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Date: 07-16-2021
Case Style:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSE MOYHERNANDEZ, AKA YINDO
Case Number: 20-625
Judge: DENNIS JACOBS
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Plaintiff's Attorney: KEDAR BHATIA (Anna M. Skotko, on the brief), for
AUDREY STRAUSS, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
New York, New York - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with a conspiracy to
distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, more than 50 grams of cocaine base charge.
In 1996, Jose Moyhernandez sold (to a confidential informant) about 90
grams of crack cocaine and a semi-automatic pistol. In 2000, a jury convicted
Moyhernandez of (1) conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to
distribute, more than 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
and (2) possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). At the time, because Moyhernandez had a prior drug-felony
conviction, the crack-cocaine conviction carried a mandatory minimum prison
sentence of 20 years.1 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000), amended by
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; see also United
States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining the sentencing
scheme in place at the time).
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Moyhernandez was a “career
offender.” That is, (1) he was at least eighteen years old when he committed the
crack-cocaine offense; (2) the offense was a controlled-substance felony; and (3)
he had at least two prior convictions for controlled-substance felonies. U.S.
1 Absent a prior drug-felony conviction, the mandatory minimum sentence was
ten years. United States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 2020).5
Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 1998). Two previous
convictions in Massachusetts were for felonies involving cocaine. Additional
previous convictions in New York and Massachusetts included controlledsubstance offenses.
Because Moyhernandez was a career offender, his Guidelines range was
360 months to life. At the 2000 sentencing, Judge Mukasey conceded that 30
years’ imprisonment was harsh. However, the Guidelines were then mandatory.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005). Notwithstanding his
reluctance, Judge Mukasey identified “indicia of substantial involvement way
beyond simply being a street dealer,” as well as Moyhernandez’s admission to
“moving substantial quantities.” App. at 39–40. Moyhernandez was sentenced
to 120 months on the firearm count, to run concurrently with the 360-month
sentence, and ten years of supervised release. On appeal, the conviction and
sentence were affirmed. See United States v. Moyhernandez, 17 F. App’x 62, 65–
66, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order). Moyhernandez, who was 35 years old at
sentencing in 2000, is now 56. Because he is a citizen of the Dominican Republic
and is without immigration status in the United States, he will be removed upon
his release.6
B. The Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act
The Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, enacted in
2010, “altered the threshold drug quantities that trigger the varying penalty
ranges for crack cocaine offenses.” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 662
(2d Cir. 2020). Section 2 of that Act increased, from 50 grams to 280 grams, the
quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the 20-year mandatory minimum
imposed on prior drug offenders. § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2372; see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Moyhernandez’s 90 grams falls below the new
threshold.
While district courts generally cannot modify prison sentences, they “may
modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent . . . expressly permitted
by statute.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The First Step Act, enacted in 2018, confers
that statutory authority.2 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; Holloway, 956 F.3d
at 666. Section 404(b) of the First Step Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act
retroactive: “A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on
motion of the defendant, . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of
2 The First Step Act also amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) by lowering the
mandatory minimum for prior drug offenders to 15 years and adding the
requirement that, in order to trigger this mandatory minimum, the prior drug
felony must be “serious.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220.7
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.” First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (citation omitted). A
“covered offense” is “a violation of a [f]ederal criminal statute, the statutory
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a) (citation omitted).
The First Step Act, in § 404(c), precludes review of a motion to reduce a
sentence if the sentence already conforms with the Fair Sentencing Act, or if a
reduction under the First Step Act was previously denied. Id. § 404(c).
Otherwise, if a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction--that is, if he was
sentenced for a “covered offense,” Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664--then a district
court may, in its discretion, reduce the sentence, United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d
84, 87 (2d Cir. 2020).
C. First Step Act Motion and Appeal
In August 2019, by which time the case had been reassigned to Judge
Preska, Moyhernandez moved for a reduced sentence pursuant to the First Step
Act. His letter brief argued that he was eligible because he was sentenced for a
“covered offense,” and that the district court should exercise its discretion to 8
reduce his sentence to time served. In particular, Moyhernandez argued that 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which sets forth “factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence,” militated in favor of a sentence reduction:
Judge Mukasey made clear at the time of sentencing nearly two
decades ago that if the guidelines were not mandatory, he would
have exercised his discretion under § 3553(a) to impose a sentence
lower than 30 years. The First Step Act now gives that discretion to
Your Honor. . . . No statutory purpose would be served by
additional incarceration.
App. at 26; see § 3553(a). The § 3553(a) factors are set out in the margin.3
3 (1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed--
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [by the
Sentencing Guidelines];
(5) any pertinent [Sentencing Commission] policy statement[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
§ 3553(a).9
Judge Preska denied the motion. See United States v. Moyhernandez, No.
97-CR-197, 2020 WL 728780, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020). The district court first
determined that Moyhernandez was eligible for a sentence reduction because he
was sentenced for a “covered offense,” and the § 404(c) limitations were
inapplicable. Id. at *1. Then the court exercised its discretion to decline to
reduce the sentence. The court reasoned that Moyhernandez “had a lengthy
criminal record” and that the First Step Act “did not change the applicability of
the career-offender designation.” Id. at *2. Since Moyhernandez’s Guidelines
range remained unchanged, and he was “sentenced . . . to the minimum of this
range in 2000,” the court declined to “adjust that sentence now.” Id. The court
also declined to reduce Moyhernandez’s term of supervised release, reasoning
that Moyhernandez “is to be deported upon release from custody.” Id.
In reaching its decision, the court ruled that “there is no mandate to
consider [the] § 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence under [the First Step
Act].” Id.
After Moyhernandez filed his notice of appeal, the district court issued
Form “AO 247,” headed “Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction 10
Pursuant to First Step Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”4 App. at 64. This checkmark form included boilerplate language indicating that the court had
considered, inter alia, “the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to
the extent that they are applicable.” Id.
On appeal, Moyhernandez argues primarily that the district court was
required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to grant a sentence
reduction pursuant to the First Step Act and failed to do so (Point I below), and
that the district court abused its discretion in declining to reduce his 360-month
prison sentence and ten-year term of supervised release (Point II).
Moyhernandez quibbles with the analysis the district court used to conclude that
he was eligible for a sentence reduction, and claims that Form AO 247 reflects the
court’s misapprehension as to its authority under the First Step Act (Point III).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)--inapplicable here--permits a reduction in sentence “in the
case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on
a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission,” § 3582(c)(2), “i.e., [when there has been] a change to the
Sentencing Guidelines,” Holloway, 956 F.3d at 665.11
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act is
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664. However,
when the decision is premised on statutory interpretation, we review de novo.
Id.
The government contends that Moyhernandez failed to preserve his
argument that consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was required, and that we
should therefore review for plain error. See Moore, 975 F.3d at 90 (2d Cir.)5
(reviewing for plain error when, in challenging the denial of his motion under
the First Step Act, the defendant raised an argument for the first time on appeal).
We disagree. In his letter brief, Moyhernandez asked the district court to
exercise its discretion under § 3553(a) and argued that continued incarceration
would serve “[n]o statutory purpose.” App. at 26. The district court thus
understood Moyhernandez to be requesting an application of the § 3553(a)
factors. Moyhernandez’s briefing and the district court’s explicit ruling suffice to
preserve the issue for review. See United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 146 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“An issue is reviewable on appeal only if it was ‘pressed or passed
5 Because we also cite United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2020), shortform citations to both cases will specify the circuit. 12
upon below.’” (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992))); United
States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of requiring
contemporaneous objection . . . for full appellate review is to ensure that the trial
court has an opportunity to consider and rule on disputed questions of law.
When an issue has been raised, and a ruling made, that purpose is served.”).
DISCUSSION
I
A.
Moyhernandez first challenges the ruling that “there is no mandate to
consider [the] § 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence” under § 404 of the
First Step Act. Moyhernandez, 2020 WL 728780, at *2. This issue of statutory
interpretation is novel in this Circuit, and the subject of a circuit split. We review
de novo. See Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664. And we conclude that consideration of
the § 3553(a) factors is not required.
Section 404 contains no explicit mandate to consider § 3553(a), and we do
not infer that Congress intended to imply one. (The text of § 404 is in the 13
margin.6) As Congress was undoubtedly aware, the First Step Act provided a
new avenue for relief to countless prisoners. While every First Step Act motion
should receive careful review, we decline to impose a procedural requirement
that could impede efficient consideration of meritorious applications. Should
Congress wish to require more, it may say so.
Our conclusion follows from our decision in Moore, which explained that
“all that § 404(b) instructs a district court to do is to determine the impact of
6 SEC. 404. APPLICATION OF FAIR SENTENCING ACT.
(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term
“covered offense” means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was
committed before August 3, 2010.
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a
sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the
court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in effect
at the time the covered offense was committed.
(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this
section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or
previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections
2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat.
2372) or if a previous motion made under this section to reduce the
sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a
complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this
section.
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.14
Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.); see
United States v. Bryant, 991 F.3d 452, 457–58 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(concluding that, under Moore, the district court had no obligation to apply a
change in the law that did not “flow from Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act” (quoting Moore, 975 F.3d at 86 (2d Cir.)). On its face, § 404 contemplates no
more than the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Relief is limited
to those whose “statutory penalties . . . were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act”; and the district court is limited to “impos[ing] a reduced
sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at
the time the . . . offense was committed.” First Step Act § 404(a)–(b), 132 Stat. at
5222 (citation omitted); see Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.) (interpreting § 404(b)’s
“as if” clause as narrowly instructing district courts to assess the impact of the
Fair Sentencing Act). There is no more. The only mandatory language is in the
negative, forbidding review under circumstances inapplicable here. See First
Step Act § 404(b)–(c), 132 Stat. at 5222. And of course the whole procedure is
confided to the court’s discretion.
Thus, the First Step Act provides a “limited procedural vehicle” and
expresses no requirement “to broadly revisit every aspect of a criminal 15
sentence.” Moore, 975 F.3d at 92 (2d Cir.). Moore held that the First Step Act
neither “require[s] . . . a plenary resentencing” nor “obligate[s] a district court to
recalculate an eligible defendant’s Guidelines range, except to account for those
changes that flow from Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Id. at 93.
Moore did not explicitly rule on whether consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is
required. However, it follows from Moore that, because the § 3553(a) factors do
not flow from §§ 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, district courts have no
obligation to apply them.
B.
Our sister circuits are split. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits
require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors; the First, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, along with the Ninth Circuit (in an unpublished decision), rule
that consideration of those factors is not required. See United States v. Easter,
975 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 674 (4th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 784 (6th Cir. 2020); United
States v. White, 984 F.3d 76, 90–91 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“In a case with a record of
this complexity, we think it is especially important that the District Court 16
consider the [§] 3553(a) sentencing factors when passing on a motion for relief
under [§] 404.”); United States v. Lawrence, --- F.4th ---, No. 20-3061, 2021 WL
2425959, at *2 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2021) (citing White for the proposition that
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is required). But see United States v.
Concepcion, 991 F.3d 279, 289 (1st Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-1650
(May 26, 2021); United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1118 (2021); United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1158 n.18
(10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Houston, 805 F. App’x 546, 547 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert.
filed, No. 20-1479 (Apr. 21, 2021); see also United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470,
474 n.4, 475, 477 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the district court must make
“only the changes required by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act” and
“disagree[ing]” with the argument that reconsideration of the § 3553(a) factors is
required, yet declining to rule because neither party raised the point), petition for
cert. filed, No. 20-7474 (Mar. 15, 2021).7
7 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have not explicitly decided whether
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is required upon review of a First Step Act
§ 404 motion, although the Seventh Circuit has implied that it is not. See United
States v. Whitehead, 986 F.3d 547, 551 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Shaw,
957 F.3d 734, 741 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding that district courts may
consider the § 3553(a) factors but declining to decide whether such consideration 17
Moyhernandez locates a mandate to consider § 3553(a) in § 404(c), which
precludes review of a motion “if a previous motion made under this section . . .
was . . . denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” First Step Act
§ 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (emphasis added). He cites the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Boulding, 960 F.3d at 784: “[T]he necessary review--at a minimum--includes an
accurate calculation of the amended guidelines range at the time of resentencing
and thorough renewed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.” Appellant’s Br. at
19 (emphasis added). This interpretation overreads § 404(c). “Section 404(c)
charges a district court only with ‘review’ of a defendant’s motion. It does not
require that any particular procedures be followed during that review.” Moore,
975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.); see also Moore, 963 F.3d at 728 (8th Cir.) (“A ‘complete
review’ . . . means that a district court ‘considered [petitioner’s] arguments’ . . .
and ‘had a reasoned basis for its decision.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2019))). It is unlikely that
Congress “obliquely slipped” a mandate for additional procedural steps “into a
provision that bars repetitive litigation.” Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.).
is required); United States v. Fowowe, --- F.4th ---, No. 20-3197, 2021 WL 2450405,
at *7, *9 (7th Cir. June 16, 2021) (explaining that district courts are “authorize[d]”
to consider § 3553(a) and reasoning from that premise that application of
intervening judicial decisions is permitted but not required).18
Other courts have located a mandate to consider the § 3553(a) factors in
use of the word “impose” in § 404(b): “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a
covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.” First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Because § 3553(a) sets forth “factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence,” § 3553(a) (emphasis added), these courts reason, a First Step Act
motion entails re-sentencing, complete with application of the § 3553(a) factors.
See Easter, 975 F.3d at 324; see also id. at 325 (“Section 404(b) uses the word
‘impose’ twice, and the first instance clearly refers to the act of imposing the
original sentence. Because Congress used the same word, we can infer that it
conceived of the district court’s role as being the same when it imposes an initial
sentence and when it imposes a sentence under the First Step Act.” (internal
citation omitted)); Chambers, 956 F.3d at 674 (citing United States v. Rose, 379 F.
Supp. 3d 223, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d, 841 F. App’x 328 (2d Cir. 2021)
(summary order)).
The repetition of the word “impose” in § 404(b) and § 3553(a) does not
bear such weight. Section 404(b) “does not simply authorize a district court to 19
‘impose a sentence,’ period. Instead, it authorizes the court to do so subject to
the ‘as if’ clause -- that is, to determine the impact of sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act.” Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.). A court “imposing” a sentence
in the first instance must weigh a host of considerations, and § 3553(a) provides a
mechanism for that analysis. But a court “impos[ing]” a sentence “as if” the Fair
Sentencing Act had been in place focuses on the effect of the Fair Sentencing Act,
on which § 3553(a) has little or no bearing. First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at
5222.
Reinforcing this view is § 404(b)’s instruction to “impose a reduced
sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 404(b) enables only the discretionary
reduction of a sentence that was already imposed, and thus contemplates a step
rather than imposition of a sentence from scratch. See Concepcion, 991 F.3d at
288. Further still, § 3553(a) explicitly provides that the district court “shall”
consider the listed factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also § 3582(a) (“The court, in
determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of
imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall
consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable . . . .”). It is this mandatory language--and not the word “impose”--20
that instructs district courts to apply the § 3553(a) factors in original sentencing
proceedings. See Moore, 963 F.3d at 728 (8th Cir.). The First Step Act contains no
equivalent mandatory language.
Finally, we find no mandate to consider the § 3553(a) factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(B), which permits the modification of “an imposed term of
imprisonment to the extent . . . expressly permitted by [the First Step Act].”
§ 3582(c)(1)(B); see Holloway, 956 F.3d at 666. “When Congress intends to
mandate consideration of the [§] 3553 factors, it says so.” Moore, 963 F.3d at 727
(8th Cir.). Accordingly, § 3582(c)(2), which permits a sentence reduction when
the Sentencing Commission has lowered the applicable Guidelines range,
explicitly requires consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Section 3582(c)(1)(B)
does not.
Therefore, with respect, we find unpersuasive the reasoning of sister
circuits that have adopted a differing view.
C.
Relief under the First Step Act is discretionary. Section 404(b) provides
that a court “may” reduce a sentence, as long as the defendant is eligible, subject 21
to the limitations set forth in § 404(c). First Step Act § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222. “[A]
district court retains discretion to decide what factors are relevant as it
determines whether and to what extent to reduce a sentence.” Moore, 975 F.3d at
92 n.36 (2d Cir.).
Still, discretion has limits. A decision on a motion for a reduced sentence
remains subject to appellate review; where the decision evinces “an erroneous
view of the law” or “a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” or where it
falls outside “the range of permissible decisions,” we will vacate. United States
v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132
(2d Cir. 2008)) (articulating the abuse-of-discretion standard); see White, 984 F.3d
at 88 (“[T]he deference afforded discretionary decisions, even those that are
largely unconstrained by statutory language or judicial precedent, does not mean
that such decisions are unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from
thorough appellate review.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Moreover, although § 404 prescribes no procedure, “sound legal principles”
must guide discretion. White, 984 F.3d at 88 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Accordingly, while district courts are not bound to apply the § 3553(a)
factors in every First Step Act case, those factors may often prove useful. See22
Shaw, 957 F.3d at 741 (“Familiarity fosters manageability, and courts are well
versed in using § 3553 as an analytical tool for making discretionary decisions.”).
The considerations listed in § 3553(a) may have different weight in the context of
a defendant who is already imprisoned, but they remain sound guiding
principles. Therefore, when reviewing a motion under the First Step Act § 404,
“a district court may, but need not, consider the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” Moore, 963
F.3d at 727 (8th Cir.); accord Concepcion, 991 F.3d at 290; Mannie, 971 F.3d at
1158 n.18.
II
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce
Moyhernandez’s terms of imprisonment and supervised release. A court abuses
its discretion if it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or render[s] a decision that cannot
be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Borden, 564 F.3d at 104
(quoting In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 132).
Notwithstanding Judge Mukasey’s “reluctan[ce]” to impose the 360-month
prison sentence in 2000, he considered that Moyhernandez was a career offender, 23
had “substantial involvement way beyond simply being a street dealer,” and
admitted to “moving substantial quantities.” App. at 39–40. Judge Preska
reasoned that Moyhernandez remained a career offender; accordingly, his
Guidelines range remained unchanged. And given Moyhernandez’s “lengthy
criminal record,” Judge Preska declined to reduce the sentence below the
minimum of the Guidelines range. Moyhernandez, 2020 WL 728780, at *2. In
view of Judge Mukasey’s analysis at sentencing, Moyhernandez’s criminal
history, and his Guidelines range, Judge Preska did not erroneously assess the
evidence or otherwise reach an impermissible decision.
The district court declined to reduce the ten-year term of supervised
release because Moyhernandez will be deported when he is released from
custody. In the context of the district court’s preceding discussion of
Moyhernandez’s criminal history, this decision was no abuse. Moyhernandez
offers no explanation as to why a shorter term of supervised release was
warranted, or would matter.24
III
Moyhernandez raises two related arguments regarding the analysis of his
career-offender status and the use of Form AO 247. First, Moyhernandez
challenges the district court’s citation to a decision from the Northern District of
Ohio, which erroneously implied that a career offender is ineligible for a
sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Moyhernandez, 2020 WL 728780, at
*2 (citing United States v. Lawson, No. 1:03CR398, 2019 WL 1959490, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio May 2, 2019), remanded, No. 19-3419, 2019 WL 8683560 (6th Cir. Nov. 14,
2019)). This citation, he argues, reveals that the district court adopted Lawson’s
error.
True, eligibility under the First Step Act turns on whether the defendant
was sentenced “for a covered offense,” and not on career-offender status.
Holloway, 956 F.3d at 664 (quoting First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222). But
the district court applied the correct eligibility analysis, relying on the fact that
Moyhernandez was sentenced for a “covered offense.” Moyhernandez, 2020 WL
728780, at *1. The court appears to have cited Lawson for the proposition that
“the First Step Act did not change the applicability of the career-offender
designation,” which is sound. Id. at *2.25
Next, in an argument touched upon in his briefing and further developed
at oral argument, Moyhernandez challenges the use of Form AO 247. He argues
that this form is intended to resolve motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)--which
allows for a sentence reduction based on an intervening change in the Sentencing
Guidelines--and not motions under the First Step Act. He asserts that the
emphasis on his career-offender status, combined with the boilerplate language
on Form AO 247 (referencing factors irrelevant to First Step Act motions), reflects
that the district court misapprehended its authority to grant a sentence reduction
under the First Step Act.8 We disagree. First, as discussed, the district court did
not misconstrue eligibility as depending on career-offender status. Second, the
form is titled “Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant To First
Step Act And 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” App. at 64 (emphasis added). Third,
8 Form AO 247 references U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.10 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(u), both of which are relevant to a motion for a reduced sentence based on
an intervening Guidelines change, but which are not required considerations on
review of a First Step Act motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (setting forth factors
to consider in reviewing a sentence-reduction motion based on an intervening
Guidelines change); 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (pertaining to the Sentencing
Commission’s authority to reduce Guidelines ranges); U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.10 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018) (“Reduction in Term of
Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range”); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(B); First Step Act § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222 (containing no reference to
28 U.S.C. § 994(u) or Sentencing Commission policy statements).26
although the form contains boilerplate that is irrelevant to Moyhernandez, the
written decision makes clear that the district court used the proper framework.
IV
The dissent makes a good case that federal sentencing is harsh, but when it
comes to the issue presented on appeal, the dissent fails for the following
reasons.
1. The dissent contends that the majority opinion is a “departure from the
principle of party presentation,” because “neither party argues that the Section
3553(a) factors do not apply” and because the government’s position is in
“evident disagreement” with today’s decision. Dissent at 4–5. There is no such
consensus between the parties. The whole thrust of Moyhernandez’s appellate
brief is that consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is mandatory under the First
Step Act. The United States argues against that position on several grounds,
including that under Moore, “a district court retains discretion to decide what
factors are relevant as it determines whether and to what extent to reduce a
sentence.” Appellee’s Br. at 12 (quoting Moore, 975 F.3d at 92 n.36 (2d Cir.)). 27
That is consistent with our decision. True, we reject the government’s argument
for plain error review, but it cannot be a departure from the principle of party
presentation to decide the issue on which the appellant relies for relief.
The dissent cites United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020),
but that opinion explained that “a court is not hidebound by the precise
arguments of counsel,” id. at 1581, and vacated a ruling of the Ninth Circuit
because “the Ninth Circuit’s radical transformation of th[e] case [went] well
beyond the pale,” id. at 1581–82. No visible principle forecloses us from ruling
on the decisive issue raised by the appellant.
2. The dissent’s textual argument is that, because the word “impose” is
used in § 404(b) to reference both the “court that imposed” the initial sentence
and the authority to “impose a reduced sentence” on the defendant’s motion,
both proceedings entail the same considerations. First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat.
at 5222. For this idea, the dissent relies on decisions in the Third Circuit, Easter,
975 F.3d 318, and in the Southern District of New York, Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223,
neither of which is binding Second Circuit law. Instead, we are bound by this 28
Circuit’s ruling in Moore, which forecloses the ruling that both uses of “impose”
have the same meaning.
Under Moore, “imposing” an initial sentence is distinct from “impos[ing] a
reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in
effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First Step Act § 404(b),
132 Stat. at 5222 (citation omitted); Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.). The latter is
narrower, requiring only that a district court “determine the impact of sections 2
and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.”9 Moore, 975 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir.). If, as the
dissent posits, Congress had intended “to make clear” that particular
“procedural elements” were required on such review, Dissent at 13, Congress
would have said so, and not left those elements for judges to think up, see Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (It is the “cardinal canon” of
statutory interpretation “that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); Moore, 975
9 Relatedly, § 404(b)’s instruction to retroactively apply §§ 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act is narrower than the dissent’s artful recharacterization of § 404(b)
as a mandate to apply “the procedures of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Dissent at 12
(emphasis added). No procedure is prescribed by §§ 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act. See §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. at 2372.29
F.3d at 91 n.34 (2d Cir.) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
468 (2001) (elephants and mouseholes)).
The text of § 404(b) requires the court to consider the effect of §§ 2 and 3 of
the Fair Sentencing Act rather than (as the dissent argues) the wide “world” of
sentencing law in existence when that Act was passed. Dissent at 9.
3. The dissent contends that “[t]he district court was required to consider
the Section 3553(a) factors before denying Moyhernandez’s motion . . . .” Dissent
at 4. This rule would mandate application of the § 3553(a) factors on every First
Step Act motion (assuming an eligible defendant)--even those where no
resentencing takes place because the motion is denied at the outset. Formal
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors in every case would put sand in the gears,
and delay consideration of the many meritorious motions. We do not hold, as
the dissent claims, that “the only role of a court in a First Step Act resentencing is
to place itself in the shoes of the sentencing court with all sentencing procedures
remaining in place beyond those that flow from the Fair Sentencing Act. . . .”
Dissent at 10 (emphasis added). As Moore explained, “a district court retains 30
discretion to decide what factors are relevant as it determines whether and to
what extent to reduce a sentence.” 975 F.3d at 92 n.36 (2d Cir.).
4. Without support from statutory text as it has previously been applied
by this Court, the dissent invokes extratextual concerns.
The dissent worries that discretion will leave district courts adrift, without
guiding principles; but the dissent relies on factors that themselves do nothing to
promote certainty or uniformity.
The dissent would have the district court consider, as part of the § 3553(a)
analysis, Moyhernandez’s impending deportation as a reason to reduce his
sentence. To favor those who will be deported upon release would naturally
disfavor U.S. citizens; and while that would not necessarily be an abuse of
discretion, it would undermine uniformity in a particularly curious way.
The dissent inveighs against the “unnecessarily harsh sentencing scheme”
under which Moyhernandez was initially sentenced. Dissent at 18–19. This is
pushing on an open door. The Fair Sentencing Act was passed to rectify that
harsh sentencing scheme, see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69
(2012), and its reforms are (obviously) relevant to every § 404(b) motion, 31
regardless of whether the § 3553(a) factors are considered. The same goes for the
grave “liberty interest” implicated on § 404(b) motions. Dissent at 15. The
district courts are not in need of the § 3553(a) factors to recognize that a
prisoner’s liberty interest is at stake.
The dissent observes that sentences exceeding 20 years are often
unjustified and that imprisonment is expensive. These fair points lack any clear
link to the § 3553(a) factors.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act is affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: