Date: 08-23-2023

Case Style:

Anthony Bernard Juniper v. Melvin C. Davis, et al.

Case Number: 3:11-cv-00746

Judge: John A. Gibney, Jr.

Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Henrico County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Dawn M. Davison, Robert Lee, Amy Austin

Defendant's Attorney: Alphonso Simon, Jr., Alice Anne Lloyd, Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Liam Alexander Curry, Matthew P. Dullaghan

Description: Richmond, Virginia criminal defense lawyers represented Plaintiff convicted of capital murder.

This habeas case returns to us after a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner Anthony Juniper argues that the Commonwealth of Virginia's[1] suppression of evidence and knowing presentation of false or misleading testimony were cumulatively material under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois so as to entitle him to habeas relief. The district court rejected Juniper's contention. We affirm.

I.

Juniper's habeas proceedings have followed a long and winding path, thanks in large part to the Commonwealth's refusal to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense. Our decision today marks the culmination of more than a decade of proceedings in federal court, and nearly two decades of post-conviction proceedings. We begin by summarizing this history.

Keshia Stephens, her younger brother Rueben Harrison, III, and two of her daughters, four-year-old Nykia Stephens and two-year-old Shearyia Stephens, were shot to death in Keshia's apartment in Norfolk, Virginia, on January 16, 2004.[2] Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383, 393-94 (Va. 2006). The police began trying to contact Juniper-Keshia's "on-again, off-again" boyfriend, id. at 394-"the day after the
murders," Juniper v. Davis, No. 3:11CV746, 2021 WL 3722335, at *12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2021). On January 23, having had no luck in locating Juniper, police "obtained murder warrants, and placed him on TV as wanted for murder." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Juniper turned himself in three days later. Id.

The Commonwealth tried Juniper for the murders in January 2005. As we explain in detail below, "the prosecution presented a mountain of testimonial and forensic evidence of [Juniper]'s guilt" at trial. Juniper v. Hamilton, 529 F.Supp.3d 466, 477 (E.D. Va. 2021). The jury convicted Juniper of the four murders, and the court sentenced him to death.[3] Id. at 475. On July 1, 2021, however, his sentence was commuted to life without parole after Virginia abolished the death penalty by legislation.[4]

Juniper appealed his convictions and sentences, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Juniper, 626 S.E.2d at 393, cert. denied, Juniper v. Virginia, 549 U.S. 960 (2006). He also unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief in state court, and the United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. See Juniper v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 707 S.E.2d 290, 296 (Va.) (en banc),
cert. denied, Juniper v. Kelly, 565 U.S. 1082 (2011).

A few months before the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Juniper's habeas petition, he learned about key evidence that he claims the Commonwealth did not disclose: statements by Keshia's neighbors, Wendy Roberts and her son Jason Roberts. Their statements, if accepted by the jury, would have foreclosed the prosecution's timeline of the murders and pointed to an alternative suspect. We detail those statements below.

Juniper apparently learned of the Robertses' statements during the October 2010 federal jury trial of Robert Ford, the lead police investigator on Juniper's case. Juniper v. Pearson, No. 3:11-CV-00746, 2013 WL 1333513, at *11 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2013). Ford was charged with, and convicted of, "taking bribes from drug defendants in exchange for falsely representing to judges and prosecutors that those defendants had cooperated in homicide investigations." Juniper v. Zook, 876 F.3d 551, 559 (4th Cir. 2017); see United States v. Ford, 470 Fed.Appx. 146, 146 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming Ford's convictions for conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, extortion under color of official right, and making false statements). The Government's evidence at Ford's trial included investigation notes that mentioned Wendy. Juniper, 876 F.3d at 559. Juniper's counsel only learned about Jason when they "fortuitously found him at his mother's house while trying to find [her]." Juniper, 2013 WL 1333513, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Juniper twice sought discovery in the Supreme Court of Virginia related to police interviews of Wendy and Jason. Id. at *12. But the Commonwealth opposed the motions, and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied them. Id. Juniper also filed a second habeas petition in state court based on the evidence from Wendy and Jason, but the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the petition as untimely in October 2011. Id.

The Commonwealth scheduled Juniper's execution for November 10, 2011, and the United States Supreme Court denied his application for a stay on November 9. Juniper v. Kelly, 565 U.S. 1031 (2011). But that same day, Juniper successfully obtained a stay from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. He then filed a § 2254 petition in January 2012, raising numerous exhausted and unexhausted claims.

Among Juniper's unexhausted claims was one brought under Brady related to the Roberts evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution violates due process when it suppresses material, favorable evidence). And he again "sought extensive discovery related to the information revealed in the withheld investigative notes," which the Commonwealth again opposed. Juniper, 876 F.3d at 560. "Recognizing the difficulty of assessing [Juniper]'s Brady claim without knowing what evidence was actually in the Commonwealth's possession at the time of Juniper's prosecution," however, the district court ordered the Commonwealth "to produce several categories of evidence, including any record of statements that the Roberts[es] made to police and the photo line-up that police showed to Wendy Roberts during their investigation." Juniper, 2013 WL 1333513, at *12.

As the district court put it, this order "brought to an end the Commonwealth's long, senseless resistance to the disclosure of its information about the Roberts[es]." Id. at *12 n.6. And the district court concluded "that the prosecution likely withheld exculpatory evidence, in clear violation of its legal duties." Id. at *14; accord id. at *15 ("The events leading up to this point . . . show the Commonwealth's entrenched resistance to transparency in this criminal prosecution and subsequent post-conviction proceedings.").

Nevertheless, in 2013, having reviewed the evidence in question, the district court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Juniper's § 2254 petition. Id. at *1. As to the Roberts evidence, the district court concluded that even though Juniper could satisfy two Brady requirements at the motion-to-dismiss stage[5]-that the evidence was suppressed and that it was favorable-he could not satisfy the third, namely, that the evidence was material. Id. at *15-16. The court reached this conclusion because it found that the Roberts evidence could not "unsettle certain basic facts about the murders," including forensic evidence, "Juniper's conduct and statements after the killings," and phone records. Id. at *17. Nevertheless, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on the Roberts Brady claim.[6] Juniper v. Davis, 737 F.3d 288, 289 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Final Order at 1, Juniper v. Pearson, No. 3:11-cv-00746 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2013)).

In 2017, we reviewed that claim and concluded that "the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing [the] claim without holding an evidentiary hearing because it failed to assess the plausibility of that claim through the proper legal lens." Juniper, 876 F.3d at 556. Specifically, we held that "[t]he district court did not apply the proper legal standard in determining whether [Juniper] alleged or established sufficient facts regarding materiality to warrant an evidentiary hearing." Id. at 567. We explained that "[a] petitioner who has diligently pursued his habeas corpus claim in state court is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court, on facts not previously developed in the state court proceedings, if the facts alleged would entitle him to relief, and if he satisfies one of the six factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain."[7] Id. at 563 (quoting Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 582 (4th Cir. 2006)) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963)). After concluding that Juniper had diligently pursued the claim and that he could satisfy at least one of the Townsend factors, we evaluated whether the "facts alleged would entitle him to relief." Id.; see id. at 564.

We emphasized that the applicable standard was that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)-whether, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Juniper, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, and resolving all credibility determinations in his favor, his petition stated a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. Id. at 564 (first citing Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009); and then citing United States ex rel. Oberg v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assist. Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014)); accord id. at 569. Applying that standard, we concluded that Juniper had raised a plausible claim, and therefore was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.[8] Id. at 571-72. In doing so, we stated that "we [did] not believe the inculpatory value of the [forensic evidence] [to be] so great as to preclude the Roberts evidence, if found to be sufficiently credible during an evidentiary hearing, from 'putting the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id. at 571 (alterations adopted) (emphasis added) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). We also noted that the district court could consider whether the circumstances of the case "warrant[ed] authorizing additional discovery." Id. at 572 n.9.

On remand, the district court permitted the parties to engage in further discovery, during which Juniper learned of additional evidence that he alleged was also Brady or Napue material. Juniper, 529 F.Supp.3d at 476, 481 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding that the prosecution violates due process when it knowingly offers or fails to correct false or misleading testimony)). Because Juniper had "diligently pursued" exculpatory evidence, but "only received the new evidence in post-remand discovery," the district court allowed him to file an amended habeas petition. Id. at 484; see id. at 476. The August 2019 amended petition included nineteen claims alleging (1) violations of Brady or Napue and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 476, 481. "The heart of [Juniper's amended] petition attack[ed] the credibility of the [prosecution's] witnesses .... He d[id] not challenge the validity or admissibility of the [forensic] evidence." Id. at 481.

In June 2020, the parties jointly filed more than 800 stipulations of fact. They then each moved for summary judgment. Id. at 475. In March 2021, the district court granted in part and denied in part each motion. Of Juniper's nineteen claims, the district court granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth on seven, concluding that six were barred by the mandate rule[9] and one lacked merit. Id. at 484-85, 518-19. The court also granted summary judgment to one party or the other on some prongs of some of the remaining claims, but because material disputes of fact remained on at least one prong, concluded summary judgment was not appropriate for the full claim. See J.A. 1095-98 (district court order summarizing its summary-judgment rulings as to each claim).[10] This process left twelve outstanding claims: nine under Brady, two under Napue, and one for ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.; Juniper, 529 F.Supp.3d at 481-82.

The district court held a five-day evidentiary hearing in June and July 2021, after which it rejected Juniper's remaining claims. Regarding the Brady and Napue claims, "[a]t the hearing, the Court assessed only materiality" and "assumed, without deciding, that Juniper had satisfied all other elements of his claims."[11] Juniper, 2021 WL 3722335, at *1. The court again emphasized that "[t]he conduct of the Commonwealth at trial, and the Warden during these proceedings, leaves much to be desired. The better course is always to disclose evidence, even if, as here, its materiality is questionable." Id. at *24. Nevertheless, because the court concluded that Juniper could not show materiality-either of any individual Brady or Napue claim or of all of them cumulatively-the court rejected the habeas petition and denied a certificate of appealability. Id. at *30.

Juniper timely appealed and sought a certificate of appealability on a single issue: "whether the suppression of evidence and knowing presentation of false and misleading testimony were cumulatively material" under a combined Brady and Napue analysis. Opening Br. at 1 (emphasis added). This Court granted the certificate of appealability, received full briefing, and heard oral argument.

Outcome: 08/23/2023 611 USCA Mandate re 594 Notice of Appeal - The judgment of this court, entered July 19, 2023, takes effect today. (21-9) (smej, ) (Entered: 08/23/2023)

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