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Date: 08-26-2020
Case Style:
Darius Shawtee McNary v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 20A-CR-381
Judge: James S. Kirsch
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Matthew B. MacKenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
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Call 888-853-4800 if you need a Criminal Defense Attorney in Indiana.
Description:
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[3] On January 25, 2019, Indiana State Police Troopers (“the officers”) helped
Michael Dodge, a parole officer, serve a felony warrant on a person who
resided at an Evansville apartment complex. Tr. Vol. II at 9, 19-20, 50. Some
residents of the apartment complex asked the officers to perform a welfare
check on the apartment of Tiffany Taylor (“Taylor”), where McNary also lived.
Id. at 10, 19-20. The officers knocked on Taylor’s door, and when she opened
1
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d).
3
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(a)(2), (c)(2)(A).
4
See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 3 of 16
the door, the officers could smell marijuana; Taylor consented to the officers’
request to search her apartment. Id. at 20, 129-30. During the search, the
officers lifted the ceiling tiles in the kitchen and found several bags of marijuana
and a large amount of cash. Id. at 21-22, 66; State’s Exs. 1, 2, 3, 17-18. The
officers also lifted the ceiling tiles in the bathroom where they found a loaded
handgun, a glass smoking pipe, a bag of methamphetamine, a digital scale, and
a notebook that Taylor had given McNary. Tr. Vol. II at 21, 34, 37, 39, 48;
State’s Exs. 7, 10, 32-33. The notebook was a drug ledger, which recorded drug
transactions, including the amount of money exchanged and the names of
several buyers, including “Jersey” and “Shorty.” Tr. Vol. II at 178-80; State’s
Exs. 10, 32. Once the search was over, Taylor’s children were placed in foster
care that same day. Tr. Vol. II at 144, 146, 200. Soon after, the Indiana
Department of Child Services filed a petition to find Taylor’s children as
children in need of services. Id. at 144.
[4] On March 1, 2019, the State charged McNary with Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in
methamphetamine, two counts of Level 3 felony possession of
methamphetamine, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon, Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit dealing marijuana, Level 6
felony dealing marijuana, and alleged that McNary was an habitual offender.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 4 of 16
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23, 26-28.5
The State eventually dismissed several
counts against McNary, and he proceeded to trial on the habitual offender
allegation and three counts: Count 1, Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine; Count 2, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine;
and Count 3, Level 6 felony dealing marijuana. The State dismissed the
remaining counts.
6
Tr. Vol. II at 4.
[5] Taylor testified at the September 23, 2019 trial. She stated that she had not
made a deal with the State regarding her testimony, although she hoped the
State would give her consideration for her testimony against McNary. Id. at
109-10, 158.
7 Taylor testified that while she was incarcerated, she was unable
to get her children back, but that now that she was not incarcerated, she could
work toward getting them back. Id. at 158.
5 About ten weeks later, Taylor was charged with dealing in methamphetamine, conspiracy to deal
methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, conspiracy to possess methamphetamine, dealing in
marijuana, conspiracy to deal marijuana, and possession of marijuana. Tr. Vol. II at 109, 144.
6 Count 2 and Count 3 were initially designated as Count 4 and Count 7 but were re-designated as Counts 2
and 3 when the State dropped the other charges. Tr. Vol. II at 4.
7 The record is confusing about whether the State had actually offered Taylor a plea agreement and whether
she had accepted such an offer. In an affidavit filed after trial, Deputy Prosecutor Hunter Renschler stated
that on May 13, 2019, he made an offer to Taylor's attorney, in which Taylor would plead guilty as charged
in her case and would be sentenced to a term of ten years and that if she would testify against McNary,
Deputy Prosecutor Renschler would take her cooperation into account. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 99.
Deputy Prosecutor Renschler stated that on June 6, 2019, Taylor’s attorney contacted him and said that
Taylor would be interested in testifying against McNary. Id. However, acting as if no formal deal had been
agreed to, Deputy Prosecutor Renschler also stated in his affidavit that Taylor was told that the State
expected her to tell the truth and “that her cooperation would be taken into consideration.” Id. at 100 (emphasis
added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 5 of 16
[6] Taylor’s testimony established some, but not all, of the State’s case against
McNary. Taylor testified that she began dating McNary in November of 2018
and that he lived at her apartment. Id. at 110-12. Taylor and McNary would
smoke marijuana together, and McNary introduced Taylor to
methamphetamine, which they would also smoke together. Id. at 110-11, 114-
15. During the time period McNary stayed at Taylor’s apartment, he would
have two friends over -- Shorty and Jersey -- who would smoke with McNary.
Id. at 116. Taylor also testified that McNary typically kept the
methamphetamine pipe and some methamphetamine in his pocket. Id. at 118,
121-22. She also testified that she gave McNary the notebook that McNary
later used to record his drug transactions. Id. at 127. Taylor identified the scale
that McNary used to weigh drugs. Id. at 132-33.
[7] Some of Taylor’s testimony did not confirm the State’s case. For instance,
Taylor testified that she never saw a large amount of methamphetamine or
marijuana in her apartment. Id. at 117-18. She testified that when Jersey and
Shorty came over to smoke drugs with McNary, she never saw money
exchange hands. Id. at 117. Other parts of Taylor’s testimony addressed
inconsistencies between her statements. On cross-examination, Taylor
admitted that when she was questioned by law enforcement at her apartment,
she had given a different story because McNary was standing close by and she
was afraid of him. Id. at 130, 143. Taylor stated she was testifying at McNary’s
trial because “the truth needs to be heard, and I agreed to cooperate. I have
children. I have to take care of them.” Id. at 160.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 6 of 16
[8] On September 23, 2019, McNary was convicted of all charges and admitted to
being an habitual offender. Id. at 215, 219. On November 7, 2019, McNary
was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-eight years in the Indiana
Department of Correction. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21-22.
[9] Two days after McNary was sentenced, he filed a motion to correct error, with
accompanying affidavits, alleging that he had obtained newly discovered
evidence that Taylor “testified the way she did due to pressure from the State,”
and that “the State had coached [Taylor] on what to say and what not to say.”
Id. at 109-12. McNary alleged that that evidence was discovered in two jail
phone calls between Taylor and McNary, one occurring on September 27,
2019, and the other call occurring on October 21, 2019. Id. at 109-10. McNary
claimed that “Taylor clearly gives the impression in the above phone calls that
she was pushed into testifying for the State on this manner and that at least
some of her testimony was false.” Id. at 110.
[10] In the September 27 phone conversation, Taylor told McNary that the State
was “trying to hit [her] with fucking ten years,” and asked McNary “do you
want me to look at my kids through glass for ten years.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III
at 10-11. Taylor added that “I didn’t ever do you wrong. I will say that. I
never did you fucking wrong. I tried to do everything that I fucking could for
you.” Id. at 14. In the October 21 phone conversation, Taylor again told
McNary that she was “not going to sit in jail for ten years and look at my babies
from jail.” Id. at 19. Taylor told McNary she “gave [the State] as little as I
could.” Id. When McNary asked whether the State had told Taylor what to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 7 of 16
say, she replied, “I mean, somewhat, like kinda couching [sic] me about what I
could and couldn’t say and shit like that,” and said that the State subpoenaed
her to testify. Id. at 22, 25. To provide additional context to Taylor’s
statements, we provide these excerpts from the two phone conversations:
Excerpts from Phone Conversation of September 27, 2019
MS. TAYLOR: You trying to say bogus that I did it?
MR. MCNARY: Yeah.
MS. TAYLOR: Are you talking about that bogus that I did it?
MR. MCNARY: I can’t hear you.
MS. TAYLOR: So, are you saying that it was bogus that I did it.
MR. MCNARY: Man, the whole situation (unintelligible).
MS. TAYLOR: Yeah, well, I had to do what I had to do.
. . . .
MS. TAYLOR: What do you mean, Darius? Do you want me
to look at my kids through glass for ten years?
MR. MCNARY: I’m saying, why would you do that though?
Why would you fucking listen to them and have them make you
fucking lie like that? . . . .
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 8 of 16
. . . .
MR. MCNARY: Have fucking people talk you into fucking
lying . . . ?
MS. TAYLOR: Well, whatever.
MR. MCNARY: What?
MS. TAYLOR: Said whatever.
MR. MCNARY: Oh, so they didn’t tell you to do that?
. . . .
MR. MCNARY: Like what, n***a? You fucking let them lie,
though. I mean, you let them fucking talk you into, I know for a
fact . . . . Do you not understand that they basically talked you
into basically taking a n***a’s life over some stupid dumbass
shit?
MS. TAYLOR: They were trying to hit me with ten years.
. . . .
MR. MCNARY: Then they dropped all [those charges against
you] to get you to fucking lie on me?
MS. TAYLOR: They didn’t drop everything. So, I still go shit.
And I did five fucking months in jail.
Id. at 10-12.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 9 of 16
Excerpts from Phone Conversation of October 21, 2019
MR. MCNARY: And then what? Like what the fuck were they
telling you to say?
MS. TAYLOR: You talking about.
Mr. MCNARY: I mean, were they telling you exactly what to
say on the way to there?
MS. TAYLOR: I mean, somewhat, like kinda couching [sic] me
about what I could and couldn’t say and shit like that. . . . .
Id. at 22.
[11] On November 18, 2019, Deputy Prosecutor Hunter Renschler (“Deputy
Prosecutor Renschler”) filed an affidavit asserting, “at no point was . . . Taylor
pushed or pressured into testifying for the State and we most certainly never
implied or told her to say anything other than the truth.” Id. at 100. Before
calling Taylor to testify, Deputy Prosecutor Renschler advised her that she
could not testify about McNary’s previous cases or any previous interactions
McNary may have had with law enforcement. Id.
[12] Two other deputy prosecuting attorneys, James Doyle (“Deputy Prosecutor
Doyle”) and Jessica Berry (“Deputy Prosecutor Berry”), also submitted
affidavits stating that they were present at a September 19, 2019 witness
conference with Deputy Prosecutor Renschler and Taylor. Id. at 102-05. Both
Deputy Prosecutor Doyle and Deputy Prosecutor Berry stated that Taylor was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 10 of 16
not threatened or coerced into testifying. Id. Deputy Prosecutor Doyle stated
that Taylor was not pressured to provide specific answers, and Deputy
Prosecutor Berry stated that she instructed Taylor not to speak about McNary’s
prior bad acts, criminal history, and law enforcement contacts after Taylor
brought up those events. Id. at 103.
[13] On January 10, 2020, the State and McNary filed a joint stipulation and motion
for the trial court to rule on the November 9, 2019 motion to correct error
without a hearing. Id. at 2-5. The parties attached transcripts of the September
and October phone calls, transcripts of Taylor’s trial testimony, and numerous
motions and affidavits for the trial court’s consideration. Id. On January 21,
2020, the trial court denied McNary’s motion to correct error. Appellant’s App.
Vol. II at 20. McNary now appeals. We will provide additional facts as
necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[14] McNary argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to correct error, alleging that he was entitled to a new trial because newly
discovered evidence proved that Taylor lied at trial. The decision of whether to
grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse the trial court only upon a
showing that it abused its discretion. Reed v. State, 702 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ind.
1998). An abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Jones
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 11 of 16
v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). To obtain a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must make nine showings:
(1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) it is material and
relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely impeaching; (5) it is not
privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence was used to discover it in time for
trial; (7) the evidence is worthy of credit; (8) it can be produced upon retrial;
and (9) it will probably produce a different result at retrial. Taylor v. State, 840
N.E.2d 324, 329-30 (Ind. 2006). Regarding the final and critical ninth factor, a
defendant must raise a strong presumption that the result at any subsequent trial
in all probability would be different. Reed, 702 N.E.2d at 691. We analyze
these nine factors with care because newly discovered evidence should be
viewed with great caution and carefully scrutinized. Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at 330.
The burden of showing that all nine requirements are met rests with the
defendant. Id.
[15] Of the nine factors that a defendant must show to obtain a new trial, McNary
and the State focus on factors four and nine, with McNary contending that the
newly discovered evidence is not merely impeaching and that there is a strong
presumption that the newly discovered evidence would lead to a different result
than the result in the first trial. See id.
[16] As to factor four, McNary argues that the newly discovered evidence from the
phone conversations is not merely impeaching because Taylor’s statements
during the phone conversations did more than show that the State pressured her
to testify and reveal her motives to testify against McNary; they also show her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 12 of 16
hope that testifying would help her get her children back from foster care. Tr.
Vol. II at 158. Thus, McNary claims the phone conversations demonstrate that
Taylor lied at his trial. As support for his contention, he notes that when he
accused Taylor of lying during their phone conversations, she (1) did not deny
lying and (2) did not respond by saying, “What I said was true.” Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 7. McNary concludes, “[This] is not impeachment evidence; it is a
recantment.” Id.
[17] It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether Taylor’s
statements during the phone conversations indicated that she had lied at trial.
For example, when weighing Taylor’s statement that the State was “kinda
couching [sic] me about what I could and couldn't say” -- Appellant’s App. Vol.
III at 22 -- the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the State was
not instructing Taylor to lie but was instead advising her to not testify about
McNary’s criminal record and other unlawful behavior. Indeed, Deputy
Prosecutor Berry stated in her affidavit that she told Taylor not to speak about
McNary’s prior bad acts, criminal history, and law enforcement contacts. Id. at
103. Likewise, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Taylor’s
explanation for why she testified against McNary did not indicate that she lied
at trial. In response to McNary’s questions about why she testified, Taylor
responded, “Do you want me to look at my children through glass for ten
years?” and “They were trying to hit me with ten years.” Id. at 11, 12. The trial
court could have reasonably concluded these statements simply revealed
Taylor’s motives for testifying, not that she lied at trial. If Taylor’s motives for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 13 of 16
testifying were self-serving, she was not the first, and will certainly not be the
last, witness to testify for a perceived benefit, whether promised or not. The
trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the phone conversations
did not indicate that Taylor lied at trial.
[18] Moreover, even if the trial court should have concluded that the phone
conversations established that Taylor lied at trial, Taylor’s statements during
the conversations were still “merely impeaching” and did not provide grounds
for a new trial. Notably, “impeachment” is defined as “‘[t]he act of discrediting
a witness, as by catching the witness in a lie or by demonstrating that the witness
has been convicted of a criminal offense.’” Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at 330 n.1
(emphasis added) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 768 (8th ed. 2004)). Thus,
when a person recants a previous statement, the new statement is merely
impeaching and is not grounds for a new trial. See McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d
434, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In McVey, we determined that a
molestation victim’s affidavit contradicting her trial testimony was merely
impeaching because it would “merely serve to cast doubt on [her] trial
testimony [and] . . . place her credibility at issue.” See id. Similarly, in Lahr v.
State, we held that an affidavit by a prison trustee that he had lied at trial was
merely impeaching and did not justify a new trial. 640 N.E.2d 756, 763 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. See also Abbott v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1169, 1172
(Ind. 1989) (affidavit from accomplice’s brother that the accomplice said that
the defendant was not involved in the crime was merely impeaching and did
not justify a new trial); Chiesi v. State, 644 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (Ind. 1994)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 14 of 16
(defendant was not entitled to new trial where witness did not directly recant
trial testimony and the people who filed affidavits alleging that witness had lied
were not disinterested but had their own interests in the outcome of the case),
abrogated on other grounds by Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1990).
Therefore, even if the trial court should have concluded that the phone
conversations show that Taylor lied at trial, her statements during those
conversations were merely impeaching and were not the basis for a new trial.
[19] We acknowledge that under some circumstances, Indiana’s appellate courts
have ruled that evidence showing that a witness lied is not “merely
impeaching” and does justify a new trial. For instance, in Wilson v. State, we
held that newly discovered evidence was not merely impeaching where the
boyfriend of the victim executed an affidavit that recanted his trial testimony
that he saw the defendant point a firearm at the victim; the evidence was not
merely impeaching because the affidavit exposed the boyfriend to a potential
perjury charge and was corroborated by two other affidavits. 677 N.E.2d 586,
588-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). This new evidence was not merely impeaching
because it “destroy[ed] or obliterat[ed] the testimony upon which the conviction
was obtained.” Id. at 588. In Francis v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court found
newly discovered evidence did not merely impeach the victim’s testimony
because the new evidence was eyewitness testimony from two disinterested
witnesses who placed the defendant away from the scene of crime, giving the
new evidence “independent, probative merit of its own.” 544 N.E.2d 1385,
1387 (Ind. 1989); see also State v. McCraney, 719 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. 1999)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 15 of 16
(co-defendant’s recantation was not merely impeaching because it was freestanding evidence of the defendant’s innocence). Here, however, Taylor’s
statements in the phone conversations did not “destroy” or “obliterate” her trial
testimony. Her statements did not contradict or repudiate her testimony and,
because the statements came from her and not a disinterested source, her
statements did not have independent, probative merit. See Wilson, 677 N.E.2d
at 588-89; see also Francis, 544 N.E.2d at 1387. Taylor’s statements do not fit the
criteria of the aforementioned cases where a lie or recantation was the basis to
grant a new trial.
[20] McNary has failed to establish that Taylor’s statements during the phone
conversations were not merely impeaching and would have served as a basis for
a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. A person seeking a new trial
must satisfy all nine prerequisites for newly discovered evidence to justify a new
trial. See Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at 330. In failing to demonstrate one of those
prerequisites - that Taylor’s statements were not merely impeaching - McNary
has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to a new trial. See id. at
329-30. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McNary’s
motion to correct error and his request for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
[21] We note that McNary has also failed to establish a strong presumption that the
result at a new trial would be different. See Reed, 702 N.E.2d at 691. The trial
judge may consider the weight that a reasonable trier of fact would give the new
evidence and evaluate its probable impact on a new trial in light of all the facts
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-381 | August 21, 2020 Page 16 of 16
and circumstances shown at the original trial. Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296,
302 (Ind. 1996). Here, Taylor’s statements during the phone conversations
shed light on her motives to testify against McNary. As the State observes,
Taylor’s reasons for testifying were already explored at trial, during direct
testimony, cross-examination, and closing argument. See Tr. Vol. II at 144, 146,
158-60, 203-04. Moreover, it would have been reasonable for the trial court to
determine that a jury in a second trial would give great weight to the affidavits
executed by Deputy Prosecutors Renschler, Berry, and Doyle, which all
asserted that Taylor was not pressured to lie and that they “coached” Taylor’s
testimony only to make sure that she did not testify about McNary’s criminal
record and other criminal activity. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 100, 102-05. We
reject McNary’s contention that introducing the statements Taylor made during
the phone conversations would likely lead to an acquittal at a second trial. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to correct
error an[22] Afd request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Outcome: Affirmed
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