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Defendant's Attorney:
JOE ROBERT NORTON IVV

Description:

Jackson, MS - Real Property lawyer represented appellant with a case involving real property.

We begin by addressing the history of this case, based upon the record2
and the
detailed history set forth in the chancery court’s Judgment Upon Remand. In September
1982, Lib Vanderford and his wife, Sue Vanderford, conveyed to Patsy Joan Phillips
approximately 40 acres of property in Lawrence County, Mississippi, reserving to Lib
Vanderford a life estate in “all timber, standing, lying or being upon” the property. The
property taxes were not paid in 1989, and James Alexander purchased the property by tax
2 For the purposes of adjudicating this appeal, we take judicial notice of the record
filed with this Court in Alexander I and of those pleadings and filings available on the MEC
docket for the Lawrence County Chancery Court in Cause Number 14,871. Additionally,
pursuant to the Court’s order entered November 12, 2020, the appellee supplemented the
record with documents specified in that order.
4
sale on August 27, 1990. A tax deed was conveyed to Alexander on October 7, 1993, and
recorded on the tax rolls by Sherrod Rayborn, who was the Chancery Court Clerk for
Lawrence County at that time.
¶10. On November 15, 1993, “Patsy Phillips Musgrove, the same person as Patsy Joan
Phillips” (Musgrove) filed a complaint in the Lawrence County Chancery Court seeking to
cancel the tax deed and to confirm title in her, asserting that the 1990 tax sale was void
because the chancery clerk failed to comply with the redemption-notice provisions set forth
in Mississippi Code Annotated section 27-43-3. Musgrove’s original complaint was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to name the Lawrence County Chancery Clerk,
Sherrod Rayborn, as a party, and Musgrove was allowed thirty days to file an amended
complaint. Musgrove timely filed an amended complaint on February 28, 1994, adding the
Lawrence County Chancery Clerk, Sherrod Rayborn, as a defendant and making the same
assertions she made in her November 1993 complaint.
¶11. Sherrod Rayborn filed his answer to the amended complaint on April 7, 1994. He
admitted that to the best of his knowledge “Patsy Phillips Musgrove, the same person as
Patsy Joan Phillips” is vested with title to the subject property. Rayborn also admitted to the
following allegations that were set forth in paragraph 8 of Musgrove’s amended complaint
pertaining to the notice insufficiencies under section 27-43-3, as follows:3

3 Rayborn did not admit to the allegations in subparagraph (c) providing that “[n]o
diligent search and inquiry was made to ascertain Plaintiff's street and post office address.”
With respect to that allegation, Rayborn affirmatively stated in his answer that “effort was
5
a. No notice was issued to the sheriff of the county of Plaintiff’s residence, or
that of Plaintiff’s agent.
b. No certified copy of the notice was mailed to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s agent
by registered or certified mail.
. . . .
d. No notation of the actions of the Chancery Clerk regarding issuance of the
notice, the search and inquiry as to Plaintiff’s address, or the results thereof,
are noted on the tax sale records of Lawrence County.
e. No notice of the maturing tax sale concerning subject land was published in
1992 as required.
f. No affidavit [had] been filed concerning the issuance of the statutory notice,
or specifying the acts of search and inquiry made by the clerk in an effort to
ascertain Plaintiff’s street and post office address, nor has such action been
noted on the tax sale records of Lawrence County.
¶12. On May 14, 1994, Alexander entered into a timber contract with Jayess Wood to
harvest the trees on the subject property. Jayess Wood then contracted with logger Jerry
Wayne Smithie to begin removing the timber.
¶13. When Musgrove and the Vanderfords realized that timber was being harvested from
the property, they, through their lawyer, made a demand on Smithie to cease logging
operations, and he did so on May 23, 1994. The timber that had already been cut and loaded
was sold. Pursuant to an order entered in an interpleader action initiated by Jayess Wood,
“Jayess Wood Inc. v. Patsy Musgrove, Lib Vanderford, Sue Vanderford and James
made by personal inquiry, and by telephone as to the identity and whereabouts of Patsy
Phillips.”
6
Alexander, Chancery Court of Lawrence County, Cause Number 94-0109,” the proceeds
from the timber harvest were deposited into the registry of the Lawrence County Chancery
Court. The sum deposited was $14,807.60.
¶14. On May 16, 1995, Musgrove filed a second amended complaint that included Lib
Vanderford as a plaintiff because he had retained a life estate interest in the timber on the
property. In this second amended complaint, Musgrove and Vanderford added Jayess Wood
and Smithie as defendants, and Vanderford sought actual damages and the statutory penalty
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 95-5-10 (Rev. 1994) for the timber cutting.
Alexander answered the amended complaint on June 30, 1995, and raised no affirmative
defenses.
¶15. During the pendency of this lawsuit, the 1992 property taxes on the subject property
were not paid. Alexander purchased the property at a tax sale held on August 30, 1993. On
July 22, 1998, a tax deed for the property was issued by the Lawrence County Chancery
Clerk to Alexander.4
¶16. On July 20, 1998, Musgrove moved for a judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment, asserting that the 1993 tax deed should be declared null and void due to the notice
insufficiencies required by section 27-43-3, as admitted in Sherrod Rayborn’s answer to
Musgrove’s amended complaint. Musgrove also separately moved to consolidate Cause
4 Sherrod Rayborn died in 1996, and on December 2, 1996, the new Lawrence
County Chancery Clerk, James Brister, was substituted as a defendant in Cause Number
14,871.
7
Number 94-0109 (the timber interpleader action) with Cause Number 14,87l (the
Musgrove/Vanderford action).
¶17. On August 24, 1998, the chancery court, “upon oral motion of the attorneys of record
for the parties in [Cause Number 94-0109 and Cause Number 14,871], and upon agreement
of counsel,” entered an “Agreed Order Allowing Amendment of Complaint, Substitution of
Parties, Consolidating Causes for Hearing and Setting Causes for Hearing.” Pursuant to that
order, David (Buddy)Vanderford, representing the Estate of Lib Vanderford, was substituted
as a plaintiff in Cause Number 14,871 and as a defendant in Cause Number 94-0109;
Musgrove and the Vanderford Estate filed a third amended complaint (mistakenly titled
“Second Amended Complaint”) in which Musgrove added a claim to set aside the 1998 tax
deed due to statutory redemption notice insufficiencies, and the Vanderford Estate amended
the timber-cutting claim to seek actual damages and penalties to be paid to the estate; and
Cause Number 94-0109 (the timber interpleader action) and Cause Number 14,871 were
consolidated for trial.
¶18. Alexander filed his answer to this third amended complaint in November 1998.
Alexander asserted an “affirmative defense” in his answer in which he admitted that with
respect to the 1990 tax sale, the now deceased Chancery Clerk Sherrod Rayborn had failed
to complywith the statutoryredemption notice requirements. Alexander alleged that Sherrod
Rayborn’s failure to notify the property owner (Musgrove) was “political[ly] motiv[ated]”
and constituted a “fraud on the public in general and tax purchasers [(Alexander)]
8
specifically” because it was done for the purpose of allowing “the property owner
[(Musgrove)] to avoid the . . . redemption period and thereby not lose [her] property.”
¶19. In November 2006, Musgrove filed a second motion for summary judgment, again
asserting that the 1993 tax deed should be set aside as a matter of law due to the chancery
clerk’s non-compliance with the tax sale notice provisions required under section 27-43-3.
¶20. The chancellor held a hearing on Musgrove’s motion on December 12, 2006. In his
order filed on November 29, 2007, nunc pro tunc to December 12, 2006, the chancellor
granted Musgrove’s motion. The chancellor found that numerous statutory notice
requirements under section 27-43-3 were not met with respect to notice or redemption
relating to the 1990 tax sale of the property and that, therefore, “the conveyance captioned
‘Tax Deed’ as issued on October 7, 1993, by Chancery Clerk Sherrod Rayborn . . . is hereby
set aside and declared null and void.”
¶21. On April 27, 2010, the chancellor entered a “Final Judgment” that provided:
[T]he [c]ourt had previously entered its order finding that the statutory
requirements dealing with tax sales had not been complied with and that the
tax sale is set aside and declared null and void.
The [c]ourt further finds that the tax deed issued as a result of that void tax
sale is likewise set aside.
The [c]ourt further finds that the defendant[,] James Alexander[,] is granted
the money expended for the taxes together with the legal interest rate paid
from the date of the void tax sale until paid in full. The [c]ourt further finds
that attorney[’]s fees in the amount of $1,000 are payable to Mr. Alexander for
the failure of the county to comply with the statutes as set forth.
¶22. Alexander, through counsel, appealed, and his appeal was assigned to the Mississippi
9
Court of Appeals. On October 11, 2011, the Court rendered its decision, reversing and
remanding the case with instructions that “[o]n remand, the chancery court should explicitly
and clearly address the second tax deed, the timber proceeds, and the exact nature of any
reimbursements to Alexander.” Alexander I, 72 So. 3d at 540 (¶11). The mandate provided
that “[a]ll costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellee [(Musgrove)].”
¶23. On March 14, 2014, Alexander, representing himself, filed a “Motion to Claim
Monies” in the chancery court, seeking “reimburse[ment] [of] monies that [were] put in
escrow by the State of Mississippi. This monies was from timber that was cut off of land that
[Alexander] brought through tax sale in 1991 [sic].” The motion is captioned “James
Alexander v. State of Mississippi” and does not have a certificate of service attached to it.
The record does not indicate that Alexander set the motion for a hearing or that any notice
of a hearing was filed or served.
¶24. The instant case was tried on August 22, 2017, to address the issues set forth in the
Court’s Alexander I opinion. As stated in the chancery court’s Judgment Upon Remand, the
trial was being conducted to “clear[] up the issue of the validity of the second tax sale and
disposing of the final issues not clearly addressed in the FINAL JUDGMENT, specifically
the timber proceeds and the exact nature of any reimbursements to Mr. Alexander.”
¶25. Musgrove, the original plaintiff (now Patsy Gray), was represented by counsel, and
Alexander represented himself. The record reflects that there was no one on behalf of the
Estate of Lib Vanderford (the other plaintiff) at the trial. Only one witness testified: the
10
current Chancery Clerk of Lawrence County, Kevin Rayborn.
¶26. Before the trial started, the chancellor and the parties placed certain stipulations in the
record. As set forth in the Judgment Upon Remand and as reflected in the transcript of the
August 22, 2017 trial, the parties agreed that they had previouslymet with the chancellor and
discussed the matters that would be the focus of the trial. The parties agreed that the
redemption notice statute to be addressed was section 27-43-3 (as in effect in 1995 when the
tax deed obtained at the 1993 tax sale would mature).
¶27. The chancery court then summarized the redemption notice requirements of section
27-43-3, namely that the “clerk shall issue notice [of a right of redemption] to the sheriff and
the sheriff is required to then serve the notice on the reputed owner personally by handing
him a true copy of the notice; . . . . Then the sheriff shall make a return to the chancery clerk
and the clerk shall also mail a copy of the notice to the owner’s address and publish it in the
local newspaper.” The parties agreed that those were the statutory tax sale notice
requirements.
¶28. Additionally, the chancery court obtained confirmation from the parties that “Mr.
Alexander admitted that neither he, nor Mrs. Musgrove, nor Mr. Vanderford were personally
served with the required notice either for the 1993 tax sale or the 1998 redemption period
prior to issuance of the tax deed.” Lastly, the chancery court obtained confirmation from the
parties that “[b]oth parties agreed that they had ample time in which to prepare for trial. Both
parties announced [they were] ready for trial.”
11
¶29. Musgrove called Chancery Clerk Kevin Rayborn to testify. To avoid confusion with
his father, Sherrod Rayborn (who had previously served as the Lawrence County chancery
clerk), Kevin Rayborn will be referred to by his full name. He testified that he had been the
Chancery Clerk of Lawrence County since 2000, and it was established that because he was
not the chancery clerk during the 1990s (the relevant time period), all factual testimony he
provided was derived from written records from that time period. He further testified that
he was familiar with section 27-43-3 and he read the pertinent tax sale notice portions of that
statute into the record.
¶30. According to the trial transcript, the August 9, 1995 public notice for the redemption
period expiring on August 29, 1995 (encompassing the 1993 tax sale to Alexander), was
admitted into evidence. Kevin Rayborn admitted that as part of the notice requirements,
section 27-43-3 requires the chancery clerk to publish in the local newspaper the name and
address of the reputed owner of the property at issue and the legal description of that property
not less than forty-five days prior to the expiration of the redemption period. He further
testified that the required publication notice for the subject property was run in the local
county newspaper on August 9, 1995, with the redemption expiration date of August 29,
1995, which was just twenty days before the redemption period would expire, and not for the
forty-five days required bysection 27-43-3. Regarding the contents ofthe publication notice,
Kevin Rayborn admitted that neither James Alexander nor Patsy Phillips Musgrove (or Joan
Vanderford, Joan Musgrove, or Patsy Vanderford Musgrove) were named in the public
12
notice and that the property to be sold that is the subject of this lawsuit was not listed or
described in the public notice. He also testified that based upon his review of the chancery
court records, there were no other records or evidence that proper notice was given.
¶31. Alexander also questioned Kevin Rayborn. He asked him about payment of the
property taxes on the property in the early 1990s, but, as noted, Kevin Rayborn was not the
Lawrence County chancery clerk during that time period. He testified that he had not
reviewed records from the tax assessor’s office as to that issue.
¶32. Musgrove rested her case. Alexander stated that he was finished questioning Kevin
Rayborn and that he had no other witnesses. Both parties gave summations. Before the trial
ended, Alexander also requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,000, relying on the
mandate issued by the Court of Appeals in Alexander I. Additional facts relating to this
request are addressed below. The chancellor allowed the parties five days to furnish briefs
and then confirmed with both parties that they had no further evidence or argument to
present. The record reflects that nothing was filed by Alexander relating to his $5,000
attorney’s fees request.
¶33. On January 8, 2018, the chancery court issued an “Order Allowing Post-Hearing
Introduction of Exhibits” that addressed introducing into evidence the tax receipts on the
subject property from 1988 through 2016; the deposit slip showing the original deposit into
the Lawrence County Chancery Clerk’s account of the timber proceeds from the timber
harvested from the property; and the bank statement showing the account’s current balance.
13
(These exhibits had been presented to the chancery court at the August 2017 trial, but they
were inadvertently not admitted into evidence.) The order and the attached exhibits were
filed in the record on the same day.
¶34. The chancellor sent the order and the attached exhibits to the parties on January 8,
2018, and in his cover letter the chancellor also addressed the need for another hearing. He
explained that in reviewing the court file to prepare his opinion he discovered Alexander’s
2014 Motion to Claim Monies that had not been noticed for a hearing. He instructed
Alexander to obtain a hearing date and specifically instructed himto issue notice to the Estate
of Lib Vanderford of the hearing, as this was the entity holding the timber interest. The
chancery court also instructed Alexander to give notice to Patsy Joan Phillips, then known
as Joan Vanderford Gray. The chancery court docket reflects that Alexander did not comply
with these instructions.
¶35. On February 12, 2018, Alexander filed a document titled “New Discovery” that
provided it was being filed “in the light of new evidence.” Alexander submitted a purported
record of a 1987 entry in the Lawrence County Tax Assessor’s records that simply showed
“R#363” entered in one column and “Joan Gallman” entered in the next column. For ease
of reference, we will refer to this submission as the “1987 Joan Gallman tax redemption
record.” To avoid repetition, we will discuss this notation in further detail below.
¶36. On July 9, 2018, Alexander wrote a letter to the chancery court and Musgrove’s
counsel restating his position with respect to the issues in the case, seeking calculation of
14
additional interest on the moneys he alleged were owed to him, stating that the chancery
court had awarded $5,000 in attorney’s fees to him against Musgrove, and stating that he had
not yet received that money from Musgrove. Alexander ended his letter by requesting that
the chancery court issue its decision “without fail.”
¶37. On August 9, 2019, the chancery court, after having acquainted itself “with all
pleadings, referenced law, case law, arguments, transcript of proceedings and exhibits in this
matter,” entered its Judgment Upon Remand. In its judgment, the chancery court detailed
the history of the case, as addressed above, and then rendered its decision on the three issues
that this Court specifically instructed it to address on remand: the validity of the 1998 tax
deed; distribution of the timber proceeds; and reimbursement to Alexander, if any, for
property taxes paid during the relevant time period. As we will address in more detail below,
the chancery court found that the 1998 tax deed was void for lack of proper notice of
redemption under section 27-43-3 following the 1993 tax sale; Musgrove was entitled to the
timber proceeds, as “all of the heirs of Lib Vanderford have signed quit-claim deeds to Patsy
Joan Vanderford Gray (formerly Musgrove) to the [subject] property,” and Musgrove owed
Alexander $13,208.31, representing reimbursement to Alexander for property taxes he paid
on the property, plus the statutory interest of 1.5% per month. Alexander did not file any
post-trial motions or any motion in the chancery court challenging the chancery court’s
Judgment Upon Remand.
¶38. Alexander appeals. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm the chancery court’s
15
Judgment Upon Remand in all respects.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶39. This Court “maintain[s] a limited review of a chancellor’s findings of fact. We will
not reverse the factual findings of the chancellor when supported by substantial evidence
unless the Court can say that the findings are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or amount
to an abuse of discretion.” Cleveland v. Deutche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 207 So. 3d 710, 714
(¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In matters that
are questions of law, this Court employs a de novo standard of review and will only reverse
for an erroneous interpretation or application of the law.” Panola Cnty. Tax Assessor v. Oak
Inv. Co., 297 So. 3d 1122, 1126-27 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Notice of Redemption
¶40. Alexander asserts that the Judgment Upon Remand should be reversed because “Joan
Gallman” was the record owner of the subject property in 1987, not Patsy Musgrove, and
therefore “PatsyMusgrove was not the party to be notified” of a statutory right of redemption
after the 1990 tax sale. For the reasons addressed below, we find that this contention is
procedurally barred by the waiver doctrine and that, in any event, this contention is without
merit. We find no error in the chancery court’s determination that Musgrove is the rightful
owner of the subject property in this case.
¶41. As we have discussed, on remand the chancery court was instructed to address the
16
validity of the 1998 tax deed. Prior to the August 2017 trial, the parties stipulated that the
tax sale redemption notice statutes in effect in 1995 (when the 1993 tax sale matured) would
apply. Section 27-43-1 addresses the “notice to owners” requirement as follows:
The clerk of the chancery court shall, within one hundred eighty (180) days
and not less than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the time of
redemption with respect to land sold, . . . be required to issue notice to the
record owner of the land sold as of 180 days prior to the expiration of the time
of redemption[.]
¶42. Section 27-43-3 addresses the specific way in which notice must be given to the
record owner, namely by service of personal notice, mailing by “registered or certified mail,”
and by publication, as follows:
The clerk shall issue the notice to the sheriff of the county of the reputed
owner’s residence, . . . and the sheriffshall be required to serve personal notice
as summons issued from the courts are served, and make his return to the
chancery clerk issuing same. The clerk shall also mail a copy of same to the
reputed owner at his usual street address, if same can be ascertained after
diligent search and inquiry, . . . and he shall note such action on the tax sales
record. The clerk shall also be required to publish the name and address of the
reputed owner of the property and the legal description of such property in a
public newspaper of the county in which the land is located. . . . Such
publication shall be made at least forty-five (45) days prior to the expiration
of the redemption period. . . .
Notice by mail shall be by registered or certified mail. . . .
Should the clerk inadvertently fail to send notice as prescribed in this section,
then such sale shall be void. . . .
¶43. In determining that the 1998 tax deed was void, the chancery court recognized in its
Judgment Upon Remand that the previous chancellor had rendered partial summaryjudgment
in Musgrove’s favor with respect to the validity of the 1993 tax deed. In that ruling the
17
chancellor determined that the 1993 tax deed was void due to lack of proper notice of
redemption required under section 27-43-3 following the 1990 tax sale of the property.
Alexander did not appeal the chancellor’s decision on that issue in Alexander I. Alexander
I, 72 So. 3d at 539 (¶1).
¶44. Regarding the 1998 tax deed, the chancery court found in its Judgment Upon Remand
that because the 1993 tax deed was void, Musgrove was the “rightful owner of the property”
who required statutory redemption notice relating to the 1993 tax sale, citing Rebuild Am.
Inc. v. Drew, 281 So. 3d 92, 100-01 (¶¶29-30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Based upon the
evidence before it, the chancery court found Musgrove did not receive the requisite notice
with respect to the 1993 tax sale, and therefore the 1998 tax deed was void.
¶45. Specifically, the chancery court found the parties stipulated that Musgrove did not
receive notice by personal service, and Kevin Rayborn’s testimony and the August 9, 1995
public notice for the redemption period expiring August 29, 1995, showed that numerous
other violations of the statutory redemption notice requirements were not met relating to
publication of the notice. In sum, the chancery court set aside both tax deeds as void and
declared that “Mrs. Patsy Musgrove is . . . the rightful owner of the [subject] property.”
¶46. We find no error in the chancery court’s analysis, and we further find that the
chancery court’s factual determinations are supported by substantial credible evidence. As
the chancery court found, the prior chancellor determined that based upon the record before
him, no genuine issue of material fact existed “pertaining to [Musgrove’s] allegations that
18
the notice [regarding the 1990 tax] sale were deficient and that the [1993] Tax Deed should
be set aside and adjudicated to be void, [and therefore] [Musgrove’s] Motion For Summary
Judgment is well taken and should be sustained.” Alexander did not appeal this
determination in his first appeal. Alexander I, 72 So. 3d at 539 (¶1).
¶47. Further, as the chancerycourt also determined in its Judgment Upon Remand, because
the first tax deed was void, Musgrove was the property owner at the time of the 1993 tax sale
and was entitled to statutory notice of redemption. Drew, 281 So. 3d at 100-01 (¶¶29-30).
In Drew, the Court addressed the statutory notice requirements under 27-43-3 as applied to
a series of tax sales and found:
Drew[, the landowner,] was entitled to notice of each respective tax sale. As
the chancery court ruled in Drew I, the 2008 tax sale was void for lack of
proper notice to Drew. As a result, the 2008 sale was not only void but “void
ab initio”—void from the very beginning, as if it never happened. Therefore,
Drew remained the rightful owner of the property and was entitled to statutory
notice of the 2009 tax sale. There is no dispute that the chancery clerk again
failed to provide Drew with statutory notice of the 2009 tax sale. Therefore,
the 2009 tax sale was also void ab initio, and Drew remained the rightful
owner entitled to statutory notice of the 2010 tax sale. Finally, there is no
dispute that the chancery clerk did not provide Drew with statutory notice of
the 2010 tax sale. Accordingly, that sale was also void ab initio. Thus, each
sale at issue in this case was void ab initio due to a failure to comply with
statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the chancery court properly set aside
the tax sales and declared Drew the rightful owner of the property.
Drew, 281 So. 3d at 101 (¶30); see Hart v. Catoe, 390 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Miss. 1980)
(finding that “[e]ssential mandates of the [redemption notice] statute were not followed and
the failure so to do renders the tax deed to appellant void”). Musgrove was the “rightful
property owner” and entitled to statutory redemption notice with respect to the 1993 tax sale.
19
Substantial credible evidence as detailed above supports the chancery court’s finding that
many of the requirements under section 27-43-3 were not met. The 1998 tax deed was
therefore void, and the chancery court correctly determined that Musgrove is the rightful
owner of the property.
¶48. Alexander asserts that the 1987 Joan Gallman tax-redemption record he submitted to
the chancery court in February 2018 purportedly shows “Joan Gallman” was the owner of
the property in 1987 and that “Patsy Musgrove had no title to [the subject] property at the
time [the 1993] deed was released to [Alexander] (at the [1990] tax sale).”5
In short, based
solely on this 1987 notation, Alexander appears to assert that “Joan Gallman” was entitled
to statutory notice of redemption relating to the 1990 tax sale, not Patsy Phillips or Patsy
Musgrove, and thus the 1993 tax deed should not have been deemed void on summary
judgment. We find no merit in this argument for the reasons addressed below.
¶49. First, this issue is procedurally barred because Alexander has waived any challenge
to the chancery court’s determination that the 1993 tax deed was void, including the theory
Alexander now raises that Musgrove was not entitled to statutory notice of redemption with
respect to the 1990 tax sale. This lawsuit has been pending since 1993. Despite the fact that
the Joan Gallman tax redemption notation has been in existence since 1987, it was not until
5 Musgrove does not dispute this assertion. She states in her Appellee’s Brief that she
“is in fact that same Joan Gallman asserted by Alexander, her former married name having
been Patsy Joan Gallman.” There is no evidence, however, of this fact in the record or any
indication that this fact was presented to the chancery court. We therefore address
Alexander’s assertions.
20
February 2018 that Alexander asserted that “Joan Gallman,” and not Musgrove, was the
property owner entitled to statutory notice of redemption relating to the 1990 tax
sale—twenty-five years after Musgrove filed her complaint seeking to set aside the 1993 tax
deed. Moreover, this new theory relates to the validity of the first (1993) tax deed, but
Alexander did not raise any issue in his first appeal challenging the prior chancellor’s
determination that the first tax deed was void. Alexander I, 72 So. 3d at 539 (¶1). The only
issue Alexander raised on appeal in Alexander I with respect to the two tax deeds was that
“there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding who was entitled to notice for the second
tax sale.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, the only issue sent back to the chancery court to
determine on remand that related to the tax deeds was the validity of the second tax deed.
Id. at 540 (¶11). Accordingly, because the chancery court’s determination that the first tax
deed was void was never challenged on appeal, this issue is waived. Jourdan River Estates
LLC v. Favre, 278 So. 3d 1135, 1147 (¶47) (Miss. 2019) (determining that because “the
plaintiffs did not assign as error or make any argument respecting this portion of the circuit
court’s order . . . [any] argument against the dismissal of these claims is waived”); Petty v.
Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 190 So. 3d 17, 20 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
because the appellant did not “raise any arguments regarding the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment on her claims of tortious interference and defamation, she has now
waived those issues”).
¶50. To address the specific circumstances in this case, we further find that because
21
Alexander did not assign as error the chancery court’s determination with respect to the 1993
tax deed in Alexander I, he certainly cannot circumvent his failure to do so by attempting to
raise his new theory on this issue on remand. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. McGory, 697 So. 2d
1171, 1176 (¶24) (Miss. 1997) (“The original ruling denying punitive damageswas not raised
on the first appeal in this case. . . . Therefore, the original summary judgment (not appealed
by the McGorys at that time) should stand.”); accord Med. Ctr. Pharm. v. Holder, 634 F.3d
830, 834 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that under the waiver doctrine, “an issue that could have
been but was not raised on appeal is forfeited and may not be revisited by the district court
on remand”).
¶51. As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in the analogous law-of-the-case
context,6
“[w]hile [the appellant] did not raise this theory in the prior appeal, he should have
done so, as the matter [that this theory relates to] . . . was squarely before the Court at that
time.” Lee v. Thompson, 167 So. 3d 170, 177 (¶20) (Miss. 2014) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in this case, Alexander waived his ability to challenge the chancellor’s ruling that
6
In Holder, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that
“[t]he waiver doctrine, like the law-of-the-case doctrine, serves judicial economy by forcing
parties to raise issues whose resolution might spare the court and parties later rounds of
remands and appeals.” Holder, 634 F.3d at 834 (citation and internal quotation mark
omitted). But the waiver doctrine “differs from the law-of-the-case doctrine in that it arises
as a consequence of a party’s inaction, not as a consequence of a decision on our part.” Id.
(internal quotation mark omitted). In the case before us, this Court did not specifically
address the validity of the first tax deed in Alexander I because the issue was not raised on
appeal. Accordingly we find that the waiver doctrine, rather than the law-of-the-case
doctrine, applies in this case.
22
the 1993 tax deed was void, including his ability to raise his new theory that Patsy Musgrove
did not own the subject property and thus was not entitled to statutory redemption notice
relating to the 1990 tax sale. Alexander’s challenge to the 1993 tax deed on this basis is
barred by the waiver doctrine.
¶52. We also find that the 1987 Joan Gallman tax redemption notation does not
demonstrate that the prior chancellor erred in finding that the 1993 tax deed was void as a
matter of law based upon the statutory notice insufficiencies with respect to the 1990 tax sale.
The entry Alexander relies upon merely shows “R#363” entered in one column and “Joan
Gallman” entered in the next column. There is no heading on either column, and there is no
indication what property was associated with the entries.
¶53. In comparison, the 1982 deed shows that “Patsy Joan Phillips” (Musgrove) obtained
the property in 1982 from Lib and Sue Vanderford (with the timber rights excepted).
Further, the 1993 tax deed issued to Alexander with respect to 1990 tax sale plainly states
that on August 27, 1990, the Lawrence County Tax Assessor sold the subject property
“assessed to Patsy Joan Phillips . . . for the taxes assessed thereon for the year 1989, when
James Alexander became the best bidder therefore[.]” (Emphasis added). Additionally,
defendant Lawrence County Chancery Clerk Sherrod Rayborn admitted in his answer to
Musgrove’s amended complaint that to the best of his knowledge, “Patsy Phillips Musgrove,
the same person as Patsy Joan Phillips,” was vested with title to the subject property.
Sherrod Rayborn further admitted to numerous notice insufficiencies under section 27-43-3
23
relating to the 1990 tax sale, including the chancery court’s failure to personally notify
Musgrove or her agent, notify Musgrove by certified or registered mail, and publish notice
of the maturing tax sale concerning the subject property in 1992. Finally, in his answer to
the amended complaint, Alexander himself asserted as an affirmative defense that Sherrod
Rayborn purposefully failed to comply with the 1990 tax sale redemption notice
requirements, allegedly constituting a “fraud” on the public and on Alexander, specifically,
so Musgrove could “avoid the . . . redemption period and thereby not lose [her] property.”
In short, we find no error in the chancery court’s determination that the 1993 tax deed was
void due to the statutory redemption notice deficiencies. We find that Alexander’s challenge
to this determination is without merit.
II. Timing of the Judgment Upon Remand
¶54. Alexander asserts that the Judgment Upon Remand was “premature” because the
chancery court “fail[ed] to comply with its commitment to continue the case with further
court proceedings” before entering its decision on August 9, 2019. We find no merit in
Alexander’s assertion. The parties had ample opportunity to present all evidence and
argument in support of their positions, and there were no outstanding issues when the
chancery court entered its Judgment Upon Remand on August 9, 2019.
¶55. Specifically, the issues on remand were tried before the chancery court on August 22,
2017. Prior to the start of trial, the chancery court confirmed that the parties had had “ample
time” to prepare for trial and that they were ready for trial. The parties stipulated to the
24
issues to be addressed at trial, and the parties presented evidence and questioned Kevin
Rayborn, the current Chancery Clerk of Lawrence County, who was the only witness called
by either party. The parties also presented summations at the end of the trial, and the
chancery court allowed the parties five days to present briefs or any other documentation to
support their positions.
¶56. In January 2018, after the chancellor discovered that the parties failed to have exhibits
that were presented at trial admitted into evidence, the chancellor corrected this oversight by
issuing its Order Allowing Post-Hearing Introduction of Exhibits. Attached to this order
were the tax receipts on the subject property from 1988 through 2016; the deposit slip
showing the original deposit into the Lawrence County Chancery Clerk’s account of the
timber proceeds fromthe 1994 timber harvest; and the bank statement showing the account’s
current balance. Additionally, in February 2018, Alexander filed the 1987 Joan Gallman tax
redemption record discussed above. Finally, on July 9, 2018, Alexander wrote a letter to the
chancery court restating his position with respect to the issues in the case and then ended his
letter by requesting that the chancery court issue its decision “without fail.”
¶57. On August 9, 2019, the chancery court, after having acquainted itself “with all
pleadings, referenced law, case law, arguments, transcript of proceedings and exhibits in this
matter,” entered its Judgment Upon Remand. We find no error in the chancery court’s
entering its judgment at that time. The Judgment Upon Remand was not premature.
¶58. Alexander, however, relies on the chancellor’s January 8, 2018 letter to the parties in
25
which the chancellor explained the need for another hearing due to Alexander’s outstanding
“Motion to Claim Monies” that Alexander filed on March 14, 2014, pertaining to the timber
proceeds on deposit with the Lawrence County Chancery Clerk. In his letter, the chancellor
explained that the timber interest was held by Lib Vanderford, now the Estate of Lib
Vanderford (substituted as a partybyagreement after Vanderford’s death), and that there was
no indication in the record that Alexander had provided the Vanderford Estate (or Musgrove)
with notice of the motion. The chancellor specifically directed Alexander to schedule a
hearing date and to issue notice of the hearing to the Vanderford Estate and Musgrove.
There is no indication in the record that Alexander complied with this explicit directive.
Eventually the issue became moot because, as the chancellor stated in his Judgment Upon
Remand, “all of the heirs of Lib Vanderford signed quit-claim deeds to Patsy Joan
Vanderford Gray (formerly Musgrove) to the [subject] property.”
¶59. In sum, Alexander’s own inaction, coupled with the quitclaim deeds from the
Vanderford heirs to Musgrove with respect to their timber rights in the property, eliminated
the need for another hearing prior to the chancellor issuing his Judgment Upon Remand. We
find no prejudice to Alexander on these facts and reject his contention that the Judgment
Upon Remand was issued prematurely.
III. Consolidation of Cause Number 14,871 (Musgrove/Vanderford
action) and Cause Number 94-0109 (timber-proceeds interpleader
action)
¶60. Alexander asserts that the chancery court’s consolidation of “Cause No. 94-0109 with
26
Cause No. 14,871 [was] in error as they reflect two independent and unrelated tax sale
purchases” and that this “merger” “leaves no room for restitution nor resolution of
unreimbursed funds submitted by [Alexander] in good faith.” For the reasons addressed
below, we find no merit in these assertions.
¶61. The Agreed Order entered on August 24, 1998, specifically provides that it was
entered “upon oral motion of the attorneys of record for the parties in [Cause Number 94-
0109 and Cause Number 14,871], and upon agreement of counsel.” (Emphasis added).
Alexander was represented by counsel at the time. The Agreed Order was signed by the
chancellor as well as each party’s lawyer as “agreed to.” Pursuant to this order, the Estate
of Lib Vanderford was substituted for Lib Vanderford, Musgrove was allowed to amend her
complaint to include claims relating to the 1998 tax deed, and Cause Number 94-0109 (the
timber interpleader action) and Cause Number 14,871 (the Musgrove/Vanderford action)
were consolidated for trial.
¶62. Alexander is bound by the Agreed Order entered by the chancery court and signed by
his lawyer. In Newsome v. Peoples Bancshares, 269 So. 3d 19, 31 (¶40) (Miss. 2018), the
supreme court recognized:
It is always presumed that an attorney who has represented a party is
authorized to do all acts necessary to properly conduct the litigation, and the
party denying such authority has the burden of showing his want of authority,
and is bound, as to the opposite party, by any act which the attorney does in the
regular course of practice, however improper the act may be, if done without
fraud or collusion.
(Quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Majure, 176 Miss. 356, 168 So. 468, 472 (1936)). We
27
find that this principle applies here. Alexander makes no argument, and offers no evidence,
that his lawyer was unauthorized to agree that Musgrove could amend her complaint and that
the two lawsuits could be consolidated. Nor does Alexander cite any legal authority that
would prohibit such an agreement.
¶63. Regarding the agreed-to amendment to the complaint, Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) allows a party to “amend a pleading . . . upon written consent of the adverse
party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a) was complied with
here with respect to amending the complaint to add a challenge to the validity of Alexander’s
1998 tax deed. As noted, Alexander’s lawyer consented to the amendment in writing.
¶64. Regarding consolidation ofthe two actions, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)
provides that “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order . . . the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Although Alexander
asserts that the two actions “reflect two independent and unrelated tax sale purchases,” we
do not find merit in this assertion. In the Musgrove/Vanderford action, Musgrove seeks to
void Alexander’s tax deeds on the subject property, and the Vanderford Estate seeks damages
for the timber cut and removed from the property. The interpleader action concerns the
proceeds fromthe 1994 timber harvest on the property. The two actions, both pending before
the chancery court, plainly “involv[e] a common question of law or fact.” We find no abuse
of discretion in any manner in the chancery court’s ordering the agreed-to consolidation
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under Rule 42(a).
¶65. Alexander asserts that “merg[ing]” the two lawsuits “leaves no room for restitution
nor resolution of unreimbursed funds submitted by [Alexander] in good faith.” We simply
find nothing in the record that supports this contention. On the contrary, the chancery court
reviewed the tax receipts submitted at trial and determined that Musgrove owed Alexander
reimbursement for property taxes paid from the tax year 1989 (relating to the first tax sale)
through the tax year 2018 (the last tax year before the Judgment Upon Remand was entered
in August 2019), with the exception of the tax years 1991 and 2007,7
“plus the statutory
interest of 1.5% per month[,] . . . for a total of $13,208.31.” The chancery court’s
reimbursement calculation covers the entire relevant period and is supported by substantial
credible evidence. Alexander’s assertion on this point is without merit.
IV. The Timber Proceeds
¶66. Alexander asserts that Vanderford’s claim for the timber proceeds was time-barred
and that Musgrove is not entitled to the 1994 timber proceeds. We find no merit in either
assertion, as addressed below.
¶67. To briefly reiterate the relevant facts, in May 14, 1994, Alexander contracted to have
the timber on the subject property harvested, and it was cut and sold shortly thereafter. On
May 16, 1995, Musgrove filed an amended complaint adding Lib Vanderford as a plaintiff
due to his life estate ownership interest in the timber. Vanderford asserted claims for “actual
7
The record reflected that Musgrove paid the property taxes in 1991 and 2007.
29
damages for the value of the timber cut and removed from subject land” and statutory
penalties provided for in Mississippi Code Annotated section 95-5-10.
¶68. Alexander now claims on appeal that the May 16, 1995 complaint “failed to meet the
statutory timing to affect a judgment regarding the timber.” Alexander cites no legal
authority for this proposition and thus fails to complywith the requirement that an appellant’s
arguments must be supported by “the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). “Arguments that
do not comply with Rule 28(a)(7) are ‘procedurally barred.’” Hill v. State, 215 So. 3d 518,
524 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Cowart v. State, 178 So. 3d 651, 666 (¶39) (Miss.
2015)). We further observe that “‘[w]hile pro se litigants are afforded some leniency, they
must be held to substantially the same standards of litigation conduct as members of the
bar.’” Id. (quoting Sumrell v. State, 972 So. 2d 572, 574 (¶6) (Miss. 2008)).
¶69. Procedural bar notwithstanding, we also reject Alexander’s contention on the merits.
We recognize that in 1994, when the timber was cut and removed, a one-year statute of
limitations applied to “[a]n action for any specific penalty.” Miss. Code Ann. § 95-5-29
(Rev. 1994) (emphasis added). But the chancery court did not award a statutory penalty for
the timber cutting in this case. Rather, the chancery court granted Vanderford’s request for
actual damages (i.e., the proceeds from the timber sale). With respect to this claim, in 1994
the applicable limitations period was three years from the time the timber was cut, as
explained by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stockstill v. Gammill, 943 So. 2d 35, 45-49
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(¶¶19-28) (Miss. 2006).
¶70. Addressing claims for damages for timber cut in December 1997, the supreme court
held that although section 95-5-29 provided a one-year limitations period for a claim for
specific penalties for timber cutting, “claims for the fair market value of . . . trees cut and
reforestation costs were governed by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, . . . which provides for a
three-year limitations period” from the time the cause of action accrued. Stockstill, 943 So.
2d at 49 (¶28).8
¶71. The same statutory provisions in effect during the relevant time period in Stockstill
were in effect when Alexander harvested the timber in this case in May 1994. Accordingly,
Mississippi’s catch-alllimitations provision under Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-
49 (1972) also applies in this case to Vanderford’s claim for actual damages for the timber
cutting. The amended complaint adding Vanderford’s timber-cutting claimwas filed on May
16, 1995, well within the applicable three-year limitations period that began running when
the timber was cut in mid-May 1994. Vanderford’s claim for the value of the trees cut was
not time-barred. Alexander’s assertions on this point are without merit.
¶72. We also find that Alexander’s contention that the chancery court erred in awarding
the timber proceeds to Musgrove is without merit. After Vanderford’s death, the parties
8
In 1999 the Mississippi Legislature amended Mississippi Code Annotated section
95-5-29 to provide that a two-year statute of limitations applies to any action “for the
remedies and penalties provided by Section 95-5-10 [(actions for “cutting down or killing
trees”)].”
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agreed that his estate would be substituted in his place in Cause Number 14,871 (the
Musgrove/Vanderford action). Subsequently, as reflected in the chancery court’s Judgment
Upon Remand, all of Lib Vanderford’s heirs signed quitclaim deeds to Musgrove to their
interests in the subject property (excepting all oil, gas, and other minerals). As the chancery
court determined, Musgrove owns the property, including the timber rights. We therefore
find no error in the chancery court’s determination that Musgrove was entitled to the timber
sale proceeds.
V. Property Taxes Reimbursement
¶73. Alexander asserts that the chancerycourt incorrectly calculated the amount Musgrove
owed him as reimbursement for property taxes paid, plus interest. Alexander has failed to
correctly assert this assignment of error, and we therefore are unable to take notice of it. As
specifically stated in Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(c):
When a party relies on an error in the calculation of interest or damages as a
reason for altering a judgment, a true calculation shall be presented to the
appellate court, in writing and figures, with a certificate by a certified public
accountant not interested in the cause, that the calculation is correct; and no
such error will be noticed unless so presented to the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals.
Alexander has submitted as part of his “record excerpts” a one-page chart titled “Taxes Paid
by James Alexander Sr.” that appears to be his calculation of the reimbursement amount
owed to him, plus interest. There is no indication in the record that this document was filed
in the chancery court record prior to the chancery court issuing its August 2019 Judgment
Upon Remand. To the extent Alexander seeks to have this Court consider his calculations,
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the submission has no “certificate by a certified public accountant not interested in the cause,
that the calculation is correct.” M.R.A.P. 14(c). We therefore are unable to consider this
purported assignment of error. Id.
¶74. In any event, we find no merit in Alexander’s assertion. The Judgment Upon Remand
reflects that the chancellor reviewed the tax receipts submitted at trial and admitted into
evidence. The chancellor carefully itemized the tax receipts for 1989–2018, listing the date
a tax payment was made, the amount, and the interest due, all as reflected in Exhibit A
attached to the judgment. The chancellor then applied the statutory interest rate of 1.5% per
month, calculating that Musgrove owed Alexander reimbursement for property taxes paid,
plus interest, in the amount of $13,208.31, to be paid “within thirty days of the date of [the
Judgment Upon Remand].” We find that the chancery court’s calculations with respect to
reimbursement to Alexander for property taxes paid, plus interest, are supported by
substantial credible evidence.9

VI. Appeal Costs from Alexander I
¶75. Alexander asserts that the chancerycourt’s Judgment Upon Remand “failed to include
judgment for the $5,000 cost of my appeal Cause No. 2010-CA-00890-COA [(Alexander
I)].” We reject this assignment of error for two reasons.
9 According to the assertions in Musgrove’s Appellee’s Brief, “Community Bank
Official Check Number 368357 in the amount of $13,208.31 was sent to the Lawrence
County Chancery Clerk as the amount awarded to Alexander in the Court’s Judgment on
Remand. Alexander has refused acceptance of this payment, and the check is in the
possession of the Lawrence County Chancery Clerk at this time.”
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¶76. To briefly recap the relevant circumstances, before the end of the August 22, 2017
trial in the chancery court, Alexander orally requested attorney’s fees in the amount of
$5,000. In making this request, Alexander relied upon the mandate in Alexander I, which
provided that “all costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellee [(Musgrove)].” The
“costs”’ assessed pursuant to the Court’s mandate from Alexander I, however, do not include
attorney’s fees. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(c) provides that these “costs”
include only the “costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, the costs
of the reporter’s transcript, if necessary for the determination of the appeal, the premiums
paid for cost of supersedeas bonds or other bonds to preserve rights pending appeal, and the
fee for filing the appeal[.]” Because “costs” of appeal do not include attorney’s fees,
Alexander’s assignment of error on this point is without merit.
¶77. Second, to the extent Alexander is asserting that he is entitled to attorney’s fees
incurred post-Alexander I in the chancery court, we find that he has waived that issue.10
When Alexander orally requested $5,000 in attorney’s fees at the end of the August 22, 2017
trial, he offered no statement or billings in support of his request. The chancellor made no
ruling on the issue, but instead specifically told Alexander that “[i]f you’ve got something
10 The record reflects that in the “Final Judgment” entered by the prior chancellor on
April 27, 2010, which Alexander appealed from in Alexander I, Alexander was awarded
“attorney[’s] fees in the amount of $1,000 . . . for the failure of the county to comply with
the statutes.” Alexander does not refer to this judgment, and we therefore do not believe that
this relates to his current assertion that he is entitled to $5,000 in attorney’s fees. In any
event, the issue would be waived. Further, Musgrove states in her Appellee’s Brief that she
has paid this $1,000 amount into the registry of the Lawrence County Chancery Court.
34
to file about attorney’s fees . . . you need to file it and bring it to my attention.” The record
reflects that nothing was filed by Alexander relating to his $5,000 attorney’s fees request or
supporting such a request. There was no ruling on this issue. Because Alexander did not
properly raise this issue in the chancery court as instructed by the court and obtain a ruling,
“there is no discretionary ruling for this Court to review.” Hoffman v. Hoffman, 270 So. 3d
1121, 1129 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). This issue is therefore procedurally barred on
appeal. Id

Outcome: AFFIRMED

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