W. Va. 404, 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993).
Consistent with our authority to do so, we reformulate the questions certified
as follows:
1. For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code §
60A-4-414(b), is an indictment specifically alleging a
conspiracy involving a single defendant and only one
other co-conspirator sufficient, under constitutional
principles, to put the defendant on notice that he or she
may be held responsible under § 60A-4-414(f) for the
quantity of drugs delivered or possessed with intent to
deliver solely by the co-conspirator to other persons not
named in the indictment?
Answer: Yes
2. For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code §
60A-4-414(b), does § 60A-4-414(f) require that overt
acts have to be in furtherance of the conspiracy before
the trier of fact can attribute to the defendant “all of the
controlled substances manufactured, delivered or
possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by other
participants or members of the conspiracy”?
Answer: Yes.
3. For purposes of the trier of fact’s determination under
West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(f), is evidence of an
unindicted co-conspirator’s drug transactions with
others not named or identified in the indictment
admissible for consideration in determining the amount
of controlled substances attributable to the Defendant
for purposes of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b)
subject to the knowing and foreseeable principles
outlined in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946) and its progeny?
Answer: Yes.
7
4. Where an indictment charges a conspiracy in violation
of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b) involving the
defendant and only one other named, but indicted coconspirator, may counsel for the defendant continue to
represent similarly situated, but separately indicted
defendants who were not named in the defendant’s
indictment but who are alleged to have had separate
conspiracies with the same, named unindicted coconspirator as identified in the defendant’s indictment
when the State seeks to offer evidence in the
defendant’s trial of drug transactions between the
named, unindicted co-conspirator and the other
separately indicted individuals for consideration in
determining the quantity of controlled substance
attributable to the defendant under West Virginia Code
§ 60A-4-414(f)?
Answer: No.
We will address each of these questions in turn.
A. “Sufficiency of Indictment”
In the first certified question, we are asked to determine if an indictment for
conspiracy under W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b) (2017) is sufficient to a place a defendant
on notice that he or she may be held responsible for the quantity of drugs delivered or
possessed with intent to deliver solely by a co-conspirator to other persons who have also
been charged in separate indictments alleging a single conspiracy involving the same coconspirator, when those other persons are not named in the indictment.
An indictment “shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.” W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The West
Virginia Constitution provides, “[i]n all [criminal] trials, the accused shall be fully and
8
plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation[.]” Further, this Court has
previously held “[a]n indictment need only meet minimal constitutional standards, and the
sufficiency of an indictment is determined by practical rather than technical
considerations.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Miller, 197 W. Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996).
In answering this question, the circuit court relied, in part, upon the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Camara, 908 F.3d 41 (4th Cir. 2018), which noted
that “the government need not identify any co-conspirators.” Camara at 46. In discussing
this issue, the United States Supreme Court has noted “at least two persons are required to
constitute a conspiracy, but the identity of the other members of the conspiracy is not
needed, inasmuch as one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names
are unknown.” Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951). When considering a
case with a similar indictment, the Sixth Circuit noted, “not to construe this indictment to
charge a conspiracy involving two or more persons might create tension with the general
rule that the prosecution need not furnish co-conspirators’ names as long as the defendant
has notice of the conspiracy with which he is charged.” United States v. Pingleton, 216 F.
App’x 526, 529 (6th Cir. 2007).
Practically speaking, a defendant who is charged with conspiracy under W.
Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b) of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, is on notice that he
or she may be held responsible for the quantity of drugs delivered or possessed with intent
to deliver solely by the co-conspirator to other persons not named in the indictment. This
is because the conspiracy statute, W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414, allows the trier of fact to
9
“include all of the controlled substances manufactured, delivered or possessed with the
intent to deliver or manufacture by other participants or members of the conspiracy” when
it is determining the quantity of controlled substances attributable to the defendant in a
charge under this section. W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f) (2017) (emphasis added). To the
extent that the defendant is charged under the conspiracy statute, such attribution may be
permitted.
Therefore, we hold that an indictment for conspiracy under W. Va. Code §
60A-4-414(b) need not name all of the co-conspirators. An indictment specifically alleging
a conspiracy involving a single defendant and only one other co-conspirator is sufficient,
under constitutional principles, to put the defendant on notice that he or she may be held
responsible under § 60A-4-414(f) for the quantity of drugs delivered or possessed with
intent to deliver solely by the co-conspirator to other persons not named in the indictment.
The reformulated certified question asked:
For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code §
60A-4-414(b), is an indictment specifically alleging a
conspiracy involving a single defendant and only one other coconspirator sufficient, under constitutional principles, to put
the defendant on notice that he or she may be held responsible
under § 60A-4-414(f) for the quantity of drugs delivered or
possessed with intent to deliver solely by the co-conspirator to
other persons not named in the indictment?
We answer the reformulated certified question in the affirmative.
B. “Overt Acts”
The second question certified by the circuit court relates to the quantity of
controlled substances that are attributable to a defendant who has been charged under W.
10
Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b). In this question, we are asked if W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f)
requires that overt acts have to be in furtherance of the conspiracy before the trier of fact
may attribute to a defendant “all of the controlled substances manufactured, delivered or
possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by other participants or members of the
conspiracy.” W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f). Answering this question requires us to
examine the conspiracy statute within the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, W. Va.
Code § 60A-4-414.
We begin our analysis with a review of our rules regarding statutory
interpretation. When deciding the meaning of a statutory provision, “[w]e look first to the
statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive question,
the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v.
State Tax Dep’t of W. Va., 195 W. Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995). See also Syl.
Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where the language
of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without
resort to interpretation.”).
With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we examine W. Va. Code
§ 60A-4-414. It provides, in relevant part:
***
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section, any person who willfully conspires with one or more
persons to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to
manufacture or deliver one kilogram or more of heroin, five
kilograms or more of cocaine or cocaine base, one hundred
grams or more of phencyclidine, ten grams or more of lysergic
11
acid diethylamide, or fifty grams or more of methamphetamine
or five hundred grams of a substance or material containing a
measureable amount of methamphetamine, if one or more of
such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
imprisoned in a state correctional facility for a determinate
sentence of not less than two nor more than thirty years.
***
(f) The determination of the trier of fact as to the quantity of
controlled substance attributable to the defendant in a charge
under this section may include all of the controlled substances
manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver or
manufacture by other participants or members of the
conspiracy.
Subsection (b) clearly requires an overt act. The statutory language provides
“if one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy...” W.
Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b) (emphasis added). When examining the overt act requirement
as it relates to our general conspiracy statute, W. Va. Code § 61-10-31(1), this Court has
noted that “[t]he purpose of the overt act requirement is merely to show ‘that the conspiracy
is at work.’ …. It is not necessary that each conspirator involved in the conspiracy commit
his or her own overt act. The overt act triggering the conspiracy as to all the conspirators
can be committed by any one of their number.” State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 265, 294
S.E.2d 62, 67 (1981) (internal citations omitted). Although W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b)
does not require each conspirator to commit his or her own overt act, it requires an overt
act to effect the object of the conspiracy.
12
Subsection (f) of this conspiracy statute provides, “[t]he determination of the
trier of fact as to the quantity of controlled substance attributable to the defendant in a
charge under this section may include all of the controlled substances manufactured,
delivered or possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by other participants or
members of the conspiracy.” W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f) (emphasis added). We believe
that the conspiracy referenced in subsection (f) is the conspiracy charged in the indictment.
Therefore, we hold that for purposes of a crime under W. Va. Code § 60A4-414(b), W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f) requires that overt acts have to be in furtherance of
the conspiracy before the trier of fact can attribute to the defendant “all of the controlled
substances manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by
other participants or members of the conspiracy.”
The reformulated certified question asked:
For purposes of a crime under West Virginia Code §
60A-4-414(b), does § 60A-4-414(f) require that overt acts have
to be in furtherance of the conspiracy before the trier of fact
can attribute to the defendant “all of the controlled substances
manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver or
manufacture by other participants or members of the
conspiracy”?
We answer the reformulated certified question in the affirmative.
C. “Foreseeability”
The third question certified by the circuit court also relates to the quantity of
controlled substances that are attributable to a defendant who has been charged under W.
Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b). However, this question asks whether the amount of controlled
13
substances attributable to a defendant under W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b) is subject to the
foreseeability principles of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and its
progeny.
As has previously been discussed, the circuit court concluded that the
evidence of an unindicted co-conspirator’s drug transactions with others not identified in
the indictment is admissible for the trier of fact’s consideration in determining the amount
of controlled substances attributable to a defendant under W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b).
In addition, the circuit court also concluded that such attribution is subject to the knowing
and foreseeability principles contained in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)
and its progeny, and we agree.
Pinkerton has been described as the “leading case” on the issue of vicarious
conspirator liability. United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 993 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992). In
Pinkerton, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the substantive convictions of a coconspirator even though there was no evidence that the co-conspirator participated directly
in the commission of the substantive offenses. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946). The Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that for such liability to be imposed,
the act of the co-conspirator must be done “in furtherance of the conspiracy” and must be
“reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.”
Pinkerton at 647-48. “The idea behind the Pinkerton doctrine is that the conspirators are
each other’s agents; and a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of
the agency.” United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1379 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
14
States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986)). When determining the quantity
of drugs attributable to an individual defendant involved in a drug conspiracy, the Fourth
Circuit has recognized that “a trial court is obliged to ‘instruct a jury to use Pinkerton
principles.’ United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 558 (4th Cir. 2008).
We hold that for purposes of the trier of fact’s determination under W. Va.
Code § 60A-4-414(f) as to the amount of controlled substances attributable to a defendant
for purposes of W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b), the admissibility of evidence of an unindicted
co-conspirator’s drug transactions with others who are not named or identified in the
indictment is subject to the knowing and foreseeable principles outlined in Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) and its progeny.
The reformulated certified question asked:
For purposes of the trier of fact’s determination under
West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(f), is evidence of an
unindicted co-conspirator’s drug transactions with
others not named or identified in the indictment
admissible for consideration in determining the amount
of controlled substances attributable to the Defendant
for purposes of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b)
subject to the knowing and foreseeable principles
outlined in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946) and its progeny?
We answer the reformulated certified question in the affirmative.
D. “Conflict of Interest”
The last question certified by the circuit court relates to whether counsel for
a defendant who is charged with conspiracy in violation of W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(b)
15
may continue to represent similarly situated, but separately indicted defendants who were
not named in the defendant’s indictment but who are alleged to have had separate
conspiracies with the same named unindicted co-conspirator as identified in the
defendant’s indictment.
“The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article III,
Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution both guarantee to the criminally accused the
right to counsel.” State ex rel. Humphries v. McBride, 220 W. Va. 362, 366, 647 S.E.2d
798, 802 (2007) (per curiam). “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists under W. Va.
Const. art. III, § 14, there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts
of interest.” Syl. Pt. 2, Cole v. White, 180 W. Va. 393, 376 S.E.2d 599 (1988). Rule 1.7
of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct governs conflicts of interest with
current clients. Rule 1.7 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists
if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.
The fourth question contemplates a scenario in which the State may use
evidence of drug transactions involving persons who are represented by the same attorney
and are both alleged to have obtained controlled substances from the same supplier. As
16
the circuit court correctly noted, there is a likelihood that counsel “will be forced to choose
between clients at trial” if one or more of counsel’s clients are called to testify. By way of
example, one client may possess knowledge or information that would be helpful to his or
her own case, but the same information may be harmful to another client. Further,
testimony from the various clients may not only be sought by the State. The petitioner
raises the possibility that he may need to subpoena “every individual” that transacted with
the unindicted co-conspirator in an effort to defend himself. However, providing testimony
at trial is not the only concern. Counsel may also be navigating plea offers for these
various clients.
The representation of one client need not be directly adverse to another client.
A conflict exists if there is a “significant risk” that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client. Rule 1.7, West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. The scenario contemplated in this question poses
a significant risk that the representation of one client will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client. Given this Court’s answers to the preceding
questions and for the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that such representation would
result in a conflict of interest.4
The reformulated certified question asked:
Where an indictment charges a conspiracy in violation of West
Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b) involving the defendant and
only one other named, but indicted co-conspirator, may
4 Petitioner concedes that if this Court answered any of the preceding certified
questions in the affirmative, then a conflict of interest would exist.
17
counsel for the defendant continue to represent similarly
situated, but separately indicted defendants who were not
named in the defendant’s indictment but who are alleged to
have had separate conspiracies with the same, named
unindicted co-conspirator as identified in the defendant’s
indictment when the State seeks to offer evidence in the
defendant’s trial of drug transactions between the named,
unindicted co-conspirator and the other separately indicted
individuals for consideration in determining the quantity of
controlled substance attributable to the defendant under West
Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(f)?
We answer the reformulated certified question in the negative.
Outcome: Having answered the reformulated certified questions, we remand this case
to the Circuit Court of Fayette County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Certified questions answered.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: