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Date: 05-07-2025

Case Style:

William D. Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc., et al.

Case Number: 2025-OK-29

Judge: Not Available

Court: District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney:


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Defendant's Attorney:


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Description: Tulsa, Oklahoma personal injury lawyer represented the Plaintiffs on personal injury wrongful death theories.

In October 2009, Lunn, individually and on behalf of the estates of his three children, filed suit against CMI, 1 claiming wrongful death from an airplane crash that caused the death of his children. Lunn alleged that a design defect caused the plane to crash. In September 2012, CMI made an offer of judgment pursuant to § 1101.1(A) as to all claims against it in the amount of $300,000, unapportioned between each plaintiff. Lunn (on behalf of himself and his children's estates) rejected the offer. After nearly nine years of litigation, a jury found in favor of CMI at trial. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted three years later in February 2021. CMI then appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial because Lunn's claims were barred as a matter of law by the 18-year statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006). The Court of Civil Appeals ("COCA") agreed with CMI and reversed the district court's decision. Since the judgment at trial was less than CMI's offer of judgment, CMI filed a motion for attorney's fees, seeking approximately $3.4 million. The district court denied CMI's motion, and CMI appealed.

COCA affirmed, holding that the district court's conclusion that CMI's offer of judgment did not meet the statutory provisions of § 1101.1(A) conformed with existing Oklahoma case law. COCA relied on three of its prior cases wherein COCA interpreted § 1101.1(A) to require the defendant's offer to be apportioned among the plaintiffs, allowing each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. See Schommer v. Communicate Now!, L.P., 2014 OK CIV APP 38, 324 P.3d 433; Medlock v. Admiral Safe Co., Inc., 2005 OK CIV APP 72, 122 P.3d 883; Haddock v. Woodland Park Home, Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 42, 90 P.3d 594. We granted certiorari to decide the first impression question.

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These cases collectively present three practical policy reasons for requiring the defendant to apportion the settlement amount in multiple plaintiff cases, rather than offering a lump sum. First, courts need to easily compare the offer of judgment with the actual judgment amount. An unapportioned offer creates uncertainty as to whether the actual judgment received by an individual plaintiff was less than the plaintiff's share of the offer. Courts require two figures that can be easily compared. Without this clarity, courts will have to weigh the parties' claims and determine the apportionment of fees. To inject the court into the determination of what is a fair apportionment undermines the clear intent of the statute, which is to place the responsibility for apportionment on the parties and their attorneys.

Outcome: An offer of judgment under § 1101.1(A) is valid only when it is apportioned among the plaintiffs in a lawsuit.

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AK Morlan
Kent Morlan, Esq.
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