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Date: 08-04-2022

Case Style:

STATE OF OHIO vs. JALIL SAHEID DIXON

Case Number: C-210614

Judge:

Marilyn Zayas; Presiding Judge


Candace C. Crouse
Ginger S. Bock
concur

Court:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


On Appeal From The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas




Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

Defendant's Attorney:



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Description:

Cincinnati, Ohio - Criminal Defense lawyer represented defendant with appeals his sentences one count of discharging a firearm over a public highway charge.



Dixon pled guilty to one count of discharging a firearm upon or over a
public highway and one count of aggravated assault with a one-year gun specification.
Dixon admitted that after he was struck by a car, he obtained a gun and fired multiple
shots at that car that hit him. No one was injured. The trial court sentenced Dixon to
a 36-month term of incarceration for discharging the firearm, an 18-month term for
the aggravated assault, and a 12-month term for the gun specification to be served
prior and consecutive to the 18-month term. The two terms were ordered to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 66 months.
Standard of Review
{¶3} In his first assignment of error, Dixon argues that the trial court erred
by failing to merge the offenses for purposes of sentencing. An appellate court applies
a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial court’s R.C. 2941.25 merger
determination. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d
1245, ¶ 28.
Law and Analysis
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3
{¶4} Under R.C. 2941.25, a trial court must merge offenses if the conduct of
the defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of a similar
import, and this conduct shows that the offenses were not committed separately or
with a separate animus. See State v. Bailey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-
Ohio-2997, ¶ 74. The determination of whether offenses are allied contemplates
“three separate factors – the conduct, the animus, and the import.” State v. Ruff, 143
Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶5} Offenses of dissimilar import exist when the conduct involves separate
victims or if the resulting harm is separate and identifiable. Id. at paragraph two of
the syllabus. Separate convictions are permitted for allied offenses if the offenses were
(1) dissimilar in import or significance, (2) committed separately, or (3) committed
with a separate animus or motivation. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. A
reviewing court may end its analysis upon finding that any one of the three applies.
Bailey at ¶ 83.
{¶6} “[W]hen the defendant’s conduct put more than one individual at risk,
that conduct could support multiple convictions because the offenses were of
dissimilar import.” Ruff at ¶ 23. “[O]ffenses are not allied offenses of similar import
if they are not alike in their significance and their resulting harm.” Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶7} Dixon contends that the offenses should have merged because there was
only one victim, a single harm, and one animus.
{¶8} Firing multiple shots in rapid succession across the road at a targeted
victim constitutes separate offenses because they are not of similar import. See State
v. Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27663, 2018-Ohio-1647, ¶ 23; State v. Williams,
2015-Ohio-4987, 132 N.E.3d 1233, ¶ 47-49 (8th Dist.). “The victim of the offense of
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
4
discharging a firearm upon or over a public road or highway is the public. This is
because it is the act itself that is prohibited. The offense can be completed with no one
remotely near the location where the firearm is discharged upon or over the public
road or highway. R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) is a statute intended to benefit the public
good[.]” Williams at ¶ 24, quoting State v. James, 2015-Ohio-4987, 53 N.E.3d 770
(8th Dist.). The victim of the aggravated-assault conviction was the driver of the car.
{¶9} The two offenses were of dissimilar import because they involved
multiple victims. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in not merging the two
offenses, and we overrule the assignment of error.

Outcome: Having overruled Dixon’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

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