Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 03-29-2021
Case Style:
STATE OF OHIO vs. DARRYL D. TAYLOR
Case Number: 19CA24
Judge: Peter B. Abele
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
Plaintiff's Attorney: Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and W. Mack Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Circleville, Ohio - Criminal defense attorney represented Darryl D. Taylor with (1) drug trafficking in the presence of juveniles, (2) two counts of drug trafficking (3) one count of drug trafficking charges.
A jury found appellant guilty of: (1) drug trafficking in the presence of juveniles in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony, (2) two counts of drug trafficking
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(1)(c), third-degree felonies, and (3) one count of drug
trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(c), a third-degree felony. The trial court
sentenced appellant to serve a total of 13 years in prison. On April 27, 2016, this court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for limited resentencing.
{¶ 3} In particular, we affirmed appellant’s convictions, but concluded that the trial court
failed to advise appellant of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. State v. Taylor, 4th Dist.
Lawrence No. 15CA12, 2016-Ohio-2781, ¶ 41, citing State v. Fischer 1 , 128 Ohio St.3d 92,
2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 27-29, State v. Triplett, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 10CA35,
2011-Ohio-4628, ¶ 4.
{¶ 4} On May 25, 2016, the trial court resentenced appellant to serve a 13-year prison term.
On March 5, 2019, appellant filed a pro se “motion to vacate void judgment,” and argued that the
1
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that when a sentencing court has jurisdiction to act,
sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render a sentence voidable, not void. The sentence may be
set aside, however, if successfully challenged on direct appeal. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480,
2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248. LAWRENCE, 19CA24 3
court must vacate “void portions of the judgment of conviction based upon lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” On September 19, 2019, the trial court overruled the motion.2
{¶ 5} Generally, appellate courts review decisions that grant or deny R.C. 2953.21
postconviction relief petitions under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Smith, 4th Dist.
Highland No. 19CA16, 2020-Ohio-116, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377,
2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 28. In Gondor, the Court recognized that the differences
between a direct appeal and an appeal from a postconviction relief petition warrants different
appellate review standards. Gondor at ¶ 53-54. The Court stated, “A postconviction claim is not
an ordinary appeal: ‘A postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction, but,
rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.’” Id. at ¶ 48, quoting State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d
399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Knauff, 4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA976,
2014-Ohio-308, ¶ 19, citing Cullen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St.3d 373,
2013-Ohio-4733, 999 N.E.2d 614, ¶ 19.
I.
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to
vacate his conviction on count one because, as he argues, it is the product of an impermissible
constructive amendment of the complaint. Apparently, the state first filed a complaint in the
municipal court that charged appellant with one count of trafficking in drugs in the presence of
2
On November 12, 2019, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. This court issued a Magistrate’s Order
to direct appellant to file a memorandum to address whether this court had jurisdiction because appellant filed the
notice of appeal more than 30 days after the trial court entered judgment. Because the Clerk of Courts failed to note
service of the entry on the docket, this court allowed the appeal to proceed. LAWRENCE, 19CA24 4
juveniles, a second-degree felony. Later, a grand jury returned an indictment that charged appellant
with four counts of trafficking in drugs. Appellant argues that because the initial complaint charged
him under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), but count one of the grand jury indictment charged him under R.C.
2925.03(A)(1), his conviction under count one is void and must be vacated. There is no merit to
this argument.
{¶ 7} Indictments and complaints are charging instruments that serve different purposes.
State v. Allen, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1225, 2018-Ohio-878, ¶ 12. A complaint is the basic
charging instrument in all criminal proceedings in this state. Id. at ¶ 10; State v. Hess, 7th Dist.
Jefferson No. 02 JE 36, 2003-Ohio-6721, ¶ 16. Pursuant to Crim.R. 3 and R.C. 2935.09, a
complaint is a written statement of the essential facts that constitutes the offense charged.
Prosecutors usually file complaints to quickly invoke municipal court jurisdiction. State v. Mbodji,
129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 12. On the other hand, a grand jury
issues an indictment after grand jurors convene and consider the alleged charges. Ohio
Constitution, Article I, Section 10; R.C. 2939.20. An indictment specifies “in ordinary and concise
language without technical averments or allegations not essential to be proved” that “the defendant
has committed a public offense.” Crim.R. 7(B). An indictment is required to invoke the common
pleas court’s jurisdiction. Allen at ¶ 12.
{¶ 8} We recognize that the procedural aspects of a criminal case can be somewhat confusing
to a layperson. However, appellant cites no authority to support his claim that the state cannot first
charge a defendant by complaint in the municipal court, then later charge and prosecute a defendant
by indictment in the common pleas court. In fact, this activity is common-place in all Ohio courts.
In the case sub judice, the grand jury indictment invoked the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction LAWRENCE, 19CA24 5
and appellee properly tried and convicted appellant on the charges set forth in the indictment.
Obviously, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding this matter.
{¶ 9} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
II.
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing
to vacate and correct void sentences imposed on counts two, three, and four. Specifically, appellant
asserts that the trial court “substituted the statutory terms of months for that of years;” thus, his
sentences should be vacated and reimposed. However, our review does not substantiate this claim.
In each entry appellant references, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve a total prison term of
13 years.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of error.
III.
{¶ 12} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court failed to correct an
increase in punishment contrary to law. Appellee points out, however, that appellant is mistaken.
At the original sentencing, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve seven years in prison on count
one, and two years each on counts two, three, and four, all to be served consecutively for a total
prison term of 13 years. Although the first sentencing entry (May 14, 2015) incorrectly ordered
appellant to serve count four concurrently, the second sentencing entry (June 2, 2015) corrected the
mistake and specified that all counts must be served consecutively, once again for a total prison term
of 13 years.
{¶ 13} As we explain above, on April 27, 2016 this court remanded the case to the trial court
to impose postrelease control. Taylor, supra, at ¶ 10. Our review of the third sentencing entry LAWRENCE, 19CA24 6
(May 25, 2016) reveals that the trial court sentenced appellant to the same term of imprisonment, 13
years, but, as this court mandated, also imposed a postrelease control term and specified the penalties
for a postrelease control violation. Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertions, the trial court did not
increase appellant’s term of imprisonment.
Outcome: Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third assignment of error and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: