Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 03-24-2021
Case Style:
STATE OF OHIO vs. JAMES EMANUEL
Case Number: C-190450
Judge: Beth A. Myers
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
Plaintiff's Attorney: Andrew W. Garth, Interim City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting
Attorney, and Jon Vogt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Cincinnati, OH - Criminal defense attorney represented James Emanuel with a sexual imposition charge.
On July 13, 2017, defendant-appellant James Emanuel was convicted
of sexual imposition, a conviction that automatically classified Emanuel as a Tier I
sexual offender. The municipal court judge’s sheet, which sentenced Emanuel,
contains the notation, “all warnings about responsibilities as a sex offender were read
to defendant.” This sentencing entry does not contain the language “Tier I.” The
record contains a notification of registration duties signed by Emanuel indicating
that he was a Tier I sex offender. This notification explains in detail all of Emanuel’s
duties. And, consistent with the judgment entry’s notification that all responsibilities
were read to Emanuel, the judge also signed the written notification form indicating
that he read these duties to Emanuel and that he understood them. Emanuel also
acknowledged by his signature that the requirements had been explained to him.
Emanuel appealed his sexual-imposition conviction, which we affirmed in State v.
Emanuel, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170445 and C-170446 (July 18, 2018)
(“Emanuel I”). The only issues raised in Emanuel’s appeal were the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
{¶2} Emanuel’s probation was terminated on March 12, 2019. On June 5,
2019, Emanuel filed a motion to vacate/set aside his tier classification and
registration requirements on the basis that the municipal court had not imposed the
Tier I classification in the sentencing entry, and therefore, the classification had
never been legally imposed. Emanuel further argued that because he had served his
sentence, the trial court had no authority to impose the classification. The trial court
overruled Emanuel’s motion on the basis of a sentence reciting the facts in Emanuel
I, which stated, “The jail term imposed for each crime was suspended, and the trial
court placed him on one year of community control and classified him as a Tier I
sexual offender.” Relying on that sentence, the municipal court stated that “the OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3
matter has been determined,” and overruled Emanuel’s motion. Emanuel has
appealed.
{¶3} We first note that the issue of Emanuel’s tier classification was not
raised or decided in Emanuel I. The only issues raised in that appeal were the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, the issue of tier classification has not
previously been addressed.
{¶4} In this appeal, Emanuel’s sole assignment of error states, “The trial
court erred in denying the motion to vacate Mr. Emanuel’s tier classification.”
Because we did not previously decide any issue with respect to classification in the
prior appeal, we address it now.
{¶5} This court has held repeatedly that any tier classification under Ohio’s
version of the Adam Walsh Act is a criminal sanction that is part of the sentence and
must be set forth in the sentencing entry in order to be effective. See State v. Rucker,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180606, 2019-Ohio-4490; State v. Fannon, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-180270, 2019-Ohio-1752; State v. Merritt, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C170649, 2018-Ohio-4995; State v. Arszman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170595, 2018-
Ohio-4132; State v. Rucker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170488, 2018-Ohio-3575; State
v. Hildebrand, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150046, 2018-Ohio-2962. We held in
Fannon that the tier classification was never imposed where it was not included in
the sentencing entry, even though the classification was “noted at the hearing and
documented in detail in the ‘Explanation of Duties to Register as a Sex Offender[.]’ ”
In Merritt, we held that the tier classification was not imposed where it was not
included in the sentencing entry, even though the trial court had informed Merritt
before accepting his pleas that he would be a Tier III sex offender subject to
registration requirements. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4
{¶6} In this case, the municipal court did not include a “Tier I” sex offender
classification in its sentencing entry. It merely stated that the warnings about
responsibilities as a sex offender were given to Emanuel. We must determine if this
was sufficient.
{¶7} Under our case law, the tier classification must be included in the
sentencing entry in order to be effective; and therefore, the tier classification was not
validly imposed in this case. We must now determine how the trial court’s failure to
include the tier classification in the sentencing entry affects Emanuel’s duty to
register. This depends in part on whether the sentence is void or voidable.
{¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently stated, in State v. Harper, 160
Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 4-5,
Today, we realign our precedent in cases involving the
imposition of postrelease control with the traditional understanding of
what constitutes a void judgment. When a case is within a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction and the accused is properly before the
court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing
postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable, permitting
the sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully
challenged on direct appeal.
In this case, the common pleas court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the accused.
Because the court had the constitutional and statutory power to enter a
finding of guilt and impose a sentence, any error in the exercise of its
jurisdiction in failing to properly impose postrelease control renders
the judgment of conviction voidable, not void, and it is not subject to
collateral attack. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
5
{¶9} In State v. Henderson, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 1, the
Supreme Court stated, citing Harper, “Here, we conclude that sentences based on an
error, including sentences in which a trial court fails to impose a statutorily
mandated term, are voidable if the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over
the case and the defendant.” The Henderson court further stated,
[W]e are mindful that parties may still try to distinguish Harper from
cases that do not involve the imposition of postrelease control. Today,
we make it clear that sentences based on an error are voidable, if the
court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the
defendant, including sentences in which a trial court fails to impose a
statutorily mandated term. A sentence is void only if the sentencing
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal
jurisdiction over the accused.
Henderson at ¶ 27.
{¶10} While prior precedent held that the classification portion of the
sentence was void, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Harper and
Henderson, the trial court’s failure in this case to include in its sentencing entry the
tier classification, which was part of Emanuel’s sentence, rendered that part of the
sentence voidable, not void. Therefore, in order to correct it the error had to be
raised on direct appeal. But neither party raised the error on direct appeal, and it
cannot now be raised.
{¶11} Under our case law requiring that the tier classification be included in
the sentencing entry to be effective, there is no valid order in place requiring
Emanuel to register as a sex offender. Therefore, Emanuel is not required to register
as a sex offender. The assignment of error is sustained. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
6
Outcome: We note that Emanuel’s motion requested that the trial court
vacate/set aside his sex offender his tier classification and registration requirements.
But because the tier classification was never validly imposed, it need not be vacated
or set aside. We remand this cause with instructions to the trial court to enter an
order that Emanuel does not have to register as a sex offender because there is no
valid order in place requiring him to register.
Judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: