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Date: 04-17-2020
Case Style:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ERNTRAVIS M. BREDHOLD AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. EFRAIN DIAZ, JR.
JUSTIN SMITH
Case Number: 2017-SC-000536-TG
AND
2017-SC-000537-TG
Judge: Lisabeth Tabor Hughes
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Plaintiff's Attorney: Matthew Robert Krygiel
Jason Bradley Moore
Assistant Attorneys General
Defendant's Attorney:
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A Fayette County grand jury indicted Travis M. Bredhold and charged
him with one count of murder, first-degree robbery, theft by unlawful taking
over $10,000, trafficking in less than eight ounces of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Bredhold
allegedly robbed a Marathon gas station and fatally shot Mukeshbhai Patel, an
employee, on December 17, 2013. Bredhold was eighteen (18) years and five
(5) months old at the time of the offenses. 2017-SC-000436-TG.
Efrain Diaz, Jr., and Justin Smith, co-defendants, are charged with the
robbery and fatal shooting of Jonathan Krueger on April 17, 2015.2 A Fayette
County grand jury indicted and charged Diaz with one count of murder and
two counts of first-degree robbery. Diaz was twenty (20) years and seven (7)
months old at the time he allegedly committed the offenses. The same grand
jury indicted and charged Smith with one count of murder, two counts of firstdegree robbery, and one count each of tampering with physical evidence and
first-degree fleeing or evading police. Smith was eighteen (18) years and five (5)
months old at the time of the alleged offenses. 2017-SC-000536-TG, 2017-SC000537-TG.
2 Aaron Gillette, walking with Krueger, was also robbed at gunpoint.
4
All three Appellees pled not guilty and in all three cases the
Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. Each
Appellee moved the trial court to exclude the death penalty as a sentencing
option at trial, specifically asking the trial court to extend the holding of Roper,
543 U.S. 551. As noted, Roper holds that capital punishment is an
unconstitutional penalty for juvenile offenders less than eighteen (18) years old
at the time of the offense. Each Appellee requested the trial court to extend the
death penalty prohibition to include persons under the age of twenty-one (21)
at the time of the offense.
Bredhold and Smith supplemented their respective motions to remove
the death penalty with an affidavit of Dr. Ken Benedict, a clinical psychologist
and neuropsychologist. Dr. Benedict found Bredhold was about four years
behind his peer group in multiple capacities, including the capacity to regulate
his emotions and behavior, and that he suffered from a number of mental
disorders. As for Smith, Dr. Benedict concluded his executive functions related
to planning, anticipating the consequences of his actions, and impulse control
are below those of an adult and he too exhibited a number of mental
disorders.3
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Diaz’s and Smith’s
motions, hearing Dr. Laurence Steinberg’s testimony. Dr. Steinberg, a
3 Diaz had given notice of potential evidence as to mental defect, but it appears
evaluations were not complete prior to entry of the trial court’s orders declaring
Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional.
5
nationally recognized expert in adolescent development, explained current
scientific knowledge regarding brain development and its impact on behavior,
comparing the maturational differences between individuals less than twentyone (21) years of age and those twenty-one (21) and older. Dr. Steinberg also
supplemented his testimony with a written report. The Commonwealth did not
submit any proof. Although the testimony was presented in the Diaz/Smith
case, the trial court supplemented Bredhold’s record with the Steinberg
testimony.
The trial court later entered a separate but similar order in each case
declaring Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment insofar as it permits capital punishment for offenders under
twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of their offense. In addition to this
general legal conclusion, the court made specific findings regarding Bredhold’s
and Smith’s individual psychological assessments. The trial court concluded
that those individual findings provided further support for the exclusion of the
death penalty as to Bredhold and Smith individually.
The Commonwealth filed interlocutory appeals and this Court granted
the Commonwealth’s motions to transfer the appeals from the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 74.02, finding that the
issues raised are of great and immediate public importance and arose during
capital litigation, an area exclusively within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Ky. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Guernsey, 501 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky. 2016).
6
ANALYSIS
In these consolidated appeals we are asked to review the Fayette Circuit
Court’s decision finding Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional as
to defendants who were between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-one (21)
at the time of their offense. Before reaching this significant inquiry, it is
incumbent that we consider whether the issue is properly before us.
“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice,
demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of
[the legislature] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our
judicial function . . . .” Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919); accord
Louisville/Jefferson Co. Metro Gov’t v. TDC Group, LLC, 283 S.W.3d 657, 660
(Ky. 2009) (recognizing this Court’s “practice of avoiding constitutional
questions” unless judicially necessary). See also Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing rules
used to avoid constitutional questions). As a threshold matter, Kentucky
courts do not have constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate a question raised by
a litigant who does not have standing to have the issue decided.
Commonwealth Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., Dep’t for Medicaid Servs. v.
Sexton by & through Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 195
(Ky. 2018). Because the Appellees have yet to be adjudicated guilty and the
Commonwealth’s power to punish has yet to be invoked, we conclude the
question whether Kentucky’s death penalty is unconstitutional as to the agebased group identified by Appellees is currently not justiciable. For context, we
7
discuss briefly the parties’ positions on the constitutional issue raised before
turning to the mandatory considerations of standing and ripeness.
Under Kentucky law, a person convicted of a capital offense, may be
sentenced to death pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 532.030.
Imposition of the death penalty, however, is subject to the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution which, via the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits states from imposing cruel and unusual punishments.4 Roper, 543
U.S. at 560 (citations omitted). “While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” “reaffirms the
duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” Roper, 543 U.S.
at 560. Recognizing that the Eighth Amendment “is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice,” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), the United
States Supreme Court has adopted “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society” as a measure to enforce the Constitution’s
protection of human dignity and to determine which punishments are so
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
A trio of United States Supreme Court decisions, Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988), Stanford, 492 U.S. 361, and Roper, 543 U.S. 551, have
4 The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
8
applied society’s evolving standards of decency to address the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles of a certain age. In Thompson, the Supreme Court determined that
society’s standards of decency do not permit the execution of any offender
under the age of sixteen (16) at the time of the crime. Soon afterward, in
Stanford, the Supreme Court declined to extend that age range, holding that
standards of decency did not prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders who
were over fifteen (15) but under eighteen (18) years old at the time of their
offense. In Roper, decided only sixteen years after Stanford, the Supreme Court
determined that standards of decency had evolved to proscribe execution of
juvenile offenders under eighteen (18) years of age.
Appellees contend that contemporary standards of decency are now such
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of Kentucky’s death
penalty on individuals under the age of twenty-one (21) at the time of their
offense. The Commonwealth counters that Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, designates
age eighteen (18) as the bright line for separating adults from juveniles for
Eighth Amendment purposes, and thus the trial court erred by declaring
Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional when applied to offenders
between eighteen (18) and twenty-one (21) years of age.
Presently, by interlocutory appeal, the Commonwealth seeks to vacate
the Fayette Circuit Court’s orders that declare Kentucky’s death penalty statute
unconstitutional insofar as it permits capital punishment for a defendant
under twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of his offense. Although the
9
Commonwealth noticed its intent to seek the death penalty as to all three
Appellees, at the point their motions were heard by the circuit court (and even
now), the cases remained untried and no jury had recommended the death
penalty. While death penalty trials are unquestionably more involved than
typical felony trials, requiring both group and individual voir dire and
presenting issues and procedures unique to the gravity of the penalty sought,
the focus of Eighth Amendment analysis is not the trial, but rather the actual
penalty imposed. Despite no penalty having been imposed and the clear
possibility that death would not be recommended by the jury in any of these
cases, the trial court declared prior to trial that Kentucky’s death penalty
statute is unconstitutional as to these Appellees based on their age. This
preemptive ruling was legally inappropriate under controlling precedent.
Constitutional challenges to statutes generally fall within one of two
categories: a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. In order to declare a
statute unconstitutional on its face, a court must find that the law is
unconstitutional in all its applications. Commonwealth of Kentucky v.
Claycomb by & through Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202, 210 (Ky. 2018) (citations
omitted); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). “It is a wellestablished principle that ‘[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’”
Harris v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991)). On the other hand, in order to declare a
10
statute unconstitutional as applied, a court must find the law unconstitutional
as applied to the challenger’s particular circumstances. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 n.3 (1987).
No matter the type of constitutional challenge brought, the person(s)
bringing the challenge must first demonstrate standing in order for the
challenge to be justiciable. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 196. Otherwise, the trial
court does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the constitutional
challenge, whether raised by declaratory judgment action or, as in these cases,
by motion. See id.; In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 566–67 (1945); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).5 It follows that an appellate court does not
have jurisdiction to review on its merits an interlocutory appeal arising from a
circuit court judgment entered in such circumstances. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at
196-97.
5 As In re Summers, 325 U.S. at 566–67 explains:
A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any
question respecting the Constitution, treatise or laws of the United States
has assumed ‘such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
it.’ Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 819, 6 L. Ed. 204. The Court was
then considering the power of the bank to sue in the federal courts. A
declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on rights which
may arise in the future, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,
226, 29 S. Ct. 67, 69, 53 L. Ed. 150, and there must be an actual
controversy over an issue, not a desire for an abstract declaration of the
law. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361, 31 S. Ct. 250, 255, 55
L. Ed. 246; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129, 42 S. Ct. 274, 275,
66 L. Ed. 499. The form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the
nature and effect which is controlling. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259, 53 S. Ct. 345, 346, 77 L. Ed. 730, 87 A.L.R.
1191.
11
Kentucky’s constitutional standing doctrine, adopted from Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), wherein several
organizations sought declaratory judgment and an injunction, is outlined in
Sexton.
[A]t bottom, for a party to sue in Kentucky, the initiating
party must have the requisite constitutional standing to do so,
defined by three requirements: (1) injury, (2) causation, and (3)
redressability. In other words, “A plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”6 “[A] litigant
must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent . . . .”7 “The
injury must be . . . ‘distinct and palpable,’ and not ‘abstract’ or
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”8 “The injury must be ‘fairly’
traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must
be ‘likely’ to follow from a favorable decision.”9
566 S.W.3d at 196.
Sexton dealt with initiation of a civil suit; nevertheless, the “standing”
principles apply with equal force to this interlocutory motion raised in a
criminal proceeding. “In essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Standing is one
of the five major justiciability doctrines which assure that the courts do not
6 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed.2d 556 (1984),
overruled on other grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118 (2014).
7 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed.2d 248
(2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, 112 S. Ct. 2130).
8 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315.
9 Id.
12
address non-existent issues or provide advisory opinions. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d
at 192-97.10 In federal constitutional parlance a “case or controversy” is
required, Art. III, § 2, Clause 1, while in Kentucky the circuit courts (and
consequently the Court of Appeals and this Court exercising appellate
jurisdiction) are constitutionally required to address “justiciable causes.” Ky.
Const. §113(6). Upon review of the standing requirements, it is evident that
Appellees’ motions are not justiciable at this time.
A litigant must satisfy all prongs of the standing inquiry to invoke a
court’s jurisdiction in a constitutional challenge. In this case, we need only
consider whether Appellees meet the first prong, the injury requirement:
whether the litigant “‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.”
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). It is well-settled that “[a]llegations of possible
future injury do not satisfy the requirements of [standing].” Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). “A threatened injury must be ‘certainly
impending’ to constitute injury in fact.” Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). These principles regarding the
injury necessary to establish standing are incorporated in the United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence explaining the context within which an Eighth
Amendment claim may be properly raised. “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is
10 The United States Supreme Court has identified the five major justiciability
doctrines as: “(1) the prohibition against advisory opinions, (2) standing, (3) ripeness,
(4) mootness, and (5) the political-question doctrines.” 566 S.W.3d at 193.
13
appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . . [T]he State
does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is
concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law.” City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
671–72, n.40 (1977)).
In the cases before this Court, if one or more of the Appellees is convicted
of a capital offense, the sentencing options are numerous. KRS 532.030(1)
provides:
When a person is convicted of a capital offense, he shall have his
punishment fixed at death, or at a term of imprisonment for life
without benefit of probation or parole, or at a term of
imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until he
has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years of his sentence, or
to a sentence of life, or to a term of not less than twenty (20) years
nor more than fifty (50) years.
Thus, assuming conviction, the sentencing range for the Appellees would
extend from a twenty (20) year-sentence to death. To reiterate, the Appellees
have yet to be tried, convicted, or sentenced. “It is just not possible for [the
Appellees] to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any
particular result in [their] case.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 159–60. With the
Appellees having not yet suffered a concrete and particularized injury by
14
having the death sentence imposed, no actual or imminent injury exists.11 At
this point, imposition of the death sentence can only be viewed as hypothetical.
Although we approach the justiciability of these cases under the standing
doctrine, application of the related ripeness doctrine has likewise resulted in
courts dismissing premature claims and vacating premature decisions in the
context of an Eighth Amendment challenge.12 For example, in 18 Unnamed
“John Smith” Prisoners v. Meese, 871 F.2d 881, 882–83 (9th Cir. 1989), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a summary judgment in favor of the
government in a case involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to a proposed
double bunking plan as cruel and unusual punishment. The Ninth Circuit,
finding the inmates’ claims were not sufficiently concrete to warrant judicial
11 Requiring the litigant to prove “actual injury” “tends to assure that the legal
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The gist of
the question of standing is has the litigant “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
12 The line between standing and ripeness is not readily drawn. The ripeness
doctrine is “drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” W.B. v. Com., Cabinet for
Health & Family Servs., 388 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Ky. 2012) (quoting National Park Hosp.
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807–08, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 155 L. Ed.2d 1017
(2003) (citations omitted)). The overlap between standing and ripeness concepts has
led some legal scholars to suggest that the there is little benefit in having a distinct
ripeness doctrine. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability,
22 Conn. L. Rev. 677, 682-83 (1990) (“The standing determination demands that the
plaintiff demonstrate that he or she has been or imminently will be injured. Ripeness
focuses primarily on whether the matter is premature for review and asks whether the
plaintiff has suffered or imminently will suffer an injury. In light of this overlap, little
seems to be gained by having a distinct ripeness doctrine.”).
15
intervention, explained that the effects of the proposed double bunking, such
as overcrowding, deprivation of essential food, and lack of sanitation, were only
speculative, involving “‘contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed not occur at all.’” Id. at 883 (citing Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985) (quoting 13A C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 (1984))).
In Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s dismissal of an Eighth
Amendment pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that allegedly imposed
excessive fines. The Eleventh Circuit described the ripeness doctrine as
“ask[ing] whether there is sufficient injury to meet Article III’s requirement of a
case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently mature, and the
issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by
the court.” Id. at 1524 (citation omitted). More particularly, the Cheffer court
concluded “Eighth Amendment challenges are generally not ripe until the
imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment
or fine.” Id. at 1523 (citing Meese; Askins v. District of Columbia, 877 F.2d 94,
97–99 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (challenge to proposed transfer to another prison facility
not ripe)).
In Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998), a case involving
the constitutionality of a statute that imposed sanctions on inmates who file
frivolous claims, the Eighth Circuit recognized likenesses in the standing and
ripeness doctrines: “Although we realize that standing and ripeness are
16
technically different doctrines, they are closely related in that each focuses on
whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial
intervention. . . . Thus, whether this principle is labeled ‘standing’ or
‘ripeness’, [the inmates’] claim [is not justiciable].” Id. at 1090, n.4 (internal
quotations, original alterations, and citations omitted). See also People v.
Stark, 400 P.2d 923, 928 (Colo. 1965) (“With reference to the argument that the
several offenses defined in the statute are punishable by ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ we hold that until some person has been convicted of a crime
and a sentence has been imposed which is then asserted to be ‘cruel and
unusual’ there is no justiciable question presented.”); Floyd v. Filson, 940 F.3d
1082 (9th Cir. 2019) (challenge to lethal injection protocol not ripe when state
has no implementable protocol at the time of the challenge; injury speculative
and may never occur); Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d
1370 (11th Cir. 2019) (challenge to ordinance penalty provision not ripe when
no allegations that fine has been imposed or imposition immediately
forthcoming).13
13 We note cases exist which hold an Eighth Amendment challenge is justiciable
prior to the litigant’s adjudication of guilt. In United States v. Jones, 731 F. Supp. 2d
1275 (M.D. Fla. 2010), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute
imposing a minimum mandatory prison sentence of five years. The defendant was
indicted on three counts of distributing crack cocaine, a conviction on any one count
subjecting him to the minimum mandatory sentence. The Jones court concluded that
if an injury in fact may be found “where the law has yet to be enforced against the
party so long as he can show a well-founded fear of enforcement or imminent threat of
prosecution, then surely an injury in fact shall be found where, as here, the party
invoking the court’s authority has already been indicted and is facing trial.” Id. at
1280. United States v. Sanders, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2010), contains the
same question and analysis. These outlier cases relied primarily (and incorrectly in
our view) on Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988), a case
involving a First Amendment pre-enforcement facial challenge (providing “well-founded
17
The Commonwealth has not raised the issue of standing directly,14 but
Sexton is clear that “all Kentucky courts have the constitutional duty to
ascertain the issue of constitutional standing, acting on their own motion, to
ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court, because the issue of
constitutional standing is not waivable.” Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 192. Thus,
while the Appellees have raised a serious question as to whether the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for offenders in the eighteen (18) to
twenty-one (21) year-old range, it is not currently justiciable whether viewed as
a lack of standing or a matter of ripeness.
Rather recently, in Guernsey, 501 S.W.3d 884, this Court addressed a
challenge similar to that raised in this case and decided that prior to trial the
circuit court could not adjudicate the defendants’ motion to preclude the
Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty as a constitutionally
disproportionate penalty. In Guernsey, as here, the Commonwealth sought
review of a Fayette Circuit Court’s pretrial order granting the defendants’
fear” language and explaining danger of challenged statute is largely self-censorship),
and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a case involving allegations that both the
existence and the enforcement of a criminal statute impaired the plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights. Unlike an Eighth Amendment claim, a First Amendment claim,
particularly a facial challenge, is subject to a relaxed ripeness standard because of the
special need to protect against the chilling of the right of free expression. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002).
14 The Commonwealth cited Commonwealth v. Guernsey, 501 S.W.3d 884 (Ky.
2016), discussed infra, for the premise that statutorily the trial court was prohibited
from prematurely (prior to trial) removing the death penalty as a sentencing option.
The trial court considered Guernsey, but as reflected in its orders, believed it could
address Appellees’ constitutional argument.
18
motion to exclude death as a sentencing option in the event of conviction. The
case was noticed as a death penalty case because the murder was allegedly
committed in the course of a first-degree robbery, which occurred in the
context of drug-trafficking. The circuit court concluded that, based on its
knowledge of the facts following a pretrial hearing, capital punishment would
be constitutionally disproportionate in that particular case and perhaps also
comparatively disproportionate pursuant to KRS 532.075(3). Id. at 887.
This Court, in a unanimous decision, clarified that the KRS 532.075(3)
comparative proportionality review is a function assigned to the Supreme
Court, but that the circuit court may determine whether a death sentence
would be inherently disproportionate. Id. at 888-90. As this Court explained,
however, the circuit court may only properly exercise this authority once the
Commonwealth has had the opportunity to present all of its evidence at trial
and a death sentence has actually been recommended. Id. at 892.
We concluded:
While Guernsey and Jones correctly note that the death
penalty has fallen into disfavor in recent years, it remains a viable
penalty in Kentucky authorized by our legislature in specific types
of cases, including those in which the defendant is charged with
committing murder in the course of the commission of first-degree
robbery. The Fayette County Grand Jury indicted the Appellees for
those very offenses, and the Commonwealth, as is its statutory
right, subsequently noticed its intent to seek the death penalty.
Although at the conclusion of trial, should the jury recommend the
death penalty for either of the Appellees, the circuit court will have
discretion to determine whether that sentence is constitutionally
proportionate, there is no authority for exercising that discretion
pretrial before all relevant evidence is actually heard. Accordingly,
the Fayette Circuit Court’s Order Excluding the Death Penalty is
vacated . . . .
19
Id. at 894.15
Even though Guernsey involved a disproportionality argument that
focused on the particular facts of a case that had not yet been tried to verdict
while the cases currently before this Court raise a purely legal issue, judicial
determination of Appellees’ age-based challenge to the death penalty is still not
appropriate prior to trial. Regardless of the merits of the circuit court’s Eighth
Amendment analysis (about which we express no opinion), as in Guernsey the
lower court erred by treating the Appellees’ pretrial motions as justiciable and
removing from the jury’s consideration a penalty that is currently viable under
Kentucky law.
Consistent with our conclusion regarding the current non-justiciability of
the Appellees’ constitutional challenge, none of the cases they cite support this
Court addressing pretrial whether Kentucky’s death penalty is constitutionally
inappropriate for an offender in the eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21) year old
range.
16 All cases cited involving Eighth Amendment death or other penalty
15 On remand, the co-defendants in Guernsey reached plea agreements with the
Commonwealth. Robert Guernsey was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years for
second-degree manslaughter and first-degree robbery, and Trustin Jones was
sentenced to forty (40) years for murder and first-degree robbery.
16 This is also true of other cases not included in Appellees’ list: Melton v.
Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corrs., 778 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007); In re Garner, 612 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2010); In re
Phillips, No. 17-3729, 2017 WL 4541664 (6th Cir. July 20, 2017); In re Cathey, 857
F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2017); Tercero v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 2013); State v.
Myers, 114 N.E.3d 1138 (Ohio 2018); Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2018);
People v. Powell, 425 P.3d 1006 (Cal. 2018); People v. Gamache, 227 P.3d 342 (Cal.
2010); Williams v. State, 67 S.W.3d 548 (Ark. 2002); State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d
251 (Mo. 2001); Samra v. State, 771 So. 2d 1108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff’d 771 So.
2d 1122 (Ala. 2000); Butts v. State, 546 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 2001); Wilson v. State, 525
S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1999).
20
challenges, inclusive of United States Supreme Court, federal circuit and state
cases, are appeals by individuals who had already been convicted and
sentenced:17 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701 (2014); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); United States v. Marshall, 736
F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2013); Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2018); Otte v.
State, 96 N.E.3d 1288 (Ohio 8th Dist. App. 2017); Powell v. Delaware, 153 A.3d
69 (Del. 2016); Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012);
Romero v. State, 105 So. 3d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2012); Mitchell v. State, 235
P.3d 640 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010); Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2008);
17 Within the cited cases, United States v. Lopez-Cabrera, No. S5 11Cr.1032,
2015 WL 3880503 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015), is one case that does not precisely follow
this guiding principle. Prior to sentencing, three defendants convicted of murder in
aid of racketeering sought relief from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of
life imprisonment. As Appellees note, Lopez-Cabrera, an unpublished opinion, is not a
death penalty case.
21
Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2006); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W.3d
577 (Ky. 2006).18
Undoubtedly, the death penalty’s unique “severity and irrevocability,”
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (citations omitted), weighs heavily
on a defendant who has been notified by the Commonwealth of its intent to
seek the death penalty. However, when a defendant is tried and convicted of a
capital crime, the principle that capital punishment must be limited to those
whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution is
implemented through a carefully designed capital sentencing process. Roper,
543 U.S. at 568 (citation omitted). The sentencing phase allows the defendant
the opportunity to present mitigating evidence to convince the jury that death
is not the appropriate punishment. KRS 532.025(1)(b). “[W]here sentencing
discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed that . . . ‘possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics’
is ‘[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate sentence
. . . .’” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602–03 (1978) (quoting Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (emphasis added in Lockett)); see also Furman
18 New Jersey ex rel. D.B., No. A–353–84T5 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Feb. 19,
1985) (unpublished), a juvenile death penalty case, is similar to the case before this
Court. By interlocutory appeal, the defendant argued that application of the capital
punishment statute to a juvenile was unconstitutional. The New Jersey appellate
court refused to decide the issue because the defendant had yet to be convicted and
the imposition of the death penalty at that point was merely speculation. See also
State v. Smith, 495 A.2d 507, 510 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. Apr. 19, 1985) (applying New
Jersey ex rel. D.B. to a juvenile defendant’s pretrial motion challenging New Jersey’s
death penalty statute as cruel and unusual punishment as to a juvenile and declining
to decide the speculative constitutional question).
22
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 297-98
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 402-03
(Burger, C. J., dissenting); id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, as
reflected in KRS 532.025(2) which allows the jury to consider any mitigating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and in KRS 532.025(2)(b)’s
delineated mitigating circumstances, which includes the youth of the defendant
at the time of the crime, wide latitude is given to capital defendants to raise as
a mitigating factor “any aspect of [his or her] character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.” Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
19
As to this case, if the Appellees go to trial and are convicted, the jury
would presumably hear the age-based arguments made before this Court,
along with each Appellee’s individual circumstances when determining the
19 The death penalty remains relatively rare in the Commonwealth. Currently,
twenty-seven individuals are on death row in Kentucky. Kentucky Department of
Corrections, Death Row Inmates, https://corrections.ky.gov/Facilities/AI/Pages/
deathrowinmates.aspx. The sentencing dates for these individuals range between
March 1980 and October 2014. Id.; Death Penalty Information Center, Sentencing
Data, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/sentencing-data/deathsentences-in-the-united-states-from-1977-by-state-and-by-year. Between 1976 and
2019, Kentucky executed three individuals (in 1997, 1999, and 2008) with two of
those waiving further challenges to their sentence. Death Penalty Information Center,
Executions, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executiondatabase?filters%5Bstate%5D=Kentucky. Of those currently on death row, three are
sentenced to death for crimes committed when they were over eighteen (18) but under
twenty-one (21) years of age: Ronnie Lee Bowling, date of birth 12/05/1968, date of
first of two murders 01/20/1989; Karu Gene White, date of birth 11/18/1958, date of
three murders 02/12/1979; William (Bill) Harry Meece, date of birth 10/18/1972,
date of three murders 02/26/1993. Kentucky Department of Corrections, supra;
Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627 (Ky. 2011) (Meece committed the murders
Feb. 26, 1993, but was not indicted until Feb. 2003). (Websites last viewed Feb. 8,
2020.)
23
Appellee’s sentence. If the jury recommends the death penalty for any of the
three Appellees, the Appellee will have review of the appropriateness of that
sentence by both the trial judge, KRS 532.070, and this Court, KRS
532.075(3), through direct appeal and post-conviction review. We reiterate that
KRS 418.075 requires notice to the Attorney General in order to preserve for
our review a constitutional challenge to a statute. Craft v. Commonwealth, 483
S.W.3d 837, 840 (Ky. 2016); Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Ky.
2008) (compliance with the notification provisions of KRS 418.075 is
mandatory even in criminal cases). Thus, in the event a jury recommends
death, a defendant challenging that sentence on constitutional grounds must
give notice to the Attorney General so he or she can participate at the trial
court level as provided by KRS 418.075.
In summary, only when, if ever, one or more of these Appellees is
convicted and a jury recommends the death penalty will the circuit court be
confronted with an Eighth Amendment issue presented by an individual with
standing to raise it. Should that occur, this Court anticipates that the
evidentiary record regarding the psychological and neurobiological
characteristics of offenders under twenty-one (21) years old generally, as well
as of the Appellee specifically, will be fully developed by all parties and both the
24
trial court and this Court will have the scientific evidence necessary to address
a truly justiciable constitutional issue.20
Outcome: Because none of the Appellees has standing to present the issue of
whether Kentucky’s death penalty constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment
under the Eighth Amendment as to defendants ages eighteen (18) to twentyone (21) at the time of their offense, neither the circuit court nor this Court is
presented with a justiciable cause. Accordingly, the Fayette Circuit Court’s
orders declaring Kentucky’s death penalty statute unconstitutional as applied
to these Appellees are vacated and these cases are remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: