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Date: 03-27-2023
Case Style:
Case Number: 4:20-CV-584
Judge: John A. Ross
Court: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis County)
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Defendant's Attorney: John M. Hessel and Joseph E. Martineau
Description: St. Louis, Missouri civil rights lawyers represented Plaintiff who sued Defendant claiming that Plaintiff's First Amendment Constitutional rights were violated by Defendant.
Plaintiffs Raven Wolf C. Felton Jennings II (“Jennings”) and Raymond Douglas (“Douglas”) are street musicians who perform in the University City Loop Special Business District (“the Loop”). On April 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality, both facially and as applied, of University City Ordinance § 215.720: Obstructing Public Places (the “Original Ordinance”), which prohibited any person from standing or remaining idle in a public place in such manner so as to obstruct any public sidewalk “by hindering or impeding or tending to hinder or impede the free and uninterrupted passage of … pedestrians[.]” Plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of alleged City policies forbidding individuals engaged in speech or performance from remaining stationary on public sidewalks (“Non-Stationary Policy”) and requiring conditional use permits for musicians to perform on private property adjacent to public sidewalks (“Permit Policy”). In conjunction with their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the City's Ordinance and other policies, alleging the City relied on the ordinance and policies to broadly prohibit expressive activities on public sidewalks in violation of their constitutional rights to free speech and due process, even when individuals engaged in such activities were not actually obstructing pedestrian traffic.
Outcome: For these reasons, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claims for nominal damages for violations of their constitutional rights under the Original Ordinance and the City's Non-Stationary and Permit Policies. Plaintiffs have represented in their motion that they have no evidence of actual damages beyond nominal damages and suggest they are entitled to at least $1.00 for the violation of their rights. Nominal damages are the appropriate means “to vindicate constitutional rights whose deprivation has not caused an actual, provable injury.” Corpus, 430 F.3d at 916 (quoting Westcott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1998)). The Eighth Circuit has recognized one dollar as an appropriate value for nominal damages. Id. (citing Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000)). The Court therefore awards Plaintiffs the sum of $1.00 in nominal damages for the constitutional violations alleged in Counts I through V of their complaint.
he Court further finds and concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claims in Counts III, IV, and V for declaratory relief regarding the City's Non-Stationary and Permit Policies. The Court finds and declares that the City's policy of forbidding individuals engaged in speech or performance from remaining stationary on public sidewalks (Non-Stationary Policy) is a violation of the First Amendment and Due Process Clause, both facially and as-applied. The Court further finds and declares that the City's policy of requiring a permit for musicians to play unamplified music on private property adjacent to public sidewalks is an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs have not, however, demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment on their claims in Counts III, IV, and V for injunctive relief regarding the City's policies.
Lastly, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment on their claims in Counts I and II for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the Amended Ordinance.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [54] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with the rulings herein.
Lastly, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment on their claims in Counts I and II for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the Amended Ordinance.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [54] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part in accordance with the rulings herein.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: