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Date: 06-18-2021
Case Style:
STATE OF OHIO v. BRANDON Q. QUINN
Case Number: 20CA0027-M
Judge: Donna J. Carr
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Plaintiff's Attorney: S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Akron, Ohio - Criminal defense attorney represented Brandon Quinn with 11 counts of gross sexual imposition charges.
In 2017, Quinn was indicted on 11 counts of gross sexual imposition. The first two
counts were charged as third-degree felonies as those incidents were alleged to have occurred in
2007 when the victim was less than thirteen years of age. The nine additional counts were charged
as fourth-degree felonies. Those incidents were alleged to have occurred between 2008 and 2012
at times when the victim’s ability to consent was substantially impaired due to the fact that she
was sleeping. A jury found Quinn guilty of all eleven counts in the indictment. The trial court
imposed an aggregate four-year prison sentence and classified Quinn as a Tier II sex offender.
Quinn’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Quinn, 9th Dist. Medina No.
18CA0022-M, 2019-Ohio-3980, ¶ 39; but see id. at ¶ 40-47 (Teodosio, P.J., dissenting). 2
{¶3} While Quinn’s appeal was pending, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in
the trial court. The State filed a brief in opposition and asked the trial court to dismiss the petition.
Quinn then supplemented his petition. The trial court ultimately issued a journal entry dismissing
Quinn’s petition without a hearing. The trial court found that several of Quinn’s claims could have
been raised on direct appeal and that Quinn had not pointed to any evidence outside the record that
would merit a hearing.
{¶4} On appeal, Quinn raises four assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BRANDON QUINN A HEARING
ON HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PURSUANT TO [R.C.] 2953.21
PETITION TO VACATE OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF
SENTENCE WHEN HE SUPPORTED THE PETITION WITH NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, AN EXPERT OPINION INDICATING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND
PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO USE THE NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE, AND AN EXPERT OPINION DETAILING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE PREJUDICE TO BRANDON QUINN.
(Sic.)
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND
CHALLENGE THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY
WHEN SHE MADE ALLEGATIONS OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT IN
RESIDENCES SHE DIDN’T EVEN RESIDE IN DURING THE TIME OF THE
ALLEGATIONS AND WAS THAT TO THE PREJUDICE OF BRANDON
QUINN[.]
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Quinn contends that the trial court erred when it
denied his petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing because he presented newly
discovered evidence which brought the credibility of the victim’s testimony into question. In his
second assignment of error, Quinn maintains that the newly discovered evidence demonstrated 3
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and verify the
victim’s allegations. This Court disagrees with both assertions.
{¶6} Former R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a
delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the
person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States[] * * * may file a petition in
the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and
asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other
appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other
documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.
{¶7} Former R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) provides that said petitions shall be filed within 365
days after the date on which the transcript is filed in the direct appeal. A trial court considering a
timely petition for post-conviction relief must make a determination as to whether a hearing is
warranted. Whether the trial court must conduct a hearing is governed by former R.C. 2953.21(D),
which states:
The court shall consider a petition that is timely filed under division (A)(2) of this
section even if a direct appeal of the judgment is pending. Before granting a hearing
on a petition filed under division (A) of this section, the court shall determine
whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making such a determination,
the court shall consider, in addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and
the documentary evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings
against the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the indictment, the court’s
journal entries, the journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court
reporter’s transcript. The court reporter’s transcript, if ordered and certified by the
court, shall be taxed as court costs. If the court dismisses the petition, it shall make
and file findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to such dismissal.
{¶8} Thus, a trial court may dismiss a petition that “does not allege facts which, if
proved, would entitle the prisoner to relief[]” or a petition in which the allegations are negated by
the supporting evidence and the record. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraphs two
and three of the syllabus. Courts may also consider whether the claims raised in a petition for
post-conviction relief are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at paragraph eight of the 4
syllabus. “Constitutional issues cannot be considered in postconviction proceedings * * * where
they have already been or could have been fully litigated by the prisoner while represented by
counsel, either before his judgment of conviction or on direct appeal from that judgment, and thus
have been adjudicated against him.” Id. at paragraph seven of the syllabus.
{¶9} “When a trial court exercises its ‘gatekeeping’ function by determining that the
petitioner has not alleged sufficient operative facts that would establish the substantive grounds
for relief, our review is a two-step process.” State v. El-Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26616, 2013-
Ohio-3349, ¶ 5. “First, we must determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported
by competent and credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Wesson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25874,
2012-Ohio-4495, ¶ 11, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 52. “If this
Court concludes that the findings are properly supported, then this Court reviews the trial court’s
decision in regard to its gatekeeping function for an abuse of discretion.” El-Jones at ¶ 5, quoting
Wesson at ¶ 11, citing Gondor at ¶ 52. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment;
it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶10} The principal allegation underpinning Quinn’s petition was that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and challenge the testimony of
the victim, S.L. Quinn asserted that a reasonable investigation would have revealed that S.L. “did
not live in the residence she alleged the criminal conduct took place during the timeframe in which
she alleged the criminal conduct took place.” S.L.’s mother, Barbara Quinn, was dating Quinn at
the time of the alleged incidents. Quinn attached an affidavit from Barbara Quinn, who averred
that while S.L. testified that she lived on Granger Road at the time the incidents occurred in 2007,
Barbara Quinn and S.L. did not move to the Granger Road address until January 1, 2008. Barbara 5
Quinn further averred that Quinn lived on Haury Road in Medina “for the period covering the
majority of 2007.” The affidavit was supported by a copy of the Granger Road lease agreement,
which showed that the lease commenced on December 1, 2007, as well as checks evidencing
payments made pursuant to the lease. Quinn also attached his 2007 W-2 form indicating that he
lived on Haury Road at that time.1
Several months after filing his petition, Quinn submitted the
report of a criminal defense attorney who averred that, in his professional opinion, trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an investigation to uncover evidence that
could have been used to impeach S.L.’s testimony.
{¶11} Quinn set forth three constitutional claims pertaining to trial counsel’s
performance.2
Quinn argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to
perform an investigation and conduct adequate discovery pertaining to S.L.’s allegations,
particularly in regard to where the incidents occurred, (2) failing to adequately cross-examine S.L.
and introduce evidence contradicting her testimony, and (3) failing to move for a new trial on the
basis that the details of the lease agreement called S.L.’s credibility into question.
{¶12} In dismissing the petition without a hearing, the trial court found that Quinn did not
provide any probative evidentiary materials in support of his petition other than the affidavit of
Barbara Quinn. The trial court found that many of the claims relating to trial counsel’s
performance were barred by res judicata as those issues could have been raised on direct appeal.
The trial court further determined that even “assum[ing], arguendo, that the narrow issue of the
residence location raised in the affidavit [fell] outside of the record[,]” the allegations in the
1
At several points throughout his petition, Quinn noted that he was not able to provide additional
evidence in support of his claims because he needed a court-appointed investigator as well as time
to conduct additional discovery.
2
Quinn set forth a fourth claim wherein he alleged that the indictment did not contain a statement
evidencing a probable cause finding. 6
affidavit neither negated the element of venue, nor did the allegations call trial counsel’s
performance into question to the extent that the result of the trial would have been different. (Italics
in original.)
{¶13} On appeal, Quinn asserts that the evidence he attached to his petition was sufficient
to merit a hearing. Stressing that S.L.’s testimony was central to the State’s case, Quinn maintains
that a hearing was necessary to determine whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to adequately investigate and verify the victim’s allegations. Although Quinn argues that
the trial court erroneously denied his motion without a hearing, it does not appear that he
challenges the trial court’s factual findings. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶14} This Court remains mindful that “in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed
competent.” Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, at ¶ 62. In order to prevail on his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Quinn must show that (1) trial counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by
counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus. This Court need not
address both prongs of the Strickland test if appellant fails to prove either prong. State v. Ray, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 22459, 2005-Ohio-4941, ¶ 10.
{¶15} Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it dismissed Quinn’s petition without a hearing. As an initial matter, a review of the record
reveals that the credibility of S.L.’s testimony was a central issue at trial. Many of the challenges
to trial counsel’s performance that Quinn set forth in support of his petition, such as not adequately 7
cross-examining certain witnesses and failing to advance alternate theories attacking S.L.’s
credibility, were evident on the face of the record at the time Quinn filed his direct appeal. Thus,
these challenges cannot be considered during a post-conviction proceeding because they could
have been fully litigated on direct appeal and are now barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, at paragraphs seven and eight of the syllabus.
{¶16} Furthermore, the allegations in Barbara Quinn’s affidavit and the supporting
documents did not constitute the operative facts necessary to merit a hearing. At trial, S.L. testified
that she was eleven years old when Quinn began living with S.L., her mother, and her siblings.
During her testimony, S.L. acknowledged a degree of uncertainty about where they resided when
they first moved to Medina. Although S.L. testified that she “believe[d]” that the Granger Road
residence was the first place she lived in Medina, she noted that there was “lots of moving around.”
Significantly, however, S.L. testified that Quinn lived with S.L., her mother, and her siblings
during the entirety of the time that they resided in Medina. S.L. gave a detailed account of how
Quinn began to molest her when she was eleven years old and, further, how Quinn’s conduct
persisted on a regular basis until she moved out in 2012. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to
dismiss the petition without a hearing was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable given
that Quinn failed to demonstrate substantive grounds for relief on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Even if trial counsel had pursued a defense strategy based on the residence location
averments contained in Barbara Quinn’s affidavit, there is no basis to conclude that the result of
the trial would have been different. See Strickland at 687.
{¶17} Finally, to the extent that Quinn argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying him additional discovery and access to a court-appointed investigator, we note that there
is generally no right to discovery in a post-conviction proceeding. See State v. Craig, 9th Dist. 8
Summit No. 24580, 2010-Ohio-1169, ¶ 6. The procedures applicable to a post-conviction
proceeding are set forth in R.C. 2953.21. Craig at ¶ 6. Non-capital offenders filing a petition for
post-conviction relief do not have a right to discovery under R.C. 2953.21.
{¶18} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE INDICTMENT IN THIS CASE IS VOID DUE TO [THE] FAILURE OF
THE INDICTMENT TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE GRAND JURY?
{¶19} In his third assignment of error, Quinn contends that the indictment in this case is
void because it does not specify that the grand jury made a probable cause finding. We have
previously confronted this issue and held that the lack of a specific probable cause finding on the
face of an indictment does not render the indictment void. State v. Zazzara, 9th Dist. Medina No.
18CA0007-M, 2019-Ohio-662, ¶ 7, citing State v. Stevens, 9th Dist. Medina Nos. 16CA0033-M,
16CA0034-M, 2017-Ohio-5482, ¶ 7. As any alleged error in the indictment would have been
apparent in the record, Quinn could have raised that issue prior to trial pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C)
and then subsequently on direct appeal. As Quinn failed to do so, he is now barred from raising
the issue on the basis of res judicata. Zazzara at ¶ 7.
{¶20} The third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE ASSIGNMENT IS VOID WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE RECUSES
HIMSELF DUE TO THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AND THEN
SUBSEQUENTLY EXERCISES AUTHORITY OVER THE CASE WITH
ASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER COURT RATHER THAN THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT?
{¶21} In his final assignment of error, Quinn asserts that the initial trial judge improperly
exercised authority over this case when he transferred the matter to another judge’s docket at the
time of his recusal. “Matters of disqualification of trial judges lie within the exclusive jurisdiction 9
of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio and [her] designees. This Court is without
authority to review a matter involving the disqualification of a judge.” (Internal quotations and
citations omitted.) State v. Fry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26121, 2012-Ohio-2602, ¶ 49. As such, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to address Quinn’s fourth assignment of error.
Outcome: Quinn’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: