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Date: 05-02-2021
Case Style:
ANTHONY MCCLAIN vs. STATE OF OHIO
Case Number: C-200195
Judge: Beth A. Myers
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
Plaintiff's Attorney: Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Margaret Moore, Assistant Attorney
General
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Cincinnati, Ohio - Criminal defense attorney represented Anthony McClain with appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court, following a bench trial, in favor of the state of Ohio on his
statutory claim for a determination that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual.
{¶2} In 1995, McClain was indicted for murder and an accompanying
firearm specification. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the offenses and was
sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life for the murder offense, to be served
consecutively to a three-year prison term for the firearm specification. This court
affirmed McClain’s conviction on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to
review the matter. State v. McClain, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950859, 1996 WL
487931 (Aug. 28, 1996), jurisdictional motion overruled, 77 Ohio St.3d 1515, 674
N.E.2d 370 (1997).
{¶3} In 2002, McClain filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. In 2004, the trial court converted the
motion for leave into a motion for a new trial and denied the motion. This court
reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. State v. McClain,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040647 (Aug. 17, 2005).1 In 2006, at a retrial, a jury
acquitted McClain of the offenses.
1 The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the state’s motion for leave to appeal. State v. McClain, 107
Ohio St.3d 1699, 2005-Ohio-6763, 840 N.E.3d 204. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3
{¶4} McClain filed an action against the state of Ohio to be declared a
“wrongfully imprisoned individual,” as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A),2 and included a
jury demand in his complaint. The trial court overruled McClain’s request for a jury
trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of whether McClain
satisfied the condition in R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), by showing “either that the offense of
which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, was not
committed by the individual or that no offense was committed by any person.” The
court determined that McClain failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the
murder offense and declined to declare McClain a wrongfully imprisoned individual.
This appeal followed.
II. Right to a Jury Trial
{¶5} In a single assignment of error, McClain argues that the trial court
erred by denying his constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial in his wrongfulimprisonment action against the state.
{¶6} Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution states that “[t]he right of
trial by jury shall be inviolate[.]” However, the right to a jury trial is not absolute.
Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849
N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 22. The Constitution does not guarantee all civil litigants a trial by
jury. Id. There is no right to a jury trial unless that right is extended by statute or
existed at common law prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution. Kneisley v.
Lattimer-Stevens Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 354, 356, 533 N.E.2d 743 (1988).
2 McClain initially filed the action in 2008 in Franklin County, Ohio. He voluntarily dismissed his
complaint in 2010, and refiled it in 2011. In 2016, the venue of the case was transferred to
Hamilton County, Ohio. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4
III. The Wrongful-Imprisonment Statute
{¶7} The wrongful-imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, allows a person
who satisfies the definition of a wrongfully imprisoned individual to bring an action
against the state in the court of claims to recover damages because of the person’s
wrongful imprisonment. R.C. 2743.48(D); Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-
Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 10. But first, the person must file a civil action to be
declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A), in the
court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was
initiated. See R.C. 2743.48(B)(1). That court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to
hear and determine the action. R.C. 2305.02. “Only courts of common pleas have
jurisdiction to determine whether a person has satisfied the five requirements of R.C.
2743.48(A).” Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d
1157, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶8} R.C. 2743.48(A) defines a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” as an
individual who satisfies each of the five following conditions:
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the
Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the violation
charged was an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor.
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the
particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the court or jury
involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty was
an aggravated felony, felony, or misdemeanor. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
5
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of
imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of
which the individual was found guilty.
(4) The individual’s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on
appeal and all of the following apply:
(a) No criminal proceeding is pending against the individual for any
act associated with that conviction.
(b) The prosecuting attorney in the case, within one year after the date
of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not sought any further
appeal of right or upon leave of court, provided that this division does
not limit or affect the seeking of any such appeal after the expiration of
that one-year period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.
(c) The prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or
other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, within one year
after the date of the vacating, dismissal, or reversal, has not brought a
criminal proceeding against the individual for any act associated with
that conviction, provided that this division does not limit or affect the
bringing of any such proceeding after the expiration of that one-year
period as described in division (C)(3) of this section.
(5) Subsequent to sentencing or during or subsequent to
imprisonment, an error in procedure was discovered that occurred
prior to, during, or after sentencing, that involved a violation of the
Brady Rule which violated the individual’s rights to a fair trial under
the Ohio Constitution or the United States Constitution, and that OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
6
resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined by the court
of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action
was initiated either that the offense of which the individual was found
guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, was not committed by
the individual or that no offense was committed by any person. In
addition to any other application of the provisions of this division
regarding an error in procedure that occurred prior to, during, or after
sentencing, as those provisions exist on and after the effective date of
this amendment, if an individual had a claim dismissed, has a claim
pending, or did not file a claim because the state of the law in effect
prior to the effective date of this amendment barred the claim or made
the claim appear to be futile, those provisions apply with respect to the
individual and the claim and, on or after that effective date, the
individual may file a claim and obtain the benefit of those provisions.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2743.48(A).
{¶9} If the common pleas court determines that a person is a wrongfully
imprisoned individual, then the person may file a civil action against the state in the
court of claims to recover a sum of money because of the wrongful imprisonment.
R.C. 2743.48(D). The court of claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction over such a
civil action. Id. Upon presentation of the requisite proof to the court of claims, a
wrongfully imprisoned individual is entitled to receive a sum of money as set forth in
the statute. R.C. 2743.48(E)(2).
{¶10} “Because the legislature created the right to bring a wrongfulimprisonment action under R.C. 2743.48 in 1986, * * *, [such an action is] a special OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
7
proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(A)(2).” State ex rel. O’Malley v. Russo, 156 Ohio
St.3d 548, 2019-Ohio-1698, 130 N.E.3d 256, ¶ 21; R.C. 2505.02(A)(2) (defining
“special proceeding” as one “that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853
was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity”).
IV. No Statutory Right to a Jury Trial
{¶11} The Supreme Court has explained, “when the General Assembly
intends that a case may be tried by a jury, it has manifested its intent with
appropriate language.” State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-
Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 46 (holding that the requirement in R.C. 2701.10 that
the “judge” to whom a case is referred “try all of the issues in the action or
proceeding” denies the judge the authority to conduct a jury trial); see Kneisley, 40
Ohio St.3d at 357, 533 N.E.2d 743 (“Absent ambiguity, statutory language is not to
be enlarged or construed in any way other than that which its words demand.”).
{¶12} The language of R.C. 2743.48 indicates that the General Assembly
intended that a judge, and not a jury, should determine in the first instance whether
a person was wrongfully imprisoned. R.C. 2743.48(B)(2) specifically provides that
“the court of common pleas” is to make the determination that a person is a
wrongfully imprisoned individual. To be so declared in this case, McClain was
required to prove that he satisfied each of the five conditions in R.C. 2743.48(A),
including the condition in (A)(5) that:
it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where
the underlying criminal action was initiated either that the offense of
which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
8
offenses, was not committed by the individual or that no offense was
committed by any person.
(Emphasis added.) The unambiguous statutory language indicates that the General
Assembly intended that the common pleas court, not a jury, make the determination
of innocence under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). See Collier-Hammond v. State, 2020-Ohio2716, 154 N.E.3d 364, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.) (R.C. 2743.48 does not expressly provide a
statutory scheme for a jury trial). Consequently, we hold that R.C. 2743.48 does not
provide the right to a jury trial for the initial determination of innocence by the
common pleas court in an action filed under R.C. 2743.48(B)(1).
{¶13} McClain argues that a wrongful-imprisonment action is one “for the
recovery of money only” so that R.C. 2311.04 provides him with a statutory right to a
jury trial. R.C. 2311.04 provides:
Issues of law must be tried by the court, unless referred as provided in
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues of fact arising in actions for the
recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property, shall be
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or unless all parties consent
to a reference under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
All other issues of fact shall be tried by the court, subject to its power
to order any issue to be tried by a jury, or referred.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶14} However, a wrongful-imprisonment action is not an “action for the
recovery of money only.” There is no recovery of money in the first step of the twostep procedure set forth in R.C. 2743.48. The first step is simply an “action to be
declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual.” See R.C. 2743.48(B)(1). And, even OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
9
though the second step in the court of claims is “to recover a sum of money” under
R.C. 2743.48(D), R.C. 2311.04 does not provide a jury trial for a “special proceeding”
that did not exist at common law. See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio
St.3d 397, 419-420, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987).
{¶15} In Armstrong, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected an argument by a
dissenting shareholder that R.C. 2311.04 provided the right to a jury trial in a special
proceeding under R.C. 1701.85 for the valuation of a corporation’s shares. Id. The
court held:
The scope of [R.C. 2311.04] is certainly no greater than the
constitutional provision [in Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio
Constitution].
In contrast to appellant’s claim, R.C. 1701.85(B) provides that: “The
court thereupon shall make a finding as to the fair cash value of a
share, and shall render judgment against the corporation for the
payment of it * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Quite clearly, this provision
dispenses with the requirement of a jury trial and requires that the
finding be made by the trial court[.]
(Emphasis sic.) Armstrong at 419.
{¶16} The court explained that the General Assembly was entitled to
establish “special proceedings,” which were not actions for money requiring jury
participation. Id. at 419-420. The court quoted its 1929 decision in Belding v. State
ex rel. Heifner, wherein it held that a statute providing for a trial court’s
determination of an amount payable as child support did not violate the Ohio
Constitution: OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
10
It was not, however, the intention of the framers of that clause * * * to
guarantee the right of trial by jury in all controversies. That guaranty
only preserves the right of trial by jury in cases where under the
principles of the common law it existed previously to the adoption of
the Constitution. The right of trial by jury has uniformly been
recognized and enforced in this state in actions for money, where the
claim is an ordinary debt, but it is equally well recognized that many
special proceedings for the enforcement of a moral duty, where the
payment of money is the ultimate relief granted, does [sic] not entitle
the parties to a jury trial.
Id. at 420, quoting Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 393, 396-397, 169
N.E. 301 (1929).
{¶17} In Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co., the Supreme Court followed
Armstrong and refused to interpret the term “court” in former R.C. 4121.80(D) to
permit a jury trial in an employee’s intentional tort action under that statute, which
provided:
[I]n any action brought pursuant to this section, the court is limited to
a determination as to whether or not the employer is liable for
damages on the basis that the employer committed an intentional tort.
If the court determines that the employee or his estate is entitled to an
award under this section and that determination has become final, the
industrial commission shall, after hearing, determine what amount of
damages should be awarded. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
11
Kneisley, 40 Ohio St.3d at 355, 533 N.E.2d 743. The court noted that the General
Assembly recognized the distinction between the terms “jury” and “court.” Id. at
357. The court concluded that, “in assigning liability determinations under R.C.
4121.80(D) to the ‘court’ instead of to the court or jury, the General Assembly
intended a bench trial only.” (Emphasis sic.) Id.; see Hoops v. United Tel. Co. of
Ohio, 50 Ohio St.3d 97, 101, 553 N.E.2d 252 (1990) (holding that no jury trial is
available for an age-discrimination action where R.C. 4101.17 stated that “the court”
would make findings and order an appropriate remedy).
{¶18} Because a wrongful-imprisonment action under R.C. 2743.48 is a
“special proceeding” that did not exist at common law, Russo, 156 Ohio St.3d 548,
2019-Ohio-1698, 130 N.E.3d 256, at ¶ 21, we hold that R.C. 2311.04 does not provide
a right to a jury trial for such an action. See Armstrong, 32 Ohio St.3d at 419-420,
513 N.E.2d 776.
{¶19} McClain also asserts that another statute, R.C. 2721.10, provides him a
right to a jury trial. He argues that a wrongful-imprisonment action under R.C.
2743.48 is a declaratory-judgment action and that he is entitled to a jury trial
pursuant to R.C. 2721.10, which provides:
When an action or proceeding in which declaratory relief is sought
under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, that
issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact
are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which the
action or proceeding is pending.
(Emphasis added.) OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
12
{¶20} That statute makes clear, however, that its application is limited to
actions brought under R.C. Chapter 2721, the Declaratory Judgment Act, so it has no
application to a wrongful-imprisonment action under R.C. 2743.48.
{¶21} Consequently, we reject McClain’s argument that he has a statutory
right to a jury trial for a wrongful-imprisonment action.
V. No Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
{¶22} At common law, no remedy existed for a wrongfully imprisoned person
to bring an action against the state. Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 53, 547
N.E.2d 962 (1989); Wright v. State, 69 Ohio App.3d 775, 779, 591 N.E.2d 1279 (10th
Dist.1990). Before the enactment of R.C. 2743.48 (the wrongful-imprisonment
statute) and R.C. 2305.02 (the statute setting forth the exclusive, original jurisdiction
of the common pleas court to determine an action commenced under R.C.
2743.48(B)), the state was immune from such lawsuits. Walden at 53. “The action
created by R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48 is a waiver of the state’s common-law sovereign
immunity, and has no parallel in the ancient dual system of law and equity.”
(Emphasis added.) Id.; see Russo, 156 Ohio St.3d 548, 2019-Ohio-1698, 130 N.E.3d
256, at ¶ 21 (a wrongful-imprisonment action is a special proceeding because it was
one that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an
action at law or a suit in equity). Therefore, “Section 5, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution does not preserve a right to a jury trial for [a wrongful-imprisonment]
action filed against the State.” Collier-Hammond, 2020-Ohio-2716, 154 N.E.3d 364,
at ¶ 22.
{¶23} McClain argues, however, that an action for wrongful imprisonment is
analogous to a common law intentional tort claim for false imprisonment, for which OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
13
the right to a trial by jury existed at common law. Claims for injuries arising from
intentional torts were recognized at common law and typically retain a right to trial
by jury. Arrington, 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, at ¶ 24.
{¶24} Under Ohio law, however, false imprisonment and wrongful
imprisonment are distinct causes of action. Brandon v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &
Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-211, 2021-Ohio-418 ¶ 16. False imprisonment
exists where “a person confines another intentionally ‘without lawful privilege and
against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.’ ”
Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 573 N.E.2d 633
(1991), quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, 362 N.E.2d 646 (1977).
An action for false imprisonment against the state may be based on the state’s failure
to comply with statutes mandating the release of its prisoners. Id. at 110. The
elements of a false-imprisonment claim by a former prisoner against the state are (1)
the expiration of a lawful term of confinement; (2) intentional confinement after the
expiration; and (3) knowledge that the privilege initially justifying the confinement
no longer exists. Brandon at ¶ 17, citing Washington v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-830, 2020-Ohio-3385, ¶ 22. These actions may now be
brought against the state by virtue of R.C. 2743.02 (the general waiver of immunity).
{¶25} Conversely, an action for wrongful imprisonment under R.C. 2743.48
is an action against the state to “provid[e] compensation to innocent persons who
have been wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for a felony.” Bennett at 110.
Although R.C. 2743.48 was initially drafted to provide recovery based on a
demonstration of actual innocence, the statutory language has been amended to
include individuals released as a result of Brady violations. Brandon at ¶ 16, citing OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
14
Lemons v. State, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109188, 2020-Ohio-5619, ¶ 17. This action
did not exist at common law. See Walden, 47 Ohio St.3d at 53, 547 N.E.2d 962.
{¶26} In addition, at common law, claims for false imprisonment could not
be maintained against the state because of sovereign immunity. Bennett at 110-111.
Until the enactment of R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), the state could not be held liable for the
false imprisonment of its prisoners. See id. R.C. 2743.02 was enacted in 1975 as part
of the Court of Claims Act. Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 69-70, 471 N.E.2d
776 (1984). “With the passage of the Act, individuals can sue the state and have
liability determined with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private
parties.” Id. at 70. Under R.C. 2743.02(A)(1), the state may be held liable for the
false imprisonment of its prisoners because “[t]he tort of false imprisonment is a rule
of law that is generally applicable to private parties.” Bennett, 60 Ohio St.3d 107 at
110, 573 N.E.2d 633.
{¶27} Unlike an action for false imprisonment, an action for wrongful
imprisonment is not one generally applicable to private parties and did not exist at
common law. The state, and only the state, can wrongfully convict someone.
Therefore, “even after the waiver of sovereign immunity in R.C. 2743.02” in 1975 the
state “remained generally immune from lawsuits by persons who were wrongfully
convicted and incarcerated” until the enactment of R.C. 2743.48 in 1986. Id.
{¶28} Although at common law, a claim for false imprisonment existed
between private parties, no such claim could be brought against the state. In 1975,
by virtue of R.C. 2743.02, an action for false imprisonment could now, theoretically,
be brought against the state. However, there was never an action at common law for
someone who was wrongfully imprisoned, i.e., wrongfully convicted. It was not until OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
15
1986, with the enactment of R.C. 2743.48, that a wrongful-imprisonment action
could be brought against the state. If, as McClain argues, R.C. 2743.48 is an
extension of the common law tort of false imprisonment, the legislature would not
have needed to enact R.C. 2743.48, the wrongful-imprisonment statute, 11 years after
it waived its sovereign immunity by the enactment of R.C. 2743.02.
{¶29} As the Supreme Court explained in Bennett, “R.C. 2743.48 does not
replace the false imprisonment tort but, rather, supplements it to allow a recovery in
some cases when recovery was not available before.” Id. at 111. In other words, R.C.
2743.48 did not extend the tort of false imprisonment that existed at common law, it
created a distinct cause of action against the state for prisoners who were wrongfully
convicted. Collier-Hammond, 2020-Ohio-2716, 154 N.E.3d 364, at ¶ 22 (“The right
to a jury trial in claims of wrongful imprisonment did not exist in common law,
because R.C. 2743.48 did not exist until 1986.”).
{¶30} Therefore, Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution does not
preserve a right to a jury trial in a wrongful-imprisonment action because the action
did not exist at common law. See id. Consequently, McClain did not have a
constitutional right to a jury in the action before the trial court.
Outcome: Because no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial exists in an
action to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 2743.48,
we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling McClain’s request for a jury trial.
We overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
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