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Date: 01-20-2021
Case Style:
STATE OF OHIO v. PHIL D. MILLS
Case Number: 28954
Judge: Jennifer L. Hensal
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Plaintiff's Attorney: SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
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Akron, OH - Criminal defense attorney represented Phil Mills with with one count of aggravated burglary with an accompanying firearm specification, one count of aggravated robbery with an accompanying firearm specification, and one count of having weapons while under disability.
{¶2} In State v. Graves, this Court explained our obligations in a reopened appeal as
follows:
Under Rule 26(B)(9) of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[i]f th[is] [C]ourt
finds that the performance of appellate counsel was deficient and the applicant was
prejudiced by that deficiency, [it] shall vacate its prior judgment and enter the
appropriate judgment. If th[is][C]ourt does not so find, [it] shall issue an order
confirming its prior judgment.” Deficient performance by a lawyer is a
performance that falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation.
State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, at ¶ 204 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). A defendant is prejudiced by the
deficiency if there is a reasonable probability that, but for his lawyer’s errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. (citing Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
(Alterations sic.) 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009397, 2011-Ohio-5997, ¶ 9. With those obligations
in mind, we now turn to the relevant facts and procedural history of this case.
{¶3} Much of the factual history of this case is not relevant for purposes of this appeal.
What is relevant is that an armed intruder broke into the victim’s home on July 29, 2010, and that
the case went cold until 2011 when the police received a CODIS hit, indicating a possible DNA
match with Mr. Mills. State v. Mills, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28954, 2019-Ohio-774, ¶ 2, 5. The
police obtained a DNA sample from Mr. Mills in 2016, which matched the DNA found on items
discovered near the victim’s home. Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶4} The record reflects that Mr. Mills was arrested on August 16, 2016, and that a grand
jury issued an indictment on August 26, 2016, charging Mr. Mills with one count of aggravated
burglary with an accompanying firearm specification, one count of aggravated robbery with an
accompanying firearm specification, and one count of having weapons while under disability. Id.
at ¶ 6. Mr. Mills pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Id.
{¶5} At trial, defense counsel stipulated that Mr. Mills had previously been convicted of
a felony-drug offense for purposes of having weapons while under disability. Id. at ¶ 9. The jury
ultimately found him guilty, and Mr. Mills appealed. Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶6} In his direct appeal, Mr. Mills raised two assignments of error, asserting that: (1)
the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. This Court held that Mr. Mills failed to establish that his convictions were
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that he failed to establish that he suffered prejudice
as a result of his trial counsel’s actions. Id. at ¶ 16, 19. We, therefore, overruled both assignments
of error. Mr. Mills moved for reconsideration, which this Court denied. Mr. Mills also moved for
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reopening on the basis that his prior appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. This Court
granted his application. In his reopened appeal, Mr. Mills has raised two assignments of error and,
pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(B)(7), has addressed the claim that his prior appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE FAILURE OF APPELLATE
COUNSEL TO ASSIGN AS ERROR THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 3,
HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER DISABILITY, WHEN THE SIX-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD HAD EXPIRED PRIOR TO THE
FILING OF THE INDICTMENT.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Mills argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not moving to dismiss the weapons-while-under-disability count based
upon the expiration of the statute of limitations, and that his prior appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to assign his trial counsel’s failure in this regard as an error on
appeal. This Court disagrees.
{¶8} Mr. Mills was charged and convicted of having weapons while under disability
pursuant to Revised Code Section 2923.13(A)(3). That offense is a third-degree felony and must
be prosecuted within six years after the offense is committed. R.C. 2923.13(B); R.C.
2901.13(A)(1)(a). Section 2901.13(G), however, provides that “[t]he period of limitation shall not
run during any time when the corpus delicti remains undiscovered.” “The corpus delicti of a crime
is the body or substance of the crime and usually has two elements: (1) the act itself and (2) the
criminal agency of the act.” State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, paragraph one
of the syllabus. “For example, when the offense is homicide, the corpus delicti ‘involves two
elements, i.e., (1) the fact of death and (2) the existence of the criminal agency of another as the
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cause of death.’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 261 (1988). “The
purpose of the corpus delicti is simply to establish that the crime occurred.” State v. Smith, 9th
Dist. Wayne Nos. 01CA0039, 01CA0055, 2002-Ohio-4402, ¶ 10, citing Van Hook at 262. It is
discovered when a competent person other than the wrongdoer, or someone equally at fault, has
knowledge of both the act and its criminal nature. State v. McLaughlin, 109 Ohio App.3d 868,
871 (9th Dist.1996), citing State v. Hensley, 59 Ohio St.3d 136, 138 (1991).
{¶9} Mr. Mills asserts that the statute of limitations for the weapons-while-underdisability count expired on July 10, 2016, six years after the offense was committed, 1 and that
none of the tolling provisions under Section 2901.13(H) apply. In response, the State argues that,
because the corpus delicti of having weapons while under disability was not discovered until DNA
tests on items discovered at the scene matched to Mr. Mills through the CODIS hit in 2011, the
statute of limitations did not expire until 2017.
{¶10} As previously noted, the police became aware of Mr. Mills’s identity through a
CODIS hit in 2011, which indicated a possible match of his DNA to the DNA obtained from items
discovered near the victim’s home. While the State knew that the intruder who broke into the
victim’s home had possessed a firearm, without knowing the identity of the intruder, the State had
no way of knowing the criminal nature of that act (i.e., that the intruder was under a disability).
Stated differently, under these facts, only when the police learned of the intruder’s identity could
the State have become aware of the criminal nature of Mr. Mills’s act of possessing a firearm. The
corpus delicti of the weapons-while-under-disability crime, therefore, was not discovered until
2011, giving the State until 2017 to prosecute Mr. Mills for that crime. See R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a);
R.C. 2901.13(G). Because the State prosecuted Mr. Mills in 2016, we reject his argument that the
1
The record reflects that the offense was committed on July 29, 2010.
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statute of limitations had expired, as well as his ineffective-assistance arguments that stem
therefrom. Mr. Mills’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE FAILURE OF APPELLATE
COUNSEL TO ASSIGN AS ERROR THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT AT THE SENTENCING HEARING
BY NOT REQUIRING THE TRIAL COURT TO PROPERLY GIVE THE
APPELLANT ALL THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING POSTRELEASE CONTROL.
{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Mills argues that the trial court failed to
properly advise him regarding the terms of his post-release control, that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not raising this issue at the sentencing hearing, and that his prior appellate
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assign his trial counsel’s failure in this regard
as an error on appeal. More specifically, Mr. Mills asserts that the trial court failed to advise him
that if he violated his post-release control, the parole board may impose a prison term of up to onehalf of the prison term originally imposed on him. He, therefore, concludes that his prior appellate
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing so that
the trial court can properly advise him of the terms of his post-release control.
{¶12} The State concedes this error on appeal, and this Court’s review of the record
likewise indicates that the trial court did not properly advise Mr. Mills regarding his post-release
control. As this Court has stated:
“It is settled that ‘a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of postrelease
control at the sentencing hearing’ and that ‘any sentence imposed without such
notification is contrary to law.’” State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 23. As
part of that duty, “at the sentencing hearing, the court must notify the offender that
if he or she ‘violates that supervision * * *, the parole board may impose a prison
term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally
imposed upon the offender.’” Grimes at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e); see
also State v. West, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28051, 2016-Ohio-5694, ¶ 6.
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State v. Hennacy, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29115, 29116, 2019-Ohio-1332, ¶ 25.
{¶13} “When a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the accused is
properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease
control renders the court’s judgment voidable, permitting the sentence to be set aside if the error
has been successfully challenged on direct appeal.” State v. Harper, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio2913, ¶ 4. Because the trial court did not properly impose post-release control, that part of Mr.
Mills’s sentence is set aside, and Mr. Mills is entitled to a new sentencing hearing limited to the
proper imposition of post-release control. Mr. Mills’s second assignment of error sustained.
III.
{
Outcome: Mr. Mills’s first assignment of error is overruled. Mr. Mills’s second assignment
of error is sustained. The matter is reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing limited to the proper imposition of post-release control. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
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