Defendant's Attorney: Erin M. McManis, Ember A. Van Vranken, and Joshua M. Bolen

Description: Phoenix, Arizona consumer credit lawyer represented the Plaintiff who sued on a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") violation theory.

IQ acquired a debt obligation for Six’s purported breach of a residential lease. Six learned of the debt and, on August
18, 2021, mailed a letter to Equifax disputing the debt and requesting documentation of it. The same day, Six’s counsel
mailed a letter directly to IQ providing notice that Six was represented and that all correspondence should be sent to
counsel.

On September 2, 2021, IQ received Six’s dispute letter and submitted an internal request to generate and send the
requested documentation to Six’s mailing address. The next day, September 3, IQ updated its records to show that it had
processed Six’s counsel’s letter and that direct communication should cease. But on that same day, IQ also sent the letter with verification of the debt to Six’s mailing address.

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In sum, both Congress’s judgment and a comparison to traditionally recognized harms establish that Six suffered a
concrete injury when IQ sent him a letter. Furthermore, Six’s harm is both particularized and actual. IQ’s letter was
delivered directly to Six, which affected him in a “personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). And because receipt of the letter in alleged violation of § 1692c(a)(2) inherently violated
Six’s privacy, he has sufficiently alleged actual harm, rather than a “conjectural” harm or “bare procedural violation.”
Compare Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342 (noting that a formatting error in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act may not
result in actual harm), with Hall v. Smosh Dot Com, Inc., 72 F.4th 983, 988 n.5, 991 (9th Cir. 2023) (finding that a
violation of TCPA § 227(c) for texting a phone number on the Do-Not-Call Registry established actual harm because an
unsolicited text is inherently an invasion of privacy). Thus, Six suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing at this juncture of the case.

Outcome: Dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Reversed.

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Defendant's Experts:

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