Date: 01-19-2022

Case Style:

In the Interest of: J.A.T., Appellant, vs. Jackson County Juvenile Office

Case Number: SC9925

Judge: Zel M. Fischer

Court:

Missouri Supreme Court
On appeal from The CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY

Plaintiff's Attorney: Bree A. Sturner of the
juvenile office in Kansas City

Defendant's Attorney:

St. Louis, Missouri - Best Juvenile Criminal Defense Lawyer Directory

Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World.

Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement

Counselor:
MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public.

MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge

Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800

Description:

Kansas, Missouri Juvenile Criminal Defense lawyer represented a juvenile with appealing from a judgment finding he committed acts that would have constituted first-degree assault and armed criminal action.

The Jackson County circuit court found J.A.T. committed acts that would
constitute first-degree assault and armed criminal action if committed by an adult. J.A.T.
appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in requiring J.A.T. to participate in the
adjudication hearing via two-way video because it violated J.A.T.'s rights to due process
and confrontation under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution.
The circuit court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.
Facts and Procedural History
The Jackson County juvenile officer filed a petition alleging J.A.T. committed acts
that would constitute first-degree assault, first-degree attempted robbery, and two counts
of armed criminal action if committed by an adult. The juvenile officer alleged J.A.T.
Opinion issued January 11, 2022
2
committed the acts personally, or with an accomplice for whom J.A.T. would be
criminally responsible, and knowingly caused serious physical injury to the alleged
victim, Dalvon Stiner, by shooting him multiple times.
The adjudication hearing was continued multiple times by J.A.T. and the circuit
court.1 Prior to the adjudication hearing, J.A.T. filed an "Objection to Adjudication by
Video" and argued J.A.T. had a right under the United States Constitution, the Missouri
Constitution, and Missouri statute to be adjudicated in person and to confront adverse
witnesses in person. At a pretrial conference, which occurred via two-way video
conferencing, J.A.T. objected to proceeding with the adjudication hearing "in this fashion
on video" based on the previously filed "Objection to Adjudication by Video." The
circuit court noted the juvenile officer had not yet filed a response to that objection, and
stated: "We don't know what the condition of things, public health-wise will be on [the
adjudication hearing date]. . . . I have looked at the request that you're making, but at this
time I'm not going to rule on it until closer to [the adjudication hearing date]." The
juvenile officer filed a "Response to Juvenile's Objection to Adjudication by Video" and
argued a two-way video hearing would protect J.A.T.'s constitutional rights and it was
appropriate due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The circuit court conducted the adjudication hearing, requiring J.A.T. to
participate via two-way live video from the juvenile detention facility. Only J.A.T.
1 The circuit court continued the adjudication hearing once on its own order "due to compelling
and extenuating circumstances which include public health concerns related to the ongoing
pandemic."
3
appeared by two-way video.
2
The circuit judge, J.A.T.'s attorney, the juvenile officer's
attorney, a deputy juvenile officer, a victim services representative, J.A.T.'s parents, and
the witnesses appeared in person at the hearing. J.A.T. renewed the objection to the
circuit court requiring J.A.T. to attend via two-way video. The circuit court overruled the
objection and stated its reasoning for doing so:
And just I think I've said this before or not in this case, but I have in
other cases. In the times of the pandemic, of the coronavirus and
COVID-19, we've had to make a number of significant adjustments to how
we do things in court.
One of them is utilizing the Webex technology, which the [Missouri]
Supreme Court has explicitly given us permission to do so. That coupled
with the fact that there have been numerous detention facilities who have
had difficulty maintaining—or not maintaining, keeping COVID-19 out of
their facilities. Our facility has done a great job of doing that. We want to
keep doing that.
One of the policies being put in place by the detention center of the
Family Court is that the juveniles will not be transported to and from court
to limit the exposure to germs of that particular juvenile as well as
additional juveniles in detention. The Court believes that's reasonable for
them to make such a policy. It's reasonable for the Court to follow it.3
Furthermore, following the Webex procedure as outlined by the
[Missouri] Supreme Court, I don't believe, violates [J.A.T.'s] due process
rights in any way. For that reason, I will deny your request to have [J.A.T.]
here in person.
(Footnote added).
Contrary to the circuit court's statements, this Court was careful to ensure its order
incorporating the operational directives would not be interpreted to permit the violation
2 An intern for J.A.T.'s attorney was present in the detention facility with J.A.T. during the
adjudication hearing. J.A.T.'s attorney also relocated to the detention facility during a recess in
the hearing and presented closing argument from the detention facility with J.A.T. via two-way
video. 3 Exhibit A, Supreme Court of Missouri en banc, In re: Operation Directives for Easing
COVID-19 Restrictions on In-Person Proceedings (May 4, 2020); Exhibit B, Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri, 16th Judicial Circuit, In Re: Updated Court Operations upon ReOpening of Courthouses Administrative Order 2020-084 (May 14, 2020).
4
of a juvenile's constitutional or statutory rights. Whether a hearing was required to be
held during a pandemic—or continued until a hearing could be held safely—is a different
issue than whether the law requires a hearing to be held in person and the juvenile and the
witnesses be required to appear face-to-face. Once a circuit court determines an
adjudication hearing must be held, nothing in this Court's Operational Directives
expressly permit prohibiting the accused juvenile from appearing in person if he objects
to appearing remotely.
This Court's Operational Directives, entered May 4, 2020, specifically provided
that "[p]roceedings pursuant to chapters 210 and 211 pertaining to juvenile
delinquency" were excluded from the provisions allowing for remote proceedings.
In re: Operation Directives, supra note 3 at C(2) (emphasis added). After listing that
exception and other exceptions, this Court directed:
Courts may set in-person hearings in the above listed proceedings but it
does not mandate a judge set a hearing in any individual case. The
presiding judge of each circuit court and the chief judges of each appellate
court are authorized to determine the manner in which the listed in-person
exceptions are to be conducted. Such proceedings shall be limited to the
attorneys, parties, witnesses, security officers, and other individuals
necessary to the proceedings as determined by the judge presiding over
the proceedings. The judge presiding over such proceedings has the
discretion to excuse jurors or other individuals who cannot or should not
appear as a result of risks associated with COVID-19.
Id. (emphasis added).
This Court specifically cautioned about the requirement for in-person proceedings
in delinquency adjudications. Id. This Court gave circuit court presiding judges the
discretion to determine the manner of in-person proceedings. Id. But this Court
5
specifically provided that parties, attorneys, and witnesses were among the people who
are physically present at in-person proceedings. See id. Nothing in this Court's directives
encouraging remote proceedings for many types of hearings supports the circuit court's
determination that remote proceedings were authorized in this case irrespective of the
juvenile's statutory and constitutional rights. In other words, nothing in this Court's
directives permitted the circuit court to deny J.A.T.'s request to appear in-person and
proceed over his objection at the adjudication hearing.
The juvenile officer presented testimony of Stiner and the police detective, Kaitlyn
Elias, who investigated the incident. Stiner testified he was contacted on Snapchat by an
individual who asked to purchase marijuana from him. Stiner and the individual agreed
on a plan for the marijuana purchase. Upon arriving at the designated meeting spot, two
individuals—both with money visible—approached Stiner in his car. Stiner took the
money, and the two individuals got into Stiner's car. One individual sat in the front
passenger seat and one individual sat in the back seat. The back seat passenger was
armed with a firearm. The individuals asked Stiner to divide the marijuana, and Stiner
testified he felt rushed. A struggle occurred that involved the front seat passenger
reaching for something within the car. Stiner testified he was then shot six times by the
back seat passenger and blacked out. When Stiner woke up, he first called a friend, and
then called the police. Stiner was taken to the hospital, where he required surgery. Stiner
testified he was armed with a firearm on his left side that night; however, he never pulled
out the weapon. Stiner also testified the two individuals did not take the marijuana,
firearm, or other belongings in the car.
6
Detective Elias testified she responded to the scene to investigate the shooting and
found five .45-caliber shell casings, two .40-caliber shell casings, a bullet fragment, a
firearm, a .45-caliber magazine, and 18 grams of marijuana. The firearm was reported as
stolen, and Detective Elias testified Stiner possessed the firearm on the night of the
shooting. Detective Elias testified there was no evidence the shooting occurred outside
the vehicle. Detective Elias spoke to Stiner the day after the shooting and testified Stiner
described two suspects, 14 to 16 years old, and 5'5" to 5'6" in height. Stiner also
provided the Snapchat account name of the person he arranged to meet with that night.
Detective Elias applied for a search warrant from Snapchat for the
communications between Stiner and the individual who contacted him to purchase
marijuana. Detective Elias, with assistance of the school district, searched for names in
connection with the Snapchat user name. This led Detective Elias to J.A.T. and J.A.T.'s
address, which was in close proximity to the shooting location. Detective Elias compiled
a photographic lineup; Stiner identified J.A.T. as the front seat passenger, and another
individual as the back seat passenger. In connection to the Snapchat warrant, Detective
Elias described a video that showed J.A.T. holding a firearm, which was time-stamped
"just prior" to Stiner's call to police on the night of the incident. The video showed J.A.T.
wave the barrel of the firearm in front of the camera, where "distinct X mark
ammunition" can be seen loaded in the chamber of the firearm. Detective Elias testified
that DNA was recovered from multiple locations in Stiner's vehicle, including the
passenger door handle, the firearm magazine, and the interior of the rear passenger door,
7
and none of that DNA matched J.A.T. Detective Elias also testified a search warrant was
executed on J.A.T.'s home, and no firearms were found in the home.
In addition to the testimony of the two witnesses, the juvenile officer admitted into
evidence a .45-caliber bullet, multiple crime scene photos depicting Stiner's vehicle, the
search warrant for information from Snapchat, multiple booking photographs used for the
lineup, and the photographic lineup presented to Stiner.
J.A.T. filed a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the juvenile officer's
evidence, which the circuit court denied. J.A.T.'s attorney then requested to go to the
detention facility to speak to J.A.T., ultimately deciding to present no additional
evidence. J.A.T. filed another motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all
evidence, which the circuit court also denied. The juvenile officer presented closing
argument in person, and J.A.T. presented closing argument from the detention facility via
two-way video.
The circuit court sustained the allegations of first-degree assault and armed
criminal action relating to the assault, beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court did
not sustain the allegations of first-degree attempted robbery and armed criminal action
relating to the attempted robbery. After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court ordered
J.A.T. be committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. J.A.T. appealed;
the court of appeals issued an opinion but then transferred the case to this Court pursuant
to Rule 83.02. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri
Constitution.
8
Standard of Review
"Juvenile proceedings are reviewed in the same manner as other court-tried cases."
D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cnty Juv. Off., 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal
quotations omitted). "This Court will affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding unless it
is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or
applies the law." Id. Whether a person's constitutional rights were violated is a question
of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Mo. banc
2006). Properly preserved constitutional violations are presumed prejudicial. Id. at 881.
"[T]he constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceedings are also applicable in
juvenile delinquency proceedings due to the possibility of a deprivation of liberty
equivalent to criminal incarceration." In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc
2007).
Analysis
J.A.T. argues requiring him to attend the adjudication hearing via two-way live
video violated his rights to due process and confrontation under the United States
Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; the Missouri Constitution, Mo. Const. art. I,
§§ 10, 18(a); and Supreme Court of Missouri Rule 128. J.A.T. properly preserved this
issue for appeal by objecting to virtual adjudication before and during the adjudication
hearing.
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies to juvenile
proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Allen
v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1986). The Fourteenth Amendment states "[n]o State
9
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process requires application during a juvenile
adjudication hearing of "the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Gault, 387
U.S. at 30. The United States Supreme Court has held certain rights enumerated within
the Bill of Rights apply to juvenile proceedings, including notice of charges, right to
counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 33, 41, 55, 56.
"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the
accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). "[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense
without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend." State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455,
467 (Mo. banc 2012) (alteration in original). "The right to be present at critical stages of
trial is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the Missouri Constitution, and
Missouri statutory law." State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 116 (Mo. banc 2000).4

"[T]he juvenile and the juvenile's parents, guardian or custodian shall have the
right to be present at all times during any hearing." Rule 128.01a; "No hearing . . . may
be commenced without the presence of the juvenile unless the juvenile's presence is
waived by counsel; provided, a detention hearing . . . may be commenced without the
presence of the juvenile if the juvenile's presence is waived by the juvenile's counsel or
4 See also Mo. Const. art. I § 18(a) ("[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend, in person and by counsel[.]"); § 546.030, RSMo 2016 ("No person indicted
for a felony can be tried unless he be personally present, during the trial[.]"); Rule 31.03(a) ("No
trial shall be conducted . . . unless the defendant is present[.]"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(2) ("[T]he
defendant must be present at: every trial stage[.]").
10
the court determines the juvenile's presence is not warranted." Rule 128.01b. The circuit
court may continue with a hearing upon the "subsequent voluntary absence of the
juvenile." Rule 128.01c. The circuit court may also "exclude any unruly or disruptive
person from a hearing where exclusion is necessary to the orderly conduct of the
hearing." Rule 128.01g. At a juvenile adjudication hearing, "[a]ll parties shall be
afforded the opportunity to testify, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and
present arguments of law and fact and arguments concerning the weight, credibility and
effect of the evidence." Rule 128.02b.
A defendant has a "due process right to be present at a proceeding whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge." United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (internal
quotations omitted). "[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the
extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent
only." Id. (alteration in original). "The focus is whether, on the whole record, the
defendant could have done or gained anything by attending." State v. Middleton, 998
S.W.2d 520, 526 (Mo. banc 1999); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745-46
(1987) (holding the defendant's due process rights were not violated by his exclusion
from the competency hearing of two witnesses against him because "[n]o question
regarding the substantive testimony that the two girls would have given during the trial
was asked at that hearing." But noting "a competency hearing in which a witness is
asked to discuss upcoming substantive testimony might bear a substantial relationship to
a defendant's opportunity better to defend himself at trial."). "[A] defendant is
11
guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Stincer,
482 U.S. at 745.
The right to be present, however, can be lost either involuntarily or voluntarily.
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be
carried on with him in the courtroom.

Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. "Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as
soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and
respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings." Id. A defendant may
also waive his right to be present at trial. State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo.
banc 2015). "When a defendant choses [sic] to waive a constitutional right, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made." Id. "In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the defendant's purposeful absence from the courtroom creates the
presumption of a valid waiver." Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 116. "A defendant can waive his
right to be present at all critical stages of his or her trial by voluntarily and willfully
leaving the courtroom." State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 776 (Mo. banc 1999).
In the case at bar, J.A.T. repeatedly asserted his right to be physically present at
his adjudication hearing to defend himself. By requiring J.A.T. to attend his own
adjudication hearing via two-way video, the circuit court denied him the crucial right to
be physically present at the stage of the proceedings critical to its outcome—the
determination of guilt or innocence. This exclusion, with no fault being attributed to
12
J.A.T., contributed to the fairness of these proceedings because the adjudication hearing
was J.A.T.'s opportunity to defend against the accusations of the juvenile officer. The
circuit court's general reference to the policy of the detention facility to not transport
juveniles to and from court "to limit the exposure to germs of that particular juvenile as
well as juveniles in detention" during the COVID-19 pandemic does not in and of itself
justify the denial of J.A.T.'s right to be present at this most critical stage of his
proceeding.
The purported necessity of prohibiting J.A.T. from being transported to the
hearing from the detention facility for his own protection and for the protection of other
juveniles at the detention facility is undercut by the fact that defense counsel was
permitted to go to the facility and complete the hearing with J.A.T. after defense counsel
had been present in the courtroom with the circuit judge, the circuit judge's staff, J.A.T.'s
parents, the juvenile officer, a deputy juvenile officer, a victim services representative,
and all the witnesses. Presumably the circuit court found the safety measures in place in
the courtroom to be sufficiently protective to permit several individuals to be present.
Furthermore, nothing in this Court's Operational Directives granted permission to
conduct J.A.T.'s adjudication hearing with J.A.T. appearing via two-way video from the
detention facility. This Court's COVID Operational Directives outlined phases of
operation for Missouri courts to follow to gradually resume in-person appearances and
proceedings. In re: Operation Directives, supra note 3. Each phase authorized resuming
certain in-person proceedings and appearances, upon the order of the presiding judge or
chief judge of the applicable circuit, based on findings of specific "Gateway Criteria."
13
Id. at A-B. The "Gateway Criteria" outlined considerations "before resuming court
activity or progressing to a new Operating Phase." Id. at A. The Sixteenth Circuit
entered its order in response to this Court's order: "The Court will follow the Operational
Directives and criteria set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court." In Re: Updated Court
Operations, supra note 3 at pg. 2.
Throughout the pandemic, this Court's orders have excepted from in-person
proceedings that could be suspended "[p]roceedings necessary to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants." In re: Operation Directives, supra note
3 at C(2) (emphasis added). In all phases of operation, this Court's order contained a
"Gateway Criteria" providing: "Encourage judges and court staff to continue utilizing all
available technologies – including teleconferencing and video conferencing – whenever
possible to limit in-person courtroom appearances to the extent not prohibited by
constitutional or statutory provisions." Id. at C(4), D(5), E(5), F(5) (emphasis added)
(operating phase two and operating phase three contain slightly different language). The
Sixteenth Circuit's order similarly provided: "Whereas, the Missouri Supreme Court has
continued to encourage judges to utilize all available technologies – including
teleconferencing and video conferencing – to limit in person courtroom appearances
to the extent not prohibited by the constitution or statutes as to the proceedings[.]"
In Re: Updated Court Operations, supra note 3 at pg. 2 (emphasis added).
Operating phase zero of this Court's order, the most stringent phase of operation,
suspended all in-person proceedings, subject to exceptions, which included:
"Proceedings pursuant to chapters 210 and 211 pertaining to juvenile
14
delinquency[.]" In re: Operation Directives, supra note 3 at C(2) (emphasis added).
The Sixteenth Circuit's order also specifically addressed juvenile proceedings:
The Court Administrator/Deputy Court Administrator may resume
programming operated by the Family Court Services, provided however,
that the resumption of said programming can proceed in compliance with
the Operational Directives, social distancing requirements, limitations on
size of gatherings, other terms of this Administrative Order and guidelines
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
In Re: Updated Court Operations, supra note 3 at pg. 4 (emphasis in original).
In addition to the circuit court's violation of J.A.T.'s constitutional right to due
process as discussed previously by requiring J.A.T.'s attendance via two-way video over
objection, the circuit court also failed to heed the caution of this Court's order, which was
drafted to ensure the constitutional and statutory rights of juveniles were protected during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Conclusion

Outcome: The circuit court erroneously declared and applied the law in requiring J.A.T.'s
attendance and participation via two-way video in violation of J.A.T.'s due process right to be physically present at his adjudication hearing. The court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: