United States of America v. Santuron Cureton

PER CURIAM:



Santuron Cureton pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); distribution and

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court sentenced Cureton to a total of 180 months'

imprisonment and he now appeals. Cureton's sole argument on appeal is that counsel

rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing. The Government has moved to dismiss

Cureton's appeal on the basis that the record does not conclusively establish that his trial

counsel was ineffective and, therefore, Cureton's claims of ineffective assistance are not

cognizable on direct appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

establish both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88, 692 (1984). An attorney's performance is deficient if "counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. This court "must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,

the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation

marks omitted). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

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proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Claims of ineffective assistance are cognizable on direct appeal only where

ineffective assistance "conclusively appears on the face of the record.” United States v.

Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir. 2016). Generally, a defendant should instead raise

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, to permit sufficient

development of the record. Id. at 508; see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-06

(2003).

Cureton argues that his counsel was deficient by waiving a challenge to whether his

prior South Carolina convictions qualified as controlled substance offenses under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2021), in light of this court's decision in

United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), and by not requiring the

Government to provide evidence showing the statutes under which Cureton was convicted.

The present record does not conclusively establish that Cureton's trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. See Faulls, 821 F.3d at 507-08. Therefore, Cureton's claim is not

cognizable on direct appeal.

Accordingly, although we deny the Government's motion to dismiss the appeal, we

affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

Accordingly, although we deny the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we

affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.