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Date: 04-01-2021
Case Style:
State of Ohio v. Benjamin Marx
Case Number: WD-20-018
Judge: Thomas J Osowik
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
Plaintiff's Attorney: Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
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Description:
Toledo, OH - Criminal defense attorney represented Benjamin Marx with a one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and one count of theft charges.
This is an appeal from a January 22, 2020 judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas, denying appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, and
finding appellant guilty on one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a
police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331, a felony of the third degree, and one count 2.
of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a felony of the fifth degree. Appellant was
sentenced to a 41-month total term of incarceration. For the reasons set forth below, this
court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Benjamin Marx, sets forth the following two assignments of
error:
I. The court abused its discretion and erred to the prejudice of
[a]ppellant by denying his Crim.R. 29 motion.
II. The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence [].
{¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On the morning
of May 11, 2019, a local attorney residing in the Toledo area arrived at the Perrysburg
Township Lowe’s store in order to make household purchases.
{¶ 4} As he parked his vehicle in the Lowe’s parking lot, he noticed the distinct
sound of the Lowe’s store security alarms going off. He simultaneously observed
appellant hurriedly pushing a shopping cart full of tools away from the store with several
store employees in rapid pursuit.
{¶ 5} At this juncture, one of the employees pursuing appellant requested that the
above-described witness call 9-1-1. The employee explained to the witness that appellant
had just stolen merchandise from Lowe’s but store policy prohibits employees from
directly calling 9-1-1 to report theft. 3.
{¶ 6} The witness did as he was asked, promptly called 9-1-1, reported the
specifics of the crime, and furnished the perpetrator’s license plate number. The witness
had been able to secure the license plate number given his close proximity to these
events.
{¶ 7} Shortly thereafter, an on-duty officer from the Perrysburg Township Police
Department received a notification call from dispatch regarding the crime that had just
occurred. Dispatch provided the vehicle description and license plate number.
{¶ 8} In response to this information, the officer drove onto I-75 in a northbound
direction in order to keep an eye out for the subject vehicle. While on I-75, the officer
observed appellant driving in a suspicious fashion.
{¶ 9} The officer began following the suspicious vehicle. She quickly determined
that the vehicle’s license plate number was a match to the license plate number provided
by dispatch for the perpetrator of the Lowe’s theft.
{¶ 10} Given these facts and circumstances, she activated her overhead lights and
attempted to pull over appellant. Appellant fled at a reckless rate of speed, exited I-75 at
Miami Street, and led her and other officers on an extended, high-speed chase.
{¶ 11} During the course of the ensuing police chase, appellant drove in an
exceptionally dangerous fashion, reaching speeds of 120 m.p.h. and nearly causing
numerous accidents.
{¶ 12} Later during the pursuit, appellant fishtailed his vehicle in the vicinity of
Owens Community College, resulting in appellant being face-to-face with the initial 4.
officer who first spotted him on I-75. Her police vehicle was now approximately five
feet from appellant’s now stopped vehicle.
{¶ 13} As appellant appeared to be ending his flight following his fishtail halt, the
officer began to exit her vehicle. At this point, appellant gunned his engine, resumed his
flight, and again reached speeds well in excess of 100 m.p.h.
{¶ 14} Given the extreme risk of harm associated with continuing this high speed
pursuit in a densely travelled and populated area, the chase was called off. The license
plate number of the subject vehicle was run through the Bureau of Motor Vehicle’s
database and was found to belong to appellant.
{¶ 15} Appellant was arrested later that day at a Sylvania Township sushi
restaurant where appellant was employed as a cook. In a hasty attempt to evade
responsibility by superficially altering his appearance, appellant had shaved off his facial
hair in his motor vehicle after the police chase. Appellant had placed his shaved facial
hair in the glove compartment of the vehicle. In addition, appellant had removed the rear
license plate of his vehicle.
{¶ 16} On June 19, 2019, appellant was indicted on one count of failure to comply
with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331, a felony of the
third degree, and one count of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02, a felony of the fifth
degree based upon the determined value of the stolen items being $1,406.85. 5.
{¶ 17} On January 22, 2020, following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of
both offenses. On January 28, 2020, appellant was sentenced to a 41-month total term of
incarceration. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 18} In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court abused
its discretion in its denial of appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We do not
concur.
{¶ 19} It is well-established that appellate review of a disputed denial of a Crim.R.
29 motion for acquittal is governed by the same standard as is employed in determining
whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d
255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37.
{¶ 20} In conjunction, resolving challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
requires consideration of whether, when the evidence is examined in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d
492 (1991). The appellate court must assess whether the evidence, if believed, would
support a conviction. Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 21} In principle support of the first assignment, appellant maintains that
appellee failed to establish appellant’s identity as the perpetrator at trial. The record of
evidence firmly belies this claim.
{¶ 22} Appellant appears to rely upon his transparent effort to superficially modify
his appearance by shaving in the car after his initial escape as somehow operating to 6.
negate the validity of his positive identification by multiple eyewitnesses. We are not
persuaded.
{¶ 23} The above-discussed Lowe’s patron, the eyewitness in the parking lot,
testified at trial, “I could hear the alarm going off, the security alarm, as I was coming up
to the building * * * The next thing I saw is a gentleman coming out pushing a cart, kind
of -- I wouldn’t say running -- but walking fast, jogging * * * [B]ehind him were two
Lowe’s employees telling me to call the police, he is stealing from us.”
{¶ 24} At the conclusion of his testimony, this witness was asked by the
prosecution, “[O]n a scale of 1 to 100, 1 being almost absolutely uncertain, 100 being 100
percent confident, how certain are you that the person sitting here today was the person
who pushed out that cart stealing those items from Lowe’s?”
{¶ 25} The witness definitively responded, “I am absolutely confident of that * * *
We would be at the 100 [in certainty].” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 26} The Perrysburg Township police officer who originally observed appellant
on I-75 driving the vehicle with a license plate number matching the one that had been
reported to 9-1-1 by the witness, likewise furnished detailed testimony of these events.
{¶ 27} She testified, “I received a dispatch * * * reporting that somebody had just
stolen items from Lowe’s * * * [T]hey provided a license plate [number] Henry Sam
William 9594.”
{¶ 28} The officer next explained that shortly thereafter she observed a man
driving suspiciously leaving the area in a northerly direction on I-75, so she began to 7.
follow the vehicle. She testified, “[The vehicle] started to speed up. And then at that
point, I looked at the rear license plate, and it matched the license plate that dispatch
provided, Henry Sam William 9594.”
{¶ 29} The officer testified that she activated her overhead lights. Appellant fled
at an extremely reckless rate of speed. She testified that appellant’s speed during the
chase ranged from 100 m.p.h. to 120 m.p.h.
{¶ 30} At one point, appellant’s vehicle fishtailed and screeched to a halt. This
enabled the officer to make direct visual contact with appellant in extremely close
proximity to appellant.
{¶ 31} The officer testified, “The defendant and I -- meet face-to-face. It was like
slow motion in time. I remember it took about 15 seconds * * * I looked right at him, he
looked right at me, it was like we locked eyes.”
{¶ 32} The officer further testified regarding appellant resuming his flight at a
high rate of speed and her ultimate determination to cease the pursuit due to the
significant public safety risk.
{¶ 33} The officer then testified that she subsequently viewed the bureau of motor
vehicle photo of appellant, which was connected to the license plate number of the
vehicle that the officer had just pursued.
{¶ 34} Based upon the officer’s close, direct observation of appellant during the
pursuit, the officer was asked, “How certain were you that BMV photo matched the 8.
driver that you came face-to-face with midway through that pursuit?” The officer
conclusively replied, “100 percent. That’s why I issued the warrant.” (Emphasis added).
{¶ 35} The record reflects that appellant’s assertion in support of the first
assignment of error, that appellee failed to successfully establish the identity of appellant
as the culpable party, is without merit.
{¶ 36} Multiple, credible eyewitnesses definitively identified appellant as the
offender. We find appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 37} In the second assignment of error, appellant alleges that his convictions
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not concur.
{¶ 38} It is well-established that when reviewing a manifest weight of the
evidence challenge on appeal, this court must review the record of evidence, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine
whether, in resolving evidentiary conflicts, the jury clearly lost its way such that a
manifest miscarriage of justice resulted. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶ 39} In support of the second assignment of error, appellant summarily
speculates that the jury verdicts were not based upon the weight of the evidence, but were
actually based upon jury concerns of, “the potentially dangerous outcome of a high-speed
police chase.” 9.
{¶ 40} The record contains detailed, compelling testimony provided by highly
credible eyewitnesses reflecting appellant’s guilt. The record contains no contrary
evidence or testimony on appellant’s behalf.
{¶ 41} We find that the record reflects that ample evidence, sufficient for a
rational trier of fact to have found the elements of the offenses proven beyond a doubt,
was presented at trial.
{¶ 42} Appellant has failed to establish that the jury clearly lost its way, causing
a manifest miscarriage of justice. We find appellant’s second assignment of error not
well-taken.
Outcome: On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice has been done in
this matter. The judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is hereby
affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: