Kaye Frances Base and Aryln Joe Justice sued Devon Energy Corporation

Case Number: CJ-2029-00058

Judge: Paul K. Woodward

Court: District Court, Kingfisher County, Oklahoma

Plaintiff's Attorney:

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Defendant's Attorney: Kingfisher, Oklahoma oil and gas lawyers represented the Defendant.

Description: Kingfisher, Oklahoma oil and gas lawyers represented the Plaintiff who sued the Defendants on seeking a declaratory judgment on how much royalty payments were due on an oil and gas lease on nine wells collectively called the Bernhardt Wells.

Devon filed its reply in support of summary judgment on July 6, 2020. Therein, Devon argued that any dispute over the status of the 1978 Lease as a novation or amendment of the earlier 1973 Lease accrued by 1979, such that the Trustees' quiet title claim brought more than fifteen years later is barred.77 Devon further argued that the Trustees' attempt to reframe their claim as one that arose more recently--i.e., after drilling of the Bernhardt Wells--focuses on the damages they seek for underpayment rather than on the viability of the underlying claim and fails to recognize that the drilling of the Bernhardt Wells did not create the dispute at the heart of Trustees' quiet title claim.78 Devon also asserted that neither the appointment of the Trust's new trustees in 2016 nor the generation of new title opinions since 1978 revived the Trustees' time-barred quiet title claim.79 With respect to the Division Orders, Devon argued that the Division Orders were not being used as the source for the 1/8 royalty interest (as that royalty was specified in the 1973 Lease) but were only being used to demonstrate that Eunice and the Trust had actual notice their payments were based on a 1/8 royalty interest.80 Concerning Trustees' argument about merger of title, Devon asserted that "the issue should have been adjudicated in 1979 or 15 years thereafter" and that the merits of such an argument were contradicted by Eunice's certification of the royalty interest from the 1973 Lease and by her "40-year course of conduct accepting a 1/8 royalty consistent with the 1973 Lease."81 Finally, in an effort to deflate Trustees' reliance upon Chesapeake's payment of a 3/16 royalty on production from the Justice Well, Devon produced a letter from Chesapeake's attorney to Trustees' attorney that (1) suggested the 3/16 royalty was based upon "typographical errors" in the title opinions upon which Chesapeake had relied (which he was contemporaneously producing to the Trustees); (2) characterized the 1978 Lease as "a top lease" that never became effective "as the first lease was perpetuated by the Lena Shawver 1-8 well"; and (3) asserted "Chesapeake would [therefore] have a counterclaim against the trust" for overpayment "of the royalties paid on production from the Justice 1-8 well."82

Outcome: The trial court then announced it was denying Trustees' motion to compel and motion to supplement and granting Devon's motion for summary judgment:

District Court judgment affirmed.

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