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Date: 05-11-2023

Case Style:

Rilla Jefferson v. General Motors, LLC

Case Number: 2:20-cv-2576

Judge: Jon P. McCalla

Court: United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (Shelby County)

Plaintiff's Attorney:




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Defendant's Attorney: Not available

Description: Memphis, Tennessee personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiff who sued Defendant on a breach of an express warranty theory.

Plaintiff claimed that he purchased a new GMC Acadia from Defendant for $30,2709 in 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that she began to experience a Shift-to-Park (“STP”) defect shortly after she purchased the subject vehicle. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 12; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 12.) “Ms. Jefferson testified that when she put the Subject Vehicle in the park position and tried to turn the vehicle off, the Subject Vehicle would not turn off and a message appeared on the dashboard [that stated] ‘Shift to Park' even though the vehicle was in the park position.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 14; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 14.) When the STP defect manifested, the vehicle would not stop running. (ECF No. 79-1 at PagelD 1253-54; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 5.) “When Ms. Jefferson experienced the STP condition, she had to jiggle the shifter from park to neutral or drive and then put the shifter back in the park position.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 15.) “The Subject Vehicle never rolled away [and] Ms. Jefferson was always able to start and turn off the Subject Vehicle.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 18; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff drove the Subject Vehicle regularly between the time when she purchased it in October of 2017 and when she traded in the vehicle in February of 2021. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 19; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 19.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff testified that she complained to the Dealership about the STP defect, and that Repair Orders for the Subject Vehicle do not reflect these complaints. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶¶ 20-21; ECF No. 79-1 ¶¶ 20-21.)

Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she presented the Subject Vehicle to GM dealers and described the STP defect, but GM and its dealers failed to repair the STP defect.[1](ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 6.) Ms. Jefferson testified that she took her vehicle to the Dealership on or about March of 2019, when the Dealership informed her that her warranty had expired and that she would be required to pay $144 for an inspection. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶¶ 22-23; ECF No. 79-1 ¶¶ 22-23.) At that time, her vehicle had been driven at least 48,891 miles. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 22; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 22.) She did not have the vehicle inspected or complain about the STP defect to the Dealership or any other dealership after March of 2019. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 25; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff traded in the Subject Vehicle to the Dealership for another vehicle in February of 2021. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 27; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff experienced the STP defect until she agreed to trade in the Subject Vehicle.[2](ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff served Defendant with the Report and Expert Opinion of Darren Manzari on March 4, 2022. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 29; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 29; see also ECF No. 75-8.) Mr. Manzari opined that nearly all 2017-18 GMC Acadia vehicles (the “Class Vehicles”) have experienced or will experience the STP defect. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 32; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 32.) He is of the opinion that the defect is the result of the buildup of silicone dioxide or glass on the park switch contacts. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 32; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 32.) These components build up in the shifter assembly over time because the park switch has organic silicon within the switch. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254-55; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 11.) Organic silicon decomposes into its base elements when the switch opens and closes, the base elements react to form silicon dioxide in the presence of heat, and the resultant silicon dioxide attaches to the surfaces of the switch contacts. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254-55; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 11.) There are multiple sources of silicon within the shifter assembly including silicon originating within the switch itself during manufacture, silicon mold release used during the manufacture of rubber dampers, and silicon lubricant that was used on the shifter.

(ECF No. 79-1 at PagelD 1255; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 12-13.) GM contends that it was not aware that its supplier used a silicon lubricant within the micro switch in the Class Vehicles. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1256; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 19.) Mr. Manzari is of the opinion that the cost of repairing the STP defect is $700, and that this is an appropriate proxy for measuring the diminished value of Class Vehicles stemming from the STP defect. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 9.)

b. Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action asserting breach of express warranty under Tennessee law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and breach of contract under Tennessee law. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55-70, 78-87.) Plaintiff asserts that GM “is well aware of the [STP] defect.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 22.) She describes the defect as “a safety risk” as it can drain a car battery. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 470.) Plaintiff argues that the shifter is not an expected replacement part and should last the lifetime of a vehicle. (Id. at PagelD 470-71.)

Plaintiff argues that GM used the wrong tool to identify the root cause of the STP defect, and as a result Defendant took an unreasonably long time to identify the cause of the defect and develop a repair. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 472-73.) She argues that Defendant only identified the defect in May of 2018. (Id. at PagelD 473.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant devised a way to fix the STP defect more than two years after it began selling the Class Vehicles. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.) She argues that Defendant's first attempt to develop a solution to the problem was a “bandaid,” as it involved simply replacing the defective shifter with an equally defective shifter. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 474.) She contends that Defendant knew the problem would persist or reoccur following the application of this initial repair. (Id.) She argues that Defendant then developed a silicon-free repair to the Class Vehicles in 2019 but failed to use it. (Id. at PagelD 475.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant began to utilize an effective repair to the STP defect only in December of 2020, “after the warranty period had already expired for many Class Vehicle owners.” (Id. at PageID 475-76.)

Plaintiff alleges that all class vehicles sold or leased were accompanied by Defendant's New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (Id. ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 27 (dismissing Plaintiff's claims for implied warranty and striking Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages.))

Plaintiff alleges that GM's data shows that 3,341 of the Class Vehicle have been sold in Tennessee, 1,351 of those vehicles have sought warranty repairs for the STP defect, and 784 vehicle owners have paid for repairs to the shifter assembly out of pocket. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 471-72.) Plaintiff also alleges that those numbers will continue to increase over time because the STP Defect gets worse as an affected vehicle ages. (Id.)...
Jefferson v. Gen. Motors (W.D. Tenn. 2023)


Plaintiff alleges that she began to experience a Shift-to-Park (“STP”) defect shortly after she purchased the subject vehicle. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 12; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 12.) “Ms. Jefferson testified that when she put the Subject Vehicle in the park position and tried to turn the vehicle off, the Subject Vehicle would not turn off and a message appeared on the dashboard [that stated] ‘Shift to Park' even though the vehicle was in the park position.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 14; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 14.) When the STP defect manifested, the vehicle would not stop running. (ECF No. 79-1 at PagelD 1253-54; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 5.) “When Ms. Jefferson experienced the STP condition, she had to jiggle the shifter from park to neutral or drive and then put the shifter back in the park position.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 15.) “The Subject Vehicle never rolled away [and] Ms. Jefferson was always able to start and turn off the Subject Vehicle.” (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 18; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff drove the Subject Vehicle regularly between the time when she purchased it in October of 2017 and when she traded in the vehicle in February of 2021. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 19; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 19.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff testified that she complained to the Dealership about the STP defect, and that Repair Orders for the Subject Vehicle do not reflect these complaints. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶¶ 20-21; ECF No. 79-1 ¶¶ 20-21.)

Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she presented the Subject Vehicle to GM dealers and described the STP defect, but GM and its dealers failed to repair the STP defect.[1](ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 6.) Ms. Jefferson testified that she took her vehicle to the Dealership on or about March of 2019, when the Dealership informed her that her warranty had expired and that she would be required to pay $144 for an inspection. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶¶ 22-23; ECF No. 79-1 ¶¶ 22-23.) At that time, her vehicle had been driven at least 48,891 miles. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 22; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 22.) She did not have the vehicle inspected or complain about the STP defect to the Dealership or any other dealership after March of 2019. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 25; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff traded in the Subject Vehicle to the Dealership for another vehicle in February of 2021. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 27; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff experienced the STP defect until she agreed to trade in the Subject Vehicle.[2](ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff served Defendant with the Report and Expert Opinion of Darren Manzari on March 4, 2022. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 29; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 29; see also ECF No. 75-8.) Mr. Manzari opined that nearly all 2017-18 GMC Acadia vehicles (the “Class Vehicles”) have experienced or will experience the STP defect. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 32; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 32.) He is of the opinion that the defect is the result of the buildup of silicone dioxide or glass on the park switch contacts. (ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 32; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 32.) These components build up in the shifter assembly over time because the park switch has organic silicon within the switch. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254-55; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 11.) Organic silicon decomposes into its base elements when the switch opens and closes, the base elements react to form silicon dioxide in the presence of heat, and the resultant silicon dioxide attaches to the surfaces of the switch contacts. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254-55; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 11.) There are multiple sources of silicon within the shifter assembly including silicon originating within the switch itself during manufacture, silicon mold release used during the manufacture of rubber dampers, and silicon lubricant that was used on the shifter.

(ECF No. 79-1 at PagelD 1255; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 12-13.) GM contends that it was not aware that its supplier used a silicon lubricant within the micro switch in the Class Vehicles. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1256; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 19.) Mr. Manzari is of the opinion that the cost of repairing the STP defect is $700, and that this is an appropriate proxy for measuring the diminished value of Class Vehicles stemming from the STP defect. (ECF No. 79-1 at PageID 1254; ECF No. 81-1 ¶ 9.)

b. Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action asserting breach of express warranty under Tennessee law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and breach of contract under Tennessee law. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55-70, 78-87.) Plaintiff asserts that GM “is well aware of the [STP] defect.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 22.) She describes the defect as “a safety risk” as it can drain a car battery. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 470.) Plaintiff argues that the shifter is not an expected replacement part and should last the lifetime of a vehicle. (Id. at PagelD 470-71.)

Plaintiff argues that GM used the wrong tool to identify the root cause of the STP defect, and as a result Defendant took an unreasonably long time to identify the cause of the defect and develop a repair. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 472-73.) She argues that Defendant only identified the defect in May of 2018. (Id. at PagelD 473.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant devised a way to fix the STP defect more than two years after it began selling the Class Vehicles. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.) She argues that Defendant's first attempt to develop a solution to the problem was a “bandaid,” as it involved simply replacing the defective shifter with an equally defective shifter. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 474.) She contends that Defendant knew the problem would persist or reoccur following the application of this initial repair. (Id.) She argues that Defendant then developed a silicon-free repair to the Class Vehicles in 2019 but failed to use it. (Id. at PagelD 475.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant began to utilize an effective repair to the STP defect only in December of 2020, “after the warranty period had already expired for many Class Vehicle owners.” (Id. at PageID 475-76.)

Plaintiff alleges that all class vehicles sold or leased were accompanied by Defendant's New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (Id. ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 27 (dismissing Plaintiff's claims for implied warranty and striking Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages.))

Plaintiff alleges that GM's data shows that 3,341 of the Class Vehicle have been sold in Tennessee, 1,351 of those vehicles have sought warranty repairs for the STP defect, and 784 vehicle owners have paid for repairs to the shifter assembly out of pocket. (ECF No. 63 at PageID 471-72.) Plaintiff also alleges that those numbers will continue to increase over time because the STP Defect gets worse as an affected vehicle ages. (Id.)...
Jefferson v. Gen. Motors (W.D. Tenn. 2023)

Defendant moved for summary judgment.



Outcome: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims regarding loss of use damages and injunctive relief. Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff's breach of contract and breach of express warranty claims, and Plaintiff may proceed under a diminution of value theory of damages. Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED, and the class is defined as follows: Initial purchasers and lessees of new “class vehicles,” 2017-18 GMC Acadias, who purchased or leased their vehicles in Tennessee.

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