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Date: 11-20-2020
Case Style:
DANIEL L. WELLS v. ANTHONY D. MURREL
Case Number: 28726
Judge: Howard E. Hall
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
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Defendant's Attorney:
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Description:
Dayton, OH - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant Daniel L. Wells with appeals from the Dayton Municipal Court’s dismissal of his complaint for lack of monetary and subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 2} This case arose from a dispute between Wells and defendant Anthony D.
Murrell who, together with others, shared a house, sharing housing and other expenses.
Wells kept track of everyone’s share of the expenses and their payments. In 2017, Murrell
moved out, leaving, according to Wells, a balance due. Murrell refused to pay. A month
later, Wells found Murrell’s Social Security card in Murrell’s former room and informed
Murrell that he had it. Murrell ended up calling the police to report that Wells had stolen
or was wrongfully withholding the card. Officers showed up at Wells’s house. Wells
refused to turn over the card, was handcuffed, and then was released when he finally
turned it over.
{¶ 3} On February 20, 2018, Wells filed a complaint against Murrell in Dayton
Municipal Court, and on March 2, 2018, Wells filed an amended complaint. The amended
complaint asserted six causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) conversion, (3) unjust
enrichment, (4) theft, (5) defamation, and (6) conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. 1983. As for
the relief he sought, Wells demanded relief of “not less than” $4,128.15 for each of the
first four causes of action, “an amount yet to be determined” for the fifth and sixth causes
of action, punitive damages, costs expended, attorney fees, and any other relief to which
he is entitled. Murrell filed an answer as well as a counterclaim for breach of contract.
{¶ 4} On April 1, 2019, the municipal court filed an order sua sponte asking Wells
to show cause why the amended complaint should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The court pointed out that the total damages requested exceeded its
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monetary jurisdiction of $15,000 and that some of the causes of action were outside its
subject-matter jurisdiction. In his show-cause brief, Wells stated that the first four claims
were alternative claims for relief, not conjunctive. He further said that the damages
arising from the fifth and sixth causes of action, as well as any punitive damages, would
not exceed the court’s monetary limit. Wells asked for leave to file a second amended
complaint to make all this clear. On May 16, 2019, the municipal court concluded that it
still lacked jurisdiction. It denied Wells leave to amend his complaint and dismissed the
case. Wells appealed, but because Murrell’s counterclaim remained, we dismissed the
appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.
{¶ 5} On remand, on January 14, 2020, the municipal court dismissed Murrell’s
counterclaim and again dismissed the entire case, without prejudice, for lack of
jurisdiction.
{¶ 6} Wells appeals.
II. Analysis
{¶ 7} Wells assigns three errors to the trial court. Murrell did not file an opposing
brief.
A. Monetary jurisdiction
{¶ 8} The first assignment of error alleges:
The Trial Court erred when it dismissed Wells v. Murrell on the grounds that
it lacked jurisdiction, as the amount of damages sought by the plaintiff did
not exceed the jurisdictional limit of a Municipal Court in Ohio.
{¶ 9} Under R.C. 1901.17, municipal courts have jurisdiction “only in those cases
in which the amount claimed by any party * * * does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars[.]”
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When the relief sought exceeds this amount, a municipal court is without jurisdiction to
decide the matter. State ex rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas
of Cuyahoga Cty., 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 50, 550 N.E.2d 941 (1990). In such a situation, the
court is required to dismiss the action. Id.
{¶ 10} Wells’s complete demand for relief stated:
A. Pursuant to the First Cause of Action, judgment against Defendant in an
amount yet to be determined however, anticipated to be not less than Four
Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Eight and 15/100 Dollars ($4,128.15);
B. Pursuant to the Second Cause of Action, judgment against Defendant in
an amount yet to be determined however, anticipated to be not less than
Four Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Eight and 15/100 Dollars ($4,128.15);
C. Pursuant to the Third Cause of Action, judgment against Defendant in an
amount yet to be determined however, anticipated to be not less than Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Four and 17/100 Dollars ($4,128.15);
D. Pursuant to the Fourth Cause of Action, judgment against Defendant in
an amount yet to be determined however, anticipated to be not less than
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Four and 17/100 Dollars ($4,128.15);
E. Pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, judgment against
Defendant in an amount yet to be determined;
F. Punitive damages;
G. Costs expended herein;
H. Attorney fees; and
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I. For any and all other relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled at law and in
equity.
(Emphasis added.) There was no indication that these claims were pleaded in the
alternative, and the word “and” after the penultimate demand could suggest that the
claims were conjunctive. The municipal court could have reasonably read the demand for
relief in the conjunctive. See Lance Langan Water Jetting, Inc. v. Tiger General, Inc., 9th
Dist. Medina No. 05CA0018-M, 2005-Ohio-4541, ¶ 9 (finding no indication that the claims
were pleaded in the alternative, so concluding the demand for relief was in the
conjunctive); Stewart v. Dina’s Pizza and Pub, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106790,
2018-Ohio-3415, ¶ 10 (concluding that the demand for relief in both the complaint and
the amended complaint listed conjunctive demands for each cause of action that, when
added together, clearly prayed for a sum that exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the
municipal court). Under a conjunctive reading, the first four causes of action alone sought
damages exceeding the $15,000 monetary limit, making dismissal proper.
{¶ 11} But even if the first four causes of action sought alternative relief, the court
could have reasonably found that the total amount sought still exceeded the limit. If the
first four demands for relief were deemed to have been pled in the alternative, $10,871.85
remained to reach the monetary cap. We note that Wells filed a motion for discovery
sanctions that sought $1,500 in attorney fees and costs, leaving $9,371.85 in the cap.
Wells also sought unspecified damages for defamation and unspecified damages for
violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Further, he asked for costs, attorney fees, and any other
relief to which he was entitled. Finally, Wells asked for punitive damages. We think that
the court could have reasonably determined that the requested relief for these claims had
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a good chance of exceeding the $9,371.85 left in its monetary cap. See Carter v.
Trotwood-Madison City Bd. of Edn., 181 Ohio App.3d 764, 2009-Ohio-1769, 910 N.E.2d
1088, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.), quoting Nemazee v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 56 Ohio St.3d 109, 111,
564 N.E.2d 477, fn. 3 (1990) (when a trial court determines its own jurisdiction, it “has
authority to consider any pertinent evidentiary materials”).
{¶ 12} The first assignment of error is overruled.
B. Subject-matter jurisdiction
{¶ 13} The second assignment of error alleges:
The Trial Court erred when it dismissed Wells v. Murrell on the grounds that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over some of the claims raised because
these claims were, in fact, within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
general division of a Municipal Court in Ohio.
{¶ 14} The municipal court did not say which claim or claims it thought were
outside its subject-matter jurisdiction. Wells contends, based on discussions at a pretrial
conference, that it was the defamation claim. We agree with Wells that the court does
have jurisdiction over that claim.
{¶ 15} But we suspect that the problematic claim was actually the one based on
42 U.S.C. 1983. Municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over 1983 actions, because
municipal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. Cleveland v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co.,
89 Ohio App.3d 267, 273, 624 N.E.2d 245 (8th Dist.1993) (“There is no authority for
maintaining a 1983 action * * * in the municipal courts because they are not courts of
general jurisdiction.”); White v. Chambers, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-114, 2002-Ohio2733, ¶ 4 (“While R.C. 1901.18 lists twelve circumstances in which a municipal court has
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original jurisdiction, the statute does not give a municipal court the authority to hear
§ 1983 claims.”). Therefore, the municipal court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
over Wells’s section 1983 claim and had to dismiss it.
{¶ 16} The second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Denial of leave to amend the complaint
{¶ 17} The third assignment of error alleges:
The Trial Court erred when it denied the plaintiff in Wells v. Murrell leave to
amend [his] complaint in order to clarify any potential misunderstanding
regarding whether [he] intended Claims 1 through 4 to be alternative or
conjunctive claims.
{¶ 18} In his show-cause brief, Wells asked for leave to file a second amended
complaint, which he attached to the brief, that made it clear that the relief sought in the
first four causes of action was sought in the alternative. The municipal court denied leave
and dismissed the entire complaint, without explanation, saying only that the entire case
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction “[w]ithout [p]rejudice to being refiled in the proper
court.”
{¶ 19} Civ.R. 15(A) provides that a party may amend its pleading with the court’s
leave and that “[t]he court shall freely give leave when justice so requires.” “Despite the
liberal policy in granting motions to amend,” we have said, “the appellate review of a trial
court’s decision regarding a motion to amend consists of determining whether the trial
judge’s decision was an abuse of discretion, not whether it was the same decision we
might have made.” State ex rel. Rogers v. Republic Environmental Sys., Inc., 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 23513, 2010-Ohio-5523, ¶ 36, citing Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v.
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Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 573 N.E.2d 622 (1991). “This
appellate review has narrow limits.” Id., citing Wilmington at 122. Abuse of discretion has
been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Huffman
v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985). “A decision is
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.”
AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d
157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it
deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be
persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a
contrary result.” Rogers at ¶ 37.
{¶ 20} The municipal court could have accepted Wells’s assertion that monetary
relief would not exceed the jurisdictional cap, allowed him to amend the complaint, and
dismissed the section 1983 cause of action. But we think that the court acted reasonably
by simply denying leave to amend and dismissing the entire case. Wells sought to amend
his complaint for the second time over a year after he had filed his original complaint.
While the proffered second amended complaint made it clear that the first four claims
presented alternative claims for relief, all the other damage claims and requests for relief
remained, the total of which could potentially have exceeded the municipal court’s
monetary jurisdiction. The jurisdictionally problematic section 1983 cause of action also
remained in the second amended complaint. As a matter of judicial economy, it made
sense to have Wells bring all his claims in a court with the monetary jurisdiction to award
all the relief to which Wells may have been entitled and with the subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the 1983 cause of action. Wells also had the option—since the dismissal was
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without prejudice—to clean up his complaint and refile it in the municipal court. At any
rate, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Wells leave to
amend his complaint and dismissing the entire case.
{¶ 21} The third assignment of error is overruled.
Outcome: We have overruled all of the assignments of error presented. The municipal
court’s judgment is affirmed.
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