Defendant's Attorney: Not Available

Description: Birmingham, Alabama civil rights lawyer represented the Plaintiff on a Family and Medical Leave Act theory.

This case concerned the Family and Medical Leave Act— and, as it turns out, Congress’s constitutional authority “[t]o raise and support Armies” and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13. Kristie Williams accused her former employer, the University of Alabama at Birmingham, of violating her rights under the Act. Although (for reasons we’ll explain) it’s not entirely clear at this stage of the proceedings, Williams seems to have alleged that she was entitled to leave under one or more of three of the Act’s provisions—what we’ll call the “family-care,” “ac-
tive-duty,” and “servicemember-family” leave provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), (a)(1)(E), (a)(3). The University contends that Williams’s suit is barred by state sovereign immunity. Insofar as Williams seeks only family-care leave under § 2612(a)(1)(C), this is an easy case—the Supreme Court has squarely held that sovereign immunity doesn’t foreclose such suits. But Williams might instead (or also) be claiming active-duty or servicemember-family leave under § 2612(a)(1)(E) or § 2612(a)(3), respectively. That possibility requires us to resolve a more difficult question—namely, whether Alabama, by virtue of having agreed to the Constitution’s plan that the national defense is the province of the federal govern- ment, has waived its immunity to suits brought under the Act’s ac- tive-duty and servicemember-family leave provisions.

Outcome: Affirmed on appeal.

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