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Defendant's Attorney: Robert Aguilar of Aguilar & Sieron, P.A.

Description:

Tallahassee, FL - Defamation lawyer represented defendant with challenging the dismissal of his defamation lawsuit.

The appellant, a city councilman, challenges the trial court’s
dismissal of his defamation lawsuit against the appellee, a
resident of the city he represented. On appeal, the councilman
argues that the trial court erred because it granted the resident’s
motion for summary judgment and applied section 768.295,
Florida Statutes (2020), which is also known as the anti-SLAPP
statute. We find the trial court correctly granted the resident’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the councilman’s
petition.
The resident filed her motion for summary judgment shortly
after the complaint was filed. Her motion for summary judgment
was based on two theories. First, she was entitled to summary
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judgment because the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Second, even
if the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply, she was entitled to
summary judgment because there was no proof that she made her
statements with actual malice.
In order for the anti-SLAPP statute to apply, the resident was
required to prove, in addition to other things, that the councilman
filed a meritless lawsuit. § 768.295(3), Fla. Stat. (2020). The
resident was also required to prove the lawsuit was meritless if the
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. To determine whether the
councilman’s lawsuit had merit, the trial court first had to
determine whether the councilman was a public figure because a
different standard applies to public figures. If the plaintiff is a
public figure, he must show that the defendant made the
statements with actual malice, which has been defined as knowing
the statements were false at the time they were made or making
the statements with a reckless disregard of the truth. Mile
Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla.
4th DCA 2002). If the plaintiff is not a public figure, he must show
the defendant made the statements negligently. Id.
The actual malice standard became the national standard for
public figures suing for defamation in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Until that time, some states had
held that an actual malice standard applied, and others had not.
Id. at 280. After examining the reasons for and against applying
the actual malice standard, the United States Supreme Court
decided that the First Amendment demanded the application of
the higher actual malice standard. Id. at 268−84. The court
reasoned that without this standard, people were more likely to
curtail their criticism of the government. Id. at 283−84.
During oral argument, the councilman conceded he was a
public figure. As a result, the actual malice standard applies. In
addition to the presence of actual malice, the trial court had to
review the summary judgment evidence to determine if the
following additional elements were present: (1) publication of the
statement; (2) falsity of the statement; (3) actual damages; and (4)
the statement was defamatory. Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997
So. 2d 1098, 1105−06 (Fla. 2008). After hearing argument of
counsel and reviewing the evidence filed in support of and opposing
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the resident’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court
determined that there was no evidence that the resident knew her
statements were false or that the statements were made with a
reckless disregard for the truth. On appeal, the councilman has
argued that the trial court erred when it made that determination.
Since that element is necessary for this Court to determine
whether summary judgment was proper under either of the
resident’s theories, we begin our review there.
After reviewing the entire record on appeal, we find the trial
court correctly determined there was no evidence of actual malice.
As such, the trial court correctly determined that the resident was
entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of the councilman’s
complaint. Having found the trial court correctly granted the
resident’s motion for summary judgment, we do not need to
examine the other elements necessary to sustain the trial court’s
determination that the anti-SLAPP statute applied.

Outcome: AFFIRMED

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