Date: 10-08-2020

Case Style:

Case Number: 19A-CR-2812

Judge: Margret Robb

Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney: Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Indianapolis, IN - Criminal Defense Attorney, dealing in a narcotic drug, , dealing in methamphetamine, and dealing in cocaine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, and possession of a narcotic drug, dealing in marijuana, possession of marijuana

Narcotics Detective James Smith of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department (“IMPD”) was advised by a confidential informant (“CI”) that an
older black male was selling heroin from a residence located on N. Eastern
Avenue in Indianapolis. Detective Smith arranged for the CI to conduct two
controlled buys at the residence between February 7 and February 10, 2018.
The CI was equipped with a device that both transmitted and recorded audio
during each buy and IMPD provided the CI with recorded “buy” money for the
transactions. After both controlled buys, the CI informed Detective Smith that
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an older black male the CI knew as “Ladell Robinson” answered the door of
the residence and provided the heroin in exchange for the “buy” money.
[3] Following some research, Detective Smith identified Robinson as the older
black male involved in the controlled buys and learned that Robinson was on
electronic monitoring at the residence. On February 14, Detective Smith
showed the CI a photo line-up and the CI identified Robinson as the individual
who sold them the heroin during each controlled buy. Based on this
information, Detective Smith applied for and was granted a search warrant to
search the residence for narcotics, seize various items, and arrest Robinson.
[4] On February 15, Detective Smith, with the assistance of IMPD SWAT and
Northwest District Narcotics Unit, executed the warrant. Inside the residence,
officers located and detained three individuals, including Robinson, and
discovered and seized (among other things) 49.43 grams of marijuana, 96.28
grams of cocaine, 86.93 grams of heroin, 27.02 grams of methamphetamine,
more than thirty oxycodone/hydrocodone tablets, and $8,817 in cash.
Robinson was placed under arrest.1
[5] The State charged Robinson with dealing in a narcotic drug, dealing in
methamphetamine, and dealing in cocaine, all Level 2 felonies; possession of
methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, and possession of a narcotic drug, all
1 With respect to the other two detainees, one was arrested for visiting a common nuisance; however, the
probable cause affidavit does not indicate that the other detainee was arrested.
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Level 3 felonies; dealing in marijuana, a Level 6 felony; and possession of
marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The State also alleged Robinson was an
habitual offender. The State did not, however, charge Robinson with any crime
related to the controlled buys.
[6] On August 31, defense counsel e-mailed the assigned prosecutor requesting the
audio recordings of the controlled buys. Weeks later, defense counsel reached
out again and requested to listen to the recordings at the prosecutor’s office.
The deputy prosecutor stated he would be willing to provide a five second clip
of the recordings for the defense. Detective Smith “redacted [the recordings] so
that Defense Counsel could hear [Robinson]’s voice in the recording without
any risk of revealing the CI’s identity.” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 76.
[7] On September 25, Robinson filed a motion to compel discovery to obtain a
copy of the complete audio recordings of the controlled buys that ultimately led
to the search warrant. Robinson argued that the buys “were the entire basis for
the search warrant that was issued in this case, and the charges are based
entirely on suspected narcotics and contraband seized pursuant to that warrant;
as such, the recordings are both highly relevant and necessary for an effective
defense.” Id. at 99. In response, the State filed a motion for a discovery
protective order requesting that the trial court deny disclosure of the audio
recordings for several reasons: (1) the controlled buys were “uncharged
conduct”; (2) Robinson did not allege any material representations, omissions,
or untruths contained in the affidavit; (3) Robinson failed to demonstrate that
the recordings are material to the preparation of his defense; and (4) disclosure
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of the recordings would lead to the disclosure of the CI’s identity. See id. at 92-
95.
[8] In addition, the State attached an affidavit from Detective Smith detailing the
risk of compromising the CI’s identity by disclosing the audio recordings of the
controlled buys, which would endanger the CI and compromise other
investigations. See id. at 76-77. The State also tendered a brief in support of its
position that it has an interest in protecting the CI’s identity and that disclosure
of the audio recordings
could identify the exact date and time of the controlled buys . . . ,
the informant’s gender, possibly the informant’s race, any
identifying physical features of the informant or any [identifying]
voice characteristics, and the vehicle used by the [CI]. This
information will be revealed by the defense attorney’s review of
any audio recordings of these uncharged controlled buys, which
law enforcement sought to prevent in the manner in which the
search warrant affidavit was written.
Id. at 70.
[9] A hearing was held on October 17 during which defense counsel stated she
wanted to listen to the audio recordings, outside the presence of Robinson, to
challenge the search warrant. The State responded that “at no point has
defense done any depositions which . . . would be a good starting point if they
were interested in pursuing anything involving the search warrant and questions
they have there[.]” Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 8. The defense
acknowledged that it intended to depose Detective Smith but believed doing so
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prior to listening to the audio “would be putting the cart before the horse” and
it wanted to avoid multiple depositions. Id. at 9. Ultimately, the trial court
denied Robinson’s motion to compel and granted the State’s motion for a
discovery protective order. Detective Smith was deposed on April 3, 2019.
[10] In July 2019, Robinson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during
the execution of the search warrant. Robinson challenged the affidavit
supporting the warrant and argued that the CI’s allegation that an older black
male was selling narcotics at the residence was not adequately corroborated by
independent investigation. The trial court denied the motion.
[11] On September 3, Robinson filed a Renewed Motion to Compel disclosure of
the audio recordings. Robinson argued that he deposed Detective Smith but
aside from the audio recordings “there [was] virtually nothing memorialized to
corroborate the existence of the CI, to document the investigation that was
performed prior to the controlled buys, or to verify that the controlled buys
were done according to acceptable procedures with appropriate safeguards.”
Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 44-45. Instead, Robinson claimed that the audio
recordings constituted “the sole piece of evidence” capable of corroborating the
contents of the probable cause affidavit and noted Detective Smith stated the
recordings do not contain any of the CI’s identifying information aside from the
CI’s voice. Id. at 45. The State subsequently filed a Renewed Motion for
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Discovery Protective Order to prevent disclosure of the recordings.2
On
September 27, the trial court denied Robinson’s renewed motion to compel and
granted the State’s motion for a protective order.
[12] A final pre-trial conference was held on October 2 during which Robinson
asked the trial court to reconsider its decision, stating he simply wanted his
attorney to verify that it was his voice on the audio recordings. The State
responded that the defense already deposed Detective Smith regarding the
controlled buys, the trial court previously determined probable cause supported
the search warrant, and the warrant was granted to search the residence based
on the controlled buys at the location and “ha[d] nothing to do with the fact
that . . . Robinson did or did not sell to the CI.” Tr., Vol. II at 18. The trial
court agreed with the State and denied the motion. Robinson noted that he
would be asking for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court
indicated it would grant. The State did not object and the parties agreed to
continue the jury trial set for October 7.
[13] On October 25, Robinson filed a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal the
trial court’s orders of October 17, 2018 denying his first motion to compel,
September 27, 2019 denying his renewed motion to compel, and October 2,
2019 denying his motion to reconsider and to stay the proceedings pending the
2
In its motion, the State asked that the trial court take notice of and include in its consideration the State’s
previous filings related to its initial Motion for Discovery Protective Order, including its motion, supporting
memorandum of law, and affidavit of Detective Smith. See id. at 30.
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outcome. The trial court granted the motion three days after Robinson filed the
motion and before the State had an opportunity to respond. This court
subsequently accepted jurisdiction. Robinson now appeals, challenging the trial
court’s denial of his renewed motion to compel, and the State cross-appeals,
claiming the trial court erred in certifying its discovery orders for interlocutory
appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Cross-Appeal: Motion to Certify
[14] A threshold issue we must address before considering the merits of Robinson’s
appeal is whether this case is properly before us. See DuSablon v. Jackson Cnty.
Bank, 132 N.E.3d 69, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“It is the duty of this Court to
determine whether we have jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the
rights of the parties on the merits.”) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.
[15] We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to certify an order for
interlocutory appeal for an abuse of discretion. Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B). An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision to certify is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the
reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn therefrom. State v. Fahringer,
132 N.E.3d 480, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
[16] This case is controlled by Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B), which governs
discretionary interlocutory appeals. Wise v. State, 997 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ind. Ct.
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App. 2013). “An appeal may be taken from other interlocutory orders if the
trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over
the appeal.” App. R. 14(B). The rule provides for a two-step process to initiate
a discretionary interlocutory appeal. Wise, 997 N.E.2d at 413. First, the trial
court must certify its order for interlocutory appeal, and second, if the trial court
does so, this court may accept interlocutory jurisdiction over the case. Id. The
party seeking certification must generally file a motion requesting certification
from the trial court within thirty days after the date the interlocutory order is
noted in the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”). App. R. 14(B)(1)(a).
However, a trial court may permit a belated motion for good cause. Id.
[17] The State contends the trial court erred by certifying “its denials of Robinson’s
repetitive motions” to compel because they were untimely. Brief of Appellee at
14. It argues that Robinson’s first motion to compel disclosure of the audio
recordings was denied on October 17, 2018 and therefore, Robinson had until
November 16, 2018 to file a motion for certification of the trial court’s order for
interlocutory appeal or to thereafter show good cause for a belated motion.
Instead, it contends, “Robinson chose to renew his motion . . . more than nine
months later, on September 3, 2019[,]” which the trial court denied on
September 27, and at a hearing on October 2, Robinson orally requested that
his motion be reconsidered but the trial court declined. Id. at 15. “It was only
after the third denial, which occurred over a year after the first decision on the
discovery issue, that Robinson filed a motion to certify the trial court’s three
denials of his motions[,]” making it untimely. Id. We are unpersuaded by the
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State’s argument that Robinson’s renewed motion constituted a “repetitive”
motion rendering his subsequent motion to certify untimely.
[18] Although both motions to compel sought the same relief – disclosure of the
audio recordings – and relied on similar theories, they were filed at different
stages of the discovery process and therefore, Robinson’s motion to certify was
not untimely. Instead, after the denial of the first motion, Robinson deposed
Detective Smith and unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant affidavit in a
motion to suppress; however, he believed he still had unanswered questions
regarding the affidavit which he claimed could only be corroborated by the
recordings. Therefore, in light of new discovery developments, the trial court
had new information to consider in rendering its decision. See Gibson v.
Evansville Vanderburgh Bldg. Comm’n, 725 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(concluding that a motion for summary judgment was not repetitive of a prior
motion to dismiss because “the motions, although based on the same theories,
required the trial court to examine different evidence in order to make the
determination as to whether the defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law”), trans. denied.
[19] Here, the trial court’s order denying Robinson’s renewed motion to compel was
noted in the CCS on September 27, 2019.3
Robinson filed his Petition to
Certify an Order for Interlocutory Appeal on October 25, 2019, within the
3 Although Robinson sought certification of the three orders and the trial court said it was certifying the three
orders, the only order properly subject to certification is the September 27, 2019 order.
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thirty-day period allowed for seeking certification of an interlocutory order.
Therefore, Robinson’s motion was timely filed, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in certifying its order for interlocutory appeal.
II. Denial of Renewed Motion to Compel
[20] Having concluded this case is properly before us, we now address the merits of
Robinson’s argument and evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his renewed motion to compel disclosure of the audio
recordings. We conclude the trial court did not err.
[21] Trial courts are afforded broad discretion on issues of discovery. Beville v. State,
71 N.E.3d 13, 18 (Ind. 2017). “Accordingly, discovery rulings – such as rulings
on motions to compel – are reviewed for an abuse of that discretion.” Id.
[22] The parties dispute whether the informer’s privilege is applicable in this case.
Under this well-established privilege, the disclosure of evidence that reveals an
informant’s identity is generally withheld to prevent retaliation against
informants and to ensure individuals come forward with information to assist
law enforcement. Id. at 19. The privilege is not absolute, id., and “to
successfully assert the informer’s privilege in the first instance – and thereby
shift the burden to the defendant – the State bears the [threshold] burden of
proving the privilege applies” by showing that the CI’s identity would be revealed
if the discovery request is granted, id. at 21. When a defendant seeks disclosure,
he bears the burden of demonstrating that “disclosure is relevant and helpful to
his defense or is necessary for a fair trial.” Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950,
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954 (Ind. 1991). “[B]are speculation that the information may possibly prove
useful is not enough to justify the disclosure of a [CI]’s identity, and an
informant’s identify shall not be disclosed to permit a mere fishing expedition.”
Mays v. State, 907 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted), trans. denied. If the defendant meets its burden, the burden shifts back
to the State to show that disclosure is not necessary to the defendant’s case or
that disclosure would threaten its ability to recruit or use CIs in the future.
Beville, 71 N.E.3d at 19. The trial court must then evaluate the parties’ evidence
and determine whether disclosure is appropriate “by balancing the public
interest in encouraging a free flow of information to the authorities with the
defendant’s interest in obtaining disclosure to prepare his defense.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
[23] However, when a defendant seeks disclosure of non-privileged information,
courts apply the Dillard test, a three-part standard set forth in Dillard v. State, 257
Ind. 282, 274 N.E.2d 387 (1971), to determine whether the discovery request
should be granted: “(1) if there is a sufficient designation of the items sought to
be discovered (particularity), and (2) if the items sought to be discovered are
material to the defense (relevance), (3) then the trial court must grant the
request unless the State makes a sufficient showing of its ‘paramount interest’ in
non-disclosure.” Beville, 71 N.E.3d at 18-19. We conclude the informer’s
privilege is not applicable and disclosure was not required under the Dillard test.
[24] Robinson argues that the State failed to make the threshold showing that the
informer’s privilege applied. See Brief of Appellant at 11. The State argues the
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privilege applies because disclosure of the audio recordings would reveal the
CI’s identity by revealing the date and time of the buys, the CI’s voice, gender,
and vehicle. Therefore, the State contends, “[c]ommon sense dictates that if
[Robinson] could glean information pinpointing the time of the drug
transaction, the gender of the buyer, and the vehicle . . . from the audio
recordings, he could likely narrow down the visitors to his residence and
determine the identity of the [CI].” Br. of Appellee at 18-19. Detective Smith
stated there was no information in the audio identifying the CI aside from the
CI’s voice and we have concerns that adopting the State’s position would, in
essence, authorize the blanket non-disclosure of any and all communications in
which one could potentially identify a CI or discern enough information through
context, voice or other characteristics to determine the CI’s identity. And given
these concerns, we decline to embrace that theory here and conclude the State
failed to meet its threshold burden to invoke the informer’s privilege.
[25] Nonetheless, Robinson seeks disclosure of the audio recordings for the purpose
of confirming that the controlled buys did, in fact, occur and to determine
whether his voice can be heard on the recordings. See Br. of Appellant at 7, 9.
However, Detective Smith’s affidavit indicated that he and the CI conducted
two controlled buys, the audio of which was recorded, and Detective Smith
subsequently “redacted [the recordings] so that Defense Counsel could hear
[Robinson]’s voice in the recording without any risk of revealing the CI’s
identity.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 76. At the hearing on Robinson’s first
motion to compel, defense counsel stated that allegedly, in this five second clip,
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one can hear a person say “oh, yeah” with no other information. Tr., Vol. II at
7. Robinson does not claim that the five second redacted recording was not
part of the audio recordings of the controlled buys or that the voice in the
redacted recording was not his. If necessary, the trial court could, as Robinson
has suggested, listen to the audio in camera to determine if there are legitimate
concerns as to whether Robinson’s voice can be heard on the audio.
[26] Ultimately, even if the State met its threshold showing to assert informer’s
privilege, Robinson has failed to demonstrate how the audio recordings of
controlled buys for which he was not charged are relevant and helpful to the
preparation of his defense as to whether or not he possessed narcotics with the
intent to deliver at the time the search warrant was executed. See Ind. Code §§
35-48-4-1, -10. The State made it clear that Robinson was not charged with any
crime related to the controlled buys and the audio recordings will not be
admitted at his trial. Cf. Beville, 71 N.E.3d at 22-23 (stating that video footage of
controlled buys between the defendant and a CI, for which the defendant was
charged, constituted a “key piece of evidence” for the State’s case and therefore,
disclosure of the video would be relevant and helpful to the defendant’s
defense). For the same reasons, Robinson also cannot prove that the audio
recordings are material to his defense compelling disclosure under the Dillard
test. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Robinson’s motion to compel disclosure of the audio recordings of the
controlled buys.

Outcome: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying its order for
interlocutory appeal or in denying Robinson’s motion to compel. Accordingly,
we affirm.

Affirmed.

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