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Date: 09-19-2020
Case Style:
Bruce A. Bennett v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 20A-CR-646
Judge: Paul D. Mathias
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description: Mishawaka, IN - murder
 |
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 1 of 8
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Tyler D. Helmond
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
I N T H E
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bruce A. Bennett,
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
September 18, 2020
Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-646
Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
The Honorable Jane Woodward
Miller, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D01-1812-MR-11
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Bruce A. Bennett (“Bennett”) was convicted in St. Joseph Superior Court of
murder. Bennett appeals and claims that the trial court erred by rejecting his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 2 of 8
request to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offense of reckless
homicide.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the evening of December 14, 2018, Bennett went to a bar in South Bend,
Indiana where he drank several alcoholic beverages with his friends. Bennett
and his friends then proceeded to a local American Legion Post, where they
drank even more. At some point in the evening, Bennett got in his car to go
home. Instead of going home, however, Bennett drove his car down the
sidewalk in from of the shopping center where the American Legion was
located and struck a mailbox and newspaper box with his car, knocking the side
mirror off his car. Bennet parked the car in the parking lot and got out, leaving
the car running. He then reentered the American Legion Post.
[4] The victim in this case, Teddy Braun (“Braun”), was standing outside the Post
with his friends and saw Bennett drive his car into the various obstacles and
reenter the Post. He followed Bennett back into the Post and told his friends,
“I’ve got this.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 163. Once inside, Braun sat Bennett down in a
chair and restrained him by putting his arms around Bennett’s shoulder, placing
his arm across Bennett’s chest, and holding Bennett’s hands down. One of
Bennett’s friends approached and asked what was happening, but Bennett did
not respond and instead stared at Braun. A woman approached the two men
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 3 of 8
and told them to “knock it off,” to which Bennett replied “he [Braun] won’t let
me leave.” Id. at 249–50.
[5] Bennett then pulled out a handgun, placed the barrel of the gun against Braun’s
chest, and fired one time. The bullet went through Braun’s aorta and his left
lung, causing a catastrophic, and ultimately fatal, injury. Braun fell to the floor,
and other patrons disarmed Bennett and held him down until the police arrived.
Bennett later told the police that he thought Braun was trying to kill him and
that he “had to do what I had to do.” Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 56. Bennett, who
had served in the Marines, also stated, “I’m a f***ing Marine. I was trained.
You don’t kill nobody unless you feel threatened. . . . I had no choice. . . . They
kill me. I gotta do what I gotta do.” Id.
[6] As a result of this incident, the State charged Bennett on December 17, 2018,
with murder and also alleged that he had used a firearm in the commission of
the crime, which is a sentence enhancement. A four-day jury trial was held on
February 10–13, 2020. Bennett presented a claim of self-defense to the jury.
Bennett, who testified that he has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”), claimed that Braun’s actions made it hard for him to breathe and
that he therefore believed he was going to die. Bennett testified that he put the
gun against Braun’s chest and shot him to stop Braun: “I knew what I was
doing. I couldn’t breathe. When you think you’re dying as a last resort you’re
going to use deadly force.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 109.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 4 of 8
[7] Toward the end of the trial, Bennet requested an instruction on the lesserincluded offense of reckless homicide. Although the trial court instructed the
jury regarding the defense of self-defense, it declined to give a reckless homicide
instruction. The jury rejected Bennett’s claim of self-defense and found him
guilty of murder. Bennet then admitted to the sentence enhancement of using a
firearm. The court subsequently sentenced Bennett to the minimum sentence of
forty-five years, to which it added a five-year sentence enhancement. Bennett
now appeals.
Standard of Review
[8] The manner of instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Randall v. State, 115 N.E.3d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Albores v. State,
987 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). On appeal, we review the
trial court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. When it comes to
the question of instructing the jury regarding a lesser-included offense, our
supreme court has “developed a three-part test that trial courts should perform
when called upon by a party to instruct on a lesser included offense to the crime
charged.” Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. 2012).
First, the trial court must compare the statute defining the crime
charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser included
offense to determine if the alleged lesser included offense is
inherently included in the crime charged. Second, if a trial court
determines that an alleged lesser included offense is not
inherently included in the crime charged under step one, then it
must determine if the alleged lesser included offense is factually
included in the crime charged. If the alleged lesser included
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 5 of 8
offense is neither inherently nor factually included in the crime
charged, the trial court should not give an instruction on the
alleged lesser included offense. Third, if a trial court has
determined that an alleged lesser included offense is either
inherently or factually included in the crime charged, it must look
at the evidence presented in the case by both parties to determine
if there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or
elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if,
in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser
offense was committed but not the greater. [I]t is reversible error
for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the
inherently or factually included lesser offense if there is such an
evidentiary dispute.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Discussion and Decision
[9] Bennett insists that there was a serious evidentiary dispute regarding his mens
rea. Murder is statutorily defined as knowingly or intentionally killing another
human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). “A person engages in conduct
‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to
do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when
he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.”
Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). In contrast, “[r]eckless homicide is defined,
unsurprisingly, as recklessly killing another human being.” McDowell v. State,
102 N.E.3d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied (citing Ind. Code § 35-
42-1-5). “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct
in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and
the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 6 of 8
conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c). Thus, “the only distinguishing feature in the
elements of murder and reckless homicide is the mens rea required of each
offense.” McDowell, 102 N.E.3d at 931 (citing Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072,
1082 (Ind. 2000)). Accordingly, reckless homicide is an inherently included
offense of murder. Id.
[10] Bennett argues that there was a serious evidentiary dispute regarding whether
he acted recklessly when he shot and killed Braun. Bennett points to the
evidence that he has COPD, that Braun held Bennett down by placing his arm
on his chest, that Bennett had difficulty breathing, that Braun refused to stop
despite being asked to do so by bar patrons, and that Bennett did not know
Braun, thought he was going to die, and did not intend to kill anyone. See
Appellant’s Br. p. 11. This evidence, Bennett claims, shows that there was a
serious evidentiary dispute regarding Bennett’s mens rea. We disagree.
[11] Even if Bennett did not intent to kill Braun, he at the very least acted
knowingly. That is, by placing a handgun against Braun’s chest and pulling the
trigger, Bennett was aware of a high probability that Braun would die as a
result; he did not merely act recklessly. “When one aims a gun at another
person’s shoulder or upper chest area and fires it, he or she is reasonably aware
of a high probability that the shot may kill.” Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457,
463 (Ind. 1999).
[12] Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury with regard to the lesser-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 7 of 8
included offense of reckless homicide because there was no serious evidentiary
dispute with regard to Bennett’s mens rea, i.e., whether he acted recklessly
instead of knowingly. See Wadsworth v. State, 750 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ind. 2001)
(holding that there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding defendants
mens rea where defendant fired a gun at close range into victim’s face); Sanders v.
State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 121–23 (Ind. 1999) (holding that there was no serious
evidentiary dispute regarding whether defendant acted recklessly instead of
knowingly where defendant fired a handgun directly at the victim at close
range); Etienne, 716 N.E.2d at 463 (holding that there was no serious
evidentiary dispute regarding defendant’s mens rea where he aimed a gun at the
victims upper chest and fired); Newman v. State, 751 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding
whether the defendant acted recklessly instead of knowingly where he pointed a
gun at the victim’s shoulder and fired).
[13] Bennett’s citation to Webb, supra, is unavailing. Our supreme court emphasized
in Webb that, when determining whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute
that justifies the giving of an instruction on a lesser-included offense, the court
must look to the evidence presented by both parties. 963 N.E.2d at 1107. And
in Webb, considering the evidence presented by the State, there was evidence
that the defendant and his friends had been playing with a gun, that the weapon
had been loaded and unloaded at different points in the evening, that the
defendant had pointed it playfully at different people, and that, after he shot the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-646 | September 18, 2020 Page 8 of 8
victim, the defendant stated that he “didn’t mean to shoot [the victim], that it
was an accident.” Id. at 1108.
[14] Here, in contrast, to stop Braun from restraining him, Bennet shot directly into
Braun’s chest, which is knowing, not reckless, behavior. See Sanders, 704
N.E.2d at 122 (“There is no evidence that [the defendant] was shooting at the
crowd on the stairs at random; rather, he shot only at [the victim].”). Because
there was no serious evidentiary dispute as to whether Bennett acted recklessly
instead of knowingly, the trial court properly denied his request to instruct the
jury regarding the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.
Outcome: he trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of reckless homicide. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Affirmed
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