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Date: 09-07-2020

Case Style:

Kerrie Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority

Case Number: S249593

Judge: Chin, J.

Court: Supreme Court of California

Plaintiff's Attorney: Frank Scott Moore, Deborah Gettleman, Benjamin Thomas Conway and Autumn Marie Elliott

Defendant's Attorney: Randall Jayman Lee, Ilya Filmus, Anne C. Gritzer and Robert Cooper

Description:





The federal Housing Choice Voucher program is a key
program in section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937.
(42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq., as amended by § 201(a) of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974.) Commonly referred
to as “Section 8,” the program provides low-income families a
monthly subsidy to pay for a portion of their rent. The amount
of the subsidy depends, in part, on the income Section 8 families
receive. The program, which is funded and regulated by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), is administered locally by public housing authorities
(PHAs). In this case, we address whether a Section 8
beneficiary’s compensation for providing in-home care for a
severely disabled adult daughter should be excluded from
income in calculating the rental subsidy. For reasons that
follow, we conclude that it should be excluded and reverse the
Court of Appeal’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, plaintiff Kerrie Reilly and her two daughters
moved into a three-bedroom apartment in Novato and began
receiving Section 8 housing assistance payments to subsidize
their monthly rent. Reilly has an adult daughter, K.R., who is
severely disabled and requires constant supervision. Reilly
receives compensation to provide in-home supportive care for
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
2
K.R. through the state and federally funded In-Home
Supportive Services (IHSS) program.
In 2004, Reilly’s other daughter, R.R., moved out of their
subsidized apartment, but Reilly did not inform the Marin
Housing Authority (MHA), which is responsible for
administering Reilly’s Section 8 voucher. Five years later, when
Reilly told MHA that R.R. no longer lived with her, MHA
advised her that her failure to report her daughter’s leaving
constituted a violation of the program rules. Reilly could only
stay in the government-subsidized apartment if she paid
approximately $16,000 in damages to MHA.
Reilly agreed to pay MHA in monthly installments,
initially starting at $486 and eventually lowered to $150 per
month at Reilly’s request. In 2010, after Reilly missed an
installment payment, MHA warned her that future missed
payments would result in termination of her housing assistance.
Reilly missed multiple payments in 2012, 2014, and 2015.
In 2015, Reilly requested that MHA recalculate her rent
and exclude her IHSS compensation from “income” under the
relevant federal regulation. (See 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)
(2020).) MHA did not respond to this request, but instead served
Reilly a notice of termination of her Section 8 voucher. After a
hearing on MHA’s decision to terminate Reilly’s housing
voucher, the hearing officer upheld the agency’s decision, noting
that Reilly’s failure to pay amounts under the settlement
agreement constituted grounds for terminating her housing
assistance. The hearing officer did not address whether the
IHSS compensation counted as income, however.
On October 26, 2015, Reilly filed a petition for writ of
mandate seeking an order requiring MHA to terminate her
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
3
repayment plan and reinstitute her Section 8 voucher; she also
sought an administrative writ ordering MHA to terminate the
repayment plan and exclude Reilly’s IHSS payments in
calculating her income going forward. The trial court rejected
Reilly’s assertion that IHSS payments were excepted from the
meaning of “annual income” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)). It
sustained MHA’s demurrer without leave to amend, and the CA
affirmed the judgment. (Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 425.) Both lower courts ordered “a stay
in the enforcement of the administrative order terminating
Reilly’s Section 8 benefits.” MHA later agreed to an extension
of this stay pending review in this court.
We granted review, limited to the issue whether IHSS
payments should be excluded from “annual income” for purposes
of calculating a Section 8 beneficiary’s home assistance
payment.
DISCUSSION
A. Overview of Section 8 voucher program
In 1974, Congress added the Section 8 housing program to
the United States Housing Act of 1937 “[f]or the purpose of
aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live.”
(42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a); see generally Friedman et al., Cal.
Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2019)
¶ 12.) The program gives eligible families either “tenant-based”
or “project-based” rent subsidies administered locally through
PHAs. (See Park Village Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer
Howard Trust (9th Cir. 2011) 636 F.3d 1150, 1152–1153
[overview of Section 8 housing assistance].) “ ‘[T]enant-based
assistance’ ” is a rent subsidy that is tied to a specific family
even if the family moves to other suitable housing. (42 U.S.C.
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
4
§ 1437f(f)(7).) “ ‘[P]roject-based assistance,’ ” on the other hand,
is tied to a specific housing development or unit. (42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(f)(6).) We focus on tenant-based assistance, which is at
issue in this case.
Under the tenant-based assistance program, at least 75%
of all admitted families must be “[e]xtremely low[] income,” i.e.,
their income may not exceed 30% of the median income
calculated by HUD for the relevant area (24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b)
(2020)); and all remaining admitted families must be “[l]ow
income,” i.e., their income may not exceed 50% of the median
income. (Ibid.; id., § 982.201(b)(1), (2)(i) (2020) [eligibility and
targeting].)
After a Section 8 family selects an eligible rental unit
approved by the applicable PHA, the PHA enters into a contract
with the rental property owner. That owner “functions as a
landlord in the private rental market. The owner signs a lease
with the Section 8 tenant (which includes a HUD Lease/Tenancy
Addendum) and also signs a Housing Assistance Payments
(HAP) contract with the Housing Authority.” (Apartment Assn.
of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 119, 123.) The PHA gives the subsidy payments
directly to the property owner. (24 C.F.R. § 982.311(a) (2020).)
As we explain below (see post, at p. 8), the amount of the
housing subsidy depends in large part on the “annual income”
the Section 8 family receives or expects to receive. (See 24
C.F.R. § 5.609(a) (2020); id. § 982.201(a), (b) (2020).) The issue
is whether the IHSS payments Reilly receives to provide
services to keep her developmentally disabled daughter at home
are excluded from income under 24 Code of Federal Regulations
part 5.609(c)(16) (2020).
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
5
B. IHSS
IHSS is a state social welfare program implemented under
The Burton-Moscone-Bagley Citizens’ Income Security Act for
Aged, Blind and Disabled Californians, enacted in 1973. (Welf.
& Inst. Code,1
§ 12000 et seq., added by Stats. 1973, ch. 1216,
§ 37, p. 2904; see County of Sacramento v. State of California
(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 428, 430–431.) The purpose of the
legislation is to give the aged, blind and disabled the “assistance
and services which will encourage them to make greater efforts
to achieve self-care and self-maintenance, whenever feasible,
and to enlarge their opportunities for independence.” (§ 12002.)
IHSS is specifically “designed to avoid institutionalization of
incapacitated persons.” (Basden v. Wagner (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 929, 931.) Providers perform nonmedical
supportive services for IHSS recipients, such as domestic
services, personal care services, protective supervision, and
accompaniment to health-related appointments. (§ 12300; see
Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 867, disapproved on
other grounds by Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
955, 986, fn. 15.)
“IHSS is actually provided under three programs: the
original IHSS program (the residual program) (§ 12300 et seq.);
the Medi-Cal personal care services program (PCSP) (§
14132.95); and the IHSS Plus waiver program (§ 14132.951).[2]

1 All further statutory references are to Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
2 Section 14132.951, subdivision (a) provides: “It is the
intent of the Legislature that the State Department of Health
Services seek approval of a Medicaid waiver under the federal
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
6
The latter two programs tap into federal funds, and IHSS
recipients will receive services under the residual program only
if they do not qualify under the other two programs. (§§ 12300,
subd. (g); 14132.95, subd. (b); 14132.951, subd. (d).)” (Basden v.
Wagner, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 933, fn. 4; see 2 Dayton et
al., Advising the Elderly Client (2019) § 22:40 (Advising the
Elderly Client); Calderon v. Anderson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
607, 609–610.)
The State Department of Social Services (Department)
administers the IHSS program in compliance with state and
federal law. The Department promulgates regulations to
implement the relevant statutes, which are set out in its Manual
of Policies and Procedures: Social Services Standards (July
2019) (MPP). (MPP, §§ 30-700 to 30-785; see Norasingh v.
Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 744–745.) County
welfare departments administer the IHSS program with the
Department’s supervision, and determine an applicant’s
individual needs to authorize necessary services. (Norasingh v.
Lightbourne, at pp. 744–745; see MPP, § 30-761 [needs
assessment standards].)
A county welfare department may either obtain and pay
directly a provider of the supportive services, or pay the
recipient who hires one. (Basden v. Wagner, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 940 [when state pays provider or recipient
directly, it assumes certain “ ‘employer’ duties”]; MPP, § 30-

Social Security Act in order that the services available under
Article 7 (commencing with Section 12300) of Chapter 3, known
as the In-Home Supportive Services program, may be provided
as a Medi-Cal benefit under this chapter to the extent federal
financial participation is available. The waiver shall be known
as the ‘IHSS Plus waiver.’ ”
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
7
763.44.) Or, as in this case, it may compensate the parent who
provides in-home care to her disabled child. (See § 12300, subd.
(e); MPP, § 30-763.45 et seq.; see also Fam. Code, § 3910, subd.
(a) [parent’s responsibility extends to a “child of whatever age
who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means”].) It bears noting that “[t]he vast majority of
home care is provided by family and friends.” (Advising the
Elderly Client, supra, § 22:17.)
Reilly’s daughter suffers from a severe developmental
disorder and obtained authorization for protective supervision,
i.e., 24-hours-a-day supervision that allows her to remain at
home safely. (§ 12301.21; MPP, § 30-757.173.) Protective
supervision involves “observing recipient behavior and
intervening as appropriate in order to safeguard the recipient
against injury, hazard, or accident.” (MPP, § 30-757.17; see
Marshall v. McMahon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1841, 1847
[“ ‘Protective supervision’ appears to be similar to care given
small children, that is, anticipating everyday hazards and
intervening to avert harm”].) Such supervision is available for
“nonself-directing, confused, mentally impaired, or mentally ill
persons only.” (MPP, § 30.757.171; see Marshall v. McMahon,
at p. 1847; Calderon v. Anderson, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at
p. 616.) There is no dispute that Reilly’s adult daughter was
entitled to IHSS services, or that Reilly was authorized to
receive IHSS compensation for providing those services to her.
C. HUD regulation on “Annual Income” and its
exclusions
The applicable federal regulation defines “annual income”
broadly, as “all amounts, monetary or not.” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(a)
(2020).) For example, income includes “compensation for
personal services” (id., § 5.609(b)(1) (2020)) and “[p]ayments in
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
8
lieu of earnings, such as unemployment and disability
compensation, worker’s compensation, and severance pay” (id.,
§ 5.609(b)(5) (2020)). However, income does not include such
amounts as “specifically excluded” under the regulation. (Id.,
§ 5.609(a)(3) (2020).) There are 16 such exclusions. (Id.,
§ 5.609(c)(1)–(17) (2020).)
“An extensive set of statutory provisions and regulations
governs the calculations of the subsidy that must be paid on
behalf of each tenant.” (Nozzi v. Housing Authority of City of
Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 1178, 1184.) In general,
Section 8 tenants must contribute 30% of their monthly adjusted
income or 10% of their gross monthly income, whichever is
greater, towards each month’s rent. (42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A).)
The housing assistance payment covers the balance of the rent,
up to a statutorily capped amount. (Nozzi v. Housing Authority
of City of Los Angeles, at pp. 1184–1185.)
We do not examine the underlying method used to
calculate the rental subsidy, however, but focus on whether
Reilly’s IHSS compensation for care of her disabled daughter is
“specifically excluded” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(a)(3) (2020)) from
income as “[a]mounts paid by a State agency to a family with a
member who has a developmental disability and is living at
home to offset the cost of services and equipment needed to keep
the developmentally disabled family member at home” (id.,
§ 5.609(c)(16) (2020), italics added). The parties do not dispute
that if Reilly’s daughter received IHSS care from a third party
rather than a family member, such amounts paid would qualify
under the exclusion. MHA argues that for the exclusion to
apply, however, a family must incur costs for hiring someone
because only then would the “[a]mounts paid” by the state to a
family truly “offset” those “cost[s].” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
9
(2020); see In re Ali (Minn. 2020) 938 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Ali)
[“Cost means an actual monetary expense . . . incurred by the
family to keep the disabled family member living at home”].)
Because the state pays Reilly to provide care for her own
daughter and not to hire a third party provider, MHA maintains
there is no actual “cost” to Reilly for such services, and
consequently, there is nothing to “offset.”
1. Meaning of “Offset” & “Cost”
MHA’s interpretation is based in part on the dictionary
definition of “offset,” which generally means to counterbalance
or compensate for something. (See Steinmeyer v. Warner Cons.
Corp. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 515, 518.) Echoing the Court of
Appeal, MHA asserts that payments by the state must offset
costs the family itself incurs to keep a developmentally disabled
member at home; “[o]therwise the payment does not
counterbalance or compensate for the costs of services.” As
MHA puts it, “the payment must go to the same entity that
incurs the cost of those services.” MHA further insists that
“cost” is a monetary term that does not encompass emotional
costs Reilly bears in caring for her daughter, nor any lost
opportunity costs when Reilly forgoes outside employment to be
her daughter’s IHSS provider.
We disagree with MHA’s interpretation. Unlike the word
“reimburse,” which means to “pay back or compensate (another
party) for money spent or losses incurred” (American Heritage
Dict. (5th ed. 2020) p. 1214, italics added), “offset” is not
similarly restrictive. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117 [“Where different
words or phrases are used in the same connection in different
parts of a statute, it is presumed the Legislature intended a
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
10
different meaning”].) For example, the term “reimbursement”
is used in two other exclusions. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(4), (8)(iii)
(2020).) Consistent with the meaning of “reimburse,” those
exclusions refer to compensation of specific, discrete amounts,
e.g., “the cost of medical expenses” (id., § 5.609(c)(4) (2020)) and
“out-of-pocket expenses” to participate in a publicly assisted
program (id., § 5.609(c)(8)(iii)).
While the term “reimburse” suggests there may be full
recompense for any out-of-pocket expenses a family incurs
under those exclusions, “offset” as used here does not necessarily
reflect that same meaning. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope
& Opportunity, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1117.) Here, what is
“offset” is the “cost of services and equipment needed to keep the
developmentally disabled family member at home.” (24 C.F.R.
§ 5.609(c)(16) (2020).) “[C]ost,” in turn, is defined to include both
“an amount paid or required in payment for a purchase; a price”
and “the expenditure of something, such as time or labor,
necessary for the attainment of a goal.” (American Heritage
Dict., supra, at p. 454.) Whether a family uses homecare
payments to support itself so that it may care for a
developmentally disabled member at home, or instead uses the
funds to pay a third party to provide care for some of the time,
these payments do no more than “offset” the “cost” of services
and equipment needed to avoid institutionalization, costs that
are not otherwise specified or limited. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)
(2020).)
Further, contrary to MHA’s suggestion, “cost” in this
exclusion (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)) does not have the
same meaning as “cost” used in other provisions of the
regulation. For instance, “actual cost of shelter and utilities” (24
C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(6)(ii) (2020)) and “cost of medical expenses for
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
11
any family member” (id., § 5.609(c)(4) (2020)) both refer to
discrete, monetary amounts. “[T]he presumption that ‘identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
have the same meaning . . . readily yields whenever there is such
variation in the connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed
in different parts of the act with different intent.’ ” (Roberts v.
Sea-Land Services, Inc. (2012) 566 U.S. 93, 108.)
2. Rulemaking history of 24 Code of Federal
Regulations par 5.609(c)(16) (2020)
This interpretation of the terms “offset” and “cost” is also
consistent with the rulemaking history of 24 Code of Federal
Regulations part 5.609(c)(16) (2020). (See 60 Fed.Reg. 17388–
17395 (Apr. 5, 1995) [“Combined Income and Rent”; interim rule
as precursor to 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)]; 61 Fed.Reg.
54492–54504 (Oct. 18, 1996) [final rule]). Though the Court of
Appeal found this history to be unhelpful and not illuminating,
we do not share that view. (See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala (1994) 512 U.S. 504, 512 [relevance of agency’s “ ‘intent
at the time of the regulation’s promulgation’ ”].)
In 1995, HUD published an interim rule proposing eight
new income exclusions — among them the homecare payments
exclusion — to the definition of annual income under Section 8
and other assisted housing programs. (See 60 Fed.Reg. 17388–
17395 (Apr. 5, 1995); 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c) (2020).) It determined
that the new exclusions “are essential for achieving its goals of
ensuring economic opportunity, empowering the poor and
expanding affordable housing opportunities. Moreover, HUD
believes that the costs of additional exclusions will be offset by
long-term future savings because the exclusions will increase
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
12
the number of economically self-sufficient families residing in
assisted housing.” (60 Fed.Reg. 17388, italics added.)
Regarding the “homecare payments” exclusion in
particular, HUD explained that the “exclusion exempts amounts
paid by a State agency to families that have developmentally
disabled children or adult family members living at home.
States that provide families with homecare payments do so to
offset the cost of services and equipment needed to keep a
developmentally disabled family member at home, rather than
placing the family member in an institution. Since families that
strive to avoid institutionalization should be encouraged, and
not punished, the Department is adding this additional
exclusion to income. The Department wishes to point out that
today’s interim rule does not define ‘developmentally disabled’
since whether a family member qualifies as developmentally
disabled, and is therefore eligible for homecare assistance, is
determined by each individual State.” (60 Fed.Reg. 17388,
17389 (Apr. 5, 1995), italics added.)
In finalizing the rule and responding to public comment
that “ ‘developmentally disabled children’ ” and “ ‘adult family
members’ ” should be expressly defined, HUD rejected the
suggestion as unnecessary: “There is no need for HUD to define
these terms, as they are defined by the State program providing
the payments. If the family is receiving such a payment from the
State because a family meets the criteria of the definition, the
[public housing authority] should consider the family eligible for
the exclusion.” (61 Fed.Reg. 54492, 54497 (Oct. 18, 1996), italics
added.)
We find several points from this rulemaking history to be
significant. As to the meaning of “offset,” HUD recognized that
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
13
states that make payments for in-home services “do so to offset
the cost” to the family keeping the developmentally disabled
member at home “rather than placing the family member in an
institution.” (60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (Apr. 5, 1995).)
Significantly, HUD here did not use “cost” and “offset” in terms
of a specific monetary expense or amount a Section 8 family
incurs, but in a broad sense with respect to describing the
overall objective of the exclusion. HUD regarded homecare
payments as reducing or offsetting costs to families caring for
developmentally disabled individuals, costs that would be borne
by state and federal governments if the family member were
institutionalized. (See Perkins & Boyle, Addressing Long Waits
for Home and Community-Based Care Through Medicaid and
the ADA (2001) 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 117, 119 [“Most states have
reduced costly institutional care by shifting some public funding
to home and community settings”].)
This background clearly informs the interpretation of 24
Code of Federal Regulations part 5.609(c)(16) (2020). The
language of the regulation (“amounts paid by a State agency . . .
to offset the costs of services and equipment needed to keep the
developmentally disabled family member at home” [italics
added]) closely tracks this rulemaking language (“States that
provide families with homecare payments do so to offset the costs
of services and equipment needed to keep a developmentally
disabled family member at home, rather than placing the family
member in an institution”) (60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389, italics
added), and the italicized phrases at issue here are identical.
The only express limitation HUD has placed on this
exclusion is that the in-home care payments must be for services
and equipment needed to keep the “developmentally disabled”
family member at home. (See post, at pp. 15–16.) Even then,
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
14
HUD found “no need” to define what “developmentally disabled”
meant, and instead left this up to the states to decide. (61
Fed.Reg. 54492, 54497 (Oct. 18, 1996; see 60 Fed.Reg. 17389
(Apr. 5, 1995) [“whether a family member qualifies as
developmentally disabled, and is therefore eligible for homecare
assistance, is determined by each individual State”].) From
HUD’s perspective, “If the family is receiving such a payment
from the State because a family member meets the criteria of
the definition, the [public housing authority] should consider the
family eligible for the exclusion.” (61 Fed.Reg. 54492, 54497,
italics added.)
Notwithstanding the general rule that exclusions from
income should be construed narrowly (see Commissioner v.
Schleier (1995) 515 U.S. 323, 328), we find no indication that
HUD intended a narrow construction of the homecare payments
exclusion. We perceive no reasoned basis — including any basis
informed by the regulation’s language — why HUD would single
out a parent provider’s compensation as unworthy for income
exclusion. Rather, we find HUD’s stated goals of encouraging
families to avoid the institutionalization of developmentally
disabled individuals through the addition of this exclusion (60
Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (April 5, 1995)), and more globally of
“ensuring economic opportunity, empowering the poor and
expanding affordable housing opportunities” (60 Fed.Reg.
17388), would be furthered by permitting all homecare
payments for services to keep developmentally disabled family
members at home — whether the provider is a family member
or third party — to be excluded from the meaning of “annual
income.” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020).) By allowing these
families to realize the full benefit of the homecare payments
without facing a corresponding increase in rent, the exclusion
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
15
would operate as intended by not penalizing families who take
on the onus of caring for a developmentally disabled family
member at home.
To that end, it is helpful to remember that “[t]he United
States Housing Act is a program of ‘cooperative federalism.’ ”
(James v. New York City Housing Authority (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 622
F.Supp. 1356, 1359; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437; see also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn. (1981) 452 U.S. 264,
289.) “HUD’s delegation of eligibility requirements to local
public housing authorities is intended to effectuate the
underlying policy of the United States Housing Act by
promoting efficient management of the programs . . . .” (James
v. New York City Housing Authority, at pp. 1361–1362.) With
respect to the exclusion for homecare payments specifically (24
C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)) (2020)), HUD expressly left it to the states
to define “developmentally disabled,” which in part determines
a family’s eligibility for the income exclusion. (See ante, at p.
12.)
Along these lines, HUD did not limit the income exclusion
based on whether a state allows a family to use a family member
or a third party to provide the necessary care; the exclusion
covers “[a]mounts paid by a State agency to a family” with a
developmentally disabled member (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)
(2020)). Indeed, acknowledging such a distinction would do
little to advance the complementary purposes of the federal and
state statutes. Congress established Section 8 with “the
purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent
place to live.” (42 U.S.C § 1437f(a).) And our Legislature
created IHSS with the goal of providing “supportive services . . .
to aged, blind, or disabled persons . . . who are unable to perform
the services themselves and who cannot safely remain in their
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Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
16
homes or abodes of their own choosing unless these services are
provided.” (§ 12300, subd. (a).) Like the purpose of the federal
exclusion (see ante, at pp. 12–13), the IHSS program’s purpose
is to enable “ ‘disabled poor persons to avoid institutionalization
by remaining in their homes with proper supportive services.’ ”
(Basden v. Wagner, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 939.)
Nevertheless, MHA would have us read in the words “from third
parties” after the phrase “cost of services” (24 C.F.R. §
5.609(c)(16) (2020)) thereby making it correspondingly harder
for certain families to provide necessary in-home care. Given
this cooperative federalism regime, we ought to be reticent to
interpret the HUD regulation in a way that would foreclose or
hinder the objectives of the state IHSS program.
The dissent overstates the import of the authority it cites
(see dis. opn., post, at pp. 1–2, 16–19). (See Anthony v. Poteet
Housing Authority (5th Cir. 2009) 306 Fed. Appx. 98, 101
(Anthony) [“One must incur costs before they can be offset”]; Ali,
supra, 931 N.W.2d 835.) In Anthony, an unpublished Fifth
Circuit decision that first addressed the issue, plaintiff Brenda
Anthony provided in-home care for her severely disabled son in
their Section 8 subsidized apartment. Unlike California, the
State of Texas does not pay families directly for in-home care;
such care is provided by third party intermediaries, who in turn
employ in-home attendants and pay them wages partially
funded by the state. Through her employment as a personal
care attendant with two private for-profit companies, Anthony
provided care not only for her son but also for other clients under
the terms of her employment.
In determining Anthony’s annual income for purposes of
calculating her subsidized rent, the PHA refused to exclude
Anthony’s wages under 24 Code of Federal Regulations part
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
17
5.609(c)(16) (2020)). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the PHA’s
decision: “[T]he fact that Anthony’s employment income
coincides with state funds that are set aside for her son’s care
does not make that income a form of reimbursement.” (Anthony,
supra, 306 Fed. Appx. at pp. 101–102.) The court further
rejected Anthony’s claim that the services she provided her son
were at a cost and were not free: “[F]or Anthony, they are free.
She has no out-of-pocket expenses — ‘costs’ — that must be
reimbursed or ‘offset’ by the state.” (Id. at p. 102.)
We are not persuaded by Anthony’s reasoning on several
grounds. Fundamentally, Texas’s program is distinct from the
IHSS scheme in that “all state-funded in-home attendant-care
services in Texas are provided by private intermediaries, and
Texas does not provide any amounts directly to families to offset
costs incurred to keep a disabled family member at home.”
(Anthony, supra, 306 Fed. Appx. at p. 101.) Next, although
Anthony’s private employers paid her to provide in-home care to
her son “with money partially provided by the state” (id. at p.
101), it is unclear what portion of her wages truly constituted
“pass-through” state funds. Her employers paid Anthony not
just to care for her disabled son, but also to care for other clients.
(Id. at p. 100.) Thus, Anthony’s compensation as an in-home
attendant was arguably indistinguishable from wages a parent
earns from outside employment, and therefore properly not
excluded from income under 24 Code of Federal Regulations
part 5.609(c)(16) (2020)). Finally, we do not agree with the Fifth
Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the exclusion as limited to outof-pocket expenses that a state directly reimburses. (See
Anthony, supra, 306 Fed. Appx. at pp. 101–102; see ante, at pp.
9–11.)
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
18
Nor are we persuaded by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Ali, supra, 938 N.W.2d 835, which relied in
part on both Anthony and the Court of Appeal opinion below to
reach a similar conclusion. (See Reilly v. Marin Housing
Authority, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 425.) Under Minnesota’s
Consumer Directed Community Support option for home and
community-based services, a family receives a budget for
specific services and equipment needed to keep a
developmentally disabled member at home. (Ali, supra, 938
N.W.2d at p. 837.) The plaintiff, whose autistic son was eligible
for the program, “chose to allocate a portion of the budget to
herself as a paid parent to provide to her son some of the
necessary services.” (Ibid.) Following Anthony and Reilly, the
Ali court adopted a narrow view of “cost” to mean out-of-pocket
expenses, and concluded that the mother incurred no actual
monetary expenses to “offset.” (Id. at p. 840.)
As with the Texas program, the Minnesota program —
which allowed the mother to “allocate her budget as she saw fit
to keep her son living at home” — is structured differently from
the IHSS program in a way that makes Ali distinguishable.
(Ali, supra, 938 N.W.2d at p. 837.) Moreover, as with Anthony,
we disagree with the Ali court’s narrow interpretation of “cost”
and “offset.”
D. MHA’s policy arguments
Notwithstanding this reading of the HUD regulation,
MHA asserts that including a parent’s IHSS compensation as
income is necessary to achieve a measure of parity between
families in similar circumstances. An expansive reading of the
exclusion (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)), MHA argues, would
unfairly advantage families who provide in-home care to a
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
19
developmentally disabled member because their compensation
is not counted as income for purposes of calculating their rent
subsidy, whereas no comparable income exclusion is available
for a family with a medically disabled member or for a family
who hires a third party provider.
In advancing this argument, MHA asserts the state pays
Reilly “wages” under the IHSS program. Describing an
employment relationship between Reilly and the State of
California, MHA relies in part on the Court of Appeal’s
reasoning that “IHSS payments substitute in the family’s
budget for the money the parent would have earned outside the
home.” Such wages, MHA continues, should be considered part
of her annual income just like the outside income of a parent
who instead hires an in-home provider. We address these points
in turn.
1. Disparity based on individuals’ different
disabilities
First, we reject MHA’s and the dissent’s assertion that
excluding Reilly’s IHSS payments from annual income under 24
Code of Federal Regulations part 5.609(c)(16) (2020) would
create an unfair disparity by extending the exclusion to families
with a developmentally disabled member but not to families
with a medically disabled member. To the extent there is any
disparity, it is inherent in the federal regulation itself, which
specifically limits the exclusion to payments made to families
caring for a “developmentally disabled family member.” (24
C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020).) Put another way, even assuming
MHA’s position is correct that the exclusion is limited to
payments made to third party providers, it would still treat
developmental disabilities more favorably than physical
disabilities because whatever its scope, the exclusion by its
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
20
terms applies only to “[a]mounts paid by a State agency to a
family with a member who has a developmental disability.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
The regulation, moreover, does not require that an
individual meet a particular definition of “developmentally
disabled” for the income exclusion to apply. As previously
discussed (see ante, at p. 15), HUD has not defined
“developmental disability” in the regulation, but instead left it
up to states to determine its meaning. Specifically, if a state
program authorizes a family to receive in-home care for a family
member, in HUD’s view that family member “meets the criteria
of the definition” of developmentally disabled, and the PHA
“should consider the family eligible for the exclusion.” (61
Fed.Reg. 54492, 54497 (Oct. 18, 1996), italics added.) This
expansive view in favor of applying the exclusion is consistent
with HUD’s expressed concern that families of developmentally
disabled members in particular would receive unfair treatment
if this income exclusion were not made available to them. HUD
added the relevant exclusion for families with a developmentally
disabled member “[s]ince families that strive to avoid
institutionalization should be encouraged, and not punished.”
(60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (Apr. 5, 1995), italics added.)
The dissent, however, asserts that precluding Reilly from
utilizing this income exclusion would not amount to punishment
because no other group, besides foster parents, enjoys the
benefit of the income exclusion. (See dis. opn., post, at p. 34, fn.
18.) This critically misapprehends the nature of the penalty
involved. The punishment here is not merely withholding a
benefit to a family that is not otherwise given to similarly
situated families; in other words, the dilemma a family faces is
not choosing between enjoying or forgoing a “preferential
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
21
benefit,” as the dissent seems to suggest. (Dis. opn., post, at
p. 23.) Rather, if a family cannot utilize the income exclusion to
exclude compensation for a parent’s in-home care, this may
cause the family to lose its Section 8 housing altogether because
it is unable to pay an increased portion of rent. Without such
housing, a family may face having to institutionalize a
developmentally disabled member, a result the exclusion seeks
to prevent in the first place.
Further, despite no expressed preference for family
providers per se, “[r]ecipients needing 24-hour protective
supervision — and other services — are more likely to receive
better continuous care from relatives living with them whose
care is more than contractual.” (Miller v. Woods, supra, 148
Cal.App.3d at p. 870.) This continuity of care is particularly
salient here because of the nature of need-based tasks under the
IHSS program. Because an IHSS recipient may only receive
specific services based on an assessed need — i.e., where
“[p]erformance of the service by the recipient would constitute
such a threat to his/her health/safety that he/she would be
unable to remain in his/her own home” (MPP, § 30.761.14) —
not all time that a provider spends with a recipient would be
compensable. (See § 12300, subd. (a); MPP, § 30.761.12.) Many
tasks are discrete and not clustered together throughout the day
(such as feeding, dressing, bowel and bladder care), and a
provider may not be compensated for time spent waiting in
between those tasks. It would no doubt prove challenging to find
many providers — other than family members — willing to work
that intermittently during the day.
Family members may also make particularly good
providers because IHSS services “involve a most intimate and
personal aspect of an individual’s life” and family providers
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
22
often “insure the least intrusion upon the recipient’s privacy.”
(Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 878; see § 12304.1
[“preference shall be given to any qualified individual provider
who is chosen by any recipient”].) Also recognizing that familyprovided care is often the best type of care for individuals with
disabilities, Congress has included it as one of the “goals of the
Nation” to provide families of children with disabilities the
services necessary to “enable families of children with
disabilities to nurture and enjoy their children at home”; and
“support family caregivers of adults with disabilities.” (42
U.S.C. § 15091(a)(6)(B), (D) [congressional findings of Families
of Children with Disabilities Support Act of 2000]; id.,
§ 15091(a)(1) [“It is in the best interest of our Nation to preserve,
strengthen, and maintain the family”].) Congress further
emphasized the important cost savings when family members
are themselves providers for their disabled children: “Families
of children with disabilities provide support, care, and training
to their children that can save States millions of dollars.
Without the efforts of family caregivers, many persons with
disabilities would receive care through State-supported out-ofhome placements.” (Id., § 15091(a)(2); see 60 Fed.Reg. 17388,
17389 (Apr. 5, 1995).) These expressed goals fully align with
HUD’s objective to have developmentally disabled individuals
avoid institutionalization and instead live with their families at
home.
3

3 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, nothing in our
opinion should be construed as implying that third party
caregivers as a whole will provide “substandard” care compared
to family members. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 31.) We merely
confirm what Congress has expressly recognized about the
benefits of having family caregivers.
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
23
This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that parents
who keep their disabled child at home instead of in an
institution — while also providing care as their child’s IHSS
provider — are different from other caregivers. That difference,
however, cuts in favor of allowing a parent’s IHSS compensation
under the exclusion. Unlike third party caregivers whose job it
is to take care of someone on an hourly basis, for these parent
providers, caring for their child “is not a day job; it is their life.”
(In re Hite (Bankr. W.D.Va. 2016) 557 B.R. 451, 458 [holding
parents’ in-home care payments excluded from monthly income
and consequently not deemed disposable income subject to
creditors].) If in-home care payments are not excluded from her
income, the benefits Reilly receives — the in-home care for her
disabled daughter K.R. and the Section 8 housing assistance —
would be at cross-purposes. A family should not be forced to
make an impossible choice between these two critical benefits.
We perceive no plausible reason why Reilly should not realize
the full benefit of what each program has to offer her family.4

2. IHSS payments as wages
Next, we reject MHA’s underlying assumption that a
parent provider’s compensation under the IHSS program seeks
to replicate the wages and hours of a parent who is employed
outside the home. A parent’s employment is relevant only to the
extent it relates to the parent’s suitability or availability to
provide IHSS services to a child. (MPP, § 30-763.451; Dept. AllCounty Letter No. 19-02 (January 9, 2019) (All-County Letter

4 This conclusion focuses on Reilly’s general entitlement to
benefits under the Section 8 voucher and IHSS programs, and
does not consider any other basis for terminating these benefits
such as the failure to comply with any program requirements.
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
24
19-02).) As section 12300, subdivision (e) explains, the predicate
for a paid parent provider is that “no other suitable provider is
available.” (§ 12300, subd. (e); see MPP, § 30-763.451.) In
providing the necessary in-home care to a disabled child, a
parent forgoes any outside employment — not to displace
otherwise competent professional caregivers — but to prevent a
third party caregiver’s “inappropriate placement or inadequate
care” for their child. (§ 12300, subd. (e).)
For instance, in its 2019 All-County Letter 19-02, the
Department clarified the paid parent provider requirements:
“The paid parent IHSS provider requirements, set forth in MPP
Section 30-763.451, do not require or imply that a parent must
have marketable job skills or a work history to be their child’s
paid IHSS provider, as long as it is the recipient child’s needs
which prevent the parent from maintaining or obtaining fulltime employment.” (All-County Letter 19-02, supra, at p. 4,
italics added.) Likewise, parents who retire or are laid off may
also serve as their child’s provider only if their retirement or
layoff is due to the child’s need for IHSS services. (Id. at p. 6.)
In short, “if a parent is not employed full-time for a reason other
than the recipient child’s IHSS needs . . . that parent would not
qualify as a paid parent IHSS provider.” (Id. at p. 4.)
Second, even assuming Reilly’s IHSS compensation
represents her wages, this does not mean that providing inhome care to her child is “an employment for all purposes.”
(Basden v. Wagner, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) In Basden
v. Wagner, the Court of Appeal recognized certain duties — such
as the state being responsible for the provider’s unemployment
compensation, workers’ compensation, federal and state income
tax and the like — that would suggest providing IHSS full-time
could be considered an employment. The court, however,
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
25
pointed out that “the Legislature defined IHSS providers as
employees for limited circumstances, but undisputedly not for
all circumstances. More significantly, nothing in the statutes
even remotely suggests the Legislature defined the provision of
in-home, full-time, IHSS funded care by a parent to a child as
full-time employment . . . .” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The question
here is whether a parent’s compensation for providing in-home
care is “specifically excluded” from the definition of annual
income for purposes of the HUD regulation. (24 C.F.R.
§ 5.609(a)(3), (c)(16) (2020).) As explained above, we conclude
that IHSS compensation to a parent provider is excluded from
income. (See ante, at pp. 14–15.)
Nevertheless, the dissent maintains that “[u]nlike funds
that reimburse a family’s expenditures, funds provided by the
state to compensate for the family’s caregiving activities are
available to meet the family’s daily needs. That is their
purpose.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 25, italics added.) This
characterization gravely misconstrues the nature and scope of
IHSS services.
Under the IHSS program, the main focus is on assessing
the disabled individual’s “service needs and authorizing service
hours to meet those needs.” (§ 12301.2, subd. (a)(1).) A
caregiver will be compensated only for those authorized service
hours and nothing more. As previously explained (see ante, at
p. 21), because many tasks are discrete and completed
throughout the day, a provider might not be compensated for
time spent waiting in between those tasks. Contrary to the
dissent’s suggestion, excluding a parent’s IHSS compensation
from income would not artificially reduce a family’s income and
thereby increase any resulting rent subsidy. At best, a parent’s
IHSS compensation will offset a portion of the costs of keeping
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
26
a developmentally disabled family member at home, and would
not go far in meeting the family’s daily needs.
The dissent’s related assertion — i.e., family providers
“are effectively selling their labor to the state, and the resulting
income is indistinguishable, in its impact on the family’s
standard of living, from money earned working outside the
home” (dis. opn., post, at p. 25) — is likewise long on conclusion
but short on facts. (See ibid. [“to receive funds from IHSS a
parent must accept their disabled child’s care as, in effect, their
job”].) In the case of Reilly’s daughter, K.R., for example, she
required protective supervision that is “only available” if “a need
exists for twenty-four-hours-a-day of supervision in order for the
recipient to remain at home safely.” (MPP, § 30-757.173(a).) A
person needing 24-hour supervision would require a provider’s
services for 720 hours in a 30-day month. However, an IHSS
provider is limited to a statutory cap of 283 hours of
compensation. (§§ 12303.4, 14132.95, subd. (g).) The
discrepancy between a parent provider’s actual hours of service
and compensation belies any assertion that IHSS payments, at
least with respect to protective supervision, are intended to
represent wages the parent would have earned outside the
home, where compensation would be based on every hour
worked.
Finally, we find it significant that the IRS also treats inhome care payments — whether the provider is related or
unrelated to the disabled individual — as excludable from a
provider’s income under Internal Revenue Code section 131. (26
U.S.C. § 131; see Rev. Proc. 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445.) In 2014,
the IRS explained that Medicaid waiver payments to states,
which are used to fund IHSS payments through the state MediCal program (see ante, at pp. 5–6 & fn. 2), should be excluded
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
27
from a provider’s gross income. (Rev. Proc. 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B.
445.) It equated these payments to foster care payments, which
are considered “difficulty of care” payments excludable from a
provider’s income under Internal Revenue Code section 131.
(26 U.S.C. § 131(a) [“Gross income shall not include amounts
received by a foster care provider . . . as qualified foster care
payments”].) “The programs share the objective of enabling
individuals who otherwise would be institutionalized to live in a
family home setting rather than in an institution, and both
difficulty of care payments and Medicaid waiver payments
compensate for the additional care required.” (Rev. Proc. 2014-
7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445 [these foster parents “ ‘are saving the
taxpayers’ money by preventing institutionalization of these
children’ ”].) As relevant here, the IRS makes no distinction
between care provided by a parent or by a third party — the
exclusion for Medicaid waiver payments “will apply whether the
care provider is related or unrelated to the eligible individual.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
Seeking to downplay any impact an IRS interpretation has
on a HUD regulation, MHA notes that HUD has indicated that
the “tax rules are different from the HUD program rules.”
(HUD, HUD Handbook 4350.3: Occupancy Requirements of
Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs (Nov. 2013) ¶ 5-1.)
Be that as it may, we do not conclude that the IRS’s
interpretation is dispositive or compels the outcome in this case.
We do, however, acknowledge that it provides persuasive
insight, one that is consistent with the rulemaking record of the
HUD regulation (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)). (See ante, at
pp. 11–13)
For example, though payments to foster parents and inhome care payments are both considered “difficulty of care”
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
28
payments excludable from a provider’s taxable income, these
payments would receive unequal treatment under MHA’s
interpretation of the regulation. Under 24 Code of Federal
Regulations part 5.609(c)(2) (2020), “[p]ayments received for the
care of foster children or foster adults (usually persons with
disabilities, unrelated to the tenant family, who are unable to
live alone)” are excluded from income for purposes of Section 8
housing. If a family takes into their home an unrelated disabled
adult who is unable to live alone, and receives payment from the
State for providing care to that adult, such payments are
excluded from the family’s income. However, if that same family
receives payment for providing the same care but to a
developmentally disabled family member, those payments
would not be excluded from income. To ascribe this
interpretation to HUD, which would impose a financial penalty
on a family simply because the care is given to a disabled family
member rather than a disabled stranger, would not only be
inconsistent with the IRS’s treatment of both payments, there is
no evidence in the regulation’s rulemaking record that HUD
intended different treatment.
E. HUD’s position
At our request, HUD filed an amicus brief in this matter.
We first note that at oral argument HUD’s counsel indicated
that the agency did not request we give deference to its
interpretation of the regulation because it believed the plain
language controlled. (See Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) 588 U.S. ___
[139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415] [“If uncertainty does not exist, there is
no plausible reason for deference. The regulation then just
means what it means — and the court must give it effect”].)
Urging us to affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment, HUD opines
that the IHSS payments Reilly receives must be treated as
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
29
income under the regulation because that “compensation
substitutes for income Reilly would otherwise earn for working
outside the home.” HUD essentially echoes the reasoning of the
Court of Appeal below.
Though deference is generally accorded an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation in the face of ambiguity (see
Auer v. Robbins (1997) 519 U.S. 452; Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
(1944) 323 U.S. 134, 140), we conclude that such deference is not
compelled here. (See United States v. Mead Corp. (2001) 533
U.S. 218, 228 [“[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances”].) Courts should defer to an agency’s
interpretation unless an “ ‘alternative reading is compelled by
the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the
[agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.’ ”
(Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 512,
italics added.)
As explained above (see ante, at pp. 12–13), we conclude
that HUD’s clearly expressed intent at the time it added the
exclusion for homecare payments (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16)
(2020)) was to encourage families to provide in-home care to, and
avoid institutionalization of, developmentally disabled family
members. This contemporaneous intent is fully realized only
when in-home payments for services needed to keep the
developmentally disabled member at home — are excluded from
income for purposes of the Section 8 program, i.e., whether those
payments are ultimately made to a family member or to a third
party provider. This interpretation is consistent with
exclusion’s language, which places no restrictions on who the
provider of services can be. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020).)
REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
30
Contrary to MHA’s suggestion, we do not perceive any
intent by HUD to treat families with a developmentally disabled
member and families with a medically disabled member the
same, or to consider a parent’s outside income the same as a
parent’s IHSS compensation. We will not pursue parity for
parity’s sake, especially if such pursuit runs counter to the
language and purpose of the exclusion. Including a parent’s inhome care payments as income to determine a family’s Section
8 eligibility will have the perverse effect of making it harder for
a family to maintain a home in which to care for the child.
In the end, we refuse to adopt a crabbed interpretation
that does little to advance the tandem goals of offering
affordable housing to low income families and of supporting
families who themselves provide in-home care for
developmentally disabled members. We cannot endorse a
construction that yields a result antithetical to our nation’s “goal
of providing families of children with disabilities with the
support they need to raise their children at home.” (42 U.S.C.
§ 15091(c).) We conclude a parent’s IHSS compensation to
provide care to keep a developmentally disabled child at home
is excluded from income under 24 Code of Federal Regulations
part 5.609(c)(16) (2020).

Outcome: We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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