Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 09-03-2021
Case Style:
United States of America v. CHRISTOPHER LAMAR CARROLL
Case Number: 3:18-CR-112-KOB-HNJ-1
Judge: KARON OWEN BOWDRE
Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
Plaintiff's Attorney: Not Listed
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Birmingham, AL - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with a possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine charge.
This matter comes before the court on Christopher Lamar Carroll’s “Motion
for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)” filed on February 19,
2021. (Doc. 37). In his motion, Mr. Carroll asks for compassionate release to care
for his disabled parents. He claims that his siblings who live near his parents are
“too busy with their own lives” to help his parents. For the following reasons, the
court will deny Mr. Carroll’s motion.
Pursuant to a plea agreement (doc. 20), Mr. Carroll pled guilty on June 4,
2018 to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine. The court sentenced Mr. Carroll on November 2, 2018 to 168
months imprisonment, and he has served almost thirty-six months of that sentence.
(Doc. 35). He is currently housed at FCI Talladega.
Mr. Carroll seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, to allow him to care for his
FILED
2021 Mar-03 AM 11:06
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 1 of 10
2
disabled parents. Upon consideration of Mr. Carroll’s motion, the court finds no
current entitlement to compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Thus, the
court finds that it must deny his motion.
DISCUSSION
Section 3582, as amended by the First Step Act, states that courts generally
cannot alter or modify a term of imprisonment after imposition, but the court can
reduce an inmate’s term of imprisonment upon a motion for sentence modification
from the Bureau of Prisons or from a prisoner, where the prisoner has exhausted
administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A prisoner can exhaust
administrative remedies by (1) pursuing all avenues of appeal of the BOP’s failure
to bring a motion for modification of sentence, or (2) by filing a request for relief
with the warden to which the warden does not respond within 30 days. Id.
As an initial matter, the court notes that it can properly consider Mr.
Carroll’s motion for compassionate release because Mr. Carroll properly exhausted
his administrative remedies and can request a modification of his sentence directly
from the court. See (Doc. 37 at 3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Nevertheless, the court finds that Mr. Carroll has not met his burden of showing
that he meets the criteria for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The court can grant a motion for modification of sentence where
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and the reduction
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 2 of 10
3
is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In general, the defendant has the burden to
show circumstances meeting the test for a reduction of sentence. United States v.
Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 327 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Heromin,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96520, 2019 WL 2411311, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2019)
(applying this burden of proof after the implementation of the First Step Act).
Mr. Carroll argues that he should qualify for compassionate release based on
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” related to the need to care for his disabled
parents. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). However, a reduction on those grounds
must also be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” See id. Rather than define “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances” itself, Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission
to promulgate policy statements regarding § 3582(c)(1)(A), including the “criteria
to be applied and a list of specific examples” of extraordinary and compelling
reasons for modifying imposed sentences. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C), (t).
The court can find no specifically listed policy statement applicable to Mr.
Carroll’s situation. One extraordinary and compelling reason in the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement involves the “death or incapacitation of the
caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor children.” Id. § 1B1.13 cmt.
1(C). Mr. Carroll’s need to take care of his disabled parents does not fit into this
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 3 of 10
4
circumstance.
And the catch-all provision found in Subsection D of the policy statement
does not apply. Subsection D of the statement allows a reduction in sentence for
“other reasons” where, “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other
than, or in combination with” the specifically enumerated circumstances meriting a
sentence reduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, application note 1(D) (emphasis added).
To this court’s knowledge, the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether relief
under Subsection D’s catch-all provision requires a recommendation from the BOP
after the implementation of the First Step Act, which for the first time allowed
prisoners to bring their own motions under § 3582. See United States v. Harris,
___ F.3d ___, No. 20-12023, 2021 WL 745262 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2021)
(specifically stating that it “need not and do not reach the issue of whether the
district court was required to consider § 1B1.13 n.1. If the court was required to, it
did. If it was not required to, it nonetheless independently considered and rejected
Harris’ reasons as not ‘extraordinary and compelling.’”)
This court previously addressed this issue and found persuasive multiple
district courts within this Circuit that have found that the policy statement, as
written, remains in effect until the Sentencing Commission sees fit to change it; so,
relief under Subsection D requires a finding from the BOP that the inmate has
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 4 of 10
5
extraordinary circumstances that merit relief outside of those circumstances
specifically enumerated in the policy. See United States v. Peake, 6:13-cr-438-
KOB-JHE, 2020 WL 7246617, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2020); United States v.
Mollica, No. 2:14-CR-329-KOB, 2020 WL 1914956, at 1 (N.D. Ala. April 20,
2020); see also Boles v. United States, No. 14-0199-WS, 2020 WL 6937722, at * 2
(S.D. Ala. Nov. 24, 2020); United States v. Lynn, 2019 WL 3805349, at *4 (S.D.
Ala. Aug. 12, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-13239-F, 2019 WL 6273393 (11th
Cir. Oct. 8, 2019); United States v. Terry, No. 3:10-cr-17-J-34JRK, 2020 WL
4261398, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2020); United States v. Pelloquin, No.
3:94cr3115-RV, 2020 WL 6556024, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 2020); United States
v. Willingham, No. CR 113-010, 2019 WL 6733028, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 10,
2019).
Specifically, the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
explained that, in 28 U.S.C. § 994, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission
to issue policy statements explaining what circumstances merit sentence reduction.
Lynn, No. CR 89-0072-WS, 2019 WL 3805349, at *3. Then, Congress “prohibited
courts from granting compassionate release unless ‘such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by’ the Commission.” Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), after its amendment by the First Step Act). Thus, if the
policy statement needs to be changed, that responsibility falls to the Sentencing
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 5 of 10
6
Commission (or, this court might add, Congress), not to the courts. Id. at 4; see
also United States v. Files, Crim. No. 97-0099-WS, 2021 WL 400543, at *2 (S.D.
Ala. Feb. 4, 2021) (citing Lynn and reaching this same conclusion). The District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia agreed, stating that the “First Step Act
still requires courts to abide by policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” Willingham, No. CR 113-010, 2019 WL 6733028, at *2 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (emphasis in original).
The court notes that the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
held that the passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 inapplicable to
motions for compassionate release filed by prisoners. These courts reasoned that
reductions in sentences under the First Step Act must be consistent with
“applicable” policy statements, and because § 1B1.13 could not apply to post-First
Step Act motions that now can be filed directly by prisoners, those policy
statements are “inapplicable” to motions filed by prisoners. These courts maintain
that, until the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step
Act, district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason justifies a sentence reduction for
compassionate release for motions filed by prisoners. United States v. Brooker,
976 F.3d 228, 234 (2nd Cir. 2020); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 6817488, at *1 (6th
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 6 of 10
7
Cir. Nov. 20, 2020); United States v. Gunn, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 6812995, at *
2 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020).
This court finds the reasoning of our sister courts within this Circuit more
persuasive than the reasoning in the recent cases in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits holding otherwise. The current language of § 3582(c)(1)(A),
even after amendment by the First Step Act, states that a sentence reduction must
be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Currently, the policy statement includes
Subsection D’s requirement for a BOP determination of extraordinary
circumstances. Although the First Step Act procedurally changed who could file a
motion for compassionate release, it did not change Congress’ instruction for the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate policy statements regarding
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), including the “criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples” of extraordinary and compelling reasons for modifying imposed
sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C), (t). Congress empowered the Sentencing
Commission—not district courts—to determine what should be considered
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a compassionate release. Terry, 2020
WL 4261398, at *3. “Nothing in the First Step Act of 2018 changed this
delegation of power.” Id.
Until Congress changes the requirement to adhere to the policy statement, or
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 7 of 10
8
the Sentencing Commission changes the policy statement itself, this court agrees
with our sister courts and finds that Subsection D requires a finding of
extraordinary circumstances by the BOP and continues to bind the court. The court
agrees with the District Judge in Pelloquin that this finding is more consistent with
the First Step Act and “avoids turning district courts into de facto parole boards
who review whether any inmate who contends that his situation involves any type
of ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ is entitled to compassionate early release
from prison.” See Pelloquin, 2020 WL 6556024, at *3.
The BOP has not determined that Mr. Carroll has extraordinary
circumstances that merit a modification of sentence or compassionate release. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, application note 1(D). Therefore, the court finds that Mr.
Carroll has not met the threshold for relief under Subsection D’s catch-all
provision.
Even if the policy statement did not bind the court and modification of his
sentence did not require a recommendation from the BOP, this court in its
discretion would find that Mr. Carroll’s circumstances do not merit compassionate
release. Although Mr. Carroll contends his siblings who live in the surrounding
area “have children and are too busy with their own lives to help” with their
parents, his siblings could make arrangement to help their parents. Those
arrangements may be difficult and take sacrificial actions, but they are possible.
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 8 of 10
9
The court is sympathetic towards Mr. Carroll’s situation with his disabled parents,
but that situation does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to
reduce Mr. Carroll’s sentence, especially considering the seriousness of his
offense.
Furthermore, § 3582 requires that a court contemplating a sentence reduction
consider “the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court specifically and explicitly
considered the § 3553(a) factors when imposing Mr. Carroll’s sentence and found
that a sentence of 168 months accurately reflected his characteristics, the
seriousness of his offenses, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need to
protect the public from further crimes. See (Doc. 33 at 16-23); 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
The court granted the Government’s motion for a downward departure based
on Mr. Carroll’s substantial assistance and imposed a sentence well below the
advisory guideline range of 188-235 months and the mandatory minimum of 249
months. The court stated at sentencing that it took “very seriously” the “extremely
large quantity of methamphetamine involved” and that Mr. Carroll’s “category six
criminal history is not a slight thing in the federal system.” Applying all of the §
3582 factors and the fact that Mr. Carroll had no history of violence, the court
found that a sentence of 168 months was reasonable. (Doc. 33 at 17). The court
stands by that finding today. And, although the court acknowledges Mr. Carroll’s
Case 3:18-cr-00112-KOB-HNJ Document 38 Filed 03/03/21 Page 9 of 10
10
good conduct record in prison, weighing all of the § 3582 factors warrant against a
sentence reduction.
Outcome: Mr. Carroll does not meet the requirements for extraordinary and compelling
circumstances meriting a modification of his sentence, so the court finds that he is
not entitled to compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the
court will deny his motion for compassionate release.
The court will enter a separate Order denying the motion for compassionate
release.
DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 2021
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: